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Abstract: Ph.D. Thesis
Immanence and Transcendence: Aesthetic Responses to "Madness" in Women's
Literature from 1892
Joanne Elizabeth Howell
English Literature Department
2003
Supervisor: Professor Patricia Waugh
This thesis will consider notions of immanence and transcendence and how these relate to the
theme of madness in women's writing focusing in particular on the work of Virginia Woolf and
Sylvia Plath. I have begun with Charlotte Perkins Gilman's The Yellow Wallpaper (1892) and
finished with Angela Carter's Nights at the Circus (1984). There are also references to other
leading female writers such as Katherine Mansfield, Margaret Atwood, Doris Lessing and
Jeanette Winterson. My aesthetic responses are centred around how women writers find
expression for subjectivity. The notion of an immanent self is inextricably linked to an
experience of a self which inhabits a body whereas the transcendent self moves beyond
embodiment. It is these states of being and the relationship between the experience of a
fragmented and / or a dispersed self which I have investigated through fiction and non-fiction
alongside an analysis of the writers' search for expression of these states.
Part One provides a theoretical critical framework which considers feminist writing about
madness, the body and language with a focus on French feminist theory. I have considered
"madness" from various perspectives: as a patriarchal construct, a result of oppression and the
fabricated notions of femininity, and a form of rebellion. I have also investigated recent
feminist theory regarding autobiography because in Part Two many readings of my readings of
Woolf and Plath refer to autobiographical texts. I have analysed the relationship between
fiction and autobiography and the form of expression Woolf and Plath employ to represent the
experience of mental instability.
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My final section considers the relationship between postmodernism and feminism, largely
focusing on Patricia Waugh's essay "Postmodernism and Feminism" (1998), Donna Haraway's
cyborg, and the grotesque in Angela Carter. The themes of relationality and conununitarian
values and how these relate to transcendent and / or immanent selves recur throughout my
analyses in a sustained consideration of how a relationship between situated, embodied selves
and fantastic selves can be established. Within the 'postmodern sublime' we can trace those
tendencies towards the themes of transcendence and immanence which we encounter within
the work of Woolf and Plath. Imaginative explorations of cybernetic and grotesque female
bodies can also be read as sexualisations of the female subject in crisis.
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Part One: Theoretical Frameworks
4
The Immanent and Transcendent Female Subject
Female subjectivity is inextricably linked to a relationship with the body. A sense of
immanence, or being in the body, can be problematic given that women have been negatively
defined through their bodies in patriarchal societies; a woman's role and her situatedness in the
world is largely connected to her experience of a self which inhabits a biologically female
body. A transcendent self would escape those narrow confines which contain and often
constrict a life. Virginia Woolf, Sylvia Plath and many other women writers have explored
ways of expressing female experience both as an experience of being in the body and as selves
who are free to roam beyond the skin.
Although I have investigated the theme of madness through the work of Woolf and
Plath, I have been concerned not to offer pathological readings based on biographical
knowledge of these two writers. My premise here is not based on pyschoanalytic theory but on
aesthetic readings of women's texts. For Woolf, the self can be described both an essential,
interior core and as an entity which is not contained and can attach itself to exterior stimuli
such as the rhythmic, strobing beams from a lighthouse. Woolf moves between these two
positions throughout her work so that her special "moments of being" can often be read as
embodied or disembodied experiences. For Plath, the urgency towards transcendence can be
most clearly seen in her final poems where the subjects or speakers often escape the body
which throughout Plath's work is often regarded as problematic. In this sense we can read
Plath's work as being an exploration of what it is to be a fragmented being in the world which
is a notably different project to Woolfs expression of a more dispersed self and the
multiplicitous experience of female subjectivity.
These notions of multiplicity and fragmentation will be helpful to us as we consider
women's "madness" and how it is expressed through autobiography and fiction as an
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experience of being a split or a diffuse subject. As I began to pursue my interest in women's
writing which expressed the experience of 'madness' I became particularly fascinated by
fictionalisations (many in part autobiographical) of mental breakdown in women's texts. I was
first interested to consider the following premises: that women's "madness" is a construct,
designed to control women; a direct result of the insidious oppression which saturates
Western ideology; and an expression of rebellion. As the project progressed I became more
interested in the relationships between women and the body, women and language, women
and fantasy, and how these might relate to female subjectivity more generally. What emerged
most strikingly in my readings of Woolf and Plath was the extent to which aesthetic practice
has been used by women to 'manage' or 'heal' those crises of subjectivity referred to as female
madness.
Women and Madness
Studies of the history of psychiatry in Britain and Europe from the seventeenth century,
found in such comprehensive works as The Anatomy of Madness (1985: eds., Roy Porter et
al.) show that the development of the treatment of mental illness was closely linked to social
reform. In the nineteenth century, the emergence of the 'hysteric' and Freudian theories of
sexuality placed women firmly at the centre of psychiatric pathologies. The 'nervous woman' in
late Victorian society in Britain, for example, led to a synonymous encodement of 'women'
and 'madness.' As Elaine Showalter points out the terms woman and madness were
inextricably linked in the late Nineteenth Century. Madness is perceived as a "female malady"
because it is considered to be "one of the wrongs of woman ... the essential feminine nature
unveiling itself before scientific male rationality" (Showalter: 1987, p.3). Showalter explains
that from the seventeenth to the twentieth century records show that women have formed the
majority of mental patients in asylums and as psychiatric outpatients (1).
The notion that madness is both a construct designed to control the population and a
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manifestation of the deconstruction of societal modes of control is fully explored in Michel
Foucault's Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1967).
We have now got in the habit of perceiving in madness a fall into determinism where all forms of
liberty are gradually suppressed; madness shows us nothing more than the natural constants of a
determinism, with the sequences of its causes, and the discursive movement of its forms; for madness
threatens modern man only with that return to the bleak world of beasts and things, to their fettered
freedom. It is not on this horizon of nature that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries recognised
madness, but against a background of Unreason; madness did not disclose a mechanism, but revealed
a liberty raging in the monstrous forms of animality. We no longer understand unreason today, except
in its epithetic form: the Unreasonable, a sign attached to conduct or speech, and betraying to the
layman's eyes the presence of madness and all its pathological train; for us the unreasonable is only
one of madness's modes of appearance. On the contrary, unreason, for classicism, had a nominal
value; it constituted a kind of substantial function. It was in relation to unreason and to it alone that
madness could be understood.
Foucault: 1993, p.83.
Within Classical rationalism, Foucault explains, animality was not considered to be the natural
state of man; the raging madman, therefore was not "tending toward a determinism," rather he
risked being swallowed up in the "threatening space of an absolute freedom" (Foucault: 1993,
p. 84).
As Elaine Showalter points out, Foucault's historical critique of the repressive institutional
power did not explore the possibility that "the irrationality and difference the asylum silenced
and confined is also the feminine" (Showalter: 1987, p.6 ). In The Female Malady (1987)
Showalter is concerned to give a historical account of psychiatry from a feminist perspective
and to expose the construction of madness as a specifically female problem. In her text
madness is not romanticised because it is a painful result of determinist notions relating to
femininity. Also, diagnosis and treatment of mental illness is inextricably linked to notions of
gender (Showalter: 1993, p.5). As we shall see, within texts such as Ruskin's influential lecture
"Of Queens' Gardens" (1985) and Freud's essay "Female Sexuality" (1931) 'reasonable'
female behaviour is entirely determined by sexual function. The epistemological fabrications of
Victorian ideology state that it is man's role to act, create, discover and progress. A woman is
to be protected, confined, must be kept healthy, happy and educated only to the degree
that she can be an adequate helpmeet, fulfilling her function as wife and mother. According to
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Freud's essay women must accept their physical inferiority. The only way to deal with penis
envy is to adjust to their social role, have a baby (preferably male) and so gain a substitute
penis. Female neurosis is due to jealousy, a result of disappointment. If women reject their role
in society they are unfeminine, abnormal, guilty, unreasonable. Normal development,
therefore, is dependent on passivity and this smooths the ground for femininity.
Whilst many of Foucault's theories of the self have been found to be helpful to the cause of
feminism in terms of human emancipation and autonomy, as Lois Mc Nay points out in
Foucault and Feminism (1992), the "asexual perspective" of his work is seen as problematic:
"Foucault insists on analyzing the specific nature of the processes of embodiment at the heart
of subjectivity and then fails to consider the effects upon the individual of one of the most
important processes of subjectification: sexual difference" (McNay: 1992, p.195).
That women were defined, diagnosed and treated by a wholly male profession is an issue
which will be raised and explored throughout our analysis of texts written by women who
have suffered under the regimes of psychiatric and psycho-analytic practice. Early means
innovated and instigated by psychiatry were not tools for helping women but for controlling
them. Women were persuaded to find the cause for their unhappiness within themselves rather
than to recognise how external forces were affecting their mental well-being. The psychologist
saw his role as one which could change the person rather than society. A failure to conform to
society's norms and expectations would result in treatment: forced inactivity, confinement,
brain surgery, drugs and later shock therapy were administered in an attempt to maintain the
status quo within patriarchal societies. Germaine Greer elaborated these points in The Female
Eunuch (1970):
As far as the woman is concerned, psychiatry is an extraordinary confidence trick: the unsuspecting
creature seeks aid because she feels unhappy, anxious and confused, and psychology persuades her to
seek the cause in herself The person is easier to change than the status quo which represents a higher
value in the psychologists' optimistic philosophy. If all else fails largactil, shock treatment, hypnosis
and other forms of 'therapy' will buttress the claim of society. Psychologists cannot fix the world so
they fix women. Greer: 1970, p.90.
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As Greer explains in her essay "Women and medicine" (General Practitioner, 8 January 1971)
in the latter part of the Twentieth Century there was a move away from the asylum and
treatment was brought closer to home. She begins:
It is assumed as a kind of rule of thumb among doctors and others, that women are particularly prone
to psychosomatic disorders. Few doctors are liable to perpetuate the old nonsenses about greensickness
and hysteria, yet a doctor faced with implacably psychosomatic symptoms in a female patient is still
quite likely to suggest that she get married, live a normal life, have a baby and so on. Really, the GP is
not to blame for the limitations of his approach. He has no option but to attempt to reconcile his
female patients to the limitations of their existence. He cannot even spare the time to follow up with
an examination of the whole family situation, or even to examine the aetiology of his patient's
symptoms over an extended period.
Greer: 1986, p.47.
The passive female came to regard the doctor as a father-surrogate and being ill allowed
access to this figure: "being ill is without moral stigma - being unhappy is an admission of
failure" (Greer: 1986, p.4'7). Greer suggests that women offered no resistance to the idea that
they are weak and silly, and became reliant on medication to combat supposedly 'menstrual'
related maladies. The result was that in the early nineteen-seventies "out of the two hundred
and forty-six million prescriptions dispensed every year, nearly seventy million are for
preparations acting on the nervous system, painkillers, tranquillizers and antidepressants, the
largest single group in the total figure" (Greer: 1986, p.48). Married women, particularly
housewives, between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four became the largest group of
addicts on record and the ratio of women to men admitted to day hospitals was two to one.
The treatment of "depressive psychoses or involuntary melancholia" was not considered
adequate in asylums or psychiatric hospitals, therefore female distress was dealt with on an
out-patient basis.
Women provided a valuable market and a vast amount of money was spent on advertising
medicinal products. This advertising exploited the current negative female self-image, fed
upon the compulsive/addictive behaviour of housewives, and thus perpetuated their
dependence on the medical profession:
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When a woman arrives in the surgery she comes from a world in which her insecurity and low
self-image are ruthlessly exploited. The barrage of propaganda telling her that she is too fat is now
equalled by the costliness of the plugs telling her that she is too smelly. Until mid-1966 the problem of
vaginal odour did not exist. In 1969, £126,000 was spent in creating awareness of it, and in 1970 the
figure had been doubled.
Greer: 1986, pp. 49-50.
Greer does not blame the doctor for prescribing drugs; they appear to be the only remedy
available to him. However, she aims to change the notion that women need treatment in order
to help them adjust to their situation:
if he were free of the prejudice that women are mystically prone as a sex to psychosomatic
disturbance, and if he were less likely to take a conventional moralist line with women who are
plainly 'maladjusted', he would at least not be contributing to the situation as it exists.
Greer: 1986, p.50.
Rather than reducing dependency, the situation is often perpetuated by medics who take pride
in their authority. The treatment of hysterical symptoms results in physical and psychological
dependency, it acts on the sufferer and not their situation: "It is a measure of the disintegration
and confusion of our society that such problems so often end up on the doctors' cards: perhaps
it is in the interests of doctors themselves to speed the coming of a new world" (Greer: 1986,
p.50). Greer's revolutionary feminism was centred on a desire to raise consciousness in order
to change the above situation:
Women are not maniacs or idiots, either by nature or by chance, but they do need help. That help
cannot come out of a bottle, nor can it be supplied by the most patient and gentle doctor. It will have
to come from the women themselves and a radical change in their situation and prospects.
Greer: 1986, p.48.
In the 1960's the formation of the British school of anti-psychiatry by such influential
thinkers in the field as RD. Laing was beginning to revolutionise the way that patients were
treated, or not treated (2). The scientific practice of psychiatry was thus brought under scrutiny
and Laing, among others, questioned the efficacy and the ethics of a technological rational
control which treated the patient as an inert body which could be operated on, locked up,
shocked and drugged. The institution of psychoanalysis was criticised by this movement for
what it considered to be violent and unhelpful measures. Laing was concerned to unlock the
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external doors of the asylum at the same time as the internal doors of the self. An expression
of "madness", for Laing, was not necessarily something to be feared:
Psychiatry could be, and some psychiatrists are, on the side of transcendence, of genuine freedom. and
of true human growth. But psychiatry can so easily be a technique of brainwashing, of inducing
behaviour that is adjusted, by (preferably) non-injurious torture. In the best places, where straitjackets
are abolished, doors are unlocked, leucotomies largely forgone, these can be replaced by more subtle
lobotomies and tranquillizers that place the bars of Bedlam and the locked doors inside the patient.
Thus I would wish to emphasise that our 'normal' 'adjusted' state is too often the abdication of ecstasy,
the betrayal of true potentialities, that many of us are only too successful in acquiring a false self to
adapt to false realities.
Laing: 1990, p.12. [ Revised preface to The Divided Self]
Despite the fact that Laing and Foucault were writing about madness at the same time,
their approaches did not coincide and they did not collaborate. Whilst both were concerned to
to explore the "truth" of madness as a part of human experience, Foucault was concerned with
self-improvement based on an externalised technology of the self, whereas Laing was more
inclined towards an existential notion of the self as real and embodied and, to a certain extent,
expressions of madness were explained as mystical insights into the 'true' nature of being,
particularly in his work The Divided Self (1960). Showalter points out that Laing's case-
studies of women suffering from schizophrenia often revealed madness as the result of a
difficulty to adapt to their role in the home and society, a split in the mind caused by what she
should be and what she actually was. Also, the manifestation of this mental illness was seen as
a form of rebellion, in many cases the only means of expressing a definite rejection of the
confining constructs of femininity. In this sense Laing's notion of an embodied and situated self
was far more helpful for women and gave the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s
some powerful ammunition in the fight against oppression in Western patriarchal cultures
(Showalter: 1993, pp. 222-232) (3).
In terms of feminism, Foucault's work is limited because it does not give adequate
guidelines for collective political action, clearly a specific necessity for women. Nevertheless,
Foucault's philosophy can offer us many insights into feminine behaviour when we consider his
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premise that the body is a locus of meaning whereon the cultural mores and societal modes of
conduct are inscribed (the body as text). In The History of Sexuality (1978) Foucault explains
that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries women's bodies were subjected to "a thorough
medicalization" because of their usefulness and importance as childbearers. This "hysterization
of women was carried out in the name of the responsibility they owed to the health of their
children, the solidity of the family institution, and the safeguarding of society" (Foucault:
1990, pp. 146-147). This strategy "formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power
centering on sex." The hysterization of women's bodies was a threefold process:
whereby the feminine body was analyzed - qualified and disqualified - as being thoroughly saturated
with sexuality; whereby it was integrated into the sphere of medical practices, by reason of a
pathology intrinsic to it; whereby, finally, it was placed in organic communication with the social
body (whose regulated fecundity it was supposed to ensure), the family space (of which it had to be a
substantial and functional element), and the life of children (which it produced and had to guarantee,
by virtue of a biological-moral responsibility lasting through the entire period of the children's
education): the Mother, with her negative image of "nervous woman," constituted the most visible
form of this hysterization.
Foucault: 1990, p.104.
It seems that the recurring theme of madness in women's literature is often linked to
women's uneasy relationship with language and the insistence on her biological functions
which in turn dictate social function. Many of these women, such as Gilman, Woolf and Plath,
write from first-hand experience. The female artist is in a nerve-wracking situation because she
is moving beyond the prescribed territory of acceptable feminine action/function/behaviour. As
Gilbert and Gubar explained in The Madwoman in the Attic (1979), for women, literary
creativity is at odds with their expected roles:
For all literary artists, of course, self-definition necessarily precedes self-assertion: the creative "I
AM" cannot be uttered if the "I" knows not what it is. But for the female artist the essential process of
self-definition is complicated by all those patriarchal definitions that intervene between herself and
herself.
Gilbert and Gubar: 1979, p.17.
Woolfs declaration that we must first kill the "Angel in the House" before we can write is a
powerful answer to Victorian idealists such as Ruskin. In Woolf s essay "Professions for
Women" (1931) she describes the patriarchal construct of the perfect woman:
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She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She was utterly unselfish. She excelled
in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg; if
there was a draught she sat in it - in short she was so constituted that she never had a mind or a wish
of her own, but preferred to sympathize always with the minds and wishes of others. Above all - I
need not say it - she was pure. Her purity was supposed to be her chief beauty - her blushes, her great
grace.
Woolf: 1979, p.59.
Despite Woolf s humour here, the nervous energy required in order to kill this phantom, an
immaterial ideal of womanhood, and pursue a literary profession often lead women into an
experience of madness (see again Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Virginia Woolf, Sylvia Plath). A
deconstruction of the spectre of the ideal woman requires a massive output of psychic energy.
The subversive action necessary to dissolve the ghostly and ghastly projections of diminutive
images of womanhood threatens the individual with a loss of identity because we have to set
about dismantling the very frameworks by which we have been formed.
As Theresa Brennan points out in her feminist reading of Freud's construction of
femininity: "the fact that this action may entail sacrificing a secure identity will explain why a
woman will remain attached to phantasies, and a disabling image" (Brennan: 1992, p.174). As
we dissolve the phantom ego, boundaries break down, we sense a loss of control, and in many
of the texts we find that this loss of self-identification is accompanied by hallucination,
productions of doubles, wild fantasies, a return to the imaginary. Kristeva's semiotic babble
replaces the rational discourse of the Symbolic. In this sense many texts explore the notion
that madness is the result of resistance as well as compliance.
However, madness is also seen as a heightened awareness; Doris Lessing calls it
"Knowing" in The Golden Notebook (1962). Dismantling structures, dismissing falsities,
causes the fragmentation of a discrete constructed identity. The production of multiple
identities is also a rejection of the notion, prescribed within male logic, that a normal human
being is unified. The Golden Notebook traces the progression of a female writer, Anna Wulf,
whose experience of the self is one of fragmentation. Anna's mental breakdown paradoxically
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leads to a sense of wholeness which is signalled by her eventual ability to write in one
notebook rather than in four separate ones. The split self of the female protagonist
disintegrates and dissolves and only after this experience is Anna able to reform a sense of self.
Lessing's representation of mental breakdown in this text seems to suggest that the experience
of madness is necessary in order to undo the splitting of the subject in society and leads to a
state of lucid revelation (Lessing: 1972, p.549). In the preface to the second edition Lessing
explains that her characters achieve "unity" because: "They 'break down' into each other, into
other people, break through the false patterns they have made of their pasts, the patterns and
formulas they have made to shore themselves and each other, dissolve. [...] sometimes when
people 'crack-up' it is a way of self-healing, of the inner self s dismissing false dichotomies and
division" (Lessing: 1972, pp. 7 & 8).
The Hysteric: Reading The Yellow Wallpaper (1892)
Foucault ends Madness and Civilisation with a declaration which cites madness as a force
which disturbs world-order and brings that order under scrutiny: "[R]use and new triumph of
madness: the world that thought to measure madness through psychology must justify itself
before madness" (Foucault: 1993, p.289). The theme of madness in women's texts is often
presented in such a way that the reader might be persuaded that madness is necessary in order
to escape patriarchal constructions of femininity, that it is a powerful means of deconstruction.
As Showalter explains, the terms hysterical and feminine were almost interchangeable. Hence,
the notion of the female neurotic has become a social cliché. The fact that the term hysteric
has its origins in the female body is well known. In the Oxford English Dictionary the
definition gives us the Greek derivative, 'husterikos' (of the womb) and further explains that
the connection is due to the fact that hysteria is thought to occur more frequently in women
than in men.
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My feminist responses to the term here are threefold. Firstly a woman is defined, and
situated as mad, as other, as hysterical, in order to control and restrain her actions. The term
hysteria, then, is born out of a male fear of otherness. Secondly, hysterical behaviour in
women is a symptom of the unhappiness resulting from the patriarchal, confining strictures of
the woman's role in society. Lastly, hysteria can be seen as a form of rebellion against those
constructions of femininity which confine women. Many feminists have joined the debate to
determine whether or not madness is an effective form of rebellion.
In "The Newly Born Woman" (1975) Catherine Clement and Helene Cixous present a case
which argues that hysteria is an effective form of resistance and rebellion and that it serves to
deconstruct patriarchal ideology which privileges reason over emotion. Referring to Freud's
work on Dora, they claim that her rebellion, a hysterical refusal to speak, was a triumph
because such behaviour "bursts the family into pieces" (4). Cixous claims:
Hysteria is necessarily an element that disturbs arrangements; wherever it is, it shakes up all those
who want to install themselves, who want to install something that is going to work, to repeat it. It is
very difficult to block out this type of person who doesn't leave you in peace, who wages permanent
war against you.
Eagleton: 1991, p.129.
Elaine Showalter, expresses her discomfort with this view. Showalter reads Dora's silence
as only a momentary triumph and more as a manifestation of her lack of power. She
encourages articulation within the dominant discourse:
The availability of a woman's movement, in which the 'protofeminism' of hysterical protest could be
articulated and put to work, offered a potent alternative to the self-destructive and self-enclosed
strategies of hysteria, and a genuine form of resistance to the patriarchal order. If we see the hysterical
woman as one end of the spectrum of the female avant-garde struggling to redefine women's place in
the social order, then we can also see feminism as the other end of the spectrum, the alternative to
hysterical silence, and the determination to speak and act for women in the public world.
Showalter: 1985, pp.160-161.
Others, like Phyllis Chesler, will not romanticise madness nor "confuse it with political or
cultural revolution." For her the madwoman is not a figure of power. Madness is an expression
of female powerlessness, a manifestation of an unsuccessful attempt to overcome that state:
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"Most weeping, depressed women, most anxious and terrified women are neither about to
seize the means of production and reproduction, not are they any more creatively involved
with problems of cosmic powerlessness, evil and love than the rest of the human race"
(Chesler: 1974, pp.14 & 15.) Jane Ussher also sees problems in glorifying madness: "The view
of madness as a protest may similarly detract from the campaign to provide effective political
action for those in distress. It presents too naive and romantic a view of the reality of
madness" (Ussher: 1991, p.239). However, Ussher says that it is important for us to read
accounts and listen to what people like Charlotte Perkins Gilman have to say, those who write
from the centre of experience.
There are many references to the nineteenth-century cult of female invalidism and
infantalisation. The nervous woman of the period had become yet another construct of
femininity. Gilman was angry about this formation of female identity, a male invention, and she
challenged women's compliance with such notions: "American men have bred a race of women
weak enough to be handed about like invalids; or mentally weak enough to pretend they are
and enjoy it" (Ehrenreich and English in Golden (ed): 1992, p.93).
As we have noted already Ruskin's lecture "Of Queens' Gardens" (1865) outlines the
distinctive functions of the sexes. Man's role is to progress in the public world but women are
to be protected from this world, kept in private domain of the home, the walled garden, where
she can fulfil her role as wife and mother. Ruskin advises men to keep their wives happy and
healthy through careful education - their minds must be checked, refined, restrained. All
subjects (except theology) must be taught so that she can understand her husband's world and
sympathize with him. Women must be queens perfecting their roles within the royal estate of
their kings' homes. If they grasp for knowledge, power or agency outside of the home they
will lose their majesty and sovereignty. The ideal woman for Ruskin is a woman who is
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continually at play in her peaceful walled garden, child at the breast, peaceful and tranquil as a
child herself. Gilman bears poignant witness to the pain induced by such confinement. If the
woman is unhappy it is a disgrace so her unhappiness is accompanied by guilt and shame. We
can see a similar revolt in Charlotte Bronte's novel Jane Eyre (1847) which can in some ways
be read as a precursive text to The Yellow Wallpaper (1892):
It is vain to say human beings ought to be satisfied with tranquillity: they must have action ., and they
will make it if they cannot find it. Millions are condemned to a stiller doom than mine, and millions
are in silent revolt against their lot. Nobody knows how many rebellions besides political rebellions
ferment in the masses of life which people earth. Women are supposed to be very calm generally: but
women feel just as men feel; they need exercise for their faculties, and a field for their efforts as much
as their brothers do; they suffer from too rigid a restraint, too absolute a stagnation, precisely as men
would suggest; and it is narrow-minded in their more privileged fellow-creatures to say that they
ought to confine themselves to making puddings and knitting stockings, to playing on the piano and
embroidering bags. It is thoughtless to condemn them, or to laugh at them, if they seek to do more or
learn more than custom has pronounced necessary for their sex.
When thus alone, I not unfrequently heard Grace Poole's laugh.
Brontë, 1985: p.141. (5)
Gilman's The Yellow Wallpaper can be read from many perspectives. It is a Gothic horror,
set in a haunted mansion house, a writing of the repressed or the uncanny, perhaps a rewriting
of Bronte's Jane Eyre (1847). It is also a fictionalisation of Gilman's own psychological
breakdown and a feminist polemic, a protest against female confinement. In each case it is an
exercise in extended metaphor. The construction of femininity in the nineteenth-century was
largely connected to the biology of women, their role as childbearers was the central issue, and
out of this notion women were confined to the home. Gilman offers a critique of this
epistemological fabrication and a feminist response which exposes the resulting mental trauma
when such notions are enforced through her protagonist, the narrator, in her novel.
Michel Foucault explains that the bourgeois inactivity inflicted upon women led to the
emergence of "the nervous woman". The nineteenth-century middle class woman was forced
to idle away her life in useless activity and so was prone to nervous disorder. In The Yellow
Wallpaper we have an account of the intense suffering which results from enforced enclosure,
protection and tranquillity. When Gilman's narrator rejects the role of mother she is diagnosed
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by her husband as suffering from a "temporary nervous disposition," "a slight hysterical
tendency." This is dismissive of the gravity and possible long-term damage which is
threatening the heroine; a permanent loss of self. However, as Gilman explains in her
autobiography The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1935) her resistance was made all the
more difficult because she was battling against an enemy who was kind and caring and in this
text the husband is depicted as "very careful and loving" (Gilman: 1981, p.12) (6). Hence, the
heroine feels ungrateful and guilty. When she does express her frustration through hysterical
outbursts she is carried up to bed like a child who has had a tantrum: "Bless her little heart,' he
said with a big hug 'She shall be a sick as she pleases' (p.24). This continual labelling of her as
a "little girl" and the indirect address of "she" puts her at a safe and impersonal distance from
the narrator's husband and places her in the position of a dependent child with no autonomy
and no possibility of communicating with him as an equal. She cannot chose where to sleep,
when to eat, who to see. She must rest and remain isolated while he works away from home.
When the protagonist threatens mental illness, however, the husband becomes stern - she must
be his darling and his comfort, she must think of the child and at this point the rest cure is
brought fully into action.
In her autobiography Gilman explains exactly the treatment prescribed by Dr S. W.
Mitchell, the North American equivalent to Freud and Breuer:
Live as domestic a life as possible. Have your child with you all the time. Lie down an hour after every
meal. Have but two hours intellectual life a day. And never touch pen, brush or pencil as long as you
live.
Gilman: 1990, p.96.
Treatments devised by such practitioners as Weir Mitchell were meant to act as deterrents for
deviant women. Certainly for Gilman the rest cure was nothing short of punitive torture (7).
Mitchell's philosophy was that women were like wild horses that needed breaking in order for
them to be thoroughly domesticated. He also describes the hysteric as being a vampire who
18
sucks the life blood from her family. In some cases women were suffocated and beaten with
wet towels; in other cases the idea was that total inactivity would lead to such intense levels of
boredom that any activity would be preferable to none. Jane Ussher explains that this
treatment bears close resemblance to the solitary confinement and sensory deprivation used on
today's political prisoners. In Women's Madness -Misogyny or Mental Illness (1991) she
explains that Mitchell's guiding philosophy was that the hysteric should be broken so that
eventually she would become cowed and tamed. In Gilman's case this treatment very quickly
led to a complete mental breakdown. The treatment of neurotic women dependent on male
physicians included the following ingredients; isolation, immobility, prohibition of intellectual
activity, overfeeding, massage, endless bed rest: Showalter explains in A Literature of their
Own (1978) the effect of such treatment (8):
Besides forcing a woman to stifle the drives and emotions that had made her sick with frustration in
the first place and depriving her of intellectual outlets for their expression, the rest cure was a sinister
parody of idealized Victorian femininity: inertia, privatization, narcissism, dependency.
Showalter: 1978, p.274.
Unable to read or write and unable to communicate with her keepers, Gilman's protagonist
begins a struggle for psychological freedom which involves reading the pattern on the
wallpaper and deliberate self-isolation in the old nursery with its barred windows. Once
Gilman's heroine has established that there is a woman, or many women, behind the paper she
is no longer afraid of the uncanny, eerie, haunting effect of the paper but curious and
determined to help them to break free of the bars in the pattern - a symbol for the social
constructions of femininity which have been pasted onto women. Therefore, it seems as
though the narrator's most profound moments of madness are in fact the most enlightened
moments of revelation about the pain of female confinement. Here is an active revolutionary.
However, this activity results in the breaking down of ego boundaries and the narrator
increasingly identifies with/ becomes ensconced and entangled in the fantastic images she
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thinks she is discovering. As she becomes obsessed with the pattern and her mental energies
are diverted and devoted totally to solving the mystery of the pattern she descends into
hallucination, both of sight and smell. Passivity may have a numbing and anaesthetic effect but
resistance and struggle brings with it pain. If we fight to deconstruct the commonly accepted
ideal model for womanhood then we risk losing all sense of identity because there may be
nothing left once those socially constructed frameworks have been dismantled.
As the story opens the narrator sets up an immediate distinction between herself and her
husband which may seem to uphold the commonly accepted notion that men are logical and
women driven by their fantasies. When she suggests that the house is haunted, he laughs, "but
one expects that in marriage," the narrator explains: "John is practical in the extreme. He has
no patience with faith, an intense horror of superstition, and he scoffs openly at any talk of
things not to be felt and seen and put down in figures" (p.9). This distinction is an illustration
of how within the narrator's marriage the notion that "women, within our dualistic systems of
language and representation, are typically situated on the side of irrationality, silence, nature
and body, while men are situated on the side of reason, discourse, culture and mind"
(Showalter: 1987, pp.3-4). When the narrator later suggests that she may be sick in mind not
in body John's fear is that the idea of mental illness will take hold. She must resist such notions
firstly for his sake, secondly for the baby and lastly for her own sake. She must trust him:
m[T]here is nothing so dangerous, so fascinating, to a temperament like yours. It is a false and
foolish fancy' (p.24).
The narrator's imagination becomes increasingly linked to the yellow wallpaper in the
couple's bedroom. The wallpaper is presented as a metaphor for a woman's fantasies. It is:
One of those sprawling flamboyant patterns committing every artistic sin.
It is dull enough to confuse the eye in following, pronounced enough to constantly irritate and
provoke study, and when you follow the lame uncertain curves for a little distance they suddenly
commit suicide - plunge off at outrageous angles, destroy themselves in unheard of contradictions.
(p.13)
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Not only is she forbidden to imagine, or to write, she is also not allowed the stimulating
company of her friends. This isolation accounts for the narrator's increasing involvement with
the paper which becomes personified:
This paper looks to me as if it knew what a vicious influence it had!
There is a recurrent spot where the pattern looks like a broken neck and two bulbous eyes stare at
you upside down.
I get positively angry with the impertinence of it and the everlastingness. Up and down and
sideways they crawl, and those absurd, unblinking eyes are everywhere. There is one place where two
breaths didn't match, and the eyes go all up and down the line, one a little higher than the other.
(p.16)
The suggestion here of hanging brings us back to an earlier observation that the room may
have been formerly a gymnasium because it has rings in the walls. There is also the suggestion
that there have been former prisoners (9).
Contrary to John's disapproval the reader becomes aware that it is through the narrator's
fantastic imaginings that she begins to see beyond the surface. The wallpaper gradually
becomes a metaphor for an all-enveloping construction of femininity, an insidious and detailed
cover-up which keeps womanhood hidden: "This wallpaper has a kind of sub-pattern in a
different shade, a particularly irritating one, for you can only see it in certain lights, and not
clearly then" (p.18). The elusive nature of gender ideology renders it barely visible, difficult to
discern and even more difficult to strip away.
The colour, as well as the pattern, of the paper is also particularly significant; it is
"repellent, almost revolting; a smouldering unclean yellow" (p.13). It reminds her of "old foul,
bad yellow things" (p.28). The smell also is insidious and personified:
It creeps all over the house.
I find it hovering in the dining-room, skulking in the parlor, hiding in the hall, lying in wait for me
on the stairs.
It gets into my hair.
f...1
It used to disturb me at first. I thought seriously of burning the house - to reach the smell.
But now I am used to it. The only thing I can think of that it is like is the color of the paper! A
yellow smell.
(pp.28-29.)
The connection to the female body is obvious here but also, as Horner and Zlosnik point out
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in Landscapes of Desire (1990), the colour yellow carried precise connotations in the
eighteen-nineties in both England and America: "Connected with the avant -garde and the
death of Victorianism, the colour yellow came to suggest the daring subversion of past values"
(Horner and Slovesnik: 1990, p.39). The colour carries with it a metaphoric signification
linked to the "subversivefin de siècle morality" (Horner and Zslosnik: 1990, p.39). The
colour yellow gathered importance in the last decade of the nineteenth-century among
Pre-Raphaelite artists as well as writers; yellow book covers signalled the emergence of "The
Yellow Literature". However, Gilman subverts the notion that yellow literature was a forum
wherein sick individuals sought notoriety. The yellow wallpaper is fearful "because it is an
instrument of unsettling revelation" (Horner and Zslosnik: 1990, p.41). The narrator learns
her own story and rather than upholding the notion of "art for art's sake." Gilman's feminist
philosophy focused on woman's identity and sexuality alongside an exposure of the confining
effects of gender constructs. Historically and contextually, this novel can be read in terms of
an account of the emergence of a new breed of woman, a woman who would threaten her
male counterpart due to "her demands for political, artistic and sexual fulfilment":
Gilman uses the delirious ramblings of her narrator to inscribe one crucial meaning within the
wallpaper pattern: this is the basic insight that the social construction of gender can be a prison house
for the growing woman.
Horner and Zslosnik: 1990, pp. 41-42.
In this sense the smell also becomes a metaphor for something uncontainable. Although fearful
and perhaps unpleasant at first, the yellow scent is symbolic of escape: "The ubiquitous nature
of this smell is rather like fog in that it can creep around any boundary, escape any enclosure.
As such the smell is elusive, undefinable, uncontainable and leads the woman beyond the
confining sense of self with which society has endowed her" (Horner and Zslosnik: 1990,
p.42).
Gradually through Gilman's text a phantom begins to emerge: "I can see a strange,
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provoking, formless sort of figure, that seems to skulk about behind that silly and
conspicuous front design" (p.18). Unlike the phantom of Woolf s "Professions for women" this
figure must be released rather than killed. It is the "silly and conspicuous front design" which
must be destroyed. But first it needs to be read and understood by an act of will. Despite the
fact that such a reading is maddening, the narrator becomes increasingly determined to
"follow that pointless pattern to some sort of conclusion." The pattern does not seem to fit any
logical design, it is "not arranged on any laws of radiation, or alteration, or repetition, or
symmetry, or anything else that I ever heard of' (p.20). By daylight there is no sequence in the
"torturing" pattern, it is "a defiance of law, that is a constant irritant to a normal mind" (p.25).
The pattern is debased, likened to terrifying delusions; it is silly, and without purpose:
Looked at in one way each breadth stands alone, the bloated curves and flourishes - a kind of "debased
Romanesque" with delirium tremens - go waddling up and down in isolated columns of fatuity.
(p.20)
At first, studying the horrific and grotesque wallpaper leads to confusion and exhaustion.
Trying to master following the pattern is a dangerous occupation because: "just as you get
well underway in following it, it turns a back-somersault and there you are. It slaps you in the
face, knocks you down, and tramples on you. It is like a bad dream" (p.25).
The narrator begins to perceive that the woman is "stooping down and creeping about
behind that pattern" (p.22). This woman shakes the paper as if she is trying to get out but all
this she must keep secret from John. While she pretends to sleep she wonders "whether that
front pattern and the back pattern really did move together or separately" (p.25). The outer
pattern reminds her of fungus, a sprouting parasitic growth. Gradually the narrator begins to
identify with the woman behind bars: "By daylight she is subdued, quiet. I fancy it is the
pattern that keeps her so still. It is so puzzling. It keeps me quiet by the hour" (p.26). Secretly
she becomes increasingly excited to discover the truth of the pattern. To John and his sister,
Jennie, she seems quieter and ironically John thinks she is "flourishing in spite of my
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wallpaper" (p.28).
The front pattern moves because the woman shakes it but the woman cannot climb through
without risking death. Images of hanging, or the suggestion of being strangled, account for the
fact that "it has so many heads" (p.30). For Gilman, an acceptance of and imitation of the
phantom of ideal femininity created by such thinkers as Ruskin and Freud would mean an
annihilation of their own desires, ambitions, identity. The domestic hearth for these women is
"death", and we can read the images of the wallpaper with their lolling heads and bulbous eyes
as being a metaphor for those women who have been strangled by the female condition.
The narrator begins to creep and crawl around the room, her project is to get the top
pattern off and try to help the woman get out: "I pulled and she shook, I shook and she pulled,
and before morning we had peeled off yards of that paper" (p.32). They share a common cause
but, like John, the pattern laughs at her. The paper "sticks horribly and the pattern just enjoys
it! All those strangled heads and bulbous eyes and waddling fungus growths just shriek with
derision!" (p.34). Like Bertha in Jane Eyre, the narrator considers burning the house or
jumping from the window but this would be improper; this action would be misconstrued.
Finally, her triumphant statement recalls Brontes Bertha once more, particularly as
Jennie, her sister-in-law has become Jane: "I've got out at last,' said I, 'in spite of you and
Jane. And I've pulled off most of the paper, so you can't put me back!' (p.36.) There is no
longer enough pattern left to hold her.
But what do we make of this crawling figure, who is presumably covered in the paper and
physically still enclosed, if not mentally? As I began to interrogate the ambiguous denouement
in Gilman's The Yellow Wallpaper, I wondered: is the reader to consider that the female
protagonist has descended into madness, the imaginary and semiotic, where only body and
non-verbal language is possible, thus fulfilling the premises of the female as hysteric, silent,
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child? As Susan Bordo points out in Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the
Body (1993) "these pathologies of female protest ... actually function as if in collusion with the
cultural conditions that produced them" (Bordo: 1993, p.159). However, we also need to
consider whether this position can be read as a kind of transcendent sanity, an escape from / a
victory won over patriarchy and its discourses. Is the ending of the text a triumph or a defeat
for the heroine?
Before John enters the room the narrator refers to him as "young man" (p.35), the
authoritative tone here suggests that the little girl he has been addressing is now somehow his
superior. On entering the room he is literally floored by the sight of his wife crawling round
the room:
Now why should that man have fainted? But he did, and right across my path by the wall, so that I
had to creep over him every time!
(p.36)
On the one hand John is rendered unconscious which would seem to be a victory for the
narrator, after all fainting is usually regarded as a feminine action. On the other hand, his body
still forms a kind of barrier over which she has to crawl. The narrator has been awakened to
the subtextual meanings in the pattern of the wallpaper and the implications of this awakening
will effect her relationship with house and home, but our final image is of a woman fitting her
shoulder into the groove, still following the pattern, still covered in yellow smooches. Horner
and Zlosnik agree that there are no easy answers: "Her continual circling represents the
impasse which faces the woman reader: it is left to her to establish a better liaison between
women's desires and the cultural construction of gender" (Horner and Zslosnik: 1990, p.44).
The husband quite literally becomes a boundary which represents "the threshold of Victorian
marriage which must be stepped over if woman is ever to attain a more satisfactory sense of
'self" (Horner and Zslosnik: 1990, p.44).
We know that Gilman herself escaped the confining strictures of the woman's role and went
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on to become a powerful voice in the public realm for women in America, but what do we
make of the possible future for this fictional heroine in terms of autonomy and authorship? Is
the hysterical figure hopeless and helpless or is she the embodiment of forceful and effective
rebellion? Some critics argue that romanticising the figure of the madwoman is harmful to
the feminist cause because it merely endorses and perpetuates the weak position of women in
society. Other critics argue that the madwoman's power lies within her very refusal of reason,
and reasonable discourse as the only acceptable means of socialization.
Is Gilman fulfilling this prescription for female behaviour by allowing her protagonist to
descend into madness or is she exposing it? Whilst the narrator's final body language may look
like a madness, Gilbert and Gubar read the narrator's identification with the double behind the
pattern of the paper as a necessary step towards authorship (Gilbert and Gubar: 1979, pp.
89-92). However, Pearce and Mills suggest that this identification is a misrecognition; the
narrator's body language suggests that she has allowed herself to become the text written by a
male dominated profession (Mills, Pearce et al: 1989, pp. 209-219) (10).
Certainly Gilman's purpose is to expose the debilitating effect of the ideologies of
femininity and prescribed feminine behaviour, to uncover the problematic positioning of
women in terms of their role of the domestic captive slave and the ensuing problems for the
female artist if she is to reject this role as outlined by Virginia Woolf in "Professions for
Women." She may kill the Angel in the House but she will still find herself dashed against the
rocks of patriarchal ideology, she will still have to crawl over the powerful and indefinable
obstacles in her path. Woolf explains that in her own writing "telling the truth about [her] own
experiences as a body" she has not solved this problem:
Outwardly, what is simpler than to write books? Outwardly, what obstacles are there for a woman
rather than for a man? Inwardly, I think, the case is very different; she still has many ghosts to fight,
many prejudices to overcome. Indeed it will be a long time still, I think, before a woman can sit down
to write a book without finding a phantom to be slain, a rock to be dashed against.
Woolf: 1979, p.62.
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I would argue that the phantom of the female hysteric is highly significant within feminist
discourses, firstly in terms of its historical construction, given that the theory of the hysterical
woman was largely constructed in order to contain female sexuality. Freud's theories, for
example, give us ample evidence of the notion that women, left to their own devices, are
naturally promiscuous and uncontrollable. His theories of female neurosis are constantly linked
to pre-marital or extra-marital sex and masturbation. Later this figure of the hysterical woman
was adopted by feminists such as Cixous as a figure of revolt but even she admits that this is a
dangerous enterprise. In "Laugh of the Medusa" (1976), she talks about women's separation
from language and the body. If we speak, we have to face the fear of being thought of as mad
and therefore risk further marginalisation and incarceration (Cixous: 1976, pp. 875-893). This
fear becomes a formidable deterrent for women. Germaine Greer suggests that in order to
overcome the debilitating and deforming infantalisation of women we may have to accept that
marginalisation as "outcasts, eccentrics, perverts" is a necessity for those who would rebel:
"The fear of liberty is strong in us, but the fear itself must be understood to be one of the
factors inbuilt in the endurance of the status-quo" (Greer: 1970, p.327). What might appear to
the world as madness, a deformity of the norm, is for such revolutionaries as Greer a
necessary course of action, rather than a passive embodiment of defined feminine behaviour.
Greer gives us the following exhortation:
Ultimately, the greatest service a woman can do her conununity is to be happy; the degree of revolt
and irresponsibility which she must manifest to acquire happiness is the only sure indication of the
way things must change if there is to be any point in continuing to be a woman at all.
Greer: 1970, p. 282.
Ann Oakley's essay "Beyond the Yellow Wallpaper" in Essays on Women, Medicine and
Health (1993) recognises the importance of writing fact as fiction. She reads the text as an
account of both "an escape into madness and a discovery of sanity" (Oakley: 1993,
p.7). Oakley sees the story as an important fictionalisation of lived experience because:
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it illustrates the historical and cross-cultural continuity marking the unsolved problems of women and
health. It also highlights three of the most central of these - those relating to production, reproduction
and the medicalization. in the form of mental illness, of the psychological costs of women's situation.
Oakley: 1993, p.7.
She argues that women's health is dependent on productivity and that Gilman's story is an
exploration into women's problematic relationship to reproduction, in terms of childbearing
and authorship. Telling the truth about one's experiences plays, Oakley insists, a necessary role
in sustaining women's health. A condemnation of "the infantilization of women" is a political
imperative:
An isolated, unhappy child is not a political threat to anyone. But the political energy of a socially
involved adult prepared to accept conflict and contradiction as a part of life is, on the other hand,
enormous. [...]
In the end, everyone has a stake in moving towards a more humane society where health and illness
are not split off from the rest of experience, in which bodies are seen as connected to the environment,
and minds and emotions are understood to shape the way in which bodies function; everyone also has
a stake in appreciating the limits of science, and in understanding the new technologies of our brave
new world. What we want is a brave new world, not a defunct, dispirited and depressing old one.
What we want is a world in which women who ask for change are taken seriously.
Oaldey: 1993, p.17 & 18.
It is clear that Gilman's intention when writing this novel was to encourage women to be
productive rather than to engage in a therapeutic personal account which might only bring
herself psychological and emotional satisfaction. Gilman wanted to bring about change. In The
Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman Gilman tells us that whilst she did indeed suffer a severe
nervous breakdown, the hallucinations in The Yellow Wallpaper are fictitious. Therefore, we
could read her metaphorical language as being directly linked to some political purpose. Anne
Lane's introduction to Gilman's autobiography explains that the novel was not intended to be
pure autobiography. Rather than an exercise in introspection, the novel was a call to action
and engagement. Gilman herself explains in "Why I wrote The Yellow Wallpaper" (1913) that
she had a specific social and political purpose. She sent a copy of the novel to Weir Mitchell
and although he did not acknowledge it, she discovered later that he did admit that after
having read her account of the effect of the rest cure on Gilman he had altered his treatment.
This success led her to claim in her autobiography that she had "not lived in vain"
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(Gilman: 1935, p.121).
We can read this text as a feminist polemic which exposes the links between women,
madness and language alongside a highly structured aesthetic creation, an exercise in extended
metaphor. My own reading of The Yellow Wallpaper has been that the body language of the
hysteric silences the doctor, her body becomes a tool of resistance. Finally, it is the narrator's
husband who loses control: the logical tone of the narrator's final words, the dry, controlled
ascerbic humour of the denouement re-iterates the suggestion that Gilman, the implied author,
is addressing the notion that behaviour which might appear as madness is in fact representative
of a transcendence of societal constructs. We will return to this discussion in our readings of
Woolf and Plath but let us now consider in more depth one of the main causes for women's
sense of the self as fragmented: the relationship with her body.
Women and the Body
In Atwood's novel Surfacing (1973) the narrator tells us:
The trouble is all in the knob at the top of our bodies. I'm not against the body or the head either: onl)
the neck, which creates the illusion that they are separate. The language is wrong, it shouldn't have
different words for them. lithe head extended directly into the shoulder's like a worm's or a frog's
without that constriction, that lie, they wouldn't be able to look down at their bodies and move them
around as if they were robots or puppets; they would have to realize that if the head is detached from
the body both of them will die.
Atwood: 1979, p.70.
Women's problematic relationship with the body has been well documented by feminists for
many years, not least in women's fiction of the sixties, seventies and eighties. Atwood has
explored this theme of women's fragmented relationship to their bodies in many of her texts. In
her dystopian fiction The Handmaid's Tale (1986), women are entirely determined by their
bodies. The Handmaids are a protected species whose only function is to produce children in a
society where fertility has become a rarity. The confinement and rape which Offred suffers in
the Gileadean regime results in a feeling of detachment and alienation from her body.
In her earlier novel The Edible Woman (1969), Atwood presents us with a female protagonist
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who is perceived by her boyfriend to be displaying disturbing manifestations of irresponsibility
due to an unconscious desire to revolt against her femininity. Indeed Marian's instinctive
reaction to her engagement is to hide herself under a bed and run off into the night after a
supposedly civilised evening with friends. These outward bodily reactions are then internalised
as Marian develops anorexia. Shortly after her betrothal she begins to think of herself as a
consumable commodity which is reflected in the way that she thinks of her body as a piece of
flesh. Her initial reaction is to refuse to eat meat, thus distancing herself from the cannibalising
impulse which she recognises in her partner, Peter. As Patricia Waugh points out, this eating
disorder not only reflects the resistant bodily symptom in terms of an internalised rage at the
female condition but also a refusal to silence this rage:
Marian, in fact, in adopting what is essentially the parodic strategy of the anorectic, refuses silence
and uses her body to articulate a caricature of patriarchal culture's image of femininity which involves
both rejection and subversion of its requirements.
Waugh: 1989, p. 183.
It is only after attracting Peter's bewilderment and rage by leaving a formal party where she
was supposed to have been presented as his newly won prize, that Marian is able to
communicate her refusal to accept self-sacrifice as a way of life. The anorectic heroine bakes a
cake in the shape of a woman which she offers to her male partner as a substitute for herself
when she breaks off her engagement and refuses to be his object. When he leaves, silenced and
afraid of this 'mad' behaviour, she begins to eat again:
"You've been trying to destroy me, haven't you," she said. "You've been trying to assimilate me.
But I've made you a substitute, something you'll like much better. This is what you really wanted all
along, isn't it? I'll get you a fork, "she added somewhat prosaically.
Peter stared from the cake to her face and back again. She wasn't smiling.
His eyes widened in alarm. Apparently he didn't find her silly.
When he had gone - and he went quite rapidly, they didn't have much of a conversation after all.
he seemed embarrassed and eager to leave and even refused a cup of tea - she stood looking down at
the figure. So Peter hadn't devoured it after all. As a symbol it had definitely failed. It looked up at her
with its silvery eyes, enigmatic, mocking, succulent.
Suddenly she was hungry. Extremely hungry. The cake was after all only cake. She picked up the
platter, carried it to the kitchen table and located a fork. "111 start with the feet," she decided. [...1
The woman lay there, still smiling glassily, her legs gone. "Nonsense," she said. "It's only a cake."
She plunged her fork into the carcass, neatly severing the body from the head.
Atwood: 1982, p. 273.
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The humorous and seemingly triumphant denouement here is reminiscent in tone of Gilman's
The Yellow Wallpaper. The male protagonist is once again silenced by what would appear to
him an act of profound insanity but has been presented to the reader as a logical and effective
act of resistance. Waugh argues that although this text does not offer much hope in terms of
"radical social change," it does, as so many of Atwood's texts, emphasise that in order for
women to change they must "recognise the relationship between the female body and the
construction of femininity." (Waugh: 1989, p.186) The boundary between resistance and
collusion is too often diffuse.
As Susan Bordo illustrates in Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the
Body (1993) through her analysis of current representations of the female body in popular
culture and her investigation of eating disorders still prevalent among young women in
Western societies, women's relationship with the body was no less problematic in the
nineteen-nineties, nor do I see any evidence of improvement in the Twenty-First Century.
The modern woman's preoccupation with her appearance suggests a collusion with the forces
which sustain oppression; bodies, therefore, symbolize and reproduce gender. Bordo traces
the anorectic's self-inflicted brutality towards the female body to a sense of betrayal; the
hierarchical Cartesian split between mind and body and woman's situatedness as passive body
rather than active spirit separates her from the more valued counterpart. If the body is
constructed as something separate from the true self then it must be inferior. If the body is
inferior then so is woman (since she is defined through the body) and therefore she cannot
take an active part in the pursuit of knowledge or spiritual enlightenment. Her reaction leads
to a desire to transcend the body which betrays and is often manifested as a punishment of that
femaleness which has excluded her from the dominant sphere of worldly engagement. Even
starvation can seem a kind of mastery over that which is lacking, dysfunctional, limiting (11).
Naomi Wolfs groundbreaking book The Beauty Myth (1991) points to a third wave of
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feminism which must address women's problematic response to her physical appearance.
Whilst first and second wave feminism was largely concerned with women's domestic role and
her position in the private and public realm of society, women of the late Twentieth and early
Twenty-First Centuries need to negotiate freedom from the myths which relate to female
beauty. Wolf links women's self-surveillance with that practised in modern mental institutions
and used against political prisoners; surveillance which is intended to strip an individual of
privacy, therefore dignity, and breaks down their will to resist. Women watch themselves
because they know they are being watched; they want to see what others see. This
surveillance, Wolf suggests, gives us an insight into the motivating principles behind the
beauty myth:
Female thinness and youth are not in themselves next to godliness in this culture. Society really
doesn't care about women's appearance per se. What genuinely matters is that women remain willing
to let others tell them what they can and cannot have. Women are watched, in other words, not to
make sure that they will "be good," but to make sure that they will know they at being watched.
Wolf: 1991, p.99.
Contrary to the body's natural instinct to avoid pain, Wolf points out that in the modern
"Surgical Age" the desire for beauty acts as an anaesthetic which leads women to undergo
technological torture. Survival depends on keeping "ourselves from knowing what we feel;"
sensation must be cauterised (Wolf 1991, p.249). Therefore, beauty demands a psychological
cost: "The more we suffer, the more psychological resistance there will be to reopening the
mental channels we had to block" (Wolf 1991, p.249). Wolf relates this cauterisation to the
electric shock treatment carried out to control women from the Victorian age: electroshock
therapy is used typically on women asylum patients, and bears a strong resemblance to the
death-and-rebirth ceremonial of cosmetic surgery (12).
Wolf admonishes those who would criticise women for their desperate attempts to hold
onto beauty in the inevitable face of the ageing process and points out the distinction between
the effect of ageing on women as compared to the effect on men:
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Women's desperation for beauty is derided as narcissism; but women are desperate to hold on to a
sexual center that no one threatens to take away from men, who keep sexual identity in spite of
physical imperfections and age. Men do not hear in the same way the message that time is running
out, and that they will never again be stroked and admired and gratified. Let a man imagine himself
under the threat before he calls a women narcissistic. Fighting for "beauty," many of us
understandably believe we are fighting for our lives, for life warmed by sexual love.
With the threat of lost love comes the threat of invisibility. Extreme age shows the essence of the
myth's inequality: the world is run by old men; but old women are erased from the culture. A banned
or ostracized person becomes a nonperson.
Wolf: 1991, p.259.
Women undergo painful surgical processes, such as face lifts, in order to avoid vanishing and
Wolf likens this modern scientific control to that practised in order to govern wayward female
behaviour in the past, where lobotomy was the answer to unrestrained female passions (13).
Now, even in the face of death, our bodies are governed by the knife, liposuction and staples,
so that we can fit into society's norms for acceptable feminine bodies. In this way we wear our
culture on our bodies. Wolf also notes that "women are the drugged sex." She refers not only
to tranquillizers but also to slimming pills. It is disappointing to learn that twenty years after
The Female Eunuch, women in Great Britain, The United States and Canada are still "the
main subjects of electroshock treatment, psychosurgery, and psychotropic drugs" (Wolf 1991,
p.268). The motive is to produce the perfect woman: "The new wave of cosmetically directed
mood enhancers may solve the problem of women once and for all, as we dose ourselves into
a state of perpetual cheerfulness, deference, passivity and chronically sedated slimness" (Wolf
1991, p.269).
What can we do to combat this insistence on perpetual beauty? I recently co-hosted a Sixth
Form debate where the participants had chosen for their topic the proposition: "This House
would rather be beautiful than clever." The eighteen-year old girls argued their case
passionately; women who are beautiful get on in life, they are more popular, they attract more
attention, they are taken more seriously than clever women by the majority of the population.
Whilst their arguments were at times slippery, what was painfully clear is that in 2002 A.D.
young (and clever) girls are still duped by the beauty myth, are still searching for acceptance
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and recognition through an objectification of their bodies. They were talking from experience;
experiences which had made them doubt the value of a good brain, a solid education and
which had led them to believe that confidence and self-esteem are inextricably connected to
how others react to their physical appearance.
The effect of culture can be read on our bodies whose surfaces reflect the norms of one's
particular society. Through the cultivation of our bodies, our habitual activity, the formation of
our inner and outer selves through expression and concealment, we make of ourselves a map
of the cultural norms and expectations of our society. Thus the body becomes a text. By
allowing those norms to be inscribed and played out on what Foucault terms our "docile
bodies" we also repeat and reinforce those very ideologies which shape us and inhibit our
bodily movements. We are not only normalized under the gaze and surveillance of society, but
the body which embodies the society within which it is situated also serves to normalize those
other bodies within our gaze. Foucault's writing about the body, in his later work particularly,
is liberating for those who, having recognized the operation of this power, move into a
condition of self-regulating autonomy and self-determination. In Technologies of the Self
(1988) (Gk Tekhne - art) Foucault seems to come closer to Nietzsche's theories of the subject
who makes of his/her life a work of art, continually crafting and authoring the self as an object
of aesthetic production (14). However, Foucault's work on knowledge and power is
characterized by a deep pessimism which lays the stress on resistance and exposure rather than
transformation. Feminist writers, such as Nancy Harstock, would criticise Foucault's work
because it does not envision a "struggle for power, working locally and regionally" (Harstock
in Nicholson: 1990, p.165) (15). Bordo's premise is also that "postmodern culture,
poststnicturalist thought, and some aspects of contemporary feminism" are "embodying
fantasies of transcendence of the materiality and historicity of the body, its situatedness in
space and time, and its gender" (Bordo, 1993:15).
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Judith Butler upholds the view of gender as a cultural construct. In Gender Trouble (1990)
3utler argues that gender necessitates performance. Hence, to be a "woman" one has to act
)ut the narratives that exist within a gendered organization of society. If gender acts are
performed subversively, however, then the divide between Self and Other can be dissolved
hrough political action. An emphasis on the body's unnatural representations therefore calls
Mention to women's political status due to the signs of gender. Butler marks the distinction
petween sex and gender and asks: "how are we to find the body that pre-exists its cultural
nterpretation?" Butler claims that the body is a "politically neutral surface on which culture
icts" (Butler: 1990, p.7). A pre-cultural notion of a sexed body is therefore a mythification:
'There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; ... identity is performatively
onstituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results" (Butler: 1990, p.25).
Seyla Benhabib is suspicious of Butler's Nietzschean performativity and asks how we can
ransform those performances if there is no self beyond them:
If we are no more than the sum total of the gendered expresssions we perform, is there ever any
chance to stop the performance for a while, to pull the curtain down, and only let it rise it one can
have a say in the production of the play itself? Isn't this what the struggle over gender is all about?
Surely we can criticize the "metaphysical presuppositions of identity politics" and challenge the
supremacy of heterosexist positions in the women's movement. Yet is such a challenge only thinkable
via a complete debunking of any concepts of selfhood, agency and autonomy? What follows from this
Nietzschean position is a vision of the self as a masquerading performer, except of course we are now
asked to believe that there is no self behind the mask. Given how fragile and tenuous women's sense
of selfhood is in many cases, how much of a hit-and-miss affair their struggles for autonomy are, this
reduction of female agency to a "doing without the doer" at best appears to me to be making a virtue
out of necessity.
Benhabib: 1992, p.215, quoting from Butler: 1990, p.25.
Whilst Benhabib would agree with the notion that culture defines and shapes an individual
dentity she would argue against the idea that an individual is a Lockean "tabula rasa" or a
wholly "neutral surface" (Benhabib: 1992, p.217). Butler is, however, concerned to reinstate
mtological status to "abject bodies"; that is bodies who are deemed not to matter in society.
['hese bodies which do not matter not only include women's bodies but also homosexual
)odies, impoverished bodies and those who have been "identified as psychiatric 'cases'
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(Butler: 1998, p.281). Butler's philosophical argument is important for all those who are
marginalised; her polemic encourages us to read the discourses which direct our lives and
inhabit our bodies: "discourses do actually live in bodies. They lodge in bodies; bodies in fact
carry discourses as part of their own lifeblood" (Butler: 1998, p.282). Butler is concerned to
to avoid abstractions and to focus on specificity; she interrogates the systems which decide
which subjects can and cannot lay claim to ontological status and to performatively "endow"
ontology to particular abject bodies.
Foucault's earlier theories avoid locating domination and this is particularly disappointing
for feminists who seek to expose and transform domination in gender relations. Many
feminists are looking for a situated body and this entails a need to take account of a specific
location which varies according to class, ethnicity and gender. A collective recognition of the
effects of cultural forces on bodies might be more useful in terms of the political movement of
bodies to deconstruct those forces which keep certain groups of people in a state of
oppression. The postmodern notion of the death of the subject is not politically viable for
women, or any marginal group which is finally finding the means to be heard. In order to
construct a new society we must get to know ourselves in the world.
Marxist feminism would challenge Kant's notion of universal rationality and claim that
because knowledge is constructed by the ruling classes, those with a vested interest, it is
limited (16). Those who are marginalized, therefore, the Mandan proletariat, may have a more
objective view and, as they are disinterested, an easier access to the "truth." Naturally, there
are multiple marginalized voices and therefore multiple truths but a critique of the dominant
order is both possible and necessary. Whilst "the body as text" theory is perhaps an
enlightened one, feminists have been wary of a philosophy which, while seeming to retrieve
power for the individual, may in some ways be an abstract and universalizing concept.
Although, in Power/Knowledge (1980), Foucault looks at the all-pervading effect of power
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which constitutes the individual, its body and discourse, he does not address social structures.
Foucault's neutral analyses may follow a Nietzchean refusal of any notion of inherent truth
because truth only exists within given systems of power. Hence his work does not offer a
"liberating truth":
The idea of a liberating truth is a profound illusion. There is no truth which can be espoused,
defended, rescued against systems of power. On the contrary, each such system defines its own variant
of truth. There is no escape from power into freedom, for such systems of power are co-extensive with
human society. We can only step from one to the other.
Hoy:1986, p. 69.
Foucault's discoveries and histories do not lead to liberatory projects or strategic
standpoints because empowerment would only signal yet another illusory position and truth is
only ever subordinated to power. These theories are disempowering for individuals in a
subjugated position because of the insistence that power exists separately from the subject.
But there is some contradiction, or at least ambivalence, within Foucault which is certainly
highlighted by his later work. Foucault may reject notions of truth and freedom because of his
repudiation of Enlightenment universal notions which suggest essentialism and inherent,
hidden lcnowledges, but his work nevertheless points towards some kind of autonomy, as
regards a dismantling of societal structures and an individual remaking of the self. Taylor
suggests that Foucault might have moved beyond "the impossible attempt to stand nowhere"
had his work continued (Taylor in Hoy: 1986, p.99).
The problem with what Bordo terms "gender scepticism" and the post-structuralist
insistence of everyone's "difference" is that "the view from nowhere" (Thomas Nagel's term)
becomes an abstract and unreal "dream of everywhere" (Bordo: 1993, pp. 216 -217). If the
location and limitation of gendered experience is not brought into focus and taken account of,
then the result will be a blurring of political objectives; a dislocated self is disengaged. Whilst
we may wish to embrace a post-structuralist school of thought which transcends gender
difference, the "neutral" perspective of multiplicity, heterogeneity and the infinitely changing
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and unstable individual subject will not bring about a transformation of gendered experience.
The postmodern self, in this sense, is a schizophrenic self.
The problem with a post-structuralist view of the subject is that it might also result in a slip
into an individualism which disperses any possibility of political action. If everyone is focused
on their difference then how can groups be formed which might resist oppression and
reformulate social systems? Self-discovery and personal transformation must surely work
alongside some kind of recognition that, despite our differences, there are some connections
within class, gender and race and across those areas wherein a more unified vision of
domination and therefore consequent political action for change might be conceivable. It is not
surprising that when the capitalist individualism of the nineteen-eighties took hold, feminism
suffered its worst backlash.
The story of the body as a visible topos of societal modes cannot end there. Perhaps we
should reject the notion that the body is an inert and immaterial product of societal forces and
look more specifically at how we can educate young women in our own societies to think of
themselves as beautiful no matter what their physical status. There is a body behind cultural
inscription, behind the text of the beauty myth, and that body needs to be recovered, rescued
from the male/female gaze, healed and nurtured.
Simone de Beauvoir
Simone de Beauvoir's feminist position is quite different to that of the later French
feminists in the sense that she repudiated all notions of female otherness. Women had been
relegated to the position of Other for long enough. Victorian notions of essential femininity,
positive as well as negative, had done nothing to ameliorate women's position in society.
However, de Beauvoir did recognize female collectivity and believed that it was important for
women to tell stories and to listen to stories of female experience. In The Second Sex de
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Beauvoir further employs her intersubjective theory and urges women to say "we" rather than
"I". She also makes a distinction between class and gender oppression, saying that the female
position is not the same as that of the proletariat which is a "historical phenomenon." Women's
oppression is not traceable to an event, it is a condition, hence her famous "One is not born a
woman, one becomes one" is directly related to the notion that gender is a construct and that
women learn to become part of that construct through subject/object relations. The subject
inhabits not only the givens of the immanent past and present self but also the transcendent self
projects itself into further fabricated "givens" and hence "chooses" not to be free. Not
recognizing one's freedom, one's ability to transcend and make choices which fall outside of
the dominant culture constitutes "bad faith." She was concerned to reject earlier philosophical
notions of universalism and detachment (Archimedes, Kant, Descartes) and formulated instead
a mode of thinking which focused on individual, personal experience, an Existential theory
which took into account the human being's contact with the world. In order to describe and
understand the world the subject must take account of her concrete (rather than abstract) and
particular (rather than general/universalized) position and experience. Simone de Beauvoir
repudiated the notion that there is a universalist standpoint. The embodied, situated subject
lives in a material world and has a relationship to it and to other situated selves within it. Her
philosophy, therefore also emphasized intersubjectivty and reciprocity as vital to ensure
equality and freedom for all. Human consciousness is inseparable from the human body, the
world which that body inhabits and other conscious bodies.
The Second Sex (1949) opens with this assertion: "The fact is that every concrete human
being is always a singular, separate individual" (de Beauvoir: 1972, p.14). If we address this
from an existential perspective, which assumes that there is an authentic self, then we can
understand that a sense of loss would ensue whenever the self is perceived of as anything less
than concrete. The diction here emphasizes solidity and unification therefore any notion of the
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self being split, mergent, fluid, or dispersed would be an indication of ill-health. R.D. Laing
also explains in The Divided Self( 	 the danger of losing all sense of self through the
admittance of a double in his analysis of the psychology of the schizophrenic:
There is still an 'I' that cannot find a 'me'. An 'I' has not ceased to exist but it is without substance, it is
disembodied, it lacks the quality of realness, and it has no identity, it has no 'me' to go with it. It may
seem a contradiction in terms to say that the 'I' lacks identity but this seems to be so ... The
schizophrenic either does not know who or what he is or he has become something or someone other
than himself.
Laing: 1990, P. 172.
This disembodiment alters our perception of what is within and what without. Laing argues
that "personal unity is a prerequisite of reflective awareness" (Laing: 1990, p.197). The
problem for women, however, is that they are defined by their bodies: "woman has ovaries, a
uterus: these peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of
her own nature" (de Beauvoir: 1972, p.15). For de Beauvoir, the notion of an "eternal
feminine" is a flight from reality: "woman is not a completed reality, but rather a becoming"
(de Beauvoir: 1972, p.66). In order to achieve full membership in the human race women need
to recognise the reality, that they have been culturally produced, and transcend the essentialist,
determinist notions which keep them subjected or remain forever without subjectivity:
"One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or economic
fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society: it is civilisation as a whole
that produces this creature, intermediate between male and eunuch, which is described as
feminine" (de Beauvoir: 1972, p.295). Whilst a man is free to achieve liberty by continually
"reaching out towards other liberties" and justify his existence by transcending himself and
engaging "in freely chosen projects" a woman cannot take such liberties. She is caught in a
double bind, compelled to fulfil the essential roles of a daughter, wife, mother and always
regarded as the one for whom freedom is not an essential right: "The drama of woman lies in
this conflict between the fundamental aspirations of every subject (ego) - who always regards
himself as the essential - and the compulsions of a situation in which she is the inessential" (de
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Beauvoir: 1972, p.29).
A rationalist vision necessitated a separation of consciousness from the world in order to
achieve knowledge through pure reason, therefore, as Kate and Edward Fullbrook explain in
Simone de Beauvoir: A Critical Introduction (1998), de Beauvoir was far more influenced by
the work of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) than the Kantian "Transcendental Analytic" or
Edmund Husserl's phenomenological approach to philosophy (a more scientific approach than
Kant based on the notion that consciousness is related to the human body and the world and
that the material provides the objects of knowledge, the truths which produce a universal self).
Kierkegaard, a Danish philosopher, recognized both a subject's contingency, the human being's
contextualized and located existence, and his/her freedom, his/her ability to transcend
situatedness. Hence truth and moral choice are both individualistic and collective. His
"rejection of the universal ego opened philosophy's door to the indetenninancies, the concrete
particularities and, most importantly, the differences in human existence" (Fullbrooks: 1998,
p.61). Kierkegaard raised questions which not only pointed towards Twentieth Century
existentialism, and which are certainly relevant to de Beauvoir's thought but, as Fullbrook and
Fullbrook indicate, these questions are also today's "modern questions":
What is the relation between an individual's freedom and the givenness of his or her situation? What
is the nature of self-identity? How is the individual related to society? What is the ontological
structure of an individual's relation to the world? How does one make moral choices without a set of
moral absolutes? What is the relation between truth and the knowing subject?
Fullbrooks: 1998, p.61.
Simone de Beauvoir's philosophical thought also questioned the Empirical notion of the
unity of the individual self. She recognized several splits within human identity: the conscious
and non conscious being, subject/object (self and other), and the immanent and transcendent
self. For de Beauvoir consciousness is dependent on relationality. Thus, rather than a
body/mind split, she perceives of two kinds of body, one that is conscious and therefore
related to the rest of being and one which is not. Also, in terms of the subject/object split de
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Beauvoir was aware that looking within only produced the notion of a "void", that in fact we
experience ourselves through the reactions of, and our relationship to, others. If we objectify
ourselves, treat ourselves as an other, then we become aware of our own fragmentation into
multiple selves. De Beauvoir developed a relational notion of consciousness. Consciousness
requires an object and "is always conscious of something," therefore "consciousness is a
relation which human beings have to objects, both real and imagined" (Fullbrooks: 1998,
p.57). If there is no intended object, then there is nothing to be conscious of
This notion of the immanent and the transcendent self has been influential to my own
thinking and has had an impact on my reading of women's texts as we shall see later in my
analysis of Woolf and Plath. This theory is also related to the notion of a narrative self which is
fundamentally significant to feminist theory and criticism as it is explored throughout this
thesis. We can locate the notion of a divided self within individual human beings, a self which
is both situated and able to make choices given its ability to transcend and reflect on that
situation. An individual subject is therefore not only located through its relationship to the past
and present but also continually projecting a future self The individual identifies itself with
selves it may choose to become and also, according to de Beauvoir, identifies itself through its
relationship with others, part of the given situatedness of existence. The transcendent self is
therefore that part which is free, which uses the body as an instrument to realize the choices
which extend the self as projected beyond the present and the past. The immanent self is the
part of the individual which is particularly located, in terms of society, culture, history, race,
class and gender. A denial of either of these would constitute "bad faith."
De Beauvoir's theory of the narrative self was derived from the notion that the subject
recognizes a self which is immanent and a self which may become (transcendent) and these are
not identical or unified. We therefore tell ourselves stories about what we are or may be, based
on how other people describe or treat us and based on how we want to perceive ourselves, or
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want others to perceive us. We then choose to inhabit those selves, choose, or refuse to
perform. For de Beauvoir choice was the key issue. Women could choose to transcend the
role of object or become alienated from herself, she could be passive to societal drives or she
could assert her own authority and freedom. The problem, she acknowledges, is that women's
choices are so often in accordance with how she has been defined rather than in relation to
how she actually is.
So how can we incorporate de Beauvoir's philosophical thinking into a postmodern
feminist perspective? The human individual is situated in an immanent and transcendent body,
and is both subject and object of its own consciousness and is an object of others'
consciousnesses. De Beauvoir uncovers many problems here which are gender specific.
Intersubjective experiences have consequences. When I realize that I am perceived as an
object by another I am affected by my perception of their observations and judgements and I
might alter my behaviour should I perceive those judgements as critical and therefore believe
that I am being perceived negatively. If I see an image of myself in someone else's eyes which
is positive I might attempt to continually play that self which has won approval. I am not a
unified being, but a being which can make changes continually in relation to others. In The
Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), de Beauvoir extends this notion as related to the individual to a
notion which takes account of choices which are made in relation to the values of a social
group. The Second Sex (1949) proceeds to take account of subject/object relations as they are
applied to a gendered organization of behaviour. Given that male valuations are dominant in
patriarchal society then it follows that women's values will be subjugated, even altered, to fit in
with the whole. Only through an understanding of intersubjectiviO, we can reach an
understanding of the oppression of certain groups within society. For example, if I create a
positive sense of self through the reactions of my family, female friends and colleagues who
reflect an image through their perceptions of me as a daughter, a mother, a teacher, that self
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may be destabilised when I read the reflections received through male perceptions of me as a
woman, a wife or lover, wherein my femininity may be objectified. In the latter case my body
becomes a focal point, both biologically and in terms of material aesthetics. Can I look into my
own mirror and see a self which is not defined through relationality? Is there a self which is not
constructed out of the experience of being with others, a self behind those reflected images?
To what extent are my selves performances acted out in order to please those around me?
And, if, as a woman, part of my self image is always related to my feminine body, then what
effect does that objectification have on my sense of being a subject rather than an object, or a
fetishised other? If there is an essential private and a communal public self, how can we
appropriate these selves as part of a feminist project?
Whilst the terms narcissist and woman are almost interchangeable, Simone de Beauvoir
explains that: "narcissism is a well-defined process of identification, in which the ego is
regarded as an absolute end and the subject takes refuge from himself in it" (de
Beauvoir: 1972, p.597). She suggests that it is largely women's dissatisfaction with her life
experience and with the love that she receives from others which leads to a need to develop a
kind of romance with herself. Love of one's self, as with all kinds of love, requires the parallel
existence of subject and object. The inward dialogue of the narcissist is necessary for the
production of coherence and order, the mirror serves to create a unified image. Whilst to some
this relationship between self and other within an individual might be regarded as a positive
and possibly healing process, to de Beauvoir there is an obvious danger regarding selfhood for
within existential ethics there is an assumption that an essential self exists and that this self
should be discreet and circumvented. The Cartesian theory of a distinct, but not disturbing,
split between body and mind, subject and object is perhaps visible within de Beauvoir's
suggestion that a relationship with that objectified self in the mirror is indicative of a
transgressing of boundaries and will lead to the subject being captured and trapped within the
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glass. The argument here is that when the distinctions between self and other dissolve we are
left with nothing, a no-being.
De Beauvoir claims that whilst the magic of the mirror is helpful in terms of attaining some
kitid of identification of the self; herself imagined as her own heroine can never actually be
realised, therefore the self does not meet realization in the concrete world. The fact that it is
impossible to fully "recognise oneself consciously as object" and that the "duality is merely
dreamed" leads to the materialisation of the dreamed object self in the doll. The young girl
therefore "sees herself in the doll more concretely than in her own body" (de Beauvoir:
1972, p.598). A reclamation of subjectivity became de Beauvoir's feminist project and she
achieved this through an exposition of an oppressive objectification of women. Let us now
consider how these themes have been further explored through Angela Carter's fiction.
The Narcissist in Angela Carter's Magic Toyshop (1967)
Carter is often described as a "magical realist", she questioned societal constructs of sex,
class and justice through the language of fiction but, particularly in her later novels, these
explorations are more playful than polemically moralistic. Carter situates herself clearly as a
political, feminist writer but she leaves her polemical viewpoint open in terms of addressing
the reader, thus allowing the reader do the work. Her hope is that through her fiction she aims
to present:
a number of propositions in a variety of different ways, and to leave the reader to construct her own
fiction for herself from the elements of my fictions. (Reading is just as creative an activity as writing
and most intellectual development depends upon new readings of old texts. I am all for putting new
wine in old bottles, especially if the pressure of the new wine makes the old bottles explode.)
Carter: 1997, p.37.
She notes that her evolution in terms of growing into feminism was a process of maturation
and she thinks this is reflected in the changes in her writing. She particularly questions the
nature of reality for women in terms of the construction of the fiction of 'femininity'. This
construct is created outside of the woman's control and then "palmed off.., as the real thing"
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(Carter: 1997, p.38).
Rather than mysticism, Carter was interested in the material reality of the here and now
world as it is. She explains that having spent most of her working life self-employed, and
therefore not on the front line of a mixed sex working environments, her radicalisation took
place through her experience of sexual and emotional relations. Therefore in her writing
"sexuality and its manifestations in human practice" becomes a major theme (Carter: 1997,
p.39). Far from being against rationality, Carter continually engaged with socio-historical
reality and her writing is interesting to us here as she explores women's situated lives, their
relationship with the body and the role of the imagination:
Obviously the idea that my stories are all dreams or hallucinations out of Jung-land, or the notion that
the world would be altogether a better place if we threw away our rationality and went laughing down
the street, or even the one that schizophrenia is an enriching experience, that's all nonsense. I can see
how it must look to some readers, but the point is that if dreams are real as dreams, then there is a
materiality to symbols; there's a materiality to imaginative life and imaginative experience which
should be taken quite seriously.
Carter: 1997, p.85.
Carter's texts provide us with a useful link between notions of an existential self and a later
deconstructed idea of the self. Her movement towards a representation of the self as a
wholly performative and constructed being can be traced from Melanie to Fevvers, who we
will encounter at the end of this thesis. Let us begin with Melanie.
A reading of Carter's second novel, The Magic Toyshop (1967), which is primarily
concerned with developing adolescent female sexuality, alongside de Beauvoir's theories
relating to narcissism, the development of young girls and sexual initiation, will give us an
insight into how fiction can further explore a feminist viewpoint. Puppetry and performance as
a tragic doll form the climax of this novel which opens with the central character Melanie
posing and posturing in front of her mirror, touching herself and luxuriating in her body:
For hours she stared at herselt naked, in the mirror of her wardrobe; she would follow with her finger
the elegant structure of her rib-cage, where the heart fluttered under the flesh like a bird under a
blanket, she would draw down the long line from breast-bone to navel (which was a mysterious cavern
or grotto), and she would rasp her palms against her bud-wing shoulderblades.
Carter: 1981, p.1. (17)
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The fairy-tale grotto and the bud-wing shoulder blades are immediately significant here as they
look forward to Melanie's encounter with a monstrous puppet swan in a reconstruction of the
rape of Leda but also the suggestion of wings serves as a precursive image which will later be
fully developed through Fevvers in Nights at the Circus (1984), a fantastic and yet far more
autonomous being / woman.
As this novel progresses, mirrors disappear and are replaced by peepholes and paintings
and Melanie's hands become less and less a part of herself. The opening line tells us: "The
summer she was fifteen, Melanie discovered she was made of flesh and blood" (p.1). This
suggests the beginning of menstruation for Melanie and according to de Beauvoir this is when
the anxiety of being female begins to take hold and affect subjectivity. In terms of psychology
a splitting of the subject occurs precisely because the distinction between the psychic and
physical life of a young girl becomes almost indistinct:
one of the characteristics of female psychology is the close relation between the endocrine secretions
and the nervous regulation: there is a reciprocal action. The body of a woman - particularly that of a
young girl - is a 'hysterical' body, in the sense that there is, so to speak, no distance between the
psychic life and its physiological realization. The disorders of puberty are made worse by the upsetting
effect their discovery has upon the young girl. Because her body seems suspect to her, and because she
views it with alarm, it seems to her to be sick: it is sick. L..] It is in great part the anxiety of being a
woman that devastates the feminine body.
de Beauvoir: 1972, p. 356.
The opening passage continues with an account of Melanie's celebration of the flesh and an
exploration her body: "she would writhe about, clasping herself, laughing, sometimes doing
cart-wheels and handstands out of sheer exhilaration at the supple surprise of herself now she
was no longer a little girl" (p.1). This kind of "solitary pleasure," according to de Beauvoir,
signals a woman's ability to "divide herself into male subject and female object." The young
girl's education "has prompted her to identify herself with her whole body, puberty has
revealed this body as being passive and desirable; it is something she can touch, like satin or
velvet, and can contemplate with a lover's eye" (de Beauvoir: 1972, p.598).
Melanie imagines herself both a Pre-Raphaelite model and a chorus girl sitting for Toulouse
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Lautrec. As Spaull and Millard point out these poses "are derived from male images of
women," images which are shaping her sense of identity (Mills, Pearce et al.: 1989, p.134). As
de Beauvoir suggests the link between fairy-tale magic and passivity is a strong one:
Magic involves the idea of passive force; because she is doomed to passivity and yet wants power, the
adolescent girl must believe in magic: in that of her body, which will bring men under her yoke: in
that of fate in general, which will crown her desires without her having to do anything.
de Beauvoir: 1972, p.364.
Hence the world of reality is rejected and daydreaming becomes more prevalent as a means to
escape the fear that physical development will entail alienation and a loss of freedom (de
Beauvoir: 1972, pp.333 & 337).
Melanie prepares herself as a fairy-tale character dressing up in her mother's wedding
outfit. She first wrestles with the veil which blinds and suffocates her, then puts on the heavy
dress which is described more in terms of a death-shroud than the "marvellous wedding-dress"
she had so often admired in a photograph: "It was very cold to touch. It slithered over her,
cold as a slow hosing with ice-water, and she shivered and caught her breath" (p.15). Dressed
as a bride, she goes into the garden and shakes "with ecstasy" but the dress is too big and she
is too young. This is "Too much, too soon" (p.18). After sobbing and panicking, sensing
monsters all around her, she takes off the wedding-dress and climbs naked up the apple tree
which grows beside her bedroom window, dragging and tearing the too-big dress behind her,
while apples fall to the ground beneath her. Afraid of falling, we gain a further insight into
Melanie's fragile sense of adolescent subjectivity which has curbed her former childish
adventurous spirit:
Since she was thirteen, when her periods began, she had felt she was pregnant with herself, bearing
the slowly ripening embryo of Melanie - grown-up inside herself for a gestation time the length of
which she was not precisely aware. And during this time, to climb a tree might provoke a miscarriage
and she would remain forever stranded in childhood, a crop-haired tomboy.
Carter: 1981, p. 20.
Boys climb trees and have adventures, she may do cart-wheels in the privacy of her own
bedroom but in the outside world spontaneity must be repressed, the body must become
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docile, she must preserve her femininity.
Like Eve after the Fall, Melanie is ashamed of her nakedness:
She was horribly conscious of her own exposed nakedness. She felt a new and final kind of
nakedness, as if she had taken even her own skin off and now stood clothed in nothing, nude in the
ultimate nudity of the skeleton. She was almost surprised to see the flesh of her fingers; her very
hands might have been discarded like gloves, leaving only the bones.
Carter: 1981, p.21.
The skeletal hands here are reminiscent of the frame of a puppet. The following day Melanie
and her two siblings hear the news that both their parents have died and, in her grief and guilt,
Melanie smashes her mirror and becomes "unbending as wood" (p.26). Here we meet a Snow
White (white skin, black hair, dead mother) who will no longer have the use of a conventional
mirror to see her own reflection:
She went into her bedroom. She met herself in the mirror, white face, black hair. The girl who killed
her mother. She picked up the hairbrush and flung it at her reflected face. The mirror shattered.
Behind the mirror was nothing but the bare wood of her wardrobe.
She was disappointed; she wanted to see her mirror, still, and the room reflected in the mirror, still,
but herself gone, smashed.
Carter: 1981, pp.24-25.
Melanie and her two orphaned siblings are sent to live with their Uncle Philip, a toymaker.
Uncle Philip is an imposing Bluebeard character who, like the villain in "The Bloody
Chamber" (1979), makes his wife wear a collar-like necklace which digs into her neck. He
evokes a constant undercurrent of violence and his presence "suppressed the idea of laughter"
(p.124). Aunt Margaret, his wife, likened to a bird in a cage (p.42) has been dumb since her
wedding day. Melanie soon learns that this red-haired Irish trio have a secret life when Uncle
Philip is not around; "the red people," as she calls them, play music and dance together in the
kitchen when the children are in bed. Melanie becomes an observer, spying on them through
the door's keyhole, and in turn she is observed by Finn through a peephole in her own
bedroom wall.
There are no mirrors at Uncle Philip's house, the theatre, Finn's eyes and his paintings, act
as mirrors throughout the rest of the novel. As the external drive towards fulfilment of her
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femininity becomes stronger, so the ability to see herself except through others becomes
weaker. Melanie is entangled in a physiognomical world where transcendence of the fiction of
femininity is looking more and more impossible. At this stage in the young girl's development
de Beauvoir suggests that the feminine function begins to imitate immanence: "the eyes no
longer penetrate, they reflect; the body is no longer alive, it waits; every gesture and smile
becomes an appeal. Disarmed, disposable, the young girl is now only an offered flower, a fruit
to be picked" (de Beauvoir: 1972, p.381).
When Finn takes Melanie to a deserted pleasure garden (the ruins of the National
Exposition of 1852) she becomes an Alice, on the other side of the looking-glass. Her
superstitious response to the white and black squares, reminiscent of Carroll's chessboard,
remind us that Melanie is trying to negotiate some kind of control over her fate:
If she did not tread on any of the black, perhaps when she got to the end of the floor she would shiver
and rouse in her long-lost bed, in her striped sheets, and say good morning to the apple tree and look
at her own face in the mirror she had not broken. She had not seen her reflection since. She was
seized with panic, remembering that she had not seen her own face for so long.
Carter: 1981, p.103.
But Melanie is passive and far less assertive than Alice, she watches things happen to her and
does not take part in the action. Just before Finn kisses her for the first time, standing next to a
statue of Queen Victoria, she sees herself reflected in his eyes:
She could see her own face reflected in little in the black pupils of his subaqueous eyes. She still
looked the same. She saluted herself. He was only a little taller than she and their eyes were almost on
a level. Remotely, she wished him three inches taller. Or four. She felt the warm breath from his wild
beast's mouth softly, against her cheek She did not move. Stiff, wooden and unresponsive, she stood
in his arms and watched herself in his eyes. It was a comfort to see herself as she thought she looked.
Carter: 1981, p.105.
It is interesting that "remotely" Melanie wishes that Finn were taller, somewhere in her
consciousness there is perhaps a desire to be over-powered, in this way she could fulfil her
feminine role as a docile, passive body under the shadow of Victorian morality. This
masochistic tendency, de Beauvoir suggests, exists when the individual chooses to be treated
as a thing and so only when "the ego is set up as separate and when this estranged self, or
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double, is regarded as dependent upon the will of others" (de Beauvoir: 1972, p.420).
However, if Finn were taller, she would be over-looked, she would not be able to see herself
and here Melanie's narcissistic tendency remains strong and is a comfort to her. Nevertheless,
Carter's puppet imagery here also suggests that Melanie remains unbending to the suggestion
of passion because no one is pulling her strings. This, too, can be related to de Beauvoir's
notion of female sexual dependence:
The role of the initiator belongs to the young man anatomically and conventionally [...] the virgin
young man's first mistress also gives him his initiation; but even so he has an erotic independence
clearly shown by his erection; his mistress simply provides in its reality the object he already desires:
a woman's body. The young girl needs a man to reveal her own body to her: she is much more deeply
dependent.
de Beauvoir: 1972, p. 401.
Still not ready for a sexual awakening, Melanie takes an alienated and objective view of her
situation as if looking at her life through the lens of a camera or projected onto some big
screen. Eroticism is, for her, something foreign, objectified through the performances of
others. It is ultimately something to do with romance, and Melanie does not feel romantic:
She thought vaguely that they must look very striking, like a shot from a new-wave British film,
locked in an embrace beside the broken statue in this dead fun palace, with the November dusk
swirling around them and Finn's hair so ginger, hers so black, spun together by the soft little hands of
a tiny wind, yellow and black hairs tangled together. She wished someone was watching them, to
appreciate them, or that she herself was watching them, Finn kissing this black-haired young girl,
from a bush a hundred yards away. Then it would seem romantic.
Carter: 1981, p.106.
This self-voyeuristic vision of her first sexual encounter from a distance is perhaps an
indication of how alienated women become from their own bodies. Although her first kiss
does not match the romantic hopes of her imagination, it does mark the end of her mourning
and she tears off the black band on her sleeve. The mother is finally abjected as Melanie herself
moves inevitably towards motherhood.
Hands are, I believe, central to this bildungsroman and central to my reading of this female
protagonist who perhaps marks a starting point for Carter's heroines who move further and
further away from passivity, sexual repression and frigidity, rigidity, fear of passion, fear of the
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female body (18). Following an incident in which Finn cuts his hand so badly with a chisel that
he can no longer paint, Melanie is left alone in the kitchen. The following hallucination can be
read both as a textual connection to dismemberment in the Bluebeard story but, I will argue,
could also be read, in light of other references to hands in the text, as perhaps an even more
far-reaching feminist proposition as regards agency; independent action rather than any passive
puppet-like performance instigated through the hands of some other active subject.
It was pleasant to be in the kitchen and Melanie hummed to herself as she hung cups from their hooks
and propped the plates. She opened the dresser drawer to put away the knives and spoons. In the
dresser drawer was a freshly severed hand, all bloody at the roots.
It was soft-looking, plump little hand with pretty, tapering fingers the nails of which were tinted
with a faint, pearly laquer. There was a thin silver ring of the type small girls wear on the fourth
finger. It was the hand of a child who goes to dancing class and wears frilled petticoats with knickers
to match. From the raggedness of the flesh at the wrist, it appeared that the hand has been hewn from
its arm with a knife or axe that was very blunt. Melanie heard blood fall plop in the drawer.
'I am going out of my mind,' she said aloud. 'Bluebeard was here.'
She closed the drawer and leaned against the dresser. She was drenched in sweat and her mouth
was dry. After a moment, her knees gave way and she slithered to the floor in a clattering hail of
cutlery. All the furniture in the room danced up and down. The chairs jigged from one leg to the
other. The table waltzed ungracefully. The cuckoo clock spun round and round. She lay on the
heaving ground, frozen for fear of moving.
Carter: 1981, p.118.
This scene is almost comical with its Disneyesque dancing crockery but Melanie's fear of
madness and loss of consciousness undermines the comic, tainting it with the macabre instead
and we are reminded through Francie's explanation that the hallucination is "natural" due to
the "distress of [her] loss"; that is the loss of her mother (p.121) (19).
Following a disastrous puppet performance, part of the family's Sunday ritual, Uncle Philip
decides he will use Melanie to act with his puppets. The narrative comes full circle as she is
dressed and prepared for her role as Leda in white chiffon: "All at once, Melanie was back
home and swathing herself in diaphanous veiling before a mirror" (p.141). Uncle Philip makes
the huge swan which will rape his Leda and provides artificial daisies: "Melanie would be a
nymph crowned with daisies once again; he saw her as once she had seen herself. In spite of
everything, she was flattered" (p.141). But Uncle Phillip resents her because she is not a
puppet and, as Finn explains, the play "is only a vehicle for his handsome swan" (p.147).
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Melanie realises, despite her initial sense of being flattered, that she would not like herself if
she could see herself in costume and make-up. She must practice with Finn because she cannot
see the swan in advance; in the real performance she must react spontaneously. But her
movements are not fluid, the rehearsal is a farce and Melanie cannot act as if she is afraid. Her
amusement is stilled only by the beginning of her sexual awakening:
'This is the start,' she said to herself, clearly. She heard her own voice, certain and distinct, inside her
head. No more false starts, as in the pleasure gardens, but the real beginning of a deep mystery
between them. What would he do to her, would he be kind? She looked down with a fear that vms also
a pleasure at his stained, scarred hand. His workman's hand, which was strong and cunning. The light
seemed to die about her, leaving her to see by her senses only.
Carter: 1981, p.149.
Finn cannot respond because he has been instructed to rape her by his uncle and he refuses to
be manipulated and let their strings be pulled. Also, despite her supposed clarity, he is
disturbed by Melanie's verbal communication, "the words which floated on top of her mind"
(p.155), because he thinks it exposes an inauthentic response on her part. Her language is
rejected as words she has picked up from women's magazines. Finn demystifies the encounter,
what she feels is due to "proximity" not love, he explains (p.155). Equally, Melanie is
disturbed by Finn's use of the word "fuck":
She was deeply agitated. She had never connected the word with herself; her phantom bridegroom
would never have flicked her. They would have made love. But Finn, she acknowledged with a
sinking of her spirit, would have.
Carter: 1981, pp.151-152.
She may be ready in the flesh but her mind is still tainted with romantic images. She has not
reached sexual maturity which would enable her to respond freely, and, as Finn declares, they
are living in a madhouse which makes autonomous action near impossible (p.153). It seems
that the need for mutual autonomous action has not occurred to Melanie.
However, Melanie gains another opportunity to see herself reflected through Finn when
she sees his painting of her as a mirror image, this image would seem to undermine Finn's
supposed autonomy:
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she saw herself, and was touched.
She was taking off her chocolate sweater and was all twisted up, a rather thin but nicely made
young girl with a delicate, withdrawn face, against a wall of dark red roses. Her wallpaper. She looked
very scrubbed. She looked like a virgin who cleaned her teeth after every meal and delighted to take
bites from rosy apples. Her black hair exploded about her head in great Art Nouveau ripples. It looked
as though Finn was trying his hand at curves. The picture was as flat and uncommunicative as all his
pictures and seemed to be an asexual kind of pin-up. Round the upper part of her right arm was a
black band. He did not see her precisely as she saw herself but it could have been very much worse.
Carter: 1981, pp.153-154.
The image is reminiscent of the images she conjured of herself at the opening of the novel, and
perhaps indicates that Finn is not as free from the strings of culturally produced ideas of love,
romance and femininity as he purports to be.
Bored on Christmas day, Melanie is left to consider her purpose and position:
She did not know what to do with herself. She picked the dead yellow leaves of the geranium and
crumpled them to fragrant dust between her fingers. She stared at her hand. Four fingers and a thumb.
Five nails.
'This is my hand. Mine. But what is it for? she thought. 'What does it mean?
Her hand seemed wonderful and surprising, an object which did not belong to her and of which
she did not know the use. The fingers were people, the members of a family. The thumb the father,
short and thick-set, probably a North countryman, with flat, assertive vowels in his speech, and the
forefinger the mother, a tall, willowy lady, of middle-class origins, who said: 'dahling' frequently and
ate dessert oranges with a knife and fork Had he married above his station, in the flush of self-made
money? He had the bluff, upright stance of a man who has made his own way in the world. And three
fine children, two full grown, a big boy and girl, and one just coming into its teens. She flexed her
hand, and, obligingly, the family performed a brief dance for her. Then she was horrified.
Carter: 1981, pp.161-162.
Not only does her hand seem a separate part of her, as useless as a severed hand, but also
when she observes its movements it plays out her destiny, performing presumably something
that resembles the nuclear families she has experienced so far in her life. What is horrifying is
that even when Melanie actively "flexed" her hand it merely revealed its part as a symbolic
object in the patriarchal theatre to come.
Again, she believes she is going mad and so responds passively when the puppet show
reaches its climax. Melanie has not matured, has not resolved what she could do with her
hands. She is afraid, not of the swan, but of "giving herself to the swan" (p.162). At first, the
swan is comical "a grotesque parody of a swan ... nothing like the wild, phallic bird of her
imaginings" (p.165). But then she imagines that, like the horse of Troy:
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a trapdoor in the swan's side might open and an armed host of pigmy Uncle Philips, all clockwork,
might rush out and savage her. This possibility seemed real and awful. All her laughter was snuffed
out. She was hallucinated; she felt herself not herself, wrenched from her own personality, watching
this whole fantasy from another place; and, in this staged fantasy, anything was possible. Even that
the swan, the mocked up swan, might assume reality itself and rape this girl in a blizzard of u hite
feathers. The swan towered over the black-haired girl who was Melanie and who was not.
Carter: 1981, p.166.
Melanie's detachment from herself is signalled most forcefully by the words "this girl", for
surely the narrative voice here is hers. On the stage she is both girl and doll, both Melanie and
not. When the "obscene" swan mounts her its "gilded beak dug deeply into the soft flesh" and,
after repeated screaming, again she loses consciousness and wakes to find her dress half torn
oft: Melanie's sexual initiation leaves her feeling insubstantial; she "felt she cast no shadow"
(p.169).
Although the denouement signals the completion of Melanie's rite of passage, a feminist
reading cannot read the outcome as satisfactory. Nor is Melanie's future going to be a
romantic fulfilment of her dreams. Melanie loses the constructed romantic idealism which
opens the novel and her "prophetic vision" that she will marry Finn marks her entrance into a
more mature and realistic view of relationships.
She knew they would get married one day and live together all their lives and there would always be
pervasive squalor and dirt and mess and shabbiness, always, forever and forever. And babies crying
and washing to be done and toast burning all the rest of her life. And never any glamour or romance
or charm. Nothing fancy. Only mess and babies with hair. She revolted.
Carter: 1981, p.177.
When Finn later voices his matter of fact certainty that they will have a family at the breakfast
table and christen the first baby "Proximity", Melanie again baulks at this bleak prospect:
Melanie choked on a mouthful. Waiting outside, possibly on the landing, stood a chattenng troupe
of squinting, red-haired children jostling for admission to her belly. Francie struck her briskly on the
back and soon she recovered sufficiently to finish her breakfast.
Carter: 1981, p.183.
This bildungsroman is about the female rite of passage into the inevitable confinement of a
nuclear family. Lucy Annitt also argues that this is not, for Melanie, an "edenic, utopian
escape" she has merely passed from one puppet master to another (Armitt: 2000, p.211).
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Melanie does not learn what she can achieve by her own hand but places herself, and accepts
that her future is to be played out, within the hands of another.
The final line seems to suggest open-endedness: "At night, in the garden, they
faced each other in a wild surmise" (p.199). But, despite the word "surmise," Melanie is
denied an independent means of escape (she needs Finn for protection), and gains no access to
her own sexuality. Millard asserts that "The story then can be read as a fable of the absence of
what can be written of female desire" (Mills, Pearce et al.: 1989, p.177). In the light of this let
us now consider women's problematic relationship to language and how that might relate to
notions of female madness.
Women and Language
Shoshana Felman explains the constructed linguistic relationship between women and madness
and asks: "Is it by chance that hysteria (significantly derived, as is well known, from the Greek
word for 'uterus') was originally conceived as an exclusively female complaint, as the lot and
prerogative of women?" (Felman in Belsey and Moore: 1989, p.133). Felman addresses the
problem of the voice of the female hysteric and asks how women can speak both as mad and
not mad. How do women write about madness within a phallogocentric system which
privileges reason, logic, the unified signifier, single, discrete identities of the Symbolic Order
which are intrinsically linked to the Law of the Father:
If, in our culture, the woman is by definition associated with madness, her problem is how to break
out of this (cultural) imposition of madness without taking up the critical and therapeutic positions of
reason: how to avoid speaking both as mad and as not mad. The challenge facing the woman today is
nothing less than to re-invent language, to re-learn how to speak: to speak not only against, but
outside of the specular phallogocentric structure, to establish a discourse the status of which would no
longer be defined by the phallacy of masculine meaning.
Fehnan in Belsey and Moore: 1989, pp.152-153.
The concern of Anglo-American feminists of the seventies and eighties seemed focused on
uncovering women's texts and bringing them into the literary canon, exposing the feminist
themes within those texts, offering a feminist literary critique of the portrayal of women in
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male texts, creating a women's space separate from men's where specifically female topics
could be explored, and retrieving a female history and female creativity. The writing of
Adrienne Rich, Mary Ellman and Kate Millett, for example, was valued for its exposition and
rethinking of constructions of femininity and women's role within, and exclusion from, society.
This materialist approach to language was part of a feminist project which differed greatly
from that of contemporary French Feminists whose perception and intention was more radical
in its deconstructive methods. From these theorists came an ebullient outpouring of
philosophy which both embraced the female body and brought forth a new language in order
to express the experience of being female. This writing was most influential for its ability to
celebrate womanhood and uncompromisingly expose constructs which would place
boundaries around women. Madness is portrayed as a construct created in order to control
women, madness is exposed as a result of controlling patriarchal forces, and rebellion, overall,
necessitates that we embrace what might be considered to be madness in order to be heard;
these I read as the premises of French Feminist textual politics. This passionate and polemical
approach which expresses the relationship between body and language and a blurring of the
distinctions between logical (phallocentric) discourse and a more aestheticized feminist poetics
has offered me an invaluable inroad to Woolf and Plath, for example, as we shall see later.
The existence of an essential female nature which is inseparable from the body is the area
of philosophy which was explored by French feminists such as Héléne Cixous and Luce
Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. Although Woolf in A Room of One's Own (1929) introduced the
notion that women needed to form a new language to express female experience and
experimented herself by breaking down the traditional form of the novel into a more fluid form
using free indirect discourse to express the multiplicity of female consciousness, it was the
French writers of the early seventies, the female writers who emerged from the intellectual
revolution of 1968 in Paris, who offered a new and different perception as part of a second
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wave of feminism. These writers really began to take this notion further and fully enter into an
experimental creation of women's language which related directly to the experience of living in
a female body: "tcriture Feminine".
Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva were concerned to indicate a radical break with, or
progression from, the earlier Existential thought and theory of Simone de Beauvoir. Her
famous saying "One is not born a woman one becomes one" from The Second Sex (1949) was
no longer relevant to their polemic. Helene Cixous wanted to emphasize the fact that "one is
born a woman," that women have a female body, different to that of the male, that this female
body has been constricted and constrained due to fear of "the dark continent" (Freud) of
femininity and the need to control it. Whereas de Beauvoir exposed the positing of woman as
a lack, a negative, a marginalized Other, Irigaray challenges in The Sex which is not One
(1977) the Western philosophy of the self which places men on the side of signifying subject
and women on the side of signified other and she exposes this as a system which negates
female existence rather than signals sexual difference. However, de Beauvoir was not rejected
and in fact fully supported the new movement. The emphasis in her feminist polemics,
particularly The Second Sex (1949), had been a socio-historical exposition of the confining
patriarchal constructs which kept women imprisoned by their bodies. The emphasis was on
motherhood, the home, narcissism, the difficulties women encounter if they want to say no to
motherhood and pursue instead a career, or try to negotiate a position where both were
possible. Her project was not to celebrate difference but to instigate equality and posit a
situated self.
As Judith Butler explains: "Within a language pervasively masculinist, a phallogocentric
language, women constitute the unrepresentable. In other words, women represent the sex
that cannot be thought, a linguistic absence and opacity" (Butler: 1990, p.9). Butler points out
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that the body has prescribed boundaries and the division of the subject into "inner" and
"outer" worlds in order to regulate behaviour "is established through the ejection and
transvaluation of something originally part of identity into a defiling otherness" (Butler: 1990,
p.133). This "otherness" is another concern for women. In The Powers of Horror (1982) Julia
Kristeva explains that the coherence of a subject is not possible because the boundary between
internal an external is not a "sealed" surface. The body has openings through which fluids pass
and the excremental passages allow what is inside to come out, therefore she contends the
"other" is abjected as fearful bodily pollution, filth, waste, shit. That which is expelled is alien
and to establish stability and coherence the subject must differentiate herself from the abject.
Judith Butler thus raises the following questions:
From what strategic position in public discourse and for what reasons has the trope of interiority and
the disjunctive binary of inner/outer taken hold? In what language is 'inner space' figured? What kind
of figuration is it, and through what figure of the body is it signified? How does a body figure on its
surface the very invisibility of its hidden depth?
Butler, 1990: p.134.
Foucault clearly rejected the notions of an internalized identity and a true "inner" self which
could be discovered but it may seem that writers such as Cixous, whilst embracing multiplicity,
are reclaiming such notions as part of a feminist polemic.
Helêne Cixous claims in "Medusa" (1975) that women have been driven violently away
from their bodies and from language, she expresses her own fear of articulation; for women
reclaiming language is an effort to overcome the threat of once more being silenced and a
somewhat fearful entrance into a foreign domain. The female body needs to be celebrated,
female sexuality should no longer be a taboo, an unknown, feared and hated by both men and
women. It should be articulated and this requires a new language because never before has
that female body, that female sexuality been explored and articulated by women, for women.
Cixous does not advocate a transcendence of the body but of those forces which control it.
She retrieves a body which is no longer docile but active, a body which is specifically feminine:
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Almost everything is to be written by women about femininity: about their sexuality, that is, its
infinite and mobile complexity, about their eroticization, sudden turn-ons of a certain
miniscule-immense area of their bodies: not about destiny, but about the adventure of such and such a
drive, about trips, crossings, trudges, abrupt and gradual awakenings, discoveries of a zone at one
time timorous and soon to be forthright.
Cixous in Marks and de Courtivron: 1980, P. 355.
In terms of style Cixous adopts metaphorical language which maps out a road to discovery. In
much of her writing she voices a positive exploration of the zone of femininity in order to
counter-balance patriarchal notions of a fearsome "dark continent" as mentioned above.
Cixous appropriates and exploits the notion that women are closer to the body than men
and that the body is a text, she wants women to inhabit that space from which she has been
driven and to speak /write from and about the body. The construction of the relationship
between the female body and language, as purported by such thinkers as Jacques Lacan, is
fully exposed and undermined within Cixous' writing. Lacan's model of human development
links the stages towards maturity outlined by Freud to stages related to the acquisition of
language and entrance into the Symbolic, integration within "the Law of the Fathers" via the
"phallic stage." According to Lacan, the necessary separation from the mother, the breaking of
dyadic unity ("abjection" of the mother's body in Kristevan terms), is simultaneous with a
recognition of the father, linguistic development and the formation of the unconscious. From a
feminist perspective clearly this is problematic. The female body must become untouchable,
taboo, unspoken, hidden and locked away in the dumping ground of the unconscious if the
child is to achieve maturity. The feminist project set about to unsettle the notion that :"Woman
is a gap, a silence, invisible and unheard, repressed in the unconscious" (Millard: 1989, p.157).
Cixous' "The Laugh of the Medusa" is a powerful answer to those patriarchal giants Freud and
Lacan:
Their "symbolic" exists, it holds power - we, the sowers of disorder, know it only too well. But we are
in no way obliged to deposit our lives in their banks of lack, to consider the constitution of the subject
in terms of a drama manglingly restaged, to reinstate again and again the religion of the father.
Because we don't want that. We don't fawn around the supreme hole. We have no womanly reason to
pledge allegiance to the negative. Cixous in Marks and de Courtivron: 1980, p. 354.
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Julia Kristeva exposes the oppression of motherhood and underlines the supposed
problems of the female child who at the point of entrance to the symbolic must distance herself
from the female body and turn instead to the father, or remain in the confines of the psychotic,
mergent dyad. For those who are female, separation from the mother is also separation
from/rejection of her own body and a realization that she has a weaker relationship to
knowledge and language than her male counterpart.
The route back to the mother and to the time before the abjection of the female body is a
recurring theme within French feminism and one which is inextricably linked to women's
access to language as we can see here in Luce Irigaray's "The Bodily Encounter with the
Mother" (1991):
... we must not once more kill the mother ... We must give her new life, new life to that mother, to our
mother within us and between us. We must refuse to let her desire be annihilated by the law of the
father. We must give her the right to pleasure, to jouissance, to passion, restore her right to speech,
and sometimes to cries and anger.
We must also find, find anew, invent the words, the sentences that speak the most archaic and most
contemporary relationship with the body of the mother, with our bodies, the sentences that translate
the bond between her body, ours, and that of our daughters. We have to discover a language [langage]
which does not replace the bodily encounter, as paternal language [langue] attempts to do, but which
can go along with it, words which do not bar the corporeal, but which speak corporeal.
Irigaray in Whitford: 1991, p. 43.
In Cixous' and Irigaray's texts, in particular, we find that the body is expressed no longer as
a prison house. These writers speak the unspeakable, undo the silences and taboos, take
pleasure in and celebrate female flesh and to do this they have to develop female writing. They
aim to deconstruct male linguistic theory and psycho-analysis which emphasizes unity,
discretion, logic, control because female sexuality is not unified (phallic), discreet and limited.
These writers assimilate and exploit those old mythologies which would threaten and control
by saying, yes I am the witch, the medusa, the whore and I am not afraid or ashamed. Like
Carter, these women base new theory on old models and deconstruct that old theory by
rewriting it from a female perspective. They occupy and speak out of that space created on
the margins for women, that silent space of feared female sexuality, uncontrollable Babylonian
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lusts, hysterical voices.
In some respects the French feminist emphasis on sexual difference perhaps seems to signal
a more separatist movement than that of Woolf who, in A Room of One's Own (1929), talks
about the need for an androgynous consciousness for the artist, insisting that one must not
think of one's sex if one is to write. However, one could also point out that rather than set up
an "outsider's society" as Woolf suggests women should do in Three Guineas (1938) these
women set about deconstructing the status quo in terms of patriarchal linguistic,
psycho-analytical and philosophical theories from the inside. In fact Irigaray was expelled from
Lacan's Litcole de Lettres for her radical rethinking of such theories.
Not only did these female writers enrage those males in a position of power but also those
feminists who had been deconstructing the patriarchal myths of femininity which defined
women as hysterical, emotional, illogical, more nature than culture, more body than mind. The
debate centres around the question of whether a description of femaleness works against
emancipation. For what were these writers doing other than bringing the female body into the
forefront of consciousness, expressing themselves through ebullient and passionate
outpourings, returning to some semiotic babble which indicated a refusal to separate, a
tendency to mergence, an inability to mature? How could this seemingly hysterical or
monstrous outburst, where the emphasis is on sexual desire and pleasure, further a feminist
polemic which had insisted that the woman be released from the constrictions of her body, be
viewed as equally capable to enter into the professions as politician, teacher, medic,
philosopher?
Susan Bordo writes about the "retreat from female otherness," a reluctance to celebrate or
romanticize sexual difference and behaviour because of its possible counter effectivity in terms
of integration into the professions (Bordo: 1993, pp.229-233). The political premise was,
certainly within Cixous' texts, a refusal of the Symbolic and an embrace of the Semiotic in
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order to give voice to the feminine and unsettle the dominant masculine discourse. Toril Moi
explains in Sexual/Texual Politics that although Irigaray's expulsion from L'Ecole des Lettres
was a dramatic example of patriarchal dominance, her writing also caused an acrimonious
feminist debate especially following the publication of Speculum of the Other Woman (1974).
Many began to question the value of this kind of writing as feminist polemic.
Elaine Showalter's essay "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness" (1981) particularly takes
issue with what she terms "the wild zone" of French feminism:
Ideas about the body are fundamental to understanding how women conceptualize their situation in
society; but there can be no expression of the body which is unmediated by linguistic, social and
literary structures. The difference of women's literary practice, therefore, must be sought (in Miller's
words) in 'the body of her writing and not the writing of her body'.
The advocacy of a women's language is thus a political gesture that also carries tremendous emotional
force. But despite its unifying appeal, the concept of a women's language is riddled with difficulties ...
Language and style are never raw and instinctual but are always the products of innumerable factors,
of genre, tradition, memory, and context.
The appropriate task for feminist criticism, I believe, is to concentrate on women's access to
language, on the available lexical range from which words can be selected, on the ideological and
cultural determinants of expression. The problem is not that language is insufficient to express
women's consciousness but that women have been denied the full resources of language and have been
forced into silence, euphemism, or circumlocation.
Showalter in Lodge: 1988, p.341.
Where some would argue that French feminism disrupts and unsettles the patriarchal from
within, others would argue that such feminist theorists merely perpetuate definitions and
perceptions which have kept women in psychological and physical chains for centuries in
terms of biological essentialism and their relationship to language. Showalter claims that a
female language and a wholly "female space" is an unrealisable ideal in terms of politics
because it is necessary to communicate within the dominant discourse as well as from the
margins. Once again we seem to be meeting with a resistance to embrace a utopian vision.
Whilst these French feminist writers would argue that their voices had begun to inhabit a new
space beyond the margins, their critics would argue that this was not a place from which to
make a real difference within society.
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Writing the Body: the Schizophrenic and Autobiography
A distinguishing feature of the later French Feminist writers Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva is
that their texts embrace a kind of performativity and simultaneously reclaim the female body
as the subject of their discourse. In order to find a voice they discovered a language which
reflected a powerful agency or subjectivity. Carolyn Burke rightly points to the discomfort
which accompanies the finding of a voice in her "Report":
... when a woman writes or speaks herself into existence, she is forced to speak in something like a
foreign tongue, a language with which she may be uncomfortable.
Carolyn Burke: Signs, Summer 1978, p.851.
Sidonie Smith considers that the ecriture feminine of the French feminists which articulates
female difference signals a promising refusal to integrate women's writing into the
phallogocentric traditions of Western culture because: "women's true autobiography has yet to
be written, since women writers have, until recently, only reinscribed male writing" (Smith:
1987, p.18). Smith, however, reminds us of the discomfort expressed by those
Anglo-American theorists who question the validity of "psychosexual essentialism" and would
rather emphasise historical and cultural difference in terms of oppression than celebrate a
victorious articulation/representation of the unrepresentable (Smith: 1987, p.18). Drawing on
Carolyn Burke's report which highlights women's discomfort with self-articulation Smith
explains:
The discomfort derives from her cultural ventriloquism, a gesture of impersonation that requires the
autobiographer to speak like a man; for, speaking like a man, she may be unable to recognize the
lineaments of her experience in the language and fictions that surround and inform her text.
Smith, 1987: p.57.
Many of the texts which we will encounter later could be categorised as autobiographical
but what do I mean by that term? Clearly the non-fiction writing which is to be found in letters
and diaries is understood initially to be autobiographical because the writers, at least to a
certain extent, aim to tell the 'truth' about their lives without embracing any kind of "cultural
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ventriloquism." We have already encountered a text which is read as a fictionalisation of the
writer's life in Charlotte Perkins Gilman's The Yellow Wallpaper (1892). Also, as we shall see,
Virginia Woolf s To the Lighthouse (1927) and Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar (1963) are arguably
novels of self-representation because we can trace within them details which are part of the
writers' biographies. Writing the self; however, is a problematic project and especially for
women.
Many feminist theorists have noted an urgency for women to speak and write about
themselves in order to overcome paranoiac and hysterical silence. However, according to
Simone de Beauvoir, the autobiographer "wholly occupied with burning incense to herself' is
merely "burning incense to a nonentity":
The narcissist who identifies herself with her imaginary double destroys herself. [...] There can be no
real relation between an individual and her double because this double does not exist. The narcissist
encounters a fundamental frustration. She cannot envisage herself as a totality, she is unable to keep
up the illusion of being pour-soi - en-soi. Her isolation, like that of every human being, is felt as
contingence and forlorn abandonment.
de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1972, p.651.
The danger she suggests is that this individual, having lost a sense of independence, now lays
herself on the altar of public opinion and this can be damaging for the psychologically
vulnerable. Obsessional neuroses, and particularly paranoia, are now free to enter the arena in
order to shape, define and distort that image of the self which is in production and which is
becoming public property. Simone de Beauvoir's theory of "burning incense to a non-entity,"
however, is a long way from Cixous' theses in "The Laugh of the Medusa" (1975) and
"Sorties" (1975) where she is constantly urging women to write themselves, in order to
reclaim their bodies and appropriate language for themselves.
Of course there are problems here relating to notions of essentialism and the idea of a true
female identity, but in women's autobiographical writing we might also ask if the sense of
identity created is more authentic because of an autonomous self-construction as opposed to a
passive construction and definition by others. It as part of a feminist project, a woman means
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to establish herself as 'I' rather than 'other', can we then perceive the objectification of the
subject within autobiographical narratives as positive?
Recently the genre of autobiography, and definitions of it, have become of great interest to
critics. In A Poetics of Women's Autobiography: Marginality and the Fictions of
Self-Representation (1987), Sidonie Smith explains that more modern criticism has been less
interested in testing the "truth" of the narrative by referring to biographical/historical facts and
more concerned with problems of self-representation:
Since autobiography is understood to be a process through which the autobiographer struggles to
shape an "identity" out of amorphous subjectivity, the critic becomes a psychoanalyst of sorts,
interpreting the truth of an autobiography in its psychological dimensions rather than in its factual
and moral ones.
Smith: 1987, p.5.
The latest wave of criticism, a third mode, coming out of structuralism and post-structuralism
questions both the referentiality and the fixity of the "informing 'I":
The autobiographical text becomes a narrative artifice, privileging a presence, or icleariy, 6ha( does
not exist outside language. Given the very nature of language, embedded in the text lie alternative or
deferred identities that constantly subvert any pretensions of truthfulness.
Smith: 1987, p.5.
Critics such as Smith and Laura Marcus argue that an unavoidable fictionality will be born out
of any attempt to write the self, that there is no essential discrete self which can be
materialised through a text. The very fragments of existence brought together in one text have
to be a fictionalisation of the self Writing the self, it seems, can result in an illusory sense of
discrete wholeness, a unified self, or can reveal a fragmentary and incoherent nature of
selfhood. Also, as Susan Friedman points out all autobiography is 'necessarily fictive'; all
stories of the self, all "I"s are fictions:
The failures of Narcissus and Oedipus prefigure the impossible task of the autobiographer to reach a
'real self. All autobiography is 'necessarily fictive'; it reveals a self whose very coherence is the sign of
its falseness and alienation.
Friedman in Benstock: 1988. p 37.
Janet Frame explains that the nature of memory and time will always undermine the notion
that pure autobiography can exist in her autobiography To the Is-Land: An Autobiography
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(1983):
Where in my earlier years time had been horizontal, progressive, day by day, year after year, with
memories being a true personal history known by dates and specific years, or vertical, with events
stacked one upon the other, [...] the adolescent time now became a whirlpool, and so the memories do
not arrange themselves to be observed and written about, they whirl, propelled by a force beneath,
with different memories rising to the surface at different times and thus denying the existence of a
"pure" autobiography and confirming, for each moment, a separate story accumulating to a million
stories, all different and with some memories forever staying beneath the surface.
Frame: 1983, p.236
In her second volume An Angel at My Table (1984) Frame draws attention to the necessity of
crafting an aesthetics of the 'truth' about the self and explains that this artfulness is related to
the non-linearity of time:
Writing an autobiography, usually thought of as a looking back, can just as well be a looking across
or through, with the passing of time giving an x-ray quality to the eye. Also, time past is not time
gone, it is time accumulated with the host resembling the character in the fairytale who was joined
along the route by more and more characters none of whom could be separated from one another or
from the host, with some stuck so fast that their presence caused physical pain. Add to the characters
all the events, thoughts, feelings, and there is a mass of time, now a sticky mess, now a jewel bigger
than the planets and the sun.
Frame: 1993, p.67.
Time confers privileges of arrangement and rearrangement undreamed of until it becomes Time
past. I have been writing of the memory of publication of stories and poems. In actual memory I am
sitting talking to two Borstal girls, on the way to Seacliffe Hospital where I shall be a committed
patient.
Frame: 1993, p.68.
We will explore the themes of time and memory, and how these affect the writing of
autobiography, in more depth later. We will also encounter many fictionalisations of the
self when we consider the work of Virginia Woolf and Sylvia Plath. Janet Frame is also a
significant figure, not only because she writes about her treatment for schizophrenia in
autobiographical and fictional form, but also because she highlights the importance of
diagnosis and performativity. In An Angel at my Table, Frame gives us an account of wrongful
diagnosis and her subsequent acting-out of madness which resulted in a horrific and prolonged
incarceration which robbed her of a large part of her youth. Frame's tragic embrace of the
fictions surrounding women in relation to madness is a poignant reminder of the danger of
gender performance. However, her autobiography and her novel Faces in the Water (1961)
67
are also valuable gifts wrought out of an aesthetic production and performance of her own life
experience.
In Frame's final autobiographical volume The Envoy from Mirror City (1985) she explains
that in her novel Faces (1961) she wrote a story and a central character based on her own
experiences but necessarily, whilst writing from memory, experience must be modified in order
to create fiction:
I began to write the story of my experiences in hospitals in New Zealand, recording faithfully every
happening and the patients and the staff I had known, but borrowing from what I had observed among
the patients to build a more credibly 'mad' character, Istina Mavet, the narrator.
Frame: 1993, p.132.
Whilst Frame understood that critics would assume that Istina Mavet was a portrait of herself,
she also asserts an authority which defends the autonomy of aesthetic production:
a writer must stand on the rock of her self and her judgement or be swept away by the tide or sink in
the quaking earth: there must be an inviolate place where the choices and decisions, however
imperfect, are the writer's own, where the decision must be as individual and solitary as birth or death.
What was the use of my having survived as a person ill could not maintain my own judgement? Only
then could I have the confidence to try to shape a novel or story or poem the way I desired and needed
it to be, with both the imperfections and the felicities bearing my own signature.
Frame: 1993, pp.138-139.
There are many questions to be raised regarding the relationship between fiction and
autobiography. For Frame learning to write autobiography is inextricably linked to fiction; it is
learning to be "a citizen of the Mirror City":
My only qualification for continuing to write this autobiography is that although I have used,
invented, mixed, remodelled, changed, add, subtracted from all experiences I have never written
directly of my own life and feelings. Undoubtedly I have mixed myself with other characters who
themselves are a product of known and unknown, real and imagined; I have created 'selves'; but I
have never written of 'me'. Why? Because if I make that hazardous journey to the Mirror City where
everything I have known or seen or dreamed of is bathed in the light of another world, what use is
there in returning only with a mirrorful of me? Or, indeed, of others who exist very well by the
ordinary light of day? The self must be the container of the treasures of Mirror City, the Envoy as it
were, and when the time comes to arrange and list those treasures for shaping into words, the self
must be the worker, the bearer of the burden, the chooser, placer and polisher.
Frame: 1993, pp.154-155.
Frame does not apologise for indulging her memory because memory is a treasure, it has the
power to transform ordinary facts and ideas "into a shining palace of mirrors" (Frame: 1993,
p.190). Certainly this collection of writing from Frame has provided women with an insightful
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journey into the relationship between women, madness and language.
This brings us back to my earlier questions regarding the existence of an essential,
autonomous self as opposed to one which is passively constructed. Is writing the self an
artifice by which means we can take possession of a real / true being? Is there an inherent self
behind my performing masks? Do I meet myself in the mirror? Another recent question raised
by Nicole Ward Jouve might be: Who is the critic self? Jouve blurs the boundaries between
academic and autobiographical language and adopts an approach to autobiography which is
relevant to our purposes here. In White Woman Speaks with Forked Tongue: Criticism as
Autobiography (1991) the author begins by situating herself as a white middle class, bilingual,
woman whose writing practice includes criticism, feminist theory, fiction, creative writing and
here as a writer who will give autobiographical responses to authors and their texts. Jouve
explains that she is "in search of a different voice, a more inclusive and exploratory way of
writing about literature, or women's issues" (Jouve: 1991, p. ix ). Although there is a mass of
critical writing on autobiography which claims that "through writing the self is invented,
constructed, projected," few critics seem unaware "that they themselves, through writing, may
be in the process of inventing or projecting their own selves" (Jouve: 1991, p.1). Their
objective surveillance of "the common herd of writers" removes them "from the obligation of
having to bother with the self that writes. They inhabit a secure, objective, third-person mode
that protects them from having to be self-aware" (Jouve: 1991, p.1). Jouve questions the
notion of transcendent and "transparent objectivity" for, in order for critical writing to be
committed, Jouve suggests that the critic needs to be self-reflexive about the processes
involved in her critique: "Only when it actually thinks is criticism ever a form of writing. Only
then is it a total commitment to language" (Jouve: 1991, p.2). But Jouve's intention is not to
impose her ego and splash it "all over the page," this is an experiment in something different
which I believe is useful and significant for women who write about women's writing:
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If all criticism became autobiography, it would not only become boring, it would defeat its purpose.
Criticism is about the other. Its drive for an objective voice is a search for a consensual voice and an
attempt at openness. Let the ego be quiet so that the other can be seen. The drive is for the absolute.
However relativistic, however studded with 'seems' or aware of rival positions the critical discourse
may be, it aims at truth - in the Thomist sense, as the adequation of mind to the thing. Criticism that
would be primarily preoccupied with self would be narcissistic. [...] Literary criticism in any case is
better deployed when it is self-forgetful. Its business is indeed to read between the lines, to detect the
personal where it lurks among the other elements at play in the text.
Jouve: 1991, pp. 5-6.
Jouve asks if writing about autobiography might mask a desire to write oneself. She likens
critics to mirrors saying that they are in the business of reflecting backwards and forwards
between themselves, their responses, and the work of art. However, critics avoid confession
and with-hold the risky "I" in order to uphold the pretence of a valid polemical reading, an
attack perhaps, which is more persuasive written at a distance. I am interested in the questions
which Jouve raises because my recent readings of Woolf and Plath have been influenced by
critics such as Jacqueline Rose and Hermione Lee who have not been afraid to say "I" in their
writing. Their 'confessional' analyses have encouraged me to access a more self-conscious
approach to texts and have instigated an exploration on my part of the relationship which has
developed between myself, these writers and their texts.
Are all my readings necessarily linked to my own experiences? If so, is critical analysis a
form of autobiography? A later question will be whether writing the self provides a useful
reflection for women and ultimately I have to ask myself how writing about those who have
written autobiographically could be helpful in terms of feminism.
Paul De Man claimed that there existed an unavoidable and "universal crisis in language" in
the late sixties. The fictionality of the self is one problem but Paul de Man's influential essay
"Autobiography as Defacement" (1970) further unsettles the notion that a self can be written:
We assume that life produces the autobiography as an act produces its consequences, but can we not
suggest, with equal justice, that the autobiographical project may itself produce and determine that life
and that whatever the writer does is in fact governed by the technical demands of self-portraiture and
thus determined, in all its aspects, by the resources of his medium?
de Man in Ealcin: 1985, p. 185.
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The movement from text to knowledge of the self is also illusion according to de Man. But,
some feminist writers wanted to see a reversal of de Man's analysis in the late
nineteen-eighties. They call for a return to subjecthood, and Jouve suggests that, above all, we
need to be in touch with ourselves and with others in order to call things into question and in
order to keep critical engagement alive (Jouve: 1991, pp.11-12). Notions of subjectivity are
problematic within contemporary theory but autobiography also has a generically problematic
existence. Jouve asks:
Is it a form? Is it content? a mixed genre? an inferior genre? necessarily ruptured and discontinuous?
Does it involve a contract with the name of the author? Is it meant to make a fallacious whole of the
disparate elements of the personality? to separate, or to connect, private and public self? How can you
so glibly assume that by saying 'I' you will somehow make everything add up?
Jouve: 1991, p.10.
As I began to investigate autobiographical writing across many forms the following
questions seemed to be relevant: If autobiography is the mirror in which the individual reflects
her own image then is autobiographical writing/reading part of an inner looking narcissistic
project on the part of the author and a voyeuristic pursuit on the part of the reader? Or, more
positively, can writing and reading about female life experience be regarded as part of more
outward looking practices which further the political projects relating to feminism ? Does the
fictionalisation of life experience threaten the existence of a discrete and self-contained
identity? Is there a danger that in becoming the authors of our own lives, constructing
ourselves through fiction, we lose a sense of self-knowledge by becoming an intrinsic part of
our own aesthetic creation? Jouve suggests that there are problems when one becomes the
object or the subject of a text but dismisses any kind of faint-hearted avoidance:
It is not because consciousness can never be full, never be more than fragments or a patchwork. that
the enterprise is fallacious.
Indeed, it is because subjecthood has become so difficult, has been so deconstructed, that there is
need to work towards it. This is particularly so for women. It has often been pointed out in recent
years that women's autobiographies carry a sense of their being somehow 'unfinished' human beings.
The awareness of being 'different', pain arising from that sense of being as related to, let alone
symbolic of, the world at large.
Jouve: 1991, 10 - 11.
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In order to write about one's personal life experience one has to perceive the self as other,
the subject, then, becomes objectified. The process of crafting in poetry and prose enables the
subject to become a separate thing, an artefact, something which can be edited, shaped,
changed, tampered with. In this kind of story-telling the self becomes far more objectified than
in the immediacy of subjective oral narratives. Although we do shape and edit our spoken
stories, we silence ourselves or fill in gaps, we do not have the time, space or opportunity to
offer the last version from a pile of multiple drafts.
Doris Lessing explains in her autobiography, Under my Skin (1994), that telling the truth
and deciding how much or how little to tell is the first problem one has to face when one
decides to write about one's life (Lessing: 1995, p.11). However, the decisions about
omissions or inclusions are less problematic than the problem of changing perceptions, for
memories and judgements alter with time:
Telling the truth or not telling it, and how much, is a lesser problem than the one of shifting
perspectives, for you see your life differently at different stages, like climbing a mountain while the
landscape changes with every turn in the path. Had I written this when I was thirty, it would have
been a pretty combative document. In my forties, a wail of despair and guilt: oh my God, how could I
have done this or that? Now I look back at that child, that girl, that young woman, with a more
detached curiosity. [...] I try to see my past selves as someone else might, and then put myself back
inside one of them, and am at once submerged in a hot struggle of emotion, justified by thoughts and
ideas I now judge wrong.
Lessing: 1995, p.12.
What is particularly of interest here is the sense that Lessing comes out of herself to see herself
as others do, but then re-inhabits that objectified self only to find herself, once more, swamped
by subjective emotions. In the second volume of her autobiography, Walking in the Shade
(1997), Lessing explains that she has discovered that the trick of memory is to tidy up and
simplify one's life experiences (Lessing: 1997, p.327). Again we are faced with the notion that
coherence is only possible when one has edited out, at least in part, the multiplicity of
existence.
In Sean Burke's Reader Authorship from Plato to the Postmodern (1995) the uneasy
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relationship between author, subject and self are examined. Burke explains that the act of
authorship is an exercise in "self-deflection" or "the creation of an aesthetic identity which
seeks to transcend or negate the biographical subject" (Burke: 1995, p.303). Particularly in
autobiography the problems related to the aesthetics of subjectivity are compounded by "the
absence of an ostensible narrator or a poetic speaker through which agency the author is
distanced from the subject of representation" (Burke: 1995, p.304). Burke's introduction raises
a number of questions which will be useful to us in our exploration of women's autobiography:
When an author writes or thinks to be writing, is that author simultaneously written? Does creative
imagination guide the composition, or is the writer like the scrawl of an alien power trying out a new
pen? Are the 'great authors' masters in the house of language, or its privileged tenants? Is the author
the producer or its product? Do we speak language or does language speak us? Does the author reflect
culture and history, or is the author constructed in culture and history?
Burke: 1995, p.xv.
Here we seem to come upon another question regarding a woman's desire to become the
author of her own life: would this practice constitute a contradiction of the notions in Barthes'
"The Death of the Author" (1968)? Does autobiography undermine the birth of the reader and
remove the text from a primary position? Challenges to the concept of a speaking subject
and the belief in language's transparency have called into question Western epistemological
metanarratives including autobiography. Now the emphasis is on the text and the reader. This
is further complicated when we consider that the reader too is only a subject in process,
always only a product of language. As Smith points out, if there is no stable self, then, there is
no actual reader. The writer tells "a story" rather than "the" story and the reader is complicit in
this presentation:
Trying to tell the story she wants to tell about herself, she is seduced into a tantalizing and yet elusive
adventure that makes her both the creator and creation, writer and what is written about. The very
language she uses to name herself is simultaneously empowering and vitiating since words cannot
capture the full sense of being and narratives explode in multiple directions on their own.
Smith: 1987, p.46.
There is a less fluid contract between the reader and writer of autobiography than that
between the reader and the fiction writer. There is some expectation of truth, that a person is
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struggling with their own history, a real past. As we move towards the writing of Woolf and
Plath we will see that writers themselves struggle with the nature of memory and its impact on
writing the self In Woolf s memoirs, for example, we have an explicit expression of
self-reflexivity which confesses to the omissions, inclusions and ordering which will necessarily
alter what masquerades as a true story of the past. In terms of form and style, Plath
experiments with different genre and the same story can be read through very different texts.
In this way Plath self-consciously sought to justify herself and create order through writing.
For Plath, then, using autobiographical material in fiction and poetry was a means of undoing a
schizophrenic splitting of the subject.
Performativity, therefore becomes a key term when we consider these autobiographical
writings:
Involved in a kind of masquerade, the autobiographer creates an iconic representation of continuous
identity that stands for, or rather before, her subjectivity as she tells of this "I" rather than that "I."
She may even create several, sometimes competing stories about or versions of herself as her
subjectivity is displaced by one or multiple textual representations. The doubling of the "sell" into a
narrating "I" and a narrated "I" and, further, the fracturing of the narrated "I" into multiple speaking
postures mark the autobiographical process as rhetorical artefact and the authorial signature as
mythography.
Smith: 1987, p. 47.
The "I" becomes no longer "familiar" but "foreign" and "the drift of the disappropriation, the
shape, that is, that the autobiographer's narrative and dramatic strategies take, reveals more
about the autobiographer's present experience of "self' than about her past" and this is related
to cultural ideologies and notions of selfhood: "self-interpretation emerges rhetorically from
the autobiographer's engagement with the fictive stories of selfhood" (Smith: 1987, p.47).
The female autobiographer is therefore responding to multiple readers, both masculine
and feminine, and their expectations. She needs to negotiate the reader's desire and
expectation, she needs to create strategies and she is always self-conscious and self-reflexive,
because she knows that she is writing/speaking into an andocentric culture and literary
tradition. The reader needs to be aware of the interestedness of the author, the author needs to
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be aware of his/her responsibility to own his/her desires. A will-to-impersonality is thus seen as
a defensive mechanism. Burke explains his discomfort with recent post-structuralist theory (in
Derrida for example) and outlines some interesting notions which, to a certain extent, echo my
own; he suggests that a recognition of particularity and situatedness requires a stance that is
not impersonal or disinterested; authorship must therefore be repositioned "as a situated
activity present not so much to itself as to culture, ideology, language, difference, influence,
biography" (Burke: 1995, p.)ocxvi).
There are some questions to be raised here regarding women's problematic access to
language and cultural institutions and how a restricted access then relates to women's sense of
self both culturally and historically. Lacan, as we have seen, held that the unconscious is
created at the same time as language is acquired; the naming of objects is related to social
interaction and is motivated by the child's sense of loss and powerlessness during the
separation stage. Acquisition of language, development of self-awareness and representational
thought occurs therefore when the child is aware of itself as both subject and object.
Conscious self-reflexivity depends upon language and the imagination, therefore human
development has a direct correlation to the relationship between subjectivity and language
acquisition. The self in this regard is an emergent rather than a given entity. If women's access
to language, particularly within the public sphere, is limited then our emergent selves will also
be stunted.
Does the writing of female experience through autobiography or fiction have the potential
to change lives? When these stories become public property can they be appropriated and
inhabited by other subjects who have not found the means to articulate what is recognizable as
female experience and consciousness? Can the metaphors and symbols can become ours? Does
reading female autobiography give women access to a new language?
Once a life experience has been told as a story, verbalised or written down, it is objectified
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and as such the self can be partially unified through form. As Foucault points out in "What is
Enlightenment?" (1984) the concept of the self as an aesthetic artefact is hardly new and
certainly not limited to literary experience. We are not free to wander within and explore a
pre-existent but unknown self but are forced to consider and undertake the task of
self-production. I believe this is particularly interesting from a feminist perspective as the
writing of female experience through autobiography or fiction does have the potential to
change lives. When these stories become public property they become about "everywoman".
Writing a woman's life is of crucial importance and through women's autobiographical writing
the private and the personal have become political.
Feminist Responses
Despite the fact that women's autobiography has only recently been accepted into the literary
canon as a distinct and important genre, women have always told stories to one another and
clearly there is a long tradition of writing the self in diary and letter form. These private and
semi-private modes of representation have long existed for women but my interest is also
related to the implications of public production and publication of life stories in many forms.
Plath and Woolf seemed apt subjects due to their position as cultural icons. In my subsequent
reading of the above writers we have to address the relationship between author,
subject/object and text. In Foucault's essay "What is an author?" he states his indifference
towards the speaker: "what difference does it make who is speaking?" The emphasis is not on
the disappearance or absence of the author but rather on "the space left empty by the author's
disappearance.".We should not only try to locate this space but also "follow the distribution of
gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings that this disappearance uncovers" (Rabinow,
1987, pp.101-120). It is these fissures, these silences between the echoings and reverberations
of texts which I want to investigate. The reading of autobiography and fiction based on life
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experience means that the question "Who spoke?" is immediately answered with nothing more
than a name for a negotiation of the multiple selves which are represented means that we
cannot discover a discrete identity behind the texts. As Shari Benstock claims: "Autobiography
reveals the impossibility of its own dream: what begins on the presumption of self knowledge
ends in the creation of a fiction that covers over the premises of its construction"
(Benstock: 1988, p.11). If this is the case when authors attempt to write the self then how
much more impossible is it for the reader to reach a knowledge of the self behind the text?
Although my research into psychoanalytical and linguistic theories relating to women and
the body, women and language and the relation of these theories to notions of madness
(paranoia, schizophrenia and narcissism) have been invaluable, these theories are employed in
my literary analyses in an eclectic manner. Rather than impose pathological readings onto the
texts I have explored, I have been more concerned to look at the differences in the language
used to express life experience, the modes of expression and how they might be related to a
sense of audience and generic form. So whilst it may be tempting to offer diagnostical readings
which relate to the biographical details of an author's life, my interest is to look at the language
used to describe that life experience rather than to offer labels from psycho-analytical
terminology. As Hennione Lee in her recent biography of Woolf suggests, naming "illnesses"
can so often limit our reading.
The movement between subject and object, private and public as well as women's
problematic relationship with the body and language leads to a fragmented and displaced
notion of selfhood when women embark upon the project of writing the self. The ensuing
splitting of the subject may account for what many critics have assumed is a schizophrenic,
narcissistic or paranoid tendency within these writers' psyches. I would argue that this is
merely side-stepping the issue. The problem which must be addressed is much larger than this,
that problem is inextricably bound to the nature of self-representation, especially for women.
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Kristeva's discussion of foreigness in Strangers to Ourselves (1988) could be of some use
here as she seems to suggest that the links between primary narcissism, paranoia and
schizophrenia can be broken when the subject recognizes that his/her difference and
separateness is not only external but also internal, that we have a foreigner within. The other is
experienced as strange, dangerous or unpleasant because it constitutes the part of the self
which has been rejected and projected outwards. Production and recognition of the alien, then
becomes a defence mechanism:
In this instance the strange appears as a defence put up by a distraught self: it protects itself by
substituting for the image of a benevolent double that used to be enough to shelter it from the image of
a malevolent double into which it expels the share of destruction it cannot contain.
Kristeva: 1991, p183.
A difficulty arises when during this process of discovering our multiplicity and playing out the
emergent split identities we are in danger of being considered mad:
Being alienated from myself, as painful as that may be, provides me with that exquisite distance
within which perverse pleasure begins, as well as the possibility of my imagining and thinking ...
Split identity, kaleidoscope of identities: can we be a saga for ourselves without being considered mad
or fake?
Kristeva: 1991, pp.13-14.
One has to address the notion of an obvious dispersal of the self as it is represented by
multiple generic productions. Kristeva suggests that language is used as defence against the
abjection of the female body; language becomes the screen defending the boundary between
the conscious and the unconscious, as well as the mirror within which the repressed can be
framed and reflected in some discrete form.
However, a woman's access to language is not an easy one, as we have seen. Referring to
our earlier quote from Carolyn Burke, we either find ourselves speaking in what seems like a
foreign tongue which makes us uncomfortable or we become complicit in our assimilation of a
dominant masculine discourse. Those who speak from the margins, from what Sidonie Smith
terms "a negative position in culture," are bound to reveal "the tensions between
consciousness and the social world" (Smith: 1987, p.4). Many feminist critics have recently
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been working to retrieve and collect those voices (20).
Julia Swindells begins her introduction to The Uses of Autobiography (1994) with the
comment: "The orthodox version of the Western European autobiographical tradition displays
Roland Barthes as the Twentieth Century apotheosis, and variously St Augustine or
Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the revered head of the tradition" (Swindells: 1994, p.1). Beginning
with Barthes' confident affirmation "I myself am my own symbol" from Roland Barthes on
Roland Barthes (1977), Swindells explains that she aims to examine the issues raised by such a
statement regarding "the entire tradition [of autobiography] and the process of its
construction" (Swindells: 1994, pl). Swindells welcomes recent commentary which questions
the notion that "autobiography is a naked and transparent presentation of existence" and which
underlines the "process of mediation between the subject and author of the autobiography, and
the ideological environment they inhabit." Thus the "autobiographical act" is not always read
as an isolated "testimony to individuals, removed from their relationship to the social world"
(Swindells: 1994, p.1). However, Swindells also finds problematic an autobiographer's claim
that either due to full integration he (Swindells here is referring specifically to male
autobiographers) can offer an authoritative and perfect example of "the model relationship
between the individual and the social world" or otherwise "via a transcendent selfhood" his
superior position would allow him to produce a reflection of his "ideological domain"
(Swindells: 1994, p.2). Thus the autobiographer speaks for all, the relationship between his
consciousness and the environment serves as a model for the relationship of an "everyman"
consciousness to the world which it inhabits. The normalizing effect of this, as Swindells
suggests, means that any conflict between people and their ideological milieu is neglected.
I think it would be useful here to explore a little the traditional male genre to see how these
masculine autobiographies may differ in purpose to a female project of writing the self. The
most formative male autobiographical writing can be found in the Confessions of Saint
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Augustine (Bishop of Hippo, 397 A.D) and those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1781). Saint
Augustine's Confessions reveal that the author's purpose is not to merely tell a story about his
life, but to direct others towards the church; he writes an episodic autobiography of his sins
only to emphasize God's grace. This work directs the reader away from the author and so
employs the impersonal third person in order to persuade and encourage others to follow his
lead and seek for themselves the grace of God. For Rousseau, the self is the subject of the
discourse. His aim is not to glorify God but to provide the truth about himself by revealing
himself in all his completeness to the gaze of the reader. Rousseau's work reveals an insistence
on difference rather than universality. His appeal is related to a celebration of autonomy and
individuality, which in turn signals that we are all unique, that we all have our own individual
histories, memories and perceptions.
Whilst Rousseau's secular writing might reveal some similarities to women's
autobiographies in terms of trying to create a "self' in order to define himself to himself and to
others, it is his emphasis on an isolated inner self which makes his purpose different from that
of many female autobiographers. However, similar to Lessing's description of the process of
writing autobiography, Rousseau creates a separate self, an object which can be examined and
judged and constantly draws attention to the fictionality of his self-portrait, which suggests
that the self presented is indeed a construct, a fabrication of his own imagination.
Autobiography can be useful to a feminist project but in order to be effective the genre
must move away from individualism and isolation in order to promote social and political
change. Swindells wishes to move beyond individual life stories and to promote "the use of
autobiography as part of a political strategy to produce change" (Swindells: 1994, p.205).
Collective editions of previously silenced voices lead to the emergence of the notion and the
familiar slogan that "the personal is political." A public voicing of women's dissatisfaction
seemed to make more achievable the possibility of political action and therefore change. The
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discovery that women's experiences as mothers and daughters were often not positive due to
societal expectations had revolutionary potential. Also these works encouraged more women
to speak and write and to reconsider the value of their narratives. Formerly they had
considered that what they had to say about their lives was unimportant because of the triviality
of daily experiences and although women have long been writing diaries, letters and journals,
these forms of writing usually remain private.
Susan Friedman suggests that it is women's alienation which motivates the writing of
autobiography, that its writing can be a positive step towards the formation of a group
identity, a solidarity, and a collective consciousness: "Writing the self shatters the cultural hall
of mirrors and breaks the silence imposed by male speech" (Friedman in Benstock: 1988,
p.41). She points towards Chodorow's notion that a feminine sense of self is a sense of
connectedness and community. Nancy Chodorow's groundbreaking work The Reproduction of
Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (1978) develops a theory which
explains the difference between male and female identity and the process of individuation. She
claims that the female child is less likely to experience the same degree of separation and
disconnection from the pre-Oedipal attachments within the family as the male child, her
individuality is then not as keenly desired nor felt. The female child nevertheless becomes
marginalized because the male child enters into the public domain and the dominant discourse
of the fathers; therefore the male experience is considered to be the normative and is the
dominant human paradigm:
From this ideological perspective the girl comes to speak tentatively from outside the prevailing
framework of individuality: She brings a different kind of voice to her narrative. To be sure, the
difference in experience is culturally rather than biologically based, reproduced by the familial and
cultural structures of power constitutive of patriarchy.
Smith: 1987, P. 12-13.
Because women's "psychosexual development" differs it follows that her texts will also signal
a different relationship to representation therefore we cannot be satisfied with those theories
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which do not take account of women's sense of connectedness to others and the effect that
this would have on identity and therefore self-representation. Nevertheless, we need to address
any underlying assumptions about writing and sexual difference, about genre and gender,
about the intersection between ideologies of male and female selfhood (21).
Although patriarchal psycho-analytical discourses prioritise separation over relatedness in
order for the subject to achieve autonomy and maturity, feminists have to take issue with this
notion without somehow becoming enmeshed in other traditional patriarchal ideologies which
would keep women shut away in the bedroom, the nursery and the kitchen because of our
"relational" role in society. I would argue that the notion of connectedness, relationality and
community is a key and recurring issue within feminism, that a recognition of the centrality of
this is perhaps the only way forward for women.Women's stories may challenge the dominant
culture and yet many critics of autobiography have remained indifferent to the importance of
sexual difference and the language of female experience. Donna C. Stanton points out the
disjunction created by the absence of women's texts in discussions about autobiography and
suggests the possibility that a female tradition has been usurped. The hierarchical critical
valuations claim that the male text is "crafted and aesthetic" and that the female text is
"spontaneous, natural." These notions seem "to affirm that women could not transcend, but
only record, the concerns of the private self" Therefore the description "autobiographical"
actually becomes a "weapon to denigrate female texts and exclude them from the canon"
(Stanton in Smith: 1987, p.16).
Smith is concerned that, although consideration has been given to women's autobiography
in relation to women's biological experience, there is very little which takes consideration of
the issues of women's identity, and textuality - her writing and reading practices. Gender has
only recently become a focus of critical evaluations of life writing. Smith points out that
women's marginalization both in terms of her limited access to public space and her
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problematic relation to speech has "either condemned her to public silence or profoundly
contaminated her relationship to the pen as an instrument of power" (Smith: 1987, p.7).
Patriarchal definitions of women's nature and her prescribed roles are therefore transgressed if
she attempts to give in to the desire to speak in her own voice. Also, in terms of
representation, women's life stories are unlikely to fulfil the traditional criteria due to her
lack of standing in the public eye; a notable "eminent" woman who may achieve such status is
therefore an exception and would not be representative of her social milieu or times. Her
voice, then, either becomes part of the master narrative or else women's unexceptional life
stories remain unheard because of their inferior, narrow experience. We shall see that Plath
constantly battled with the notion that she had nothing noteworthy to write about.
Feminist literary theorists, such as Smith, have recently deconstructed "the patriarchal
hegemony of literary history, poetics, and aesthetics" and reconstructed a different perspective
(Smith: 1987, p.17). By taking into account the significance of gender, by exploring history
and genre, theories of women's autobiography are beginning to take shape:
Going beyond the adaptation of androcentric historiography and poetics, the theories are grounded in
a variety of feminocentric phenomena. The most conservative and the earliest to emerge argues that
the specificity of women's autobiography comes from thematic content, determined by women's
subordinate and prescribed status in patriarchal culture. Instead of adventures and vocations, of
existential angst and alienation, women write about the sphere of domesticity [...] But the recourse to
a binarism that reifies the public-private opposition eventuates in a simplistic and unsatisfactory
description of textual difference.
Smith: 1987, p.17.
Smith distinguishes this critique of content with that of form which seems to link experience to
style rather than consider the intrinsic nature of the genre:
Other theories of difference have distinguished women's autobiographical writing as fragmentary and
discontinuous, a narrative mode imitative of their actual experience as daughter, wife, and mother
responsive emotionally to the myriad pressures of another's needs [...] such theories of fragmentation
and discontinuity ignore the nature of autobiographical practice ... the generic contract engages the
autobiographer in a doubled subjectivity - the autobiographer as protagonist of her story and
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autobiographer as narrator. Through that doubled subjectivity she pursues her fictions of selfhood by
fits and starts.
Smith: 1987, pp.17-18.
Within my own writing on autobiography I have attempted to address the issue that the
importance of form and style is equal to content when women write about their lives.
Whilst the autobiographer "unmasks her transgressive desire for cultural and literary
authority" she also has to negotiate fictions about subjectivity, she is not a man and she is not
the woman she is supposed to be, so woman has no autobiographical self in the sense that man
does, she has been erased and should be self-effacing (Smith: 1987, p.51). The female
autobiographer is thus removed from the centre of power and discourse and speaks/writes
from a marginal position crossing many other stories already told about her: she is trespassing,
she is an interloper. If the female autobiographer is successful in the public arena, is this
because she is still telling a story about the centrality of male dominance? In terms of Julia
Kristeva's notion of the law of the father we must ask whether the daughter needs to raise
herself to his stature in order to be deemed worthy. Must she embrace the myths of patriarchy
in order to assume that she has a right to speak? And if she does so, is she not complicit in
silencing the mother, denying the maternal? Will she capitulate or accept marginalisation
because she is deemed unfeminine? Either way she will not be deemed an ideal woman, and
will still have to face an almost inevitable rejection because her story is probably not worth
telling and, of course, women who do tell their stories are only giving in to a natural female
bent towards narcissism. Smith ends her work on a more positive note regarding Twentieth
Century life narratives saying that female autobiographers are more conscious of their position
as women and less concerned to embrace a masculine mode of selfhood. The modern writer
engages with the fictions of a dominant discourse and finds herself empowered within the
very system which would silence her:
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She greets, identifies with, rebels against, cannibalizes, and ultimately transforms public forms of
selfhood. Cannabalizing the forms of selfhood embedded in the ideology of gender, she turns the
female "self' and female storytelling into some amalgam, something neither conventionally male nor
female, some energizing mutation played on autobiographical possibilities. Fashioning her own voice
within and against the voices of others, she performs a selective appropriation of stories told by and
about men and women. Subversively, she rearranges the dominant discourse and the dominant
ideology of gender, seizing the language and its powers to turn cultural fictions into her very own
story. Sometimes, in the wonderful ingeniousness of her effort, she performs a critical unravelling of
the hegemonic figures of selfhood. Always she ends up creating herself once again in a medium that
will hold her forever still but not silenced.
In that creative gesture, woman speaks to her culture from the margins. While margins have their
limitations, they also have their advantages of vision. They are polyvocal, more distant from the
centers of power and conventions of selfhood. They are heretical.
Smith: 1987, p.175-176.
Female autobiography may still be eccentric but, as we shall see in the following chapters, it is
very much alive.
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Notes
(1) Some studies show that asylums in Britain and abroad were largely populated by an equal
number of male and female patients (Anatomy of Madness: Institutions and Society
VoL2 - see Charlotte MacKenzie's figures in "Social factors in the admission, discharge,
and continuing stay of patients at Ticehurst Asylum, 1845-1917" (pp. 147-174). Also, as
Martin Stone points out, the shell shock victims of World War One had a great impact on
British psychiatry in the 1920s and 1930s and the hysterical symptoms and neuroses
generally connected to female behaviours were found to be affecting thousands of men
forced to return from the front-line trenches in France due to severe mental breakdown.
Many British doctors at the time felt that "shellshock had effectively 'disproved' Freud's
theory of sexuality" (Stone in Bynum, Porter & Shepherd: 1985, p.245). See also the
social construction of shell shock in Martin Stone, Anatomy of Madness VoL 2,
"Shellshock and the Psychologists", pp.242-271. I will investigate more fully these
concepts in relation to Septimus Smith in Virginia Woolf s novel Mrs Dalloway alongside
Woolf s comments on war, masculinity and madness.
(2) See Laing's texts The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (1959)
and The Self and Others (1961).
(3) In The Social Construction of What? (1999) Ian Hacking considers the tension between
"real" and "constructed" notions of madness, a tension which is the result of an interaction
between the two. Hacking explains that within psychopathology, "the very habitus of mind
and body," diagnosis based on biological and social causes constantly confront one
another (see Hacking: 1999, pp.100-124).
(4)Freud's 'Case of Dora', see "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of ilysttlia!' ('190 .1, 1905).
Volume 7, Standard Edition.
(5) This is the passage which Woolf takes issue with in A Room Of One's Own (1929). Woolf
notes the jarring effect of Grace Poole's laughter and considers that Bronte was airing
some "personal Grievance" (Woolf 1977, pp. 66-70).
(6) All further references are taken from this edition.
(7) See the effects of the rest cure on Virginia Woolf also in the next chapter.
(8) In Studies on Hysteria (1893-1895) by Breuer and Freud you can read other accounts of
young women, such as 'Anna 0', whose intellectual life was so restricted that they also
suffered mental breakdown. However, from Freud's perspective this neurotic behaviour is a
direct result of penis envy and an inability on the woman's part to accept the limitations of
her sex. Volume 2, Standard Edition.
(9)There is also the suggestion of former prisoners in Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale (1985)
as well as similar recurring images of hanging. Offred's discovery that she is not the first
woman to be incarcerated in her room, and the sense of a ghostly double, is a source of
comfort to her throughout the novel.
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(10) In Margaret Atwood's novel Surfacing (1979) we also find a denouement in which the
heroine could be read as an embodiment of female madness. This heroine relinquishes all
language and clothing and, in a kind of Shamanistic regression, and returns to nature in
order to escape from oppressive patriarchal systems. Although the body language
exhibited at the end of these texts is sufficient to silence the male oppressors of the
heroines, these women are nevertheless acting out an embodiment of the stories which are
told about feminine behaviour and, as Pearce and Mills argue in their marxist/feminist
reading of Margaret Atwood's Surfacing, an eventual return to the symbolic and a
re-integration into society is necessary in order to reclaim articulation and a voice in the
dominant sphere of existence if women are to make any kind of difference to their
situation (Mills, Pearce et a!.: 1989, pp. 220-224).
(11) See also Susie Orbach's book Hunger Strike: The Anorexic's Struggle as a Metaphor for
Our Age (1986). London: Faber & Faber.
(12) Wolf refers to Showalter's notion that the practice of electro-shock treatment is carried
out as a kind of religious ritual and performed by "a priestly masculine figure." The
process becomes a magical a rite of passage where the patient undergoes a "death and
rebirth ceremony". The "bad' crazy self' is killed off and a new "good' self' is
resurrected ( Showalter: 1987, p. 217). See also Janet Frame's description of ECT in the
third volume of her autobiography The Envoy from Mirror City (1985):
I learned from studying the journals that ECT (Electric Shock or Convulsive Therapy) was
commended as a means of provoking fear in the patient, the fear being as it were a bonus, and
salutary - for the psychiatrist no doubt and not for the patient! Sitting there among the labelled bottled
brains I ventured to hope for the quality of strength and vigilance in psychiatrists, their continued
examination and testing of their humanity without which they might become political operators
infected with the endemic virus of psychiatry, politics, and some other professions - belief in the self
as God.
Frame: 1993, p.118
In Faces in the Water (1961), Frame's fictionalisation of her own treatment for
schizophrenia, the narrator comments that fear itself leads patients into more madness
(Frame: 1993, p. 23).
(13) See Showalter: 1987, pp. 208-210 & 215-216.
(14)Relevant Nietszche texts here would be Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1885), Beyond Good
and Evil (1886) and Ecce Homo (1889).
(15)For a further outline of feminist responses to Foucault see Jana Sawiki "Foucault
Feminism and Questions of Identity" in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (1994),
ed. Gary Gutting.
(16) See a relevant fragment of Kant's "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?"
(1784) in Waugh: 1992, pp.87-89.
(17)All further references will be from this edition.
(18) See in particular Fevvers and Lizzie in Nights at the Circus (1984) and Nora and Dora in
87
Wise Children (1991).
(19)Lucy Armitt, who reads this novel alongside Freud's writings on Dora, the uncanny and
Totem and Taboo (1913), suggests that Francie's first response uncovers a second ghost;
that of his and Margaret's child (the result of an incestuous coupling). Francie is not
surprised at the existence of the hand but shocked that Margaret, his sister, has not kept it
more carefully hidden (Artnitt: 2000, p.210).
(20)See Sidonie Smith in A Poetics of Women's Autobiography: Marginality and the Fictions
of Self-Representation (1987) and Estelle Jelinek The Tradition of Women's
Autobiography: From Antiquity to the Present (1986). Jelinek points out that most
autobiographical theory has been founded on the readings of male texts and that this
theory will not do when considering texts written by women.
(21)This is a point which Patricia Waugh also makes: "Women's sense of identity is more
likely, for psychological and cultural reasons, to consist of a more diffuse sense of the
boundaries of self and their identity understood in relational and intersubjective terms"
(Waugh: 1992, pp. 201-203).
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Part Two: Reading
Virginia Woolf and Sylvia Plath
Virginia Woolf: Writing a Woman's Life
An investigation of Woolf s writing would seem appropriate not only because she so often
chooses for her subject the female condition but also because she continually raises questions
about the existence, or non-existence, of an essential self. The passages I have selected for
consideration are those wherein Woolf wishes to articulate the experiences of transcendence
and immanence, to find expression for a sense of momentary non-being and "moments of
being" and how these relate to the body. There is also a sense in which writing the body, or
writing about the relationship between women and their bodies, belies an investigation of the
self, a search for identity and a desire for unity whilst recognising the experience of
fragmentation and multiple selves. Although we may feel that we have a clearer picture of who
Woolf was or is to us now when we have read her across the multiple forms of her writing, it
is the voice and what that voice is able to say through those various forms that I have
attempted to analyse here. I have chosen the specific recurring themes of writing, art,
imagination and reality, illness, constructions of femininity (the mirror, narcissism, patriarchal
ideals and feminist responses), class and death; all of which were clearly specific
preoccupations for Virginia Woolf and are expressed across the whole of her writing. But that
word whole is immediately problematic, for even with a comprehensive reading of essays,
letters, diaries, memoirs and fiction, there is a constant tension between unity and
fragmentation. There is a marked difference in the language and purpose of the diary entries
and letter writing, and reading both gives us a fuller picture of Woolf s writing practices; a
fuller picture but in no sense a whole or completed one.
Woolf was deeply reticent and private in some respects, everything which was prepared for
publication was carefully censored and shaped to form a kind of mask which would hide her
identity. There is certainly a sense of masquerade even in her most intimate letters, and whilst
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the diary and autobiographical writings might suggest a less guarded style and therefore a
more voyeuristic insight for the reader, I would question this reading as being too simplistic.
Woolf may have written things that she did not expect others to read and may have recorded
as closely as she could her myriad impressions of everyday life without any explicit evidence of
a thoughtful creation of shape. Nevertheless, however unpolished the language and
punctuation may be in these 'private' texts, the voice certainly addresses an audience which
often suggests a dislocated self, a self which may just be listening, but also a self which could
be critical, punishing, wise - a self to whom she directs questions. Although in this sense
Woolf becomes her own audience, there is not a sense of wholeness here and there is no easy
singularity of Woolf "herself' for she had many selves both in the public and the private
sphere.
Woolf was concerned to experiment with form in her non-fictional writings of the self as
well as within her fictions:
There looms ahead of me the shadow of some kind of form which a diary might attain to. I might in
the course of time learn what it is that one can make of this loose, drifting material of life; finding
another use for it than the use I put it to, so much more consciously and scrupulously, in fiction.
A Writer's Diary: 1978, pp. 31-32.
Within her diary we have many voices and these tell us that she was concerned, not only with
its purpose, but also with how to write a diary, how to write a self or "a soul", how to express
that interest in oneself without becoming self-absorbed (Lee: 1996, p.5). What is clear is that,
for Woolf, life-writing was of central interest and importance and this is evident in her fiction,
essays, and politics quite apart from the writing of diaries and memoirs. Whilst Woolf s desire
was to create something as solid and formal as a building, when she came to write her most
autobiographical novel, To the Lighthouse (1925) she soon discovered that "words are more
impalpable than bricks." Woolf was well aware that as soon as one tries to write "a whole
vision, an entire conception" of an experience which had left a lasting impression in the
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memory and reconstruct it in words, one would find that it "breaks into a thousand conflicting
impressions" (1). I would suggest that this experience of fragmentation was of great interest to
Woolf and is evident, not only in her thematic explorations within and about the novels, but
throughout her writing in every form.
Let us consider initially Woolf s non-fictions of the self in "A Sketch of the Past" (1939).
Here Woolf was concerned to address the problems of how to write a life and picks out
isolated and specific scenes, memories from her early childhood, which are descriptions of her
sensations, rather than of herself She is "only the container of the feeling of ecstasy, of the
feeling of rapture" (Moments: 1976, p.6'7). She remembers the colours and sounds and the
emotions felt, but she us tells that "one only remembers what is exceptional" because life is
largely made up of the experience of "non-being," which she describes as "cotton wool"
(Moments: 1976, p.69, p.71). The remembrances, which make themselves felt through this
padding of everyday life, she describes as "sudden shocks" or "blows" and these serve as
moments of "revelation" because following such an experience comes the need for
explanation:
it is a token of some real thing behind appearances; and I make it real by putting it into words. It is
only by putting it into words that I make it whole; this wholeness means that it has lost its power to
hurt me; it gives me, perhaps because by doing so I take away the pain, a great delight to put the
severed parts together. Perhaps this is the strongest pleasure known to me. It is the rapture I get when
in writing I seem to be discovering what belongs to what; making a scene come right; making a
character come together. From this I reach what I might call my philosophy; at any rate it is a
constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is a hidden pattern; that we - I mean all human
beings- are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of
art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. But there is
no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words;
we are the music; we are the thing itself. And I see this when I have a shock
Moments: 1976, p.72.
What is interesting is that, although Woolf is concerned to make a wholeness out of and within
a scene when describing an isolated memory, she later tells us that she will not try to make a
whole out of the collection of memories, they are not shaped into a unified picture of her life.
The scenes, then, are still fragmented:
92
These scenes, by the way, are not altogether a literary device - a means of summing up and making
innumerable details visible in one concrete picture. Details there were; still, if I stopped to think, I
could collect any number. But, whatever the reason may be, I find that scene making is my natural
way of marking the past Always a scene has arranged itself: representative; enduring. This confirms
me in my instinctive notion: (it will not bear arguing about; it is irrational) the sensation that we are
sealed vessels afloat on what it is convenient to call reality; and at some moments, the sealing matter
cracks; in floods reality; that is, these scenes - for why do they survive undamaged year after year
unless they are made of something comparatively permanent? Is this liability to scenes the origin of
my writing impulse? Are other people scene makers? These are questions to which I have no answer.
Perhaps sometime I will consider it more carefully. Obviously I have developed the faculty, because in
all the writing I have done, I have almost always had to make a scene ...
Moments: 1976, p.122.
Jeanne Schulkind makes a distinction in her introduction to Woolf s posthumously
published autobiographical writing, Moments of Being (1976), between the self of the material
and social world, wherein she sees an "emphasis on change and continuity of personal
identity," and the transcendent self which experiences these "moments of being":
the individual consciousness becomes an undifferentiated part of a greater whole. Thus, just as the
outer limits of the personality are blurred and unstable because of the responsiveness of the self to the
forces of the present moment, so the boundaries of the inner self are vague and, at moments,
non-existent. For Virginia Woolf, when the self merges with reality, all limits associated with the
physical world cease to exist.
Schulkind in Moments: 1976, p.18.
Yet, within this collection of "diverse" autobiographical writings, Schulkind sees "a
remarkable unity" (Schulkind in Moments: 1976, p.11). She suggests that "the fragments do
arrange themselves into a meaningful order" despite the fact that they were written for
different purposes and span a period of forty years. Conversely, John Mepham describes this
writing as "unguarded, uncensored, and relatively uncontrolled" (Mepham: 1991, p.180). Yet
he agrees that Woolf was trying to formulate at least a "coherent identity" through her
story-telling, even when she questions the validity of her memories:
In this 'sketch', the writing is not so much designed to record or recall an already established history,
as to attempt to create a coherent identity, by holding together in a pattern the various parts of herself,
or different identities, that she feels are all authentically part of who she is. She wants to create a story
that will bring these parts together into an intelligible whole. In particular the narrator is anxious to
exhibit for us her will to write as a kind of unexplained oddity at the heart of her life. There are
different possible ways of understanding the will to write. She prefers one particular life story, one
way of making sense of it, but she cannot tell us with certainty that it is true.
Mepham: 1991, p.182.
Woolf s belief was that the ever changing shapes of the self, the flux and fluidity of
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individual identity and the notion of its evidence throughout the external multiplicity of
experience, as well as within relationships with others, altered the shape of the self. However,
she seemed constantly to be looking for coherence through the creation of highly structured
patterns in her writing. Woolf writes of the "immense forces" of "the invisible presences," such
as class or the loss of one's mother, which affect the subject and that these must be taken into
account if life-writing is not to become "futile": "I see myself as a fish in a stream; deflected,
held in place; but cannot describe the stream" (Moments: 1976, p.80). That the self is both
deviant and fixed (and presumably slippery, almost uncatchable) suggests immediately a
multiplicity of being. In the first chapter ofA Room of One's Own (1929) Woolf gives an
account of how she gathered her ideas for the lecture she was to deliver to women students at
Cambridge University. She finds herself by the banks of the river, fishing for thoughts:
Thought - to call it by a prouder name than it deserved - had let its line down into the stream. It
swayed, minute after minute, hither and thither among the reflections and the weeds, letting the water
lift it and sink it until - you know the little tug - the sudden conglomeration of an idea at the end of
one's line: and then the curious hauling of it in, and the careful laying of it out? Alas, laid on the grass
how small, how insignificant this thought of mine looked; the sort of fish that a good fisherman puts
back into the water so that it may grow fatter and be one day worth cooking and eating.
A Room: 1977, p.7.
Woolf s opening passage in "A Sketch" would indicate a passive approach: "without
stopping to choose my way, in the sure and certain knowledge that it will find itself - or if not
it will not matter - I begin: the first memory" (Moments: 1976, p.64). Also evident is Woolf s
refusal to see herself as unified, in fact author and subject are very definitely distinct in the
second passage, following the description of her first memory, the flowers on her mother's
dress:
I could spend hours trying to write that as it should be written, in order to give the feeling which is
even at this very moment very strong in me. But I should fail (unless I had some wonderful luck); I
dare say I should only succeed in having the luck if I had begun by describing Virginia herself.
Moments: 1976, p.65.
Woolf s purpose was that the past and the present self should come out as two contrasting
people, this fragmentation would suggest a denial of the possibility of unity (Moments: 1976,
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p.75). I would argue that there is always a sense of self-conscious shaping in Woolfs scene
making. Even if the existence of an impersonal tone might point towards a lack of
self-awareness, this distancing process, wherein the author stands apart from or outside of the
autobiographical episode is itself a highly self-reflexive literary device.
Life and Fiction: Writing the Self
Let us look now look at the relationship between Woolfs life-writing, and her fiction. Reading
her memoirs (and other non-fiction - her diaries, letters and essays), it is clear that Woolf was
concerned to incorporate her life experience and the people she knew into her fictional
writing. The relationships between surface and depth, being and non-being were a constant
pre-occupation both thematically and in terms of form, as we shall see when we come to Mrs
Dalloway (1925) and To the Lighthouse (1927) at the end of this section. Whilst I would
perhaps argue with Schulkind's ideas about the imposition of unity within "A Sketch," I would
agree, in part, with her penultimate closing statement in the introduction to Moments of Being
But the material of the fiction, however directly it appears to have been taken from her life, was
nevertheless subtly transmuted in the creative process. Bits of one individual or incident are not
infrequently found mixed with bits of another, but more significantly, the meaning of the thing
created, whether character or incident, is rigorously subordinated to the design of the novel which,
once established, generated its own principles of harmony.
Schulkind in Moments: 1976, p.24.
That the meaning is "subordinated" to form is questionable. Perhaps form, to Woolf, is the
very stage upon which meaning can parade itself and become visible. Maria de Battista
describes Woolfs mode of authorship in terms of the theatrical devices of ventriloquy and
soliloquy; she suggests that the relationship between these two modes, or voices, is central to
the action within Woolfs fiction:
The dialogue between these two languages, the ventriloquist tethered to the present, the soliloquist
anchored in the timeless realm of her own sensations and imaginings, is as much a part of the 'action'
in a novel by Virginia Woolf as the giving of a party, the leap from a window, the journey to a
lighthouse.
de Battista in Roe and Sellers: 2000, p. 138.
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In fact when we consider Clarissa and Septimus in Mrs Danoway and Mrs Ramsay and Lily in
To the Lighthouse alongside what we know of Woolf s life experiences the notion of
ventriloquy and soliloquy is particularly interesting in terms of the experience of embodiment
and disembodiment encountered when life becomes art and the self is fictionalised.
John Mepham relates the "fantasy of disembodiment" in Woolf s fiction (Mrs Ramsay for
example) to the traumas in Woolf s childhood; abuse and bereavement. Although I shall
address the connections between a specific scene of abuse in "A Sketch" and Woolf s fictional
writing of the mirror later, I would be very wary of Mepham's view that it is possible that
"what really drives her writing is obsession and delusion" (Mepham: 1991, p.185). It may be
true that some knowledge of Freud led her to believe "that unconscious wishes and illusions
are central in the creative life," and certainly the writing of Mrs Ramsay had some
therapeutic results for Woolf, but her purpose surely was more far-reaching than a
"pathological" response to "the worm of obsession lurking in the rose of artistic genius"
(Mepham: 1991, p.185). The writing of the domestic, the female consciousness, the woman
artist, the transcendent self is not an "existential stance of disembodiment" which identifies
Woolf s "incapacities" and failures due to past abuses in her life story (Mepham: 1991, p.187).
This is to reduce out of recognition, and consequently lose a large part, of her fiction. This is
not to read the text at all, but to see it in blindly diagnostical terms. This is to ignore, or
perhaps refuse to acknowledge, the fundamental importance of Woolf s feminism.
It is interesting to note that Woolf herself was ambivalent in her attitude towards
psycho-pathology. Elizabeth Abel's writing on Woolf s relationship to pyschoanalysis in
Virginia Woolf and the Fictions of Psychoanalysis (1989) is particularly useful. Despite the
fact that the Hogarth Press published Freud's work and her friends James and Lytton Strachey
translated Freud, the Bloomsbury group were divided in their responses to the new science.
Woolf had met Freud and shown an interest in his work but ultimately Bell, Woolf and Fry
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were largely hostile and saw the psychoanalytical theories as a possible threat to life and art.
Hermione Lee points out that, whilst she explores the psyche in her autobiographical and
fictional writing, Woolf was more concerned to negotiate the contemporary, competing,
'fictional' discourses of Freud and Darwin and find expression in "an original language of her
own" for the experience of mental illness (Lee: 1996, p.187). De Battista also notes Woolf s
avoidance of psychoanalytical terminology:
Her characters may exhibit the symptoms of the mental afflictions that preoccupy modern psychology,
but neither they nor the narrator make explicit reference to the diagnostic nomenclature of
psychoanalysis. Words like hysteria, complex, repression, trauma, melancholia, fetishism, cathexis
are either absent or rarely encountered in her fiction.
de Battista in Roe: 2000, pp. 128-129.
Telling the truth about the body in a mode that was suited to women was central to
Woolf s feminist aesthetic and far outweighed a desire to embrace current male
psychoanalytical theory:
The most notable aspect of the memoir is its preoccupation with the attempt to retrieve a sexual
history which Woolf had nowhere else attempted to document. Though 'A Sketch of the Past' was
begun entirely without strategy, she came to feel that the attempt to 'tell the truth about the body' - an
attempt to which she had already referred, in A Room of One's Own - should continue a vital aspect of
autobiography by women.
Roe: 1990, p.43.
These stories, never before told, recall images which have occurred repeatedly throughout the
fiction but here we encounter a historical and personal context. There is a distinction between
"Virginia" and the narrator of the stories, the "I" which marks the blurring of the boundaries
between writing and remembering; "between the ordering and the screening subject" (Roe:
1990, p.43-44). When Woolf tries to recount the specific incident of early abuse there is
clearly an impersonal distance in the narration which might suggest the problem of finding a
more personal voice to express such deep private/personal emotions. Hence the subject of the
narrative "screens herself' by replacing an historical persona "Virginia," born on a specific
date, with a "Virginia Stephen" who is a-historical, and who is therefore further dissociated
from "her present subjective consciousness" (Roe: 1990, p.49). But it is this trans-historical
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connection with the generations of women who have gone before her which explains her
instinctive reaction of displeasure and fear. I would argue therefore that, even within the
account of this event, which may have been an early trigger for a dissociation from and
fragmentation of the self, at the time of writing this memoir there is evidence that she is still
concerned to connect and involve herself with the issues of womanhood because she refers to
the "thousands of ancestresses in the past" (Moments: 1976, p.69).
Indeed the writing of autobiography was, for Woolf; a revolutionary act, as Lee points out:
The inhibitions and censorships of women's life-writing is one of her most urgent subjects. It was still
possible for her to say, in 1927, out of her reading of history and biography, 'Very little is known
about women.'
Virginia Woolf s feminist programme, coming into its fullest and most explicit expression in her
fifties, is above all a literary one. It is inextricably bound up with her desire to 'revolutionise
biography. She wants to find new forms for 'women's as yet tumarrated lives'.
Lee: 1996, p.13.
There is no solid "I" in "A Sketch" but a shifting of perspective indicated by the use of
multiple pronouns and naming. I would suggest that this de-centering of the female subject,
indicative perhaps of the "fissures of female discontinuity," is not necessarily negative
(Benstock: 1988, p.20). However confessional the subject matter within the non-fictional
writing, there is always this tension between the personal and the impersonal. As we have seen
above, even when disclosing the most painful and traumatic events, Woolf is at pains to make
sure that she is not asking for pity to be directed personally towards her, she points away from
herself and towards all women. This is perhaps due to "her perpetual fear of egotistical
self-exposure" (Lee: 1996, p.17), but also, I believe, it is evidence of her feminist stance. That
women's stories must be told, that writing about sexual experience, however negative, serves a
universal purpose is certainly one interpretation. But these stories must be measured and
controlled if they are to have any impact:
Her self-protectiveness is very strong in the feminist essays. This partly derives from a shrewd
political sense of her audience's resistance to a woman's special pleading: she thinks her argument
will have more impact if it is not perceived as a personal complaint. But it also shows a profound fear
of exposing emotions like self-pity, sentimentality or vanity. Lee: 1996, p.17.
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In A Room of One's Own (1929), Woolf tells us that evidence of anger and bitterness
within the language of women's writing is counter-productive to the cause of making women
heard and she criticises Bronte's Jane Eyre (1847) because she detects the expression of
"some personal grievance" (A Room: 1977, p.70) (2). We have already encountered Woolf s
notion that a woman must kill the Angel in the House if she is to write. Her next problem is
that if she does write, and if her writing is published, she must face the risk that she will be
thought of as "a monster" (A Room: 1977, p.56). Although Woolf in no sense undermines the
difficulties of the woman artist, she argues vehemently that anger, indignation and bitterness
must not fetter the mind, that women must not think about their condition if their imagination
is to be free. If women allow indignation to deflect them from achieving their genius then it is
the texts themselves which become monstrous: "deformed and twisted" (A Room: 1977, p.67).
Woolf s constant concern is with the freedom of the imagination. If we allow ourselves to
write from the position of victim, if we allow the "acidity which is the result of oppression" to
inhibit us or to make us rage, then we are perpetuating the marginalisation of women and their
interdiction from the free use of language (A Room: 1977, p.70). Woolf is able to say that
there is "no lock" on her mind because she consciously removes her own grievances from the
text, because she does not allow her imagination to "swerve" because of a personal sense of
indignation (A Room: 1977, p.72, p.'70).
Woolf was to explore the problem of union between male and female in her first novel The
Voyage Out (1915) through Rachel's frustration that the two sexes seem to be impossibly
disparate and her withdrawal, when she finds herself engaged to be married, which ultimately
leads to her death. It is Rachel's understanding of the difference and separation of the two
sexes which causes her to first resist the idea of marriage and then later consider breaking off
her engagement in The Voyage Out, written at the height of the Suffrage movement. In an
early exchange with Terence Hewett, her future fiancé, Rachel tries to explain why she has
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been offended by Hirst's assumption that her life has so far been absurdly shallow due to her
lack of literary experience and the equally terrible assumption of his own superiority. Whilst
Rachel is aware that her day revolves around meal-times and entertainments, when he offers to
lend her notable reading material Rachel is both insulted and appalled at Hirst's insolence.
Unable to articulate fully the reason for her anger Rachel merely expresses herself "bitterly":
"It's no good; we should live separate; we cannot understand each other; we only bring out
what's worse" (Voyage: 1992, p.142). Hewett later explains why he thinks that women cannot
help but respect learned men, such as Hirst, despite their insolence and arrogance:
'I believe we must have the sort of power over you that we're said to have over horses. They see us
three times as big as we are or they'd never obey us. For that very reason, I'm inclined to doubt that
you'll ever do anything even when you have the vote.' He looked at her reflectively. She appeared very
smooth and sensitive and young. 'It'll take at least six generations before you're sufficiently
thick-skinned to go into law courts or business offices. Consider what a bully the ordinary man is,' he
continued, 'the ordinary hard-working, rather ambitious solicitor or a man of business with a family to
bring up and a certain position to maintain. And then, of course, the daughters have to give way to the
sons; the sons have to be educated; they have to bully and shove for their wives and families, and so it
all comes over again. And meanwhile there are the women in the background ... Do you really think
that the vote will do you any good?'
Voyage: 1992, p.196.
This, of course, is reminiscent of Woolf s famous claim in A Room of One's Own that:
"Women have served all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and power of
reflecting the figure of at twice its natural size. Without that power probably the earth would
still be swamp and jungle. The glories of all our wars would be unknown" (A Room: 1977,
p.35).
Rachel is indifferent to the vote, she plays the piano, but she is interested in finding out
what men are like and gradually she falls in love with Hewett. The novel moves between misty
and mystical scenes of romantic love, mergence, transcendence, and togetherness which are
punctuated by realisations of the couple's actual separateness. The argument which nearly
results in a breaking off of the couple's engagement is related to Rachel's separateness, her
need for freedom and her ability to detach herself from Hewett who is jealous that she
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"seemed to be able to cut herself adrift from him, and to pass away to unknown places where
she had no need of him" (Voyage: 1992, p.285). Their realisation that they cannot separate
from one another is "painful and terrible" but as they sit together in silence, division dissolves,
the world solidifies and they feel "larger and stronger". It is only when they see themselves
reflected in a mirror that they see themselves as others might see them:
it chilled them to see themselves in the glass, for instead of being vast and indivisible they were reall
very small and separate, the size of the glass leaving a large space for the reflection of other things.
Voyage: 1992, p.286.
In the following two weeks Rachel falls ill and dies. Hewett watches as she suffers but comes
to realise that their lives are of no significance: "The nearness of their bodies in this vast
universe, and the minuteness of their bodies, seemed to him absurd and laughable. Nothing
mattered, he repeated; they had no power, no hope. He leant on the window-sill, thinking,
until he almost forgot the time and the place" (Voyage: 1992, p.326). Rachel achieves her
longed for isolation and freedom in death, and one cannot help but read a suicidal impulse
here, as she wishes to transcend life and merge with the vast universe rather than become small
and embodied in her relationship with Hewett:
for long spaces of time she would merely lie conscious of her body floating on the top of the bed and
her mind driven to some remote corner of her body, or escaped and gone flitting round the room. All
sights were something of an effort, but the sight of Terence was the greatest effort, because he forced
her to join mind to body in the desire to remember something. She did not wish to remember; it
troubled her when people tried to disturb her loneliness; she wished to be alone. She wished for
nothing else in the world.
Voyage: 1992, p.328.
Therefore, in this text, Rachel's rejection of marriage is linked to a rejection of her own body.
The question of how to reject notions which define us and constrict us through our bodies
without rejecting our bodies by falsely believing that they are the source of oppression is one
which must be foregrounded and one which is perhaps related to the problem of living in
community. In order for women to break into fiction, Woolf tells us "the book has somehow
to be adapted to the body" (A Room: 1977, p.74). The success of Jane Austen, as opposed to
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George Eliot and Charlotte Brontë was, Woolf suggests, because she did not accept the
limitation of "a man's sentence ... that was unsuited for a woman's purpose." Austen laughed at
the inadequacy "and devised a perfectly natural, shapely sentence proper for her own use and
never departed from it" (A Room: 1977, p.73). Rather than bemoan the fact that women have
had less access to the public sphere, less freedom to travel, rather than allow the mad figure of
Grace Poole to overshadow female narratives, a figure of victimisation, fear, alienation,
imprisonment and death, Woolf would harness the creative forces which have saturated the
walls of the home; she would bring us Mrs Ramsay and Mrs Dalloway, symbols of what she
considered to be "the nature of this intricacy and the power of this highly developed creative
faculty among women" (A Room: 1977, p.83). That Mrs Ramsay and Mrs Dalloway are
concerned to bring together disparate male and female figures around the dinner table is
important. Woolf would celebrate difference, she would seem to express some kind of
essentialist notion of femininity, and yet she would still argue that in order to write, the mind
must be androgynous, sex must remain "unconscious of itself' because thinking of the
distinction of one's sex "interferes with the unity of the mind" (A Room: 1977, p.88 & p.92).
In order to maintain focus, Woolf suggests one always has to repress certain states of mind
and this becomes an effort. Perhaps, Woolf wonders, division can be overcome when one
allows the "natural fusion" of male and female and maybe this will lead to "complete
satisfaction and happiness" (A Room: 1977, p.93). When one allows the male and the female
parts of the mind to work together in harmony, fertilisation and hence creativity will follow.
The androgynous mind is "naturally creative, incandescent and undivided" (A Room: 1977,
p.94).
However, Woolf seems to suggest that this unity is itself an illusion, particularly for women
whose consciousness is fragmented and alien:
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Why do I feel that there are severances and oppositions in the mind, as there are strains from obvious
causes on the body? What does one mean by 'the unity of the mind'? I pondered, for clearly the mind
has so great a power of concentrating at any point at any moment that it seems to have no single state
of being. It can separate itself from the people on the street, for example, and think of itself as apart
from them, at an upper window looking down on them. Or it can think with other people
spontaneously, as, for instance, in a crowd waiting to hear some piece of news read out. [...] Again if
one is a woman one is often surprised by a sudden splitting off of consciousness, say in walking down
Whitehall, when from being the natural inhabitor of that civilization, she becomes, on the contrary,
outside of it, alien and critical.
A Room: 1977, pp.92-93.
Despite this distinction between the sexes, Woolfs ideas on the subject of male and female
identities was in no way fixed. Woolf was interested to consider in her non-fiction and fictional
texts the difference between men and women, their separateness and their need to
communicate and live in harmony (3). Here in A Room of One's Own she tentatively lays down
a theory of the sexes and their possible relationship:
And I went on amateurishly to sketch a plan of the soul so that in each one of us two powers preside,
one male, one female; and in the man's brain the man predominates over the woman, and in the
woman's brain the woman predominates over the man. The normal and comfortable state of being is
that when the two live in harmony together, spiritually co-operating.
A Room: 1977, p.94.
Writing demands fertilisation if it is to be "[B]rilliant and effective, powerful and masterly" and
this can only happen if we accept that we are, in our brains, both male and female. Woolf uses
the image of the marriage bed to conclude this part of her argument:
it is fatal for anyone who writes to think of their sex. It is fatal to be a man or woman pure and
simple; one must be woman-manly or man-womanly. It is fatal for a woman to lay the least stress on
any grievance; to plead even with justice any cause; in any way to speak consciously as a woman. [...1
Some collaboration has to take place in the mind between the woman and the man before the art of
creation can be accomplished. Some marriage of opposites has to be consummated. The whole of the
mind must lie wide open if we are to get the sense that the writer is communicating his experience
with perfect fullness. There must be freedom and there must be peace. Not a wheel must grate, not a
light glimmer. The curtain must be close drawn. The writer, I thought, once his experience is over,
must lie back and let his mind celebrate its nuptials in darkness. He must not look or question what is
being done. Rather, he must pluck the petals from a rose or watch the swans float calmly down the
river.
A Room: 1977, p.99.
This is a very different argument to the one Woolf was later to expound in Three Guineas
(1938). In this polemical work Woolf upholds the notion that women should remain separate
and be proud to form a Society of Outsiders, in order to distance themselves from the
patriarchal urge towards a second world war. In this anti-fascist, anti-war essay Woolf argues
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that women have a more heightened sense of morality and a more balanced ethical awareness
than men because they have been marginalised and excluded from the dominant hierarchies of
Western society. But we cannot forget that Woolfs later revisions accompanied a profound
loss of faith in human connectedness with the advent of a second world war which would
cause her ultimately death-dealing depression.
Let us now look at those non-fictions and fictions which give us an insight into Woolf s
project of writing the body and her desire to appropriate language for woman's purpose.
Writing the Body
Woolf was particularly interested in the relationship between the mind and the body, partly
because her own emotional/mental sufferings, which she endured throughout most of her life,
were experienced through physical symptoms in her body. Neck aches and debilitating
headaches plagued her adult years from early womanhood. Whilst it may be tempting to offer
diagnostical readings of Woolf s texts, my interest here is to look at the language she uses to
describe that experience rather than to offer labels from psychoanalytic terminology. As
Hermione Lee suggests naming can so often limit our reading:
To name the illness is to begin a process of description which can demote her extraordinary
personality to a collection of symptoms, or reduce her writing to an exercise in therapy. But the
named illness is also 'her' illness in that it took the material of her life as its subject matter, It. and the
treatment she received for it, affected her personality, her behaviour, her writing and her politics. And
it is 'her' illness in that much of what we know about it is derived from what she wrote about it. Her
illness has become her language. . .
... Illness is at the mercy of language, and can only be identified and 'treated' (in a clinical and a
literary sense) by being named. To choose a language for Virginia Woolf s illness is at once - from the
very moment of calling it an illness - to re-write and re-present it, perhaps even to misinterpret it.
Lee: 1996, p.176.
As Woolf herself was so concerned with finding a new language to describe her experience it
is perhaps of more use to us to read from within the text than to impose external theories as to
original causes. However, the effects are there for us to decipher when we read her original
articulations in both the non-fiction and fictional writings. The following questions are the
ones which have determined my analysis as I have read across the life-writing and the fiction:
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What images does she use? What form does she create? How does the chosen and highly
crafted technique of Woolf s writing help us to understand her notions about the body and its
relation to language?
We shall see the existence of difference within the language of the non-fictional and
fictional writings which examine and explore the reaches and the workings of the self. Whilst
the content is similar, the tone and the voice is my main concern. Let us begin with Woolf s
essay "On Being Ill", written for publication in T.S. Eliot's New Criterion in 1926. She begins:
Considering how common illness is, how tremendous the spiritual change that it brings, how
astonishing, when lights of health go down, the undiscovered countries that are then disclosed, what
wastes and deserts of the soul a slight attack of influenza brings to light, what precipices and lawns
sprinkled with bright flowers a little rise of temperature reveals, what ancient and obdurate oaks are
uprooted in us in the act of sickness, how we go down into the pit of death and feel the waters of
annihilation close above our heads and wake thinking to find ourselves in the presence of the angels
and the harpers when we have a tooth out and come to the surface in the dentist's arm chair and
confuse his 'Rinse the mouth - rinse the mouth' with the greeting of the Deity stooping from the floor
of Heaven to welcome us - when we think of this and infinitely more, as we are so frequently forced to
think of it, it becomes strange indeed that illness has not taken its place with love, battle, and jealousy
among the prime themes of literature. Novels, one would have thought, would be devoted to
influenza; epic poems to typhoid; odes to pneumonia, lyrics to toothache.
Essays: 1967, p.317.
What is interesting here is the ascerbic humour with which she introduces her thesis. Whilst
she claims these strange experiences as her own, and seems to take for granted that these are
common to all who suffer a fever or are placed under anaesthetic, she immediately undermines
any feelings of sympathy which may come willingly, or unwillingly, from the reader. Thus
Woolf is at once setting up an empathy with other sufferers whilst distancing herself from pity
or comfort. Hermione Lee describes Woolf as "a sane woman who had an illness ... She
endured, periodically, great agony of mind and severe physical pain, with remarkably little self
pity" (Lee: 1996, p.175). The depersonalisation which accompanies identification with, and
distancing from, others is a form of control which keeps the anxiety of a confrontation with
the strange at bay. This voice, controlled enough to handle wit and to structure language into
a force to be reckoned with, is a public voice.
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Woolf articulates the tension between light and dark, reality and the imagination, and
highlights the "Uncanny Strangeness" (4) of "the undiscovered countries," "the wastes and
deserts of the soul," "the pit of death," by juxtaposing "precipices" with "lawns," "bright
flowers" with "the ancient and obdurate oaks". The balance of this contrast within the
language not only expresses the existence of a fissure between imagination and reality, but also
demonstrates an ability to work across the borders of representation. As Kristeva suggests in
Strangers to Ourselves (1988) "Uncanniness occurs when the boundaries between imagination
and reality are erased" (Kristeva: 1991, p.188). The use of humour enables the empowered to
transcend any threat:
Some might change the weird into irony ... the humorist goes right through uncanny strangeness and
- starting from a self-confidence that is his own or is based on his belonging to an untouchable
universe that is not at all threatened by the war between same and others, ghosts and doubles - seeing
in it nothing more than smoke, imaginary structures, signs. To worry or to smile, such is the choice
when we are assailed by the strange; our decision depends on how familiar we are with our own
ghosts.
Kristeva: 1991, p.188.
I would suggest that Woolf is not only empowering herself through her use of language but
also, in this instance, the choice of reaction articulated here is dependant upon her sense of
audience. As Lee explains Woolf was terrified of becoming incomprehensible and constantly
afraid that she might be considered "crazy rather than brilliant" (Lee: 1996, p.195). Nicole
Ward Jouve warns readers to beware any romanticising impulse when considering Woolfs
illness. Whilst Woolf s writing might suggest a mystical, spiritual exploration into a virgin land,
we cannot afford to ignore her obvious determination to formulate coherent representations of
her mental state rather than produce 'mad' scribbles such as those of Septimus Smith in Mrs
Dalloway. Jouve tells us that we must appreciate "how much alchemical hard work and
determination enabled her to transform the material of madness into the material of art" (Jouve
in Roe and Sellers: 2000, p.253). Woolf would not allow dream to be divorced from truth, nor
would she allow insanity into her writing, for that would be "an evasion" of her literary calling,
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a betrayal of her aesthetic self; above all Virginia Woolf was an artist (Lee: 1996, p.195).
Having gained our attention through use of pace, tone and structure, Woolf then takes us
into the maelstrom of her exploration, her examination of the body which "intervenes" day and
night and is not simply "negligible". To Woolf, the body is not "a sheet of plain glass through
which the soul looks straight and clear" (Essays: 1967, p.317). For her, the soul, the mind and
the body are not separate entities, they are inextricably connected and yet, in this essay, Woolf
laments the failure of language to articulate the body. This failure seems due to cowardice as
only the most "robust philosophy" can attempt such a task. For without courage we fall into
myth: "this monster, the body, this miracle, its pain, will soon make us taper into mysticism, or
rise, with rapid beats of the wings, into the raptures of transcendentalism" (Essays: 1967,
p.318). In the public sphere, an attempt at this kind of articulation would result in further
expulsion from the patriarchal discourse of reason and logic, and perhaps result in an even
more severe silencing.
Whilst Woolf toys with the notion of "a new language" which is fitted to articulating the
experience of illness, she is also aware that it is during these periods, when the mind has more
privacy and time, that fictionalisations abound and "the mind concocts a thousand legends and
romances" (Essays: 1967, p. 318). The language which she accesses to portray this experience
is the language of fantasy and fairy-tale. Friends become strangely beautiful or deformed, the
patient is either exalted to the highest peak or becomes a dejected creature crawling around on
the floor. Pleasure and pain exist side by side in a fluent symbiosis. Woolf maintains control
through structure and tone, undermining the acceptable themes of the patriarchal tradition
which neglects the significance of the body, by juxtaposing them with the language of
imaginative transcendence:
Yet it is not only a new language that we need, primitive, subtle, sensual, obscene, but a new
hierarchy of the passions; love must be deposed in favour of a temperature of 104; jealousy give place
to the pangs of sciatica; sleeplessness play the part of villain, and the hero become a white liquid with
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a sweet taste - that mighty Prince with the moth's eyes and the feathered feet, one of whose names is
Chloral.
Essays: 1967, p. 319.
This re-evaluation of hierarchies is not to be taken lightly despite Woolf s use of humour for,
as her essay shows, the experience of the body, brought to us only when we are laid low in
illness, is an experience which merits articulation. Woolf also points out that spoken
communication during illness is less guarded: "There is, let us confess it (and illness is the
great confessional) a childish outspokenness in illness; things are said, truths blurted out,
which the cautious respectability of health conceals" (Essays: 1967, p. 320).
Woolf was concerned to formulate a new "private language" (Lee: 1996, p.192) separate
from that of the grand theorists Darwin and Freud which could not only articulate as
accurately and closely as possible the experience in order to explain it to herself and others but
also to give to that experience a value. Woolf describes the return of "unreason" as the
sensation of blood coursing back into a Hint) that has been numb or deeping (0they, Seig
1919). This kind of metaphor occurs both in fiction and autobiography and this writing
"recognises the virtue of her illness, the happiness of mania or its creativity, as well as its
terror and pain" (Lee: 1996, p.191). Sympathy is rejected because it assumes continuous
human connectedness and this, according to Woolf; is illusion. We do not know and
understand one another completely. We do not know ourselves. We are at times alone and
during these times we are free to roam in the unknown landscape of the soul.
Here, Woolf employs the language of exploration, summoning images from the continents
of South America, Africa and Antarctica: "There is a virgin forest, tangled, pathless, in each; a
snow field where even the print of birds' feet is unknown. Here we go alone, and like it better
so" (Essays: 1967, p.320). During periods of health we must keep up the pretence, the
"make-believe" that we are all part of one another. When we become ill we can retreat from
"the army of the upright" and as "deserters" we can find the space and time to contemplate
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nature and restore the imagination. It is interesting to note the contrasting diction employed
here as Woolf moves from the language of exploration to that of invasion where patriarchal
empiricism desires the cultivation and education of those newly found lands. These references
are certainly reminiscent of the "dark continent" of female sexuality which is not discovered
and explored by Freud but merely reconstructed ("Female Sexuality", 1931). The movement,
then, is away from the discourses of logic and reason. Through the physical passivity brought
about by illness the artist is able to perhaps found a utopia which does not necessitate the
activity of war and occupation. A return to an archaic, perhaps pre-historic, self offers release
and the space to discover/rediscover the means to be human and to be free.
Once horizontal, illness may be a deliberate refuge. When incapacitated, we can look at the
sky, we can "become as the leaf" But we are not to expect solace to come from nature, for it
is indifferent to our existence. Nature does not act as a mirror wherein we can re-unify; it
merely shows us its own unity, its "perfect dignity and self-possession," its "inimitable
rightness" with which we cannot merge and identify because we have to act, to live: "with the
hook of life still in us still we must wriggle" (Essays: 1967, p. 322). The medium suggested
here may be fluid but the worm, or the fish (one of Woolf s favourites as we have seen in A
Room of One's Own), is a solid entity, albeit a slippery one.
There are many instances in Woolf s fiction where illness, physical or mental, is described
alongside natural imagery. Fanny Elmer, for example in Jacob's Room (1922) seems only
vaguely aware of the human world and man-made objects, she is agitated by the dim
knowledge of the existence of others which she perceives from behind a veil, whilst the
description of the natural world is far more vivid and detailed:
The body after long illness is languid, passive, receptive of sweetness, but too weak to contain it. The
tears well and fall as the dog barks in the hollow, the children skim after hoops, the country darkens
and brightens. Beyond a veil it seems. Ah, but draw the veil thicker lest I faint with sweetness, Fanny
Elmer sighed, as she sat on a bench in Judges Walk looking at Hampstead Garden Suburb. But the
dog went on barking. The motor-cars hooted on the road. She heard a far-away rush and bumming.
Agitation was at heart. Up she got and walked. The grass was freshly green; the sun
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hot. All round the pond children were stooping to launch little boats; or drawn back screaming by
their nurses. [...]
And Fanny moved, hearing some cry - a workman's whistle perhaps - high in mid air. Now,
among the trees, it was the thrush trilling out into the warm air a flutter of jubilation, but fear seemed
to spur him, Fanny thought; as if he too were anxious with such joy at his heart - as if he were
watched as he sang, and pressed by tumult to sing. There! Restless, he flew to the next tree. She heard
his song more faintly. Beyond it was the humming of the wheels and the wind rushing.
Jacob's Room: 1992, p. 102-103.
It is the jolt of the sharper "t" and "r" sounds which make us aware that Fanny's only clear
connection with the world is the one with the bird and through this tiny awakening she is able
to identify with that creature and recognise her own emotions (fear, joy, anxiety) reflected
through it.
Characters who are not comfortable in their bodies find themselves drifting out towards the
natural world, connecting themselves with trees or leaves or feeling themselves floating on
water. Leaves and waves particularly reoccur in Woolfs attempts to express the experience of
illness. We will look in more detail at Septimus (a war veteran suffering from mental illness,
depicted in Mrs Dalloway) and his preoccupation with leaves towards the end of this chapter.
Another interesting character to consider is Rhoda in The Waves (1931). Throughout the
novel Rhoda expresses her desire for isolation and annihilation, she hides from her own image
in the mirror (Waves: 1977, pp.34-35), she creeps around the far wall of a room rather than
cross it, because she does not want to be seen or have any contact with the public. The world
is separate and "immune from change" (Waves: 1977, p.85) but Rhoda is in constant flux,
pulled this way and that, shaped by the world and the people around her. She has an acute
persecution complex; every time a door opens "a tiger leaps" and "terror" pursues her (Waves:
1977, p.83):
'What I say is perpetually interrupted. I am not yet twenty-one. I am to be broken. I am to be derided
all my life. I am to be cast up and down among these men and women, with their twitching faces,
with their lying tongues, like a cork on a rough sea. Like a ribbon of weed I am flung far every time
the door opens. I am the foam that sweeps and fills the uttermost rims of the rocks with whiteness; I
am also a girl, here in this room.'
Waves: 1977, p.85.
Rhoda longs to be in another place, on another side of the world, but when she is forced to
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communicate she is "thrust back to stand burning in this clumsy, this ill-fitting body, to receive
the shafts of his indifference and scorn, I who long for marble columns and pools on the other
side of the world where the swallow dips her wings." (Waves: 1977, p.84)
Rhoda longs to merge with nature; she cannot allow herself to become part of a social
circle. She does not know how to behave, she watches others and mimics their actions. She
also cannot allow for the passing of time, so fragmented is her sense of being:
One moment does not lead to another. The door opens and the tiger leaps. You did not see me come. I
circled round the chairs to avoid the horror of the spring. I am afraid of you all. I am afraid of the
shock of sensation that leaps upon me, because I cannot deal with it as you do - I cannot make one
moment merge in the next. To me that are all violent, all separate; and if I fall under the shock of the
leap of the moment you will be on me, tearing me to pieces. I have no end in view. I do not know how
to run minute to minute and hour to hour, solving them by some natural force until they make the
whole and indivisible mass that you call life. Because you have an end in view - one person, is it, to sit
beside, an idea is it, your beauty is it? I do not know - your days and hours pass like the boughs of
forest trees and the smooth green of forest rides to a hound running on the scent. But there is no
single scent, no single body for me to follow. And I have no face. I am like the foam that races over
the beach or the moonlight that falls arrowlike here on a tin can, here on a spike of the mailed
sea-holly, or a bone or a half-eaten boat. I am whirled down caverns, and flap like paper against
endless corridors, and must press my hand against the wall to draw myself back
Waves: 1977, p.103.
Here we can see that fear and a sense of isolation accompanies the knowledge of the
multiplicity of life, its instability. Finally, what divides Rhoda from the other characters in The
Waves is that she chooses to "trust only in solitude and the violence of death" (Waves: 1977,
p.182). Rhoda's ultimate act of separation is her suicidal leap to death.
Another dominant voice in The Waves is Bernard's and his leap is a leap into language,
although his narration also moves between images of solidity and fluidity, his primary concern
is with communication, the meeting of people, the telling of stories, the capture of real things
in the concrete rather than the abstract world:
'We are swept on by the torrent of things grown so familiar that they cast no shadow. We float, we
float
'However, since one must leap ( to tell you this story), I leap here, at this point, and alight now
upon some perfectly commonplace object - say the poker and tongs.'
Waves: 1977, p.203.
It is significant that Bernard has the last voice because he, above all, recognises the need for
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human connectedness and the intercession of words. Bernard uses words to "draw the veil off
things" (Waves: 1977, p.67). Whilst Bernard too would enter into an alternative, primeval
world, he knows, ultimately that he needs an audience (Waves: 1977, p.92):
I wish to go under; to visit the profound depths; once in a while to exercise my prerogative not always
to act, but to explore; to hear vague, ancestral sounds of boughs creaking, of mammoths; to indulge
impossible desires to embrace the whole world with the arms of understanding - impossible to those
who act. Am I not, as I walk, trembling with strange oscillations and vibrations of sympathy, which,
urunoored as I am from a private being, bid me embrace these engrossed flocks; these starers and
trippers; these errand-boys and furtive and fugitive girls who, ignoring their doom, look in shop
windows? But I am aware of our ephemeral passage.
Waves: 1977, pp. 90-91.
We may transcend the body and enter into a realm outside of the self, but nature is indifferent
and humans insignificant.
The theme of withdrawal and the human need to reintegrate into social contact also
appears at the end of The Years (1937). North is constantly being jolted back from silence and
solitude by the need of others to communicate with him:
North took up his glass again. What was I thinking last time I looked at it? he asked himself. A block
had formed in his forehead as if two thoughts had collided and had stopped the passage of the rest.
His mind was a blank He swayed the liquid from side to side. He was in the middle of a dark forest.
'So, North ...' His own name roused him with a start. It was Edward speaking. He jerked forward.
Years: 1977, pp.407-408.
North's contemplations are interrupted by his companions' calls for him to make a speech,
which he is reluctant to give. What is of interest in the following passage is his change of
attitude as regards his formerly highly treasured silence and solitude:
Silence and solitude, he repeated; silence and solitude. His eyes half closed themselves. He was
tired; he was dazed; people talked; people talked. He would detach himself, generalize himself,
imagine that he was lying in a great space on a blue plain with hills on the rim of the horizon. [...]
And he was floating, and drifting, in a shallop, in a petal, down a river into silence, into solitude ...
which is the worst torture, the words came back to him as if a voice had spoken them, that human
beings can inflict ...
Years: 1977, p.418.
As North rejoins the party and makes everyone laugh Eleanor longs for more knowledge, not
the knowledge brought through dreams and fantasy but real knowledge, which would help
people to understand and know one another fully:
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There must be another life, she thought, sinking back into her chair, exasperated. Not in dreams;
but here and now, in this room, with living people. She felt as if she were standing on the edge of a
precipice with her hair blown back; she was about to grasp at something that just evaded her. There
must be another life, here and now, she repeated. This is too short, too broken. We know nothing,
even about ourselves. We're only just beginning, she thought, to understand, here and there. f...] she
felt that wanted to enclose the present moment; to make it stay; to fill it fuller and fuller, with the
past, the present and the future, until it shone, whole, bright, deep with understanding.
Years: 1977, pp.421-422.
After contemplation comes work and a return to language. In illness, Woolf explains in her
essay, words take on a "mystic quality" because we are all the more able to reach beneath the
surface of words and hear the sound, feel the ideas and images, this is instinctive and sensual.
We are no longer dominated by the intellect which teases out meaning, rather "the words give
out their scent, and ripple like leaves, and chequer us with light and shadow, and then, if at last
we grasp the meaning, it is all the richer for having travelled slowly up with all the bloom upon
its wings" (Essays: 1967, p. 324). Also, in order to read we need the "rashness" of illness
which breaks down the barriers of the intellect, the constraints of logic. Then we can become
Hamlet, we can begin to see ourselves through art, we can begin a process of identification.
To make a heaven out of nature necessitates imagination and art. Nature may offer us beauty
but art is the mirror:
Then one is Hamlet, one is youth; as, to make a clean breast of it, Hamlet is Shakespeare, is youth.
And how can one explain what one is? One can but be it. Thus forced always to look back or sidelong
at his own past the critic sees something moving and vanishing in Hamlet , as in a glass one sees the
reflection of oneself, and it is this which, while it gives an everlasting variety to the play, forbids us to
feel, as with Lear or Macbeth, that the centre is solid and holds firm whatever our successive readings
lay upon it.
Essays: 1967, p. 325.
Not only does illness allow us time and space to retreat, contemplate and read, it also gives
us a heightened awareness, which by-passes the laid-down highways of the intellectual
response to language and allows us to excavate the imagination. However, we must not
overlook the fact that whilst Woolf is always grasping for "the thing itself' which might be
more tangible in this state of mind, this "partly mystical" journey is risky (Writer's Diary:
1978, p.193). For Woolf, the experience of 'knowingness' was problematic: "Indeed, its largely
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the clearness of sight which comes at such seasons that leads to depression." (Diary Vol 1:
1979, p.298).
Let us now compare the style of Woolf s public writing with that of the more private and
intimate voice in her letters and diaries. The letters sent to her closest and most trusted friends
Vita Sackville-West and later Ethel Smyth, despite their self-conscious construction, offer
perhaps the most revealing insights into Woolf s struggle with illness. In her letter to Vita
Sackville-West, September 7, 1925, Woolf describes the isolation of illness. Here she echoes
the themes which we have already seen in her essay on the subject. Although she tries to
invent her friend through her imagination, she cannot attain the whole image because of
human disconnectedness. She laments her inability to socialise and here we can see a repetition
of the images in the essay alongside a more open and detailed articulation of the pain of illness:
It would be better to talk - much better. But I cannot talk yet without getting these infernal pains in
my head, or astonishingly incongruous dreams. Two dull people come to tea, and I dream of
precipices and horrors at night, as if - can they keep horrors and precipices concealed in them I
wonder?
What a scrawl! I cannot write at this angle with this pen.
Letters Vol 3: 1977, p.205.
Woolf described the three stages of the experience of these headaches in a letter to her friend
Ethel Smyth, as being "pain; numb; visionary" (Letters Vol 4: 1978, p.183). Although this time
of illness is perhaps a time when Woolf can prepare herself for the writing of her next novel,
where her mind may be in "chrysalis" state (Writer's Diary: 1978, p.193), we can see here in
the postscript the frustrating experience of being prostrated as regards the practical difficulty
of handwriting and the misery of being forced to rest, to be solitary and, supposedly, inactive
in terms of creativity. We can also see from a later letter to Vita (September 1929) that this
lifestyle was imposed by Leonard throughout their marriage (5):
I'm a little dismal. Another of these cursed headaches. How I get them I can't imagine - Whether its
writing, reading, or seeing people. Anyhow its not been bad at all - only it makes Leonard gloomy,
and tightens my ropes - I mustn't walk, or do anything but sit and drink milk - you know the old story.
Letters Vol 4: 1978 , p.88.
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In her letter to Janet Case, 18 September, 1925, Woolf explains that these infernal headaches
are preventing her from writing her next novel, To the Lighthouse (1927), instead she is forced
to think about writing:
I am still a good deal bothered with the infernal headache, so have to think about writing, instead of
writing, and find all these problems awfully difficult. What is form? What is character? What is a
novel?
Letters Vol 3: 1977, p.211.
The essay in which she explores these problems was sent to T.S. Eliot in November, 1925,
with a short and simple apology for its delay - "I have been working under difficulties" (Letters
Vol 3: 1977, p.220).
In A Writer's Diary, we gain an insight into the reality of these difficulties. Woolf had been
bedridden for some time and the experience, as we have already seen, affected her physical
ability to write as well as creating a mental apathy, and yet she is aware that writing would
ultimately comfort and heal. Here is the voice of self-examination, judgement and
encouragement:
Monday, September 13th, perhaps
A disgraceful fact - I am writing this at 10 in the morning in bed in the little room looking into the
garden, the sun beaming steady, the vine leaves transparent green, and the leaves of the apple tree so
brilliant that, as I had my breakfast, I invented a little story about a man who wrote a poem, I think
comparing them with diamonds, and the spiders' webs ... lam writing this partly to test my poor
bunch of nerves at the back of my neck - will they hold or give again, as they have done so often? - for
I am amphibious still, in bed and out of it; partly to glut my itch (glut' and 'itch'!) for writing. It is the
great solace and scourge.
Writer's Diary: 1978, p.111.
The uncertainty regarding the date, the breaks in fluency indicated by hyphens and the passive
contemplation of nature is reminiscent of a leaf blown about in the wind, but is also suggestive
of transcendence.
Woolf is inspired to create and involve herself with words. She lingers over the sounds and
meanings of 'glut' and 'itch', the harsh consonants and sharp vowels perhaps echoing her
frustration and self-disgust at her laziness and incapacity but also, interestingly, these words
refer us back to immanence and thus the body. To "glut", to fill an inner emptiness, to "itch",
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to attend to a surface irritation. Kristeva debates the significance of language acquisition and
its relationship to (wo)man's being in her chapter "Freud and Love: Treatment and its
Discontents"	 steva: 1987, Tales of Love) For her, the interest lies not within the
incorporation of an object but "being like" a model or imitating a pattern. Language is
necessary to facilitate the movement from "having" to "being." If we return to the idea that
talking and listening to oneself in diary form is the necessary response to a narcissistic
tendency and consider that the "other" is a double, or another self, then the following
reference from Kristeva is of particular interest with regard to the choice and emphasis of
diction:
When the object that I incorporate is the speech of the other - precisely a non-object, a pattern, a
model - I bind myself to him in a primary fusion, communion, unification. An identification. For me
to have been capable of such a process, my libido had to be restrained; my thirst to devour had to be
deferred and displaced to a level one may well call 'psychic', provided one adds that if there is
repression it is quite primal, and that it lets one hold on to the joys of chewing, swallowing,
nourishing oneself ... with words.
Kristeva: 1987, p.26.
Kristeva explains that narcissism is a necessary process in order to achieve autonomy. If the
Ego is to come into being then the speaking subject has to struggle free from the imaginary
mother who becomes abjected, a separate object. Transference from the abjected mother to
the imaginary father leaves the subject empty and the separation which accompanies primary
identification is also the beginning of a movement towards language:
Narcissism would be that correlation (with the imaginary father and the "ab-jetted" mother) enacted
around the central emptiness of that transference. This emptiness, which is apparently the primer of
the symbolic function, is precisely encompassed in linguistics by the bar separating signifier from
signified and by the "arbitrariness" of the sign, or in psychoanalysis by the "gaping" of the mirror.
If narcissism is a defense against the emptiness of separation, then the whole contrivance of
imagery, representations, identifications, and projections that accompany it on the way toward
strengthening the Ego and the Subject is a means of exorcising that emptiness. Separation is our
opportunity to become narcissists or narcissistic, at any rate subjects of representation. The emptiness
it opens up is nevertheless also the barely covered abyss where our identities, images, and words run
the risk of being engulfed.
The mythical Narcissus would heroically lean over that emptiness to seek in the maternal watery
element the possibility of representing the self or the other - someone to love. [...1
Psychotic persons, however, remind us, in case we had forgotten, that the representational
contrivances that cause us to speak, elaborate, or believe rest upon emptiness.
Kristeva: 1987, pp. 41- 42.
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That a return to words is necessary for healing is a theme we shall repeatedly encounter.
But, as Lee suggests, we cannot reduce Woolf s writing to a form of therapy, not only because
her subject matter is much broader than the explication of "madness" but also because,
although Woolf generally feels better when she is writing her fiction, writing is not an easy
option:
A great deal of the process of controlling egotism, or translating personal material into art, is done
with laborious painful difficulty. And that strenuous work marks the difference between the illness
itself and what she does with it.
Lee: 1996, P. 194.
Creative paralysis appears to be a necessary state of restful dormancy before another work of
art can begin, again suggesting that the brain-power required for such artistic efforts is itself a
tremendous strain. In The Diary, we are told that Woolf fainted and fell ill on 19 August,
1925. Her next entry is from early September:
Saturday 5 September
And why couldn't I see or feel that all this time I was getting a little used up & riding on a flat
tyre? So I was, as it happened; & fell down in a faint at Charleston, in the middle of Q.'s birthday
party: & then have lain about here, in that odd amphibious life of headache, for a fortnight. This has
rammed a big hole in my 8 weeks which were to be stuffed so full. Never mind. Arrange whatever
pieces come your way. Never be unseated by the shying of that undependable brute, life, hag ridden as
she is by my own queer, difficult nervous system. Even at 43 I dont know its workings, for as I was
saying to myself all the Summer, "I'm quite adamant now. I can go through a tussle of emotions
peaceably that two years ago even, would have raked me raw."
I have made a very quick and flourishing attack on To the Lighthouse, all the same -22 pages
straight off in less than a fortnight. I am still crawling & easily enfeebled, but if I could once get up
steam again, I believe I could spin it off with infinite relish. Think what a labour the first pages of
Dalloway were! Each word distilled by a relentless clutch on my brain.
Diary Vol 3: 1980, p.38-39.
The 'relentless clutch' again seems to suggest mental and physical discomfort and we can
understand a consequent reluctance to give way to the creative impulse. Woolf attaches
the dark side of the discourses of fairy-tale to her own nervous system, which hag-like rides
upon her and causes her to bolt, like an undisciplined or spooked horse. This fantasy language
serves to distance the subject from the experience it is describing by use of impersonal
metaphor. Her life is "that undependable brute", unnamed, dispassionate, disconnected and
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certainly unsympathetic to her plight. However, the return to the fairy-tale is also a return to
the imaginary rather than an engagement with the discourse of reason. Lets consider one final
passage from the Diary, a passage supposedly written in July 1926 during a period of
self-imposed isolation when Woolf was working on the composition of To the Lighthouse:
[Saturday 31 July]
My own Brain
Here is a whole nervous breakdown in miniature. We came on Tuesday. Sank into a chair, could
scarcely rise; everything insipid; tasteless, colourless. Enormous desire for rest. Wednesday - only
wish to be alone in the open air. Air delicious - avoided speech; could not read. Thought of my own
power of writing with veneration, as of something incredible, belonging to someone else; never again
to be enjoyed by me. Mind a blank Slept in my chair. Thursday. No pleasure in life whatsoever; but
felt perhaps more attuned to existence. Character & idiosyncrasy as Virginia Woolf completely sunk
out. Humble & modest. Difficulty in thinking what to say. Read automatically, like a cow chewing
cud. Slept in chair. Friday. Sense of physical tiredness; but slight activity of brain. Beginning to take
notice. Making one or two plans. No power of phrase making. Difficulty in writing to Lady Colefax.
Saturday (today) much clearer & lighter. Thought I could write, but resisted, or found it impossible. A
desire to read poetry set in on Friday. This brings back a sense of my own individuality. Read some
Dante & Bridges, without troubling to understand, but got pleasure from them. Now I begin to wish to
write notes, but not yet novel. But today senses quickening. No 'making up' power yet; no desire to
cast senses quickening. Curiosity about literature returning: want to read Dante, Havelock Ellis. &
Berlioz autobiography; also to make looking glass with shell frame. These processes have sometimes
been spread over several weeks.
Diary Vol 3: 1980, p. 103.
Gone is the fluency of transcendent imagination seen in the essay and the ability to cross
borders without threat of annihilation. Instead the staccato sentencing is suggestive of a
fragmented sense of self The simile which she introduces when describing how she reads is
that of a mindless domesticated beast, again her self-judgement seems harsh and unattractive.
Reading can stimulate a sense of self and give pleasure but she records with emotional
indifference her apathy regarding creativity. The days pass uneventfully and the suggestion
that this condition can span several weeks would indicate the repetition of an almost
intolerable life experience, rather than something to be celebrated in words. Mental
illness is therefore described in Woolfs private journal with little flair compared to the public
language of the essay. The writing of this experience has limited emotional content, no drama,
no lasting or impressionable images, it is instead indicative of a paralysing and stultifying
boredom, the result of continued fatigue and inactivity. However, the final references to
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autobiography, the mirror and the shell frame do suggest a movement towards more active
reading and creativity which will aid her as she responds to the urge towards the next novel,
To The Lighthouse.
. In a letter to Ethel Smyth ( June 1930) Woolf appears to be giving a brief and light-hearted
potted history of her life. The following passage, at the end of that letter, is ripe for analysis in
terms of the form and language that she uses to describe her mental states:
And then I married, and then my brains went up in a shower of fireworks. As an experience, madness
is terrific I can assure you, and not to be sniffed at; and in its lava I still find most of the things I write
about. It shoots out of one everything shaped, final, not in mere driblets, as sanity does. And the six
months - not three - that I lay in bed taught me a good deal about what is called oneself Indeed I was
almost crippled when I came back to the world, unable to move a foot in terror, after that discipline.
Think - not one moment's freedom from doctor discipline - perfectly strange - conventional men; 'you
shant read this' and 'you shant write a word' and 'you shall lie still and drink milk' - for six months.
Letters Vol 4: 1978, p.180.
Within the same paragraph with have the counter-balance of the somewhat positive
description of her madness and the crippling effect of the "Rest Cure" treatment. The
two-sidedness of the experience is expressed and reflected clearly. The images of explosion
and volcanic eruption which are suggestive of bright lights, heat, movement and energy are
symmetrically juxtaposed with the monosyllabic discourse which is reminiscent of a child
under restraint. Indeed the drinking of milk is a theme to which Woolf would repeatedly return
in her letters and her diary. In a later letter to Ethel (October, 1930) she continues the theme
of the relationship between her illness and her creative output. Here Woolf talks about her
production of a collection of short stories, Monday or Tuesday (1921), a novel Night and Day
(1919) and the conception of later work, during one of her bouts of physical incapacity and
restraint (6):
You are perfectly right about Green and Blue and the heron one [Monday or Tuesday]: thats mainly
why I won't reprint. They are mere tangles of words; balls of string that the kitten or Pan [Ethel's dog]
has played with. One of these days will write out some short phases of my writer's life; and expound
what I now merely say in short-After being ill and suffering every form and variety of nightmare and
extravagant intensity of perception - for I used to make up poems, stories, profound and to me
inspired phrases all day long as I lay in bed and thus sketched, I think, all that I now, by the light of
reason, try to put into prose (I thought of the Lighthouse then, and Kew and others, not in
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substance, but in idea) - after all this, when I came to, I was so tremblingly afraid of my own insanity
that I wrote Night and Day [1919] mainly to prove to my own satisfaction that I could keep entirely
off that dangerous ground. I wrote it, lying in bed, allowed to write only for one half hour a day. And I
made myself copy from plaster casts, partly to tranquillise, partly to learn anatomy. Bad as the book
is, it composed my mind, and I think taught me certain elements of composition which I should not
have had the patience to learn had I been in full flush of health always. These little pieces in Monday
or (and) Tuesday were written by way of diversion; they were the treats I allowed myself when I had
done my exercise in the conventional style. I shall never forget the day I wrote The Mark on the Wall
- all in a flash, as if flying, after being kept stone breaking for months. The Unwritten Novel was the
great discovery, however. That - again in one second - showed me how I could embody all my deposit
of experience in a shape that fitted it - not that I have reached that end; but anyhow I saw, branching
out of the tunnel I made, when I discovered that method of approach, Jacobs Room [1922]. Mrs
Dalloway [1925] etc - How I trembled with excitement; and then Leonard came in, and I drank my
milk, and concealed my excitement, and wrote I suppose another page of that interminable Night and
Day (which some say is my best book). All this I will tell you one day - here I suppress my natural
inclination to say, if dear Ethel you have the least wish to hear anymore on a subject that cant be of
the least interest to you. And, I add, Green and Blue and the heron were the wild outbursts of
freedom, inarticulate, ridiculous, unprintable mere outcries. Letters Vol 4:1978, p.231.
Again it is interesting to note the contrast set up within the language which is a formal
reflection of the experience. Note the longer sentences and repeated use of hyphens when
Woolf is describing inspirational flashes and discoveries about form which would influence her
later work as opposed to the shorter sentences and more measured use of punctuation in the
areas where she is relating the laborious task of "mining" Night and Day. However, we cannot
overlook the need to surface from the diversionary, underground tunnels in order to put these
ideas into practice "by the light of reason", that some of the "outbursts of freedom" are too
inarticulate to re-publish and that the "interminable" Night and Day had been well received. (7)
Again we have a balance in the expression of the contradiction of feeling/emotion and
logic/intellect.
In Woolf s letters to Ethel Smyth it is also interesting to note that she often refers to her
friend's sanity and asks for sane responses to her questions or sane opinions on a certain
subject (8). By contrast, she constantly refers to her own "insanity" in these letters: "And
remember - not I confess that you seem in any danger of forgetting this elemental fact - what a
crazy piece of work I am - like a cracked looking glass in a fair" (Letters Vol. 4: 1978, p.
203.). The tone in which she conveys this subject matter is informative, often humorous and,
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always, there is the sense of a need to be quick-witted and highly articulate even when she is
describing the most painful moments. Metaphors and similes abound in these accounts of
illness. In a letter where she is describing the state of "complete drowsiness" which follows the
pain of her attacks she writes:
I'm like an alligator, nostrils only visible, and a kind keeper gives me bananas. Ethels one of my kind
keepers. I was awake in the night; terrified and laid hold of you, like a log. One day I'll write the
history of my spine: I think I can feel every knob: and my whole body feels like a web spread on the
knobs, and twitchy and sagging and then sinking into delicious rest.
Letters Vol 4: 1978, p.208.
Also, although these letters are revealing to a certain extent because of their intimacy in
terms of theme and subject, they are equally insightful due to the continual attempts at
joviality. Woolf, at no point, will invite, nor allow, pity or self-pity to weigh down or dampen
the spirit evident in her language. Certainly in her correspondence with Ethel the emphasis is
on projecting a character which she describes as "a transient and fitful flame" (Letters Vol. 4:
1978, p.169).
Woolf s Mirrors
As we move on now to consider the fictionalisation of life experience in Woolf s writing I want
to consider particularly the recurring theme of the mirror and its reflected images. Again my
interest will lie within the similarities and differences in form and voice between the
autobiographical writing in "A Sketch of the Past" (1939) and the fictional language of two
short stories: "The New Dress" (1927), and "The Lady in the Looking-Glass: A Reflection"
(1929). Kristeva claims that narcissism is a necessary form of protection, a process which
screens us from the experience of "emptiness" which occurs at the point of separation before
the subject enters into the Symbolic stage and suggests:
Narcissism protects emptiness, causes it to exist and thus, as lining of that emptiness, ensures an
elementary separation. Without that solidarity between emptiness and narcissism, chaos would sweep
away any possibility of distinction, trace and symbolization, which would in turn confuse the limits of
the body, words, the real and the symbolic.
Kristeva: 1987, p. 24.
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The structuring of primary narcissism is, therefore, a response to the opening of the gap or
fissure which occurs at the point of differentiation and identification. Writing about the self, as
we have already discussed, involves an objectification of the subject and this is particularly the
case when life experience is fictionalised. The use of third person characterisation produces a
unification within the process of self-reflection. However, as Benstock suggests, this unified
self is as false as the image produced in the Mirror Stage as described by Lacan. The initial
perception, then, of the self as fragmented and dispersed, results in the urge to create some
kind of integrated whole and so the subject is made an object of investigation. Now that the
exclusive and seemingly impenetrable dyad between mother and child has been dissolved
language begins to formulate a third point in the extension caused by the fissure and takes its
place in a triad between signifier and signified, between the performative and the speculative.
That language acquisition occurs at the same time as a realisation of the presence of the Father
would account for the domination of the notion that the phallus is the root to all signification
and necessary to the successful entrance into the Symbolic. For women, then, language
becomes problematic since we are de-centred automatically by our lack or "abjection" and
therefore, Kristeva explains, language seems foreign, alien, part of the civilised world of which
we are not part, or from which we have at least been marginalised.
How can women writers challenge these patriarchal notions? It seems that we either must
adhere to the law of the dominant Symbolic in order to be read or risk further silencing by a
descent into the semiotic babble of the Imaginary which, as adults rather than infants, would
perhaps constitute the language of madness. Kristeva's work investigates the dialectic between
semiotic impulses and thetic control and seeks an answer to the questions faced by all female
writers: how do we hold a position which speaks against phallogocentric logic; how do we
inscribe the repressed and unspeakable in language and how do we withstand the pull towards
silence or even psychosis? (9) It seems to me that these were the questions with which Woolf
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repeatedly concerned herself. We have only to look at A Room of One's Own (1929) to see
how Jane Austen was so admired by Woolf because she had "devised a perfectly natural,
shapely sentence proper for her own use and never departed from it" (A Room: 1977, p.73).
. By contrast, Woolf scorns those female writers who were either in revolt or in obedience to
masculine values and "the eternal pedagogue" (A Room: 1977, p. 64). Austen is admired for
her ability to express her observation of human relationships without bitterness and for her
rejection of "a sentence that was unsuited for a woman's use" (A Room: 1977, p.73). Woolf
tentatively suggests that the very form of women's fiction "has somehow to be adapted to the
body" due to the physical restraints which shape their lives, the constant interruptions, the
need for rest. Woolf throughout this text draws our attention to the difference of experience
between the sexes which necessitates a different and new response to language if we are to
claim equality.
Another question: how do we respond to this initial abjection, or killing off, of the
Mother? If narcissism is a necessary screening process to protect us from the abyss opened up
by differentiation between mother and infant, how does the female child respond to the next
stage wherein the female is placed outside of the Symbolic Order? It seems that she may either
be consigned to a continuing narcissistic tendency in order to formulate an identity through her
relationship with the other reflected in the glass, which would lead to a schizophrenic splitting
of consciousness, or that she will seek identification by reading the signs of the responses that
others give to her, which puts her in the role of the paranoiac. Language also becomes the
screen defending the boundary between the conscious and the unconscious, as well as the
mirror within which the repressed can be framed and reflected in some discrete form.
Whilst Woolf was concerned to break the "screen-making habit" in her Writer's Diary and
record instead the "loose, drifting material of life" in a "loose" and "elastic" form so that her
mind could "embrace" anything, she was also aware of the threat of annihilation were the
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screens not to exist at all (Writer's Diary: 1978, p.23). The following entry was written in
1926 when Woolf was completing To The Lighthouse, the autobiographical novel in which she
investigates her relationship with her parents which we shall investigate more fully later:
The screens shut me out. Have no screens, for screens are made out of our own integument; and get at
the thing itself, which has nothing whatever in common with a screen. The screen-making habit,
though, is so universal that probably it preserves our sanity. If we had not this desire for shutting
people off from our sympathies we might perhaps dissolve utterly; separateness would be impossible.
Writer's Diary: 1978, p.100.
This not only touches on the effect of writing but also, to a certain extent, constitutes the
theme within the following passages from Woolf s short stories (10).
The Lady in the Looking-Glass (1929)
"The Lady in the Looking-Glass: A Reflection" is a short piece of fiction which explores how
a character can be constructed through imagination and language and suggests a self which
exists beyond the confining surface of a mirror. Woolf moves between surface and depth, the
real and the imagined. The fixed, framed and lifeless reflections in the hall mirror are
juxtaposed with the moving and mutable objects which are not within its range. Only
imagination can prize open the lady and the rich language and imagery in the text becomes the
medium through which this exploration is expressed when she is not framed within the mirror.
However, there is a recurring urgency about the need for truth: "There must be truth; there
must be a wall," and the need to know and convey accurately this woman's private life, her
knowledge, her romances, her preferred flowers, her thoughts and memories, her actions at
the bottom of the garden. A tension is brought out by the juxtaposition of this concern
through the narrative voice alongside the images which are suggestive rather of the wild and
uncontrolled. The speaker of the narrative speculates and builds a character out of this
speculation until the denouement when the lady returns and is reflected in the hall mirror
which, through the open door, can encapsulate the pathway through the nearer part of the
garden to the house:
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One must imagine - here was she in the looking-glass. It made one start
She was so far off at first that one could not see her clearly. She came lingering and pausing, here
straightening a rose, there lifting a pink to smell it, but she never stopped and all the time she
became larger and larger in the looking-glass, more and more completely the person into whose mind
one had been trying to penetrate. One verified her by degrees - fitted the qualities one had discovered
into the visible body. There were her grey-green dress, and her long shoes, her basket, and something
sparkling at her throat. She came so gradually that she did not seem to derange the pattern in the
glass, but only to bring some in new element which gently moved and altered the other objects as if
asking them courteously, to make room for her. And the letters and the table and the grass walk and
the sunflowers which had been waiting in the looking-glass separated and opened out so that she
might be received among them. At last there she was in the hall. She stopped dead. She stood by the
table. She stood perfectly still. At once the looking-glass began to pour over her a light that seemed to
fix her; that seemed like some acid to bite off the unessential and superficial and to leave only the
truth. It was an enthralling spectacle. Everything dropped from her - clouds, dress, basket, diamond -
all that one had called the creeper and the convolvulus. Here was the hard wall beneath. Here was the
woman herself. She stood naked in that pitiless light. And there was nothing, Isabella was perfectly
empty. She had no thoughts. She had no friends. She cared for nobody. As for her letters, they were
all bills. Look, as she stood there, old and angular, veined and lined, with her high nose and her
wrinkled neck, she did not even trouble to open them.
People should not leave looking-glasses hanging in their rooms.
Complete Shorter Fiction: 1991, p.225.
The last line of the story is an exact echo of the opening line, thus framing the narrative, and
within this passage we have a condensation/concentration of many of the elements which have
come before this incident. Therefore the language is representative of the climactic reflection
and focuses within its framework the themes which are explored throughout the story.
Here we can see Woolfs perception of the mirror and its reflections as a threat to identity.
As La Belle explains in Herself Beheld: The Literature of the Looking Glass (1988) Woolf
was concerned not to be trapped or captured by the glass: "mirroring typified an alternative to
the personality she constructed through language" (La Belle: 1988, p.156). The creating of an
exterior self through the imagination is far more important than being constrained by the need
for feminine reconstructions in the mirror. Despite the fact that the narrator tries to convince
us that "real" Isabella is the one in the glass at the end of the story, we are not convinced.
Gerard Duckworth is an interesting figure in Woolf s personal history and I would like here
to make a link between the hall mirror in "The Lady in the Looking-Glass: A Reflection" and
an incident in Woolf s autobiography which exposes her brother as an abusive and influential
force in the shaping of personality and memory. Woolf questions whether, when memories
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come back to the surface, it is perhaps because there is an existent trace of a previously
forgotten strong emotion. She tries to work out and articulate why it should be that the
memory of looking at herself in the hall mirror at Talland house should be accompanied by the
memory of a feeling of guilt and shame, why she only looked when she was sure she was
alone. Woolf realises that her ability to feel ecstasy and rapture was only possible when
disconnected from any sense of herself as body, that, therefore, she must have been ashamed
or afraid of her own body. In her autobiographical writing, "A Sketch of the Past", Woolf
attempts to articulate an incident from her personal history, which occurred in the hall, thus
accounting for this disconnection from her own body:
There was a slab outside the dining room door for standing dishes upon. Once when I was very small
Gerald Duckworth lifted me onto this, and as I sat there he began to explore my body. 1 can remember
the feel of his hand going under my clothes; going firmly and steadily lower and lower. I remember
how I hoped that he would stop; how I stiffened and wriggled as his hand approached my private
parts. But it did not stop. His hand explored my private parts too. I remember resenting, disliking it -
what is the word for so numb and mixed a feeling?
Moments: 1976, p.69.
Woolf refers repeatedly in these autobiographical writings to the problem of trying to describe
or give an account of "the person to whom things happen" because "the person is evidently
immensely complicated" (Moments: 1976, p.69). Although a writer can collect the events and
incidents in a person's life, the person remains unknown. Woolf adds a dream which she
suggests may refer to the real event described above:
I dreamt that I was looking in a glass when a horrible face - the face of an animal - suddenly showed
over my shoulder. I cannot be sure if this was a dream, or if it happened. Was I looking in the glass
one day when something in the background moved, and seemed to me alive? I cannot be sure. But I
have always remembered the other face in the glass, whether it was a dream or a fact, and that it
frightened me.
Moments: 1976, p.69.
Again the fusion between the imagined and the real is evident here. Both are incorporated,
neither one prioritised, because the effect is the same. La Belle suggests that "the spectral
dread of the mirror" in Woolf s dream is "a foreboding of insanity":
It is only one step away from looking in the mirror and, instead of seeing her own face, seeing
something nonhuman. Some of Woolfs reasons for her difficulties with the mirror seem positive -
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there is more to her willed identity than the visual image. But her primal, instinctual relationship with
the mirror also harbors a fear of the mirror, and hence of the self, a terror of what she will see in the
glass.
La Belle: 1988, p.158.
Flight from the mirror, La Belle continues, can result in either freedom and independence from
the process of self-definition through the mirror, or madness. Certainly, the links here between
narcissism, paranoia and schizophrenia are interesting when we look at Jung's theory. He
suggests that the hallucinations of the schizophrenic are "significant psychic products" which
come out of the splitting of the ego into multiple experiencing subjects. Paranoia is the
simplest form in which the personality has merely doubled. When the patient suffers a
persecution attack it is because the ego, which experiences itself as a victim, becomes
autonomous and rises to the surface. The healthy ego is paralysed, ineffective. This is not a
chance or meaningless happening but is linked to "a particular psychological moment" (Jung in
Storr: 1986, p. 41). This extraordinary moment must have had "a profound and dangerous
effect" for it to produce such intense fear of external hostility (Jung in Storr: 1986, p.42).
When this event happens the emotional life of the subject is damaged due to the hypersensitive
state of youth/childhood, hence "the spiritual form which his emotions needed in order to live"
is broken down. Paranoid convictions, delusions and hallucinations are a later result of this
early disintegration of the personality. Sue Roe sees the inclusion of the dream passage, an
addition to the story of abuse, as an attempt by Woolf to signal that it is the action of an other
"that disturbs her sense of her own integrity," hence the source which interrupted the self
"takes on an appropriately monstrous form" in the unconscious mind which dreams and within
the language of this passage (Roe: 1990, p.53).
The dream/memory which Woolf describes may well be linked to her early experience of
incestuous abuse and the image of the fearful face in the mirror could be a confrontational
reminder of a repressed, hidden, secret fear which is projected outwards and appears reflected
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as an other. The mirror acts as an enclosing screen to protect her from this other but also a
link to the "where" of the initial petrifying/paralysing incident. Hence, the appearance of the
other is not necessarily a negative event in terms of mental health, as Laing suggests:
Indeed, what is called psychosis is simply sometimes the sudden removal of the veil of the false self.
which had been serving to maintain an outer behavioural normality that may, long ago. have failed to
be any reflection of the state of affairs in the secret self
Laing: 1959, p.100.
I would suggest that the writing of the dream passage is an attempt to articulate the "dumb
and mixed feeling", for which Woolf could not find expression in the preceding passage.
Through imagery and metaphor she may be able to exorcise the real event by traversing the
boundaries between fact/fiction, real/imaginary, consciouslunconscious, zsyaoy franing the
incident within language she has gained some control over the effect of the memory.
The mirror in "The Lady in the Looking-Glass: A Reflection" does not offer release from
reality but seems to petrify and fix objects and people within its frame ("She stopped dead").
All the beauty is drained out of the character as the imagination ceases to have effect.
Confronted with "the hard wall" of "truth", the surface of the mirror, we are left with an image
which is devoid of any attractive quality. The closing and opening admonition; "People should
not leave looking-glasses hanging in their rooms," suggests that the narrator would prioritise
the imagination over reality because the objects outside of the frame of surface reality are free
to move, vibrant and beautiful. Rather "the light and fantastic and leafy and trailing, traveller's
joy", rather "the tremulous convolvulus" at the far reaches of the garden, than "the upright
aster, the starched zinnia" or the "burning roses alight like lamps on the straight posts of their
rose trees" which are captured within the glass.
The New Dress (1927)
In "The New Dress" (1927) the central female protagonist Mabel vacillates between self-love
and self-loathing. During Mrs Dalloway's party she is confronted with a sense of inferiority and
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paranoia because she considers that the dress she is wearing is unfashionable and
inappropriate. And yet she recalls a prior positive self-image when she was being fitted for the
dress she is now wearing. Not only is Mabel annoyed and frustrated by this vacillation but also
she is perplexed by her inability to decide which one of these opposing emotional extremes
reflects reality or the truth. The lack of fixity and stability in Mabel's internal emotional world
is represented metaphorically by the questioning of the reality or unreality of the images which
are reflected in the two looking-glasses, one in the dress-maker's room and one in Mrs
Dalloway's drawing-room. Thus we can see that this earlier story reflects again Woolf s
interest in the relationship between surface and depth, reality and the imagination as it relates
to knowledge of the self. The tension created for the reader by the narrator's description of
the lady's reflection in the glass as opposed to the earlier image of her in the garden is similar
to that regarding the contrast between the image of herself which Mabel remembers at the
dress-maker's and the one she sees at the party. Which images do we read as "real"?
The story begins when Mabel arrives at the party and experiences the initial sense that the
new dress she has had made is altogether wrong. Her consequent shame and humiliation, she
believes, is deserved because she had indulged in the self-love (the prior positive reflection)
that had led her to choose and deem acceptable, even admirable, this particular style, colour
and fashion. She had been pleased that, despite the fact that she had only a limited purse, she
had at least originality. Mabel believes that she can see through the veneer of friendliness, that
she can sense the lies and insincerity of the others at the party. She begins to question what is
real, whether the party brings out reality, whether the image that she saw in the dressmaker's
glass was false:
For a party makes things either much more real, or much less real, she thought; she saw in a flash to
the bottom of Robert Haydon's heart; she saw through everything. She saw the truth. This was true,
this drawing-room, this self, the other false ... and yet when Miss Milan put the glass in her hand, and
she had looked at herself with the dress on, finished, an extraordinary bliss shot through her heart.
Suffused with light, she sprang into existence. Rid of cares and wrinkles, what she had dreamed of
herself was there - a beautiful woman. Just for a second (she had not dared look longer, Miss Milan
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wanted to know about the length of the skirt), there looked at her, framed in the scrolloping
mahogany, a grey-white, mysteriously smiling, charming girl, the core of herself, the soul of herself
and it was not vanity only, not only self-love that made her think it good, tender, and true. Miss Milan
said the skirt could not well be longer; if anything the skirt, said Miss Milan, puckering her forehead,
considering with all her wits about her, must be shorter; and she felt, suddenly, honestly, full of love
for Miss Milan, much, much fonder of Miss Milan than of anyone in the whole world, and could have
cried for pity that she should be crawling on the floor with her mouth full of pins, and her face red
and her eyes bulging - that one human being should be doing this for another, and she saw them all as
human beings merely, and herself going off to a party, and Miss Milan pulling the cover over the
canary's cage, or letting him pick a hemp-seed from between her lips, and the thought of it, of this
side of human nature and its patience and its endurance and its being content with such miserable.
scanty, sordid, little pleasures filled her eyes with tears.
And now the whole thing had vanished. The dress, the room, the love, the pity, the scrolloping
looking-glass, and the canary's cage - all had vanished, and here she was in a corner of Mrs
Dalloway's drawing-room, suffering tortures, woken wide awake to reality.
Shorter Fiction: 1991, p. 172.
Not only does this passage call for our particular attention due to the singularity of the
positive self-image but also because here there is a sense of love, sympathy and human
connectedness/understanding which will be undermined and negated at the party where Mabel
experiences the "spears" of prejudice and scorn.
The reflection in the mirror at the party merely shows a yellow dot, or button "the size of a
three penny bit" which is disconnected and detached. When she does attempt communication
with the "cormorants" and "magpies" she realises, by studying the images reflected, that
everyone is greedily and tragically snatching for sympathy, and yet: "it was impossible that the
black dot, leaning forward, gesticulating, should make the yellow dot, sitting solitary,
self-centred, feel what the black dot was feeling, yet they pretended" (Shorter Fiction: 1991,
p.174). It is this very pretence which Mabel finds so distasteful and from which she wishes to
distance and extricate herself. And yet she herself succumbs, at the end of the story, to
insincerity when she tells Mrs Dalloway, despite her good intentions to escape "the saucer of
milk" in which she has been trapped like a fly and the "Lies, lies, lies" with which she has been
confronted, that she has enjoyed herself "enormously". Hence, she allows herself to be caught
once again by the contagious, insidious and insinuating hypocrisy which has pervaded the
narrative.
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But what do we make of this recollected image in the glass, this explosion of light, this
jouissance, this love and sympathy? Clearly she is no longer a "charming girl", and the "core"
of being is problematic when we consider that Woolf s writing constantly questions the notion
'of solidity, unification and essentialism. Yet, the language here is a forerunner to a later
passage where Mabel remembers "divine moments" of being when she is with her family. Here
we have a momentary revelation/epiphany where reality seems to dissolve and framed within
the looking-glass is an image which seems to fulfil all Mabel's desires in a fluid, ebullient
outpouring of well-being. The positive image of the "beautiful woman" she has always
dreamed of suggests that Mabel, in this instance, escapes the self-loathing and disgust that
accompanies an encounter with the other who is aged and wrinlded. As La Belle explains
when a woman looks into the glass she is confronted with three temporally defined images;
that of the past or who she used to be, that of the present or who she is, and that of the future
or who she thinks she will become (La Belle: 1988, p.76). For women who accept the
reflected image to be a true representative of their self the result of a confrontation with an
ageing and degenerating self is traumatic (La Belle: 1988, p.109). Denial and flight is perhaps
the suggestion here as Mabel embraces the otherness of youth which is "suffused with light".
However, the use of" a beautiful woman" and "it" as being "good, tender and true" suggests
at once a further dislocation from the other. She knows that this is not a reflection of her
surface but of the inner self she longs to be. What she fears to see reflected in the glass at the
party however is "the whole horror" of the dress, the outer surface of her clothing which she
has taken on in the vain hope of being accepted by people she neither trusts nor admires.
Freud's theories on narcissism and paranoia may be of some interest to us here. He
suggests that when the stability of the ego is threatened by reality a return to the child and
primary narcissism brings security. In Mabel's reminiscence she sees herself as a love-object
and sets up an idealised image which momentarily releases her from the reality of being
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watched, measured and judged by others. But this ideal ego is unstable and the moment
fleeting. The actual ego is measured against the imagined and her self-criticism, as well as the
external criticisms, upset the constructed narcissistic perfection (11). This watching and
Measuring of the real ego can lead to delusions of feeling observed, paranoia, whereby the
subject is assailed by external voices in the third person.
Simone de Beauvoir also writes about the inherent danger of insanity when a subject is
convinced that she deserves to be admired:
This kind of insanity does in fact change easily into delusions of persecution ... The narcissist finds it
impossible to admit that others are not passionately interested in her, if she has manifest proof that
she is not adored, she imagines at once that she is hated. She attributes all criticism to jealousy or
spite. Her frustrations are the result of evil machinations, and this confirms in her the idea of her own
importance. She slips easily into megalomania or its opposite: delusions of persecution. Being the
centre of her own universe and knowing no other universe than hers, she becomes the absolute centre
of the world.
de Beauvoir: 1953, p.605.
Hence Mabel believes that she can hear what the others are thinking about her and later in the
narrative her own vigil is emphasised by the use of impersonal pronouns signalling the split
within her own consciousness: "So she got up from the blue sofa, and the yellow button in the
looking-glass got up too" (my emphasis).
The sense of well-being and pleasure Mabel remembers is not only connected to the
idealised image, but also is to do with the care of Miss Milan. She feels loved and therefore
satisfied. Miss Milan offers no threat as she crawls around her feet tending to Mabel's needs
and this human sympathy and love is reciprocated; the narcissistic self-love allows her to
experience love for others as opposed to the paranoiac self-loathing where she sees to the
bottom of hearts and experiences hostility and alienation. Within this story, then, we have an
exploration of the pleasure and the pain of human existence which is inseparable from the
relationship of ego to object (12). The division of the world into the pleasurable, which is
internalised and results in love and attraction, is juxtaposed with alienation, the necessary
separation from that part of the world which causes pain. This alienation might incorporate an
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inner divide but the pain is, nevertheless, projected onto the external world and therefore the
world of others is considered as hostile.
The resulting repulsion and flight at the end of "The New Dress" does not suggest a
resolution of hostility, Mabel too resorts to untruths, but perhaps more significantly the story
is framed by the old "Chinese cloak". Mabel knows as soon as she arrives and takes off her
cloak that something is wrong. When she leaves she cocoons herself again, as she has done for
twenty years, wrapping herself "round and round and round". I would suggest that in doing
this she is not only protecting herself, but also it is an attempt to resolve, until the next social
engagement, her paranoid neurosis. The cloak covers the dress, it is also an article of clothing
which is trans-sexual, therefore Mabel becomes de-sexed, or androgynous. It seems to me that
Woolf was, among others things, concerned to expose the mental as well as the physical
constraints which accompany patriarchal constructions of femininity.
The two mirror images are also interesting when we consider the private and positive
experience of narcissism in the first mirror as opposed to the public exposure and critical eye
which is influenced by societal expectations of fashionable and feminine clothing. The mirror
at the party reflects the "male gaze" rather than her own perception of self. The problem then
seems to be that the second mirror is complicitous with social valuation and validation of the
ego. Perhaps Mabel is already considered to be unfeminine because she is well read and
intelligent rather than decorative. When she decides to continue the struggle to be happy,
having found a way out of the saucer at the end of the story, it is the thought of education and
political involvement which seem to offer her hope:
She would go to the London Library tomorrow. She would find some wonderful, helpful, astonishing
book, quite by chance ... or she would walk down the Strand and drop, accidentally, into a hall where
a miner was telling about the life in the pit and suddenly she would become a new person. She would
be absolutely transformed. She would wear a uniform; she would be called Sister Somebody; and she
would never give a thought to clothes again.
Shorter Fiction: 1991, p. 176.
MabeYs problem is that she falls victim to the notion that the second mirror reflects more
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accurately her self' and she becomes ensnared by the opinions of others because she has
allowed herself to be "captured in the motionless, silvered trap." (de Beauvoir: 1953, p.598)
Mabel's problem of discerning which is the "real" image is a problem which is to do with the
Subjectivity and identification of many females:
... all her life the woman is to find the magic of the mirror a tremendous help in her effort to project
herself and then attain self-identification ... In woman particularly, the image is identified with the
ego. Handsome appearance in the male suggests transcendence; in the female, the passivity of
immanence ... Man, feeling and wishing himself active, subject, does not see himself in his fixed
image; it has little attraction for him, since man's body does not seem to him an object of desire ., while
woman, knowing and making herself object, believes she really sees herself in the glass. A passive
and given fact, the reflection is, like herself, a thing; and as she does covet female flesh, her flesh, she
gives life through her admiration and desire to the imaged qualities she sees.
de Beauvoir: 1953, pp. 598-599.
It would seem that this story is not only a feminist criticism of gender constructions but also a
reflection of the narcissistic, performative tendencies prevalent among women.
As Hermione Lee points out Woolf was interested in the variant selves which presented
themselves and performed at public engagements as opposed to the self which she tried to
capture in her diary extracts and she was also concerned with and aware of "her see-saws
between involvement and withdrawal" (Lee: 1996, p.530). In her diary entry April 11, 1926
she seems to echo Mabel's cocooning process at her exit from the party: "I have wrapped
myself round in my own personality again" (Diary Vol 3: 1980, p. 74). This seems to suggest
that there is a more comfortable and familiar self with which she can clothe herself which is
perhaps less vulnerable than the selves she feels she exposes in public. And yet Woolf is again
ambivalent in her attitude. In other entries she seems to relish the idea of parties rather than
fear exposure and although there is evidence that she often felt outmodish and uncomfortable
about her clothing there is also evidence that she enjoyed dabbling with fashion: "Happiness is
to have a little string [with] onto which things will attach themselves. For example, going to
my dressmaker - thinking of a dress, imagining it made - that is the string" (April 20, 1925,
Bodlean Berg Collection, Quentin Bell). Also she interests herself in the selves that other
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people project: "But my present reflection is that people have any number of states of
consciousness: I should like to investigate the party consciousness, the frock consciousness.
The fashion world at the Beck. [In left hand margin 'second selves is what I mean']" (April 27,
1925 Bodlean Berg Collection, Quentin Bell). Her own sense of positioning is ambiguous
when she seems to make some distinction between herself, as an outsider and perhaps
unprotected, and those who do protect themselves and connect themselves to others. She
considers "people who secrete an envelope that connects them. & protects them. from others
like myself who am outside the envelope, foreign bodies" (April 27, 1925 Bodlean Berg
Collection, Quentin Bell). It is not clear whether it is she or the others who are foreign bodies.
In a letter to Ethel Smyth (March 1931), Woolf tries to explain and resolve a conflict which
has occurred between them. She is adamant about her reluctance to be exposed at public
engagements where the "chatter and clatter on top of any art, music, pictures, which I dont
understand, - is an abomination" (Letters Vol. 4: 1978, p.297) and where she feels victim to
"wolves and vultures" (Letters Vol. 4: 1978, p.298). She expresses her indignation and sense
of betrayal because she was forced to attend a party for Ethel at Lady Rosebery's in February,
1931:
It was the party. I dont know when I have suffered more; and yet why did I suffer? and what did I
suffer? Humiliation: that I had been dragged to that awful Exhibition of insincerity and inanity
against my will (I used to be dragged by my half-brothers against my will - hence perhaps some latent
sense of outrage) ... It seemed to me that you had wantonly inflicted this indignity upon me for no
reason, and that I was pinioned there and betrayed and made to smile at our damnation - I who was
reeling and shocked, as I see now, (to excuse myself,) by my own struggle with The Waves - who had
vainly perhaps but honestly tried to understand you, H.B. the Prison: there I was mocking and
mowing, and you forced me to it and you didn't mind it. I went home therefore more jangled and
dazed and out of touch with reality than I have been for years. I could not sleep. I took chloral. I spent
the next day in a state of horror and disillusion ... So then I put off [Sibyl] Colefax and Ottoline and
resolved to be quit of the posturing and insincerity and being hauled about and made to exhibit myself
forever.
Letters Vol 4: 1978, pp. 297-298.
In order to address the comment made in parenthesis here which is used as an explanation for
her "latent sense of outrage" let us now return to Woolf s non-fictional, life writing in "A
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Sketch of the Past" which, as John Mepham explains, were memoirs not yet polished for
publication and were therefore probably less guarded, "less self-protective ... less apt to use
beautiful writing as a screen" (Mepham: 1991, p.180). The source of Woolf s rebellion against
Victorian codes of acceptable female behaviour and dress code is made explicit in these later
autobiographical writings.
La Belle reflects on Woolfs admission in "A Sketch" of her early tomboy attitude, her
hatred of the restraints of clothing and her ambivalent attitude towards mirrors, which was
partly due to a refusal to define herself through Victorian constructions of femininity.
Although Woolf remembers the "habit" of looking at herself in mirrors when she was a young
girl, she also explains that this was always accompanied by "a strong feeling of guilt"
(Moments: 1976, p.68):
Woolf believes that the fact that she and her sister "played cricket" and "climbed trees" contributed to
her mixed feelings about mirrors. As a child she developed a personality through what were
considered masculine pursuits - and thus to look into a mirror was to begin a different way, socially
and sexually, of creating an identity. Woolf also suggests that looking into the mirror could become a
trap. She might start defining herself through the glass rather than through being a tomboy or (as she
later did) through writing.
La Belle: 1988, p.156.
Woolf recounts in this autobiography a later particular occasion when, as a young woman,
she was shamed and humiliated by her half-brother George. In the evenings, she explains,
work had to finish and at 8 o'clock, she and Vanessa were expected to appear presentable in
evening dress, hair done, arms and necks bare, to take their place among Victorian upper class
society. She explains the limited budget and that on one occasion she had "erratically" bought
some cheaper "house dress" fabric, not only for its economy but also because it was more
"adventurous". Perhaps here we can recognise Mabel's rash and failed attempts at originality:
Down I came: in my green evening dress; all the lights were up in the drawing room; and there was
George, in his black tie and evening jacket, in the chair by the fire. He fixed on me that extraordinary
observant [illegible] gaze with which he always inspected clothes. He looked me up and down as if [I]
were a horse turned into the ring. Then the sullen look came over him; a look in which one traced not
merely aesthetic disapproval; but something that went deeper; morally, socially, he scented some kind
of insurrection; of defiance of social standards. I was condemned from many more points of view than
I can analyse as I stood there, conscious of those criticisms; and conscious too of
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fear, of shame and of despair - "Go and tear it up", he said at last, in that curiously rasping and
peevish voice which expressed his serious displeasure at this infringement of a code that meant more
to him than he would admit.
Moments: 1976, p.130.
Woolf explains her brother's embrace and adherence to the Victorian social code, as well as
her comparative youth and poverty which accounted for her lack of defiance. In a further
passage which also employs the imagery of the circus Woolf describes her eccentric and
marginalised position:
But there was another element in our relationship which affected me as I stood there that winter's
night exposed to his criticism in my green dress. I was not wholly conscious of it then. But besides
feeling his age and his power, I felt too another feeling which I later called the outsider's feeling.
When exposed to George's scowling, I felt as a tramp or a gipsy must feel who stands at the flap of a
tent and sees the circus going on inside. Victorian society was in full swing; George was the acrobat
who jumped through hoops, and Vanessa and I beheld the spectacle, We had good seats at the show,
but we were not allowed to take part in it. We applauded, we obeyed - that was all."
Moments: 1976, pp. 131-132.
First a horse, exposed to inspection, then a tramp excluded from any action. There are many
reverberations here which suggest that Mabel's paranoia is a fictional representative of the
reality of being a comparatively poor woman living in Victorian society and we can deduce
that this exposition of delusional persecution and hostility is largely a reflection of the effect of
such constraints. Woolf explains that, to her brother, "every party was an examination, a test:
a matter of the greatest importance; it led to success; it led to failure." Success is social
success, failure is "dowdiness, eccentricity" (Moments: 1976, p.135). In "A Sketch" she tells
us that later, when she becomes involved in the Bloomsbury Circle, she finds that she is
allowed an opinion and freedom from any dress code. (13)
We can see here a contradiction within Woolf s attitude when we consider her later adult
criticism of Katherine Mansfield. In a letter to Sackville-West, which clearly exposes her
snobbery as regards clothing, it becomes clear that she was susceptible to the codes which
defined women according to the cut and cost of cloth: "Anderson seems to me extremely good
- puts a line around herself completely, as Katherine Mansfield used to wish to do, when she
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bought a tailor made coat" (Letters Vol. 4: 1978, P. 271). As we shall see this specific
reference to her contemporary, Mansfield, is both interesting and significant. (14)
Economics, Class and Katherine Mansfield.
In Lee's chapter on "Selves" she tells us that Woolf s external and internal conflicts were not
only due to the wish to withdraw into an aesthetic solitude and be part of the lively social
London scene, to write fiction and carefully record facts, but also these conflicts existed
"between wildly inconsistent feeling about the working-classes" (Lee: 1996, p.536). The
relationship between Mabel and Miss Milan, therefore, is significant in "The New Dress"
(Shorter Fiction: 1991, pp. 170-177) because it further emphasises another concern within
this story and within Woolf which is one of class distinction. Within the first paragraph of this
story we are told of "the misery" and "profound dissatisfaction" which Mabel tries to conceal
because she is ashamed of her "shabby" drawing-room, and "her mean, water-sprinkled blood
that depressed her." She later confesses her "envy" because she sees herself as a fly whilst "the
others were dragon flies, butterflies, beautiful insects." She is a "mongrel," not a
thoroughbred. She is also connected to the canary, not only through colour but also through
the juxtaposition of the remembrance of the canary's cage and her action of pecking at her
shoulder in the glass at Mrs Dalloway's party. Thus, rather than wolves and vultures, she is the
prey of the "cormorants" and "magpies," both larger than canaries and of course free.
The canary and the fly deserve further consideration at this point, especially because of
their relation to this class issue. Miss Milan's care of the canary, as does her care of Mabel,
exposes a side of human nature which is missing in those at the party, "patience and
endurance" contentment with "such miserable, scanty, sordid little pleasures," a contentment
with social and economic positioning which Mabel cannot accept or take pleasure in. Perhaps
the suggestion is that it is Mabel's attempt at social repositioning which is at the root of some
138
her problems. In her internal admonition to propel herself into the things that would make her
feel that "It would be it!" Mabel has been reflecting on those "divine moments" and on those
times when everything seems to be in place but nothing happens: "One wasn't happy. It was
flat, just flat, that was all." She goes on to blame not only "her wretched self.., lolling about
in a kind of twilight existence" but also she expands this criticism to the rest of her family "all
the same water-veined creatures who did nothing." But here, in the midst of this wallowing,
she reaches the point of release:
Then in the midst of this creeping, crawling life, suddenly she was on the crest of a wave. That
wretched fly - where had she read the story that kept coming into her mind about the fly and the
saucer? - struggled out.
Shorter Fiction: 1991, p. 176.
The story to which Woolf is referring is most probably Katherine Mansfield's "The Fly" (1923)
and this leads us into an are wherein Woolf s insecurities and ambiguous response to social
hierarchies and conventions can be investigated. Let us begin with an excloration of some of
Mansfield's shorter fiction.
"The Fly" consists mainly of the sadistic account of a man who drowns a fly by repeatedly
releasing blobs of ink from his pen. This man has been reminded by an elderly former
employee of the death of his son who has been buried in France and whose grave he has not
visited. He is distracted from his grieving when he notices that a fly has fallen into his ink well.
He lifts the fly onto a piece of blotting paper, watches it undertake "the immense task of
cleaning the ink from its wings" until "it was ready for life again":
But just then the boss had an idea. He plunged his pen back into the ink, leaned his thick wrist on the
blotting-paper, and as the fly tried its wings down came the heavy blot. What would it make of that?
What indeed! The little beggar seemed absolutely cowed, stunned, and afraid to move because of what
would happen next. But then, as if painfully, it dragged itself forward. The front legs waved, caught
hold, and, more slowly this time, the task began again from the beginning.
Mansfield: 1981, P. 417.
This torture continues until the boss decides that the fourth blot should be the last but on this
occasion the fly finally dies. After disposing of the fly and ordering a fresh sheet of blotting
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paper the boss tries to, but cannot, remember what he had been thinking about before this
incident. As Daly notes this could be a metaphorical account of Mansfield's own experience of
illness. "She had felt herself to be like a fly 'dropped into the milk-jug and fished out again ...
still too milky and drowned to start cleaning up yet." (Daly: 1994, p.101) However, in a letter
to Dorothy Brett, 1922, it is interesting to note that the profession of "the boss", which
remains obscure in the story, is named: "I have just finished a queer story called "The Fly"
about a fly that fell into an ink pot and a Bank Manager" (Mansfield: 1989, p.248).
In the same letter Mansfield refers to the next story which will be of interest to us here
"The Canary" which was published in the same year. Mansfield explains her reasons for this
subject:
I think & think about them - their feelings, their dreams, the life they led before they were caught, the
difference between the two little pale fluffy ones who were born in captivity & their grandfather &
grandmother who knew the South American forests and have seen the immense perfumed sea ...
Words cannot express the beauty of that high shrill little song rising out of the very stones. It seems
one cannot escape Beauty - it is everywhere.
Mansfield: 1989, p. 248
Having read "The New Dress" it seems likely that Woolf knew this story as there are so many
similarities between Miss Milan and the protagonist of Mansfield's narrative, both in terms of
suggested character and social standing. Although she, in her letters, claims not to have read
Mansfield's work (to Raverat Vol 3, p.59, to Sackville-West Vol 4, p.366), it is possible that
these themes were at least discussed when the two writers met.
Mansfield's "The Canary" (1923) is a landlady's monologue which tells of her immense loss
and loneliness now that her canary is dead. The bird gave her company and comfort but she
muses at the end of the story that despite the beauty of its little song that would cheer her
there was also a sense of something else, almost inexplicable: "But isn't it extraordinary that
under his sweet, joyful little singing it was just this - sadness? - Ah, what is it? - that I heard"
(Mansfield: 1981, p. 422.)
Despite the seeming thematic similarities as well as those of style (internal streams of
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consciousness), many contradictions can be heard in the different voices of Woolf in the
Writer's Diary and her letters as she tries to negotiate her position in the problematic
relationship with Mansfield. Anthony Alpers explains that despite their mutual interest in
writing "the social barrier was of a kind that couldn't be removed" (Nathan: 1993, p. 199).
Hermione Lee tells us that Woolf was wary of Mansfield because she was aware of a false self,
a masked self, which was at odds with a secret self "Virginia was right to be wary of her,
especially when she herself was so conscious of the gap between her inner and outward
selves" (Lee: 1996, p.388). Woolf, of all people, should know the dangers therein and would
not want to be on the receiving end of the kind of mockery and ridicule she so often dealt out
behind the scenes in private letters. Woolf is not only scathing on occasion about Mansfield as
a personality but also frequently as regards her writing. Her frequent vacillations on this
subject are of interest when we consider that she perhaps alters her opinions, and explicit
attitudes, according to the recipient of her letters but her ambivalent attitude is also apparent
in her diary which suggests perhaps a more sincere ambiguity.
Woolf s diary entry of August 7, 1918 is a scathing attack both on a professional and
personal level:
I threw down Bliss with the explanation, 'She's done for!' Indeed I don't see how much faith in her as
a woman or a writer can survive that sort of story. I shall have to accept the fact, I'm afraid, that her
mind is very thin soil, laid an inch or two deep upon very barren rock. For Bliss is long enough to give
her a chance of going deeper. Instead she is content with superficial smartness; and the whole
conception is poor, cheap, not the vision, however imperfect, of an interesting mind. She writes badly
too. And the effect was as I say, to give me an impression of her callousness and hardness as a human
being. I shall read it again; but I don't suppose I shall change. She'll go on doing this sort of thing,
perfectly to her and Murry's satisfaction. I'm relieved now that they didn't come. Or is it absurd to
read all this criticism of her personally into a story?
Writer's Diary: 1978, p. 18-19.
We can see here that Woolf is at least partly concerned that her personal opinions of her,
which are very much to do with social standing as we will see, is affecting the reading of
Mansfield's work. In a letter to Jacques Raverat, July 1923, we can see that she is still
concerned about this prejudice:
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I knew both the Murrys. Please read Katherine's work, and tell me your opinion. My theory is that
while she possessed the most amazing senses of her generation so that she could actually reproduce
this room for instance, with its fly, clock, dog, tortoise if need be, to the life, she was weak as water,
as insipid, and a great deal more commonplace, when she had to use her mind. That is, she can't put
thoughts, or feelings, or subtleties of any kind into her characters, without at once becoming, where
she's serious, hard, and where she's sympathetic, sentimental. Her first story which we printed.
Prelude, was pure observation and therefore exquisite. I could not read her latest [The Canary]. But
prejudice may be at work here too.
Letters Vol 3: 1977, p.59.
Later in their relationship Woolf concedes that Mansfield's supposed "hard composure is
much on the surface" (Writer's Diary: 1978, p.31). Also, it is quite clear from her entry on
June 19, 1923, that Woolf is compelled to consider Mansfield's opinions about writing, even
though she still casts aspersions on Mansfield's character:
I took up this book with a kind of idea that I might say something about my writing - which was
prompted by glancing at what K.M. said about her writing in The Dove's Nest. But I only glanced.
She said a good deal about feeling things deeply: also about being pure, which I won't criticize,
though of course I very well could. But now what do I feel about my writing?
Writer's Diary: 1978, p.82.
Clearly there is evidence here that Mansfield has some influence on Woolf and yet she needs to
stress that she only glanced, perhaps to assure herself that although the exercise was prompted
by Mansfield, her writing would not be affected.
Woolf s letters in January 1923 (following Mansfield's death) to two of Mansfield's close
friends, Dorothy Brett and Lady Ottoline Morrell would seem to contradict the feelings
expressed above. She tells Brett that she is glad to have so many of Katherine's letters, and
tells Morrell that she is sorry that they had not kept in touch, and much later (Oct 1928) that,
after reading Mansfield's letters, she feels desolated by the waste of her death "- and how
wretched it is - her poverty, her illness - I didn't realise how gifted she was either. And now
never to - but you will know all I mean. I never knew that she had been so intimate with you"
(Letters Vol 3: 1977, p. 546). In March, 1923, in another letter to Brett, Woolf goes into a
lengthy explanation for this apparent split in which she blames the fact that she did not receive
a response to one of her letters and then was put off by gossip which had maligned Mansfield's
character. Woolf explains that she is typing out Mansfield's letters for her widower and seems
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to express regret and indebtedness here: "it is terrible to me to think that I sacrificed anything
to this odious gossip. She gave me something no one else can" (Letters Vol. 3: 1977, p.18).
So what did Mansfield give to Woolf?
Perhaps the answer lies within Woolf s letter to Vita Sackville-West with whom she was
more intimate and therefore her response can perhaps be read as a more honest reflection of
her feelings:
As for Katherine. I think you've got it very nearly right. We did not ever coalesce; but I was
fascinated, and she was respectful, only I thought her cheap, and she thought me priggish; and yet we
were both compelled to meet simply in order to talk about writing. This we did by the hour. Only then
she came out with a swarm of little stories, and I was jealous, no doubt; because they were so praised:
but gave up reading them not on that account, but because of their cheap sharp sentimentality, which
was all the worse, I thought, because she had, as you say, the zest and the resonance - I mean she
could permeate one with her quality; and if one felt this cheap scent in it, it reeked in one's nostrils.
But I must read her one day ... dinners with them were about the most unpleasant exhibitions,
humanly speaking, I've ever been to. But the fact remains - I mean, that she had a quality I adored,
and needed; I think her sharpness and reality - her having knocked about with prostitutes and so on,
whereas I had always been respectable - was the thing I wanted then. I dream of her often - now thats
an odd reflection - how one's relation with a person seems to be continued after death in dreams, and
with some odd reality too.
Letters Vol 4: 1978, p366.
One immediate and striking contradiction here is that Woolf had already written to
Sackville-West in 1927 saying that she had been reading Mansfield "with a mixture of
sentiment and horror" (Letters Vol 3: 1977, p.408). It is clear that Mansfield was concerned to
find a new form, and was an important figure for Woolf as regards ideas about modernism and
art. In 1919 Mansfield wrote to Ottoline Morrell; "the time has come for a 'new word' but I
imagine that the new word will not be spoken easily. People have never explored the lovely
medium of prose. It is a hidden country still" (Mansfield: 1989, p.236). It was surely Woolf s
desire to explore this land and both writers are as important to us now as those other
modernist giants Joyce and Lawrence because they were both concerned to find a female voice
which did not give in to what Woolf considered to be the egotistical self-consciousness of the
eminent male writers of the time. They both wanted to articulate their explorations of
consciousness through "intense short pieces" rather than through the tomes of such mammoth
143
proportions as Ulysses, to find a voice more "fluid" and "impersonal" than other female
writers such as Dorothy Richardson and they were both "concerned with the problem of how
solid narrative form could be broken up without losing deep feeling" (Lee: 1996, p.392). As
Saralyn R. Daly notes it is not perhaps the similarities of image and structure that occur
between the texts which should concern us but the fact that these women became fully active
in such an important artistic and literary movement:
The two women display a kinship in craft as they think about how to treat their materials: the extent
of the narrator's knowledge, as well as what to make available to and what to require of the reader, the
increase of dramatic quality in the use of particular details; the avoidance of narrative passages; the
increase of immediacy in the use of interior monologue and the freedoms that device allows in dealing
with time. Each reflects the uncertainties of her age: neither will, neither feels that she should, reach
more than implicit conclusions in her writing. Like Henry James, they "create their readers",
requiring that they grasp inferences and attain for themselves the revelations to which stories lead. In
this kinship of craftsmanship - no matter how motive, style, or attitude toward the subject may differ -
lies these women's likeness to James Joyce, to the writers of the 1920's, to many followers in modern
fiction. Their difference is that they are consciously feminists.
Daly: 1994, pp. 115-116.
This feminism is clear when we consider another of Mansfield's stories "New Dresses"
(1924). Mansfield exposes the constraints of clothing on young females and ridicules snobbery
and convention within a family which is less than financially secure. We can see that there are
many connections between the sentiments expressed here and Woolf s life experience in terms
of the tyrannical and brutal patriarchy which imposes and exerts control when we come to the
non-fiction passages below. Helen is the tom-boy misfit who is mistreated because she is
neither feminine and obedient like her sister Rose, nor is she as acceptable as "Boy", who is
praised for his rowdy behaviour. The mother, Anne, has splashed out on some expensive green
cashmere in order to make up two Sunday dresses which she trims with lace and "apple-green
sashes." These are to be worn with "straw hats with ribbon tails" and are to last for at least
two years. Despite the intimidation and storming of her husband, Henry, when he discovers
the cost of the material, Anne is pleased with the effect the next day when the family go to
church:
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She could not help thrilling, they looked so superior ... Not a word more on the subject from Henry,
even with thirty-five shillings' worth walking hand in hand before him all the way to church. Anne
decided that was really generous and noble of him. She looked up at him, walking with his shoulders
thrown back How fine he looked in that long black coat with the white silk tie just showing! And the
children looked worthy of him. She squeezed his hand in church, conveying by that silent pressure 'It
was for your sake I made the dresses ... And she fully believed it.
Mansfield: 1981, pp. 543-544.
Rebellious Helen does not remove her dress when she gets home and consequently rips it in
the garden when she takes "a flying leap" from the swing. She then hides the dress and later
gives it away. "She felt neither frightened nor sorry", even though she knows she will be
beaten by her exasperated Father: "If it were not Sunday, Helen, I would whip you. As it is,
and I must be at the office early to-morrow, I shall give you a sound smacking after tea in the
evening ... Do you hear me?'" (Mansfield: 1981, p.547). As it is, she is saved by Dr Malcolm,
who has recovered the dress and had it mended with new material because he admires Helen
as a "young spark" rather than her preferred, spiritless and priggish sister, and because he
disapproves of the family's treatment of the "young spark."
What is also interesting is the relationship between these two writers both prior to and
following Katherine's death. Not only do the meetings suggest that ideas and themes would
be shared which would explain the recurring references and images of the fly and the canary in
"The New Dress" but also, it seems to me, that a dialogue was perhaps continuing long after
the split between them. This was a dialogue which could not take place anywhere else but
through their fictions, and one which would not only indicate an agreement in terms of an
exposition of the female condition but also reflects their differing perspectives regarding class
and economics. The continual references in Woolf s diary and letters to cheapness and this last
reference to the watery Katherine suggests that "water-veined" Mabel may well have been
partly representative of Woolf s lower class counterpart. Lets now consider Mansfield's
perspective in another of her short stories "The Garden Party" (1922).
"The Garden Party" focuses on Laura, a young girl of upper middle-class background, who
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struggles to find a proper response to the news that a man of lower class has been killed in the
middle of her family's preparations for a stylish garden party. This man's family lives in a dingy
cottage where even the smoke which comes from the chimney is "poverty-stricken" in
-comparison with "the great silvery plumes that uncurled" from her own home. Laura believes
that, out of respect, the party should be cancelled but her pleas are ridiculed by the family. The
turning point in Laura's dilemma comes when she catches sight of herself in the mirror wearing
a new hat which her mother has given to her in order to placate her distraught daughter whose
distress is ridiculed as "extravagant" and "absurd":
'I don't understand', said Laura, and she walked quickly out of the room into her own bedroom.
There, quite by chance, the first thing she saw was this charming girl in the mirror, in her black hat
trimmed with gold daisies and a long black velvet ribbon. Never had she imagined that she could look
like that. Is mother right? she thought. And she hoped her mother was right. Am I being extravagant?
Perhaps it was extravagant. Just for a moment she had another glimpse of that poor woman and those
little children and the body being carried into the house. But it all seemed blurred, unreal, like a
picture in the newspaper. I'll remember it again after the party's over, she decided. And somehow that
seemed quite the best plan....
Mansfield: 1981, p.256.
Despite the fact that the hat is trimmed with daisies, symbols of Spfmg-time and new growth,
the hat is black and serves as some kind of compensation - Laura can be in mourning all
afternoon even though the party has not been cancelled.
After the party, however, Laura is again faced with the problem of knowing what is the
right thing to do and this time she questions what she considers to be her mother's
extravagance. The mother's "brilliant idea" is to send down a basket piled high with the
sandwiches and cakes which have not been eaten, and the left-over arum lilies; "People of that
class are so impressed by arum lilies." Laura escapes the embarrassment of the lilies because
the stems would ruin her dress, but she is forced to go alone into the street where there are
"mean little dwellings" and where "children swarmed" and there was "a man whose house was
studded all over with minute bird-cages" (Mansfield: 1981, p.254). Laura feels conspicuous
and inappropriately dressed in her shiny frock. The hat may be black but it is too big and
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showy, flamboyant, with its "velvet streamer" to be an appropriate symbol of mourning in this
situation. After an awkward encounter with the grief-stricken wife Laura is so eager to get
away that she accidentally walks into the room where the dead man is lying. Despite the fact
that she feels that the man is peaceful, "wonderful, beautiful", she is faced again with the
problem of differing social codes of behaviour:
But all the same you had to cry, and she couldn't go out of the room without saying something to
him. Laura gave a loud childish sob.
'Forgive my hat,' she said.
Mansfield: 1981, p.261.
What Laura questions, and what distinguishes her from the rest of her family, are the "absurd
class distinctions". At the very beginning of the story she feels happy when she can flout the
"despised stupid conventions" which make it difficult to communicate naturally with the
workman and she defiantly eats her bread and butter on the lawn. But the sadness of this story
is not only the impossibility of social mobility, in this case downwards as opposed to upwards
as in "The New Dress," but the very absurdity which ensues when such an attempt is made.
Perhaps the mother is right in the first instance when she says that "People like that don't
expect sacrifices from us" (Mansfield: 1981, p.255). She knows her place and she also knows
that "people like that" know theirs.
In Mansfield's letters to Woolf (1917-1919) it seems that she greatly admires her as a
writer: "You write so damned well, so devilish well. ... there is your mind so accustomed to
take the air in the 'grand manner' - - To tell you the truth - I am proud of your writing"
(Mansfield: 1989, p.120). It is on this basis that Mansfield originally craves Woolf s friendship,
she says she has been "haunted" by her and encourages her not to overlook the rarity of such a
kinship:
My God I love to think of you, Virginia, as my friend. Dont cry me an ardent creature or say, with
your head a little on one side, smiling as though you knew some enchanting secret: 'Well Katherine,
we shall see' ... But pray consider how rare is it to find someone with the same passion for writing that
you have, who desires to be scrupulously truthful with you - and to give you the freedom of the city
without any reserves at all. Mansfield: 1989, p.56.
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But this was a kinship which perhaps Woolf ignored or was rejected by both as being
impossible due of class distinction and this, we suppose, Woolf later regretted. It is clear,
however, in a later letter to her husband, that there is a scornful attitude on Mansfield's part
- when she criticises the behaviour of Woolfs upper-class circle. She tells Murry that she is
"Bored to Hell" by the "delicate airs", the "curtsy" and "caper" (Mansfield: 1989, p.151).
There is certainly no evidence that Mansfield wishes to be upwardly mobile and she makes it
clear to Woolf that she is aware of her own shortcomings, with no apparent apology, and that
she is also aware of how she and Murry are considered by polite society. Following an
unfavourable review by Murry of Sassoon's work, which was not considered acceptable
according to, among others, the eminent Morrell, Mansfield explains why she is refusing an
invitation to dine at Garsington:
I don't think I can break 'crumb' in their house again. I should lose control of myself - I should do
something dreadful - sin against very Decency - commit some hideous crime - eat the clove out of a
stuffed orange or-or-God knows!
But it is only too plain from all this that Johnny Murry and I are arrogant outcasts with cannon
balls for eyes.
Mansfield: 1989, p.107.
Mansfield continues this humour by further comparing herself and Murry to Nancy and Bill
Sykes from Dickens' Oliver Twist. But her attack is perhaps even more scathing due to this
humorous tone which seems to direct the farce rather at those in judgement than on the
recipients.
It is clear that Mansfield considered herself an equal in terms of artistic profession at this
time, and we shall see that the scorn extended beyond society when she criticises Woolfs
work in a letter to her husband Murry (November 1919). Here she expresses her dismay that
Woolf s Night and Day (1919), which she is reviewing, seems to ignore the effect and impact
of the war. Although Mansfield tried to be delicate in her public appraisal, Woolf sensed that
this was an unfavourable review; she was hurt and this was the cause of the initial split
between the two women. Mansfield considered this novel to be "a lie in the soul" and that
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artists who merely "settle down" after such an event as a world war, and do not strive to find
an expression for "new thoughts & feelings," are "traitors". She criticises a "trifling scene"
which frightens her due to its triviality:
it positively frightens me- to realise this utter coldness & indifference. But I will be very careful and
do my best to be dignified and sober. Inwardly I despise them all for a set of cowards.
Mansfield: 1989, p.147.
In a later letter Mansfield again criticises the artists and writers (including Woolf) who do not
express "Real Life!" in a letter to her close friend Dorothy Brett (Mansfield: 1989, p.222).
However, it seems that the root of Mansfield's criticism stems from these artists' inability or
refusal to address "real death" and this brings us to another significant theme within both
Woolf s and her counterpart's work. (15)
Death
We have already seen from Woolf s letter to Ethel Smyth (Oct 1930) that the writing of Night
and Day (1919) served as an exercise in avoiding "insanity" and "dangerous ground" (Letters
Vol.4: 1978, p.231). Whilst one can understand Mansfield's criticism of what seems to be a
flippant and insensitive response to the horror of war (Mansfield had lost her own brother), it
is important to note that in the aforesaid letter Woolf explains that it was during this time of
evasion that she conceived of her later novel Mrs Dalloway (1925) in which she confronts this
horror through her poignant and deeply disturbing narrative of the "insane" Septimus Warren
Smith, a victim of the war who eventually plunges from a window and impales himself on the
railings below his building in order to escape the further indignity of being incarcerated in a
mental asylum. We know from her diary that this subject and the writing of the "mad" scenes
in the novel was particularly difficult for Woolf, not only because she was confronting the
larger human issues, but also because she was forced to confront her own fear and experience
of madness. In A Writer's Diary, June 19, 1923, Woolf agrees with Mansfield's notion that in
order to write one must feel things deeply. She gives an indication of her purpose in writing
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Septimus "I want to give life and death, sanity and insanity; I want to criticise the social
system, and show it at work, at its most intense" (Writer's Diary: 1978, p.82). But despite the
seeming clarity of her intentions the practice is problematic: "Of course the mad part tries me
so much, makes my mind squint so badly that I can hardly face spending the next weeks at it"
(Writer's Diary: 1978, p.83). On October 15 she writes "I am now in the thick of the mad
scene in Regent's Park. I find I write it by clinging as tight to fact as I can" (Writer's Diary:
1978, p.8'7). These admissions and the eventual suicide within the narrative hardly suggest an
evasion of the topic of death.
There are undoubtedly further reverberations here. Mrs Dalloway's initial response to the
news (which she hears from the wife of the doctor who is arguably to blame) could be likened
to the response of which Mansfield is accusing Woolf and her circle, it is also an echo of the
Sheridans' reaction when they hear news of death before their party and refuse to let this
intrude on their fun. But Mrs Dalloway cannot dismiss the significance and tragedy of such an
event and she quickly withdraws to contemplate death:
... Oh! thought Clarissa, in the middle of my party, here's death she thought.
She went on into the little room where the Prime Minister had gone with Lady Bruton. Perhaps
there was somebody there. But there was nobody. The chairs still kept the impress of the Prime
Minister and Lady Bruton, she turned deferentially, he sitting four-square, authoritatively. They had
been talking about India. There was nobody. The party's splendour fell to the floor, so strange it was
to come in alone in her finery.
What business had the Bradshaws to talk of death at her party? A young man had killed himself.
And they talked of it at her party - the Bradshaws talked of death. He had killed himself - but how?
Always her body went through it first, when she was told, suddenly, of an accident; her dress flamed,
her body burnt. He had thrown himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; through him.
blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a thud, thud, thud in his brain, and then
a suffocation of blackness. So she saw it. But why had he done it? And the Bradshaws talked of it at
her party.
Dalloway: 1992, p.201-202.
This vivid and graphic account which Clarissa feels and sees is a marked contrast to the "talk"
of the Bradshaws, the Prime Minister and Lady Bruton. This is surely evidence that Woolf is
writing from deep feeling and here Clarissa, like Laura, is looking on death. But also, like
Laura, she does not pity the young man because "[There was an embrace in death" and he
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need "[F]ear no more the heat of the sun" (Dalloway: 1992, pp. 202, 203). Despite Clarissa's
identification with the dead man she must go on living, respond to the striking of the clock
("She must assemble"), and return to the party. As Elizabeth Abel points out, Woolfs
subversion of traditional developmental plots wherein the heroine dies and the hero continues
(Hardy's Tess and Angel) is also interesting: "By making Septimus the hero of a sacrificial plot
that enables the heroine's development, Woolf reverses narrative tradition" (Abel in Bowlby:
1992, p.91).
Despite Mansfield's admonitions the representation of Claiissa's response has perhaps more
truth and realism in its articulation than that of Laura's in "The Garden Party":
There lay the young man, fast asleep - sleeping so soundly, so deeply, that he was far away from them
both. Oh so remote, so peaceful. He was dreaming. Never wake him up again. His head was sunk in
the pillow, his eyes were closed; they were blind under the closed eyelids. He was given up to dream.
What did garden-parties and baskets and lace frocks matter to him? He was far from all those things.
He was wonderful, beautiful. While they were laughing and while the band was playing, this marvel
had come to the lane. Happy ... Happy ...
All is well, said that sleeping face. This is just as it should be. I am content.
Mansfield: 1981, p.261.
It is interesting that, faced with the "real" corpse Laura is not pre-occupied with the actualities
of the accident such as the smashed skull, and yet Clarissa is able through her imagination to
conjure a disturbingly graphic image of Septimus' fatal injuries. There is perhaps a clue within
the language of fiction to yet another distinction in attitude between Mansfield and Woolf,
their attitudes towards death.
Like Woolf, Mansfield too suffered a life threatening illness and in a letter to her husband
J.M. Murry, she talks of yielding to "the silent world" and explains her struggle to accept this
suffering and to overcome the fear of death:
... Isn't it possible that if one yielded there is a whole world into which one is received? It is so near
and yet I am conscious that I hold back from giving myself up to it. What is this something mysterious
that waits - that beckons?
And then suffering - bodily suffering such as Ive known for three years. It has changed forever
everything - even the appearance of the world is not the same - there is something added. Everything
has its shadow. It is right to resist such suffering? Do you know I feel it has been an immense
privilege. Yes, in spite of all. How blind we little creatures are! Darling, its only the fairy tales we
really live by. If we set out upon a journey the more wonderful the treasure the greater the temptations
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and perils to be overcome. And if someone rebels and says Life isn't good enough on those terms one
can only say: It is. Dont misunderstand me. I don't mean a 'thorn in the flesh, my dear' - its a million
times more mysterious. It has taken me three years to understand this - to come to see this. We resist -
we are terribly frightened. The little boat enters the dark gulf and our only cry is to escape - 'put me
on land again'. But its useless. Nobody listens. The shadowy figure rows on. One ought to sit still and
uncover ones eyes.
I believe the greatest failing of all is to be frightened. Perfect Love casteth out Fear. When I look
back on my life all my mistakes have been because I was afraid ... Was that why I had to look on
death. Would nothing less cure me? You know, one can't help wondering, sometimes ... No, not a
personal God or any such nonsense. Much more likely - the soul's desperate choice ...
Mansfield: 1989, p181.
The references to fairy-tale journeys, the biblical references and indeed the whole tone of this
passage, as with the fictional one above, are suggestive of some kind of passive, unreal and
imaginative transcendence. Death is not to be actively sought, nor actively resisted. The gaps
in this thinking, indicated by three dots, also suggests a kind of giving-up, or letting go in
terms of intellectual pursuit and articulation. This is precisely what happens at the end of "The
Garden Party" when Laura's brother comes to rescue her from the dead man's street. Here are
the very last words of the story:
Laurie put his arm round her shoulder. "Don't cry," he said in his warm, loving voice. "Was it
awful?"
"No," sobbed Laura. "It was simply marvellous. But, Laurie -" She stopped, she looked at her
brother. "Isn't life," she stammered, "isn't life -" But what life was she couldn't explain. No matter.
He quite understood.
"Isn't it, darling?" said Laurie.
Mansfield: 1981, p.261.
Laura, who has had no difficulty expressing the marvel of death is now unable to find the
words to describe life.
Woolf s approach is quite different, as we have already seen in the fictional extract above,
but also this is clear when we read some of her letters on the subject of suicide; an altogether
more active pursuit of death. Here the realist tone is far more objective than Mansfield's;
Woolf is keen to gather other people's attitudes towards suicide. In a letter to Ethel Smyth
(Oct, 1930) she writes:
By the way, what are the arguments against suicide? You know what a fliberti-gibbet I am: well there
suddenly comes in a thunder clap a sense of the complete uselessness of my life. Its like suddenly
running one's head against a wall at the end of a blind alley. Now what are the arguments
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against that sense - 'Oh it would be better to end it"? I need not say that I have no intention of taking
any steps: I simply want to know - as you are so masterly and triumphant - catching your train and not
running too fast - what are the arguments against it?
Letters Vol 4: 1978, p.242.
Despite her assurance that she has no intention of undertaking such an act at this time, Woolf
does admit a former tendency of violence towards herself in a later letter to Ethel, when,
following the disastrous Rosebery party, she told Leonard that if it were not for him she would
kill herself (March, 1931). That Woolf was preoccupied with this subject is evident in a further
letter to Beatrice Webb (April, 1931):
I wanted to tell you, but was too shy, how much I was pleased by your views upon the possible
justification of suicide. Having made the attempt myself [in 1913], from the best of motives as I
thought - not to be a burden on my husband - the conventional accusation of cowardice and sin has
always rather rankled. So I was glad of what you said.
Letters Vol 4: 1978, p.305.
And, of course, Woolf did take her own life, leaving a letter for Leonard wherein it is clear
that the above motive and reason was to return:
... I am wasting your life ...
You can work, & you will be much
Better without me.
Lee: 1996, p.760.
Septimus Smith and Suicide
Woolf s most sustained and vivid representation of madness is to be found in her portrayal of
Septimus Smith, a war hero central to the novel Mrs Dalloway, who has returned to London
presumably suffering from shell shock having experienced the monstrosities of World War
One. Through this character Woolf was able not only to find expression of the experience of
mental breakdown but also to mount a scathing attack on the medical profession's response to
such victims of human violence and cruelty. Woolf also delivers here an acute criticism of the
rest cure, the infantalising regime under which she had herself suffered. She brings the
theme of human relationships and disconnectedness to the forefront and seems to offer some
kind of attempt to justify the right to choose suicide. The episodes we are about to consider
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were some of the most difficult for Woolf to write because she had to draw on the memories
of her own experience of mental breakdown. In her diary she asks herself whether the text is
being written "from deep emotion?" and answers herself with the following admission: "Of
' course the mad part tries me so much, makes my mind squint so badly that I can hardly face
spending the next weeks at it" (Writer's Diary: 1978, p.83).
When we first meet Septimus his wife Rezia is drawing his attention to an aeroplane in the
sky which is leaving a smoke trail in the sky: "For Dr. Holmes had told her to make her
husband (who had nothing whatever seriously the matter with him but was a little out of sorts)
take an interest in things outside himself' (Dalloway: 1992, p.23). The reader, however, is
made immediately aware that Septimus' relationship to the world is different to that of his wife
and others in Regent's Park, for what he sees is a signal, a special message meant especially for
him, a signal of "exquisite beauty ... bestowing upon him charity and laughing goodness"
(Dalloway: 1992, p.23). This realisation makes Septimus cry, which is clearly not the response
which his wife expects given that the plane is sending out an advertisement for toffee. This
juxtaposition of the mundane and the spiritual, of Septimus perceptions as opposed to others
around him, leaves the reader in no doubt that we have encountered what the world would
consider a madman. His perceptions, however, are represented with such sensual delicacy that
we cannot help but be drawn into his field of experience. As Rezia spells out the letters of the
word 'toffee' once again we are pulled back into the hyper-sensitive world of Septimus Smith;
the roughness of Rezia's voice is "like a grasshopper's, which rasped his spine deliciously and
sent running up into his brain waves of sound which, concussing, broke." Whilst we are aware
of Septimus' distance here from the real objects around him there is also an inner clarity; his
super sensitivity, however, is contrasted with Septimus' attempt to remain logical and scientific
in order to resist the impulse to drift away into these waves of knowingness and revelation: "A
marvellous discovery indeed - that the human voice in certain atmospheric conditions (for one
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must be scientific, above all scientific) can quicken trees into life!" (Dalloway: 1992, p.24). It
is only Rezia's hand on his knee which weighs him down otherwise he knows that this superb
vision would drive him mad. He closes his eyes. But the living trees and the leaves "being
connected by millions of fibres with his own body" and the sounds around him, all form new
meaning; for Septimus, it is "the birth of a new religion" (Dalloway: 1992, p.24).
Septimus makes notes to record his new found knowledge:
Men must not cut down trees. There is a God. (He noted such revelations on the backs of envelopes.)
Change the world. No one kills from hatred. Make it known (he wrote it down). He waited. He
listened. A sparrow perched on the railing opposite chirped Septimus, Septimus, four or five time over
and went on, drawing its notes out, to sing freshly and piercingly in Greek words how there is no
crime and, joined by another sparrow, they sang in voices prolonged and piecing in Greek words,
from trees in the meadow of life beyond a river where the dead walk, how there is no death.
Dalloway: 1992, p.26
It is interesting to note that following Woolf s first suicide attempt in 1904, she imagined that
she heard birds singing in Greek (Diary Vol 1: 1979, p.90). Septimus is haunted by the ghost
of his dead commanding officer Evans. As wet as the beckorimg, oi hying natura\ t`iiings,heis
bidden by the unseen. He is also convinced that he is in communication with Jesus "the eternal
sufferer." But Septimus rejects a call to "eternal suffering, that eternal loneliness" (Dalloway:
1992, p.27).
Rezia does not want others to notice her husband's strange behaviour and the narrator
asks whether was there anything which would lead people to suspect that "here is a young
man who carries in him the greatest message in the world, and is, moreover, the happiest man
in the world, and the most miserable?" (Dalloway: 1992,p.91). Before the war, Septimus was
an ordinary man, doing well at his job, a romantic young man, a reader of Shakespeare.
"London has swallowed up many millions of young men called Smith" (Dalloway: 1992,
p.92). During the war, we are told that "he developed manliness" (Dalloway: 1992, p.94).
When Evans died he congratulated himself that he did not feel much; he was reasonable. He
was indifferent to the shells exploding, the war had been an education :"It was sublime"
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(Dalloway: 1992, p.95). But then we are made aware of a rising panic caused by Septimus'
realisation that "he could not feel." The repetition of this phrase punctuates two pages of text;
Septimus cannot see beauty, he cannot taste food or drink, he cannot feel any emotion and this
leads him to the conclusion "that the world itself is without meaning" (Dalloway: 1992, p.97).
After his war experience he perceives a hidden message in the language of all literature: "This
was now revealed to Septimus; the message hidden in the beauty of words. The secret signal
which one generation passes, under disguise, to the next is loathing, hatred, despair"
(Dalloway: 1992, p.97).
When Rezia tells Septimus that she wants a child, his cynicism and disgust with human
nature is clear:
One cannot bring children into a world like this. One cannot perpetuate suffering, or increase the
breed of these lustful animals, who have no lasting emotions, but only whims and vanities, eddying
them now this way, now that.
[...] For the truth is (let her ignore it) that human beings have neither kindness, nor faith, nor charity
beyond what serves to increase the pleasure of the moment. They hunt in packs. Their packs scour the
desert and vanish screaming into the wilderness. They desert the fallen. They are plastered over with
grimaces.[...] In the street, vans roared past him; brutality blared out on placards; men were trapped
in mines; women burnt alive; and once a maimed file of lunatics being exercised or displayed for the
diversion of the populace (who laughed aloud), ambled and nodded and grinned past him, in the
Tottenham Court Road, each half apologetically, yet triumphantly, inflicting his hopeless woe. And
would he go mad?
Dalloway: 1992, p.98.
When he can only respond mechanically and with distant insincerity to his wife's sobbing, he
knows he must give in, he knows that the doctors must come. When Dr. Holmes says that he
is not ill, the guilt becomes acute and Septimus takes on the sins that he has levelled at
humanity:
So there was no excuse; nothing whatever the matter, except the sin for which human nature had
condemned him to death; that he did not feel. He had not cared when Evans was killed; that was
worst; but all the other crimes raised their heads and shook their fingers and jeered and sneered over
the rail of the bed in the early hours of the morning at the prostrate body which lay realising its
degradation. [...] The verdict of human nature on such a wretch was death.
Dalloway: 1992, pp. 99-100.
His experience of the medical profession would certainly seem to uphold Septimus' ideas
about human nature. Dr. Holmes is depicted as a despicable man, a snob who is more
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interested in his sense of importance than any cure. His advice is that Septimus should stop
thinking about himself, find a hobby, get control of the situation and stop frightening the
charming little lady his wife" (Dalloway: 1992, p101). In fact, Rezia is at first charmed, so
desperate is she for help that she is fooled into believing that Holmes is a kind man. But
Septimus knows more "Human nature, in short, was on him - the repulsive brute, with the
blood-red nostrils. Holmes was on him" (Dalloway: 1992, p.101). Terrified at finding
Septimus talking to himself, Rezia sends for Holmes who knowing that he is out of his depth,
suggests unkindly that they find some money and go to Harley Street.
The situation worsens as the couple seek help from Sir William Bradshaw who "very
properly" charges a "very large fee" for his advice. A knighted man of reputation, skilled,
hardworking, accurate in his diagnosis, his brilliance is ironically presented as also being due
to his "sympathy; tact; understanding of the human soul" (Dalloway: 1992, p.104). Woolf s
tone throughout this character's depiction belies a sinister undercurrent:
'You served with great distinction in the War?'
The patient repeated the word 'war' interrogatively.
He was attaching meanings to words of a symbolical kind. A serious symptom to be noted on the
card.
Dalloway: 1992, p.105.
Septimus is not able to express what is really on his mind; the "appalling crime" he thinks he is
guilty of (Dalloway: 1992, p.105). Bradshaw points out that Septimus has nothing at all to
worry about, he is a brave man with a bright future, he has a lovely wife and no money
worries: "It was merely a question of rest, said Sir William; of rest, rest, rest; a long rest in
bed" (Dalloway: 1992, p.106). The eminent doctor duly commits him to an asylum in the
country, away from Rezia because, after all he had threatened suicide, a point of law, and "the
people we care for most are not good for us when we are ill" (Dalloway: 1992, p.106).
Although his advice is "kindly" given, the patronising tone is not dissimilar to that employed
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by Holmes and it is clear that time and money are his major preoccupations. Bradshaw will not
speak of "madness", only a lack of proportion. Septimus merely needs to learn to rest. But,
again, Septimus is not easily fooled, he sneers at Sir William's suggestion. Woolf directs the
reader throughout, so that all our sympathies lay with Septimus and our regard for Bradshaw
is unfavourable:
The fellow made a distasteful impression. For there was in Sir William, whose father had been a
tradesman, a natural respect for breeding and clothing, which shabbiness nettled; again, more
profoundly, there was in Sir William, who had never had time for reading, a grudge, deeply buried,
against cultivated people who came into his room and intimated that doctors, whose profession is a
constant strain upon all the highest faculties, are not educated men.
Dalloway: 1992, pp.106-107.
Septimus realises that the doctor's purpose will be enforced. Bradshaw, like Holmes, becomes
a representative of human nature and "Human nature is remorseless." He tries to explain but
his memory fails him, he cannot remember of what he was guilty and Bradshaw's time is
running out. As Septimus falters in his attempt to communicate, he is interrupted: "Try to
think as little about yourself as possible,' said Sir William kindly. Really, he was not fit to be
about" (Dalloway: 1992, p.108).
Both Septimus and Rezia know they have been deserted but Bradshaw's self-justification
allows no room for personal attachment. We can read a powerful indictment of the medical
profession and their supposed cure for mental illness in the following passage:
To his patients he gave three-quarters of an hour; and if in this exacting science which has to do
with what, after all, we know nothing about - the nervous system. the human brain - a doctor loses his
sense of proportion, as a doctor he fails. Health we must have; and health is proportion; so that when
a man comes into your room and says he is Christ ( a common delusion), and has a message, as they
mostly have, and threatens, as they often do, to kill himself, you invoke proportion; order rest in bed;
rest in solitude; silence and rest; rest without friends, without books, without messages; six months'
rest; until a man who went in weighing seven stone six comes out weighing twelve.
[...] Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made England prosper,
secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised despair, made it impossible for the unfit to
propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of proportion - his, if they were men, Lady
Bradshaw's if they were women ( she embroidered, knitted, spent four nights out of seven at home
with her son), so that not only did his colleagues respect him, his subordinates fear him, but the
friends and relations of his patients felt for him the keenest gratitude for insisting that these prophetic
Christs and Christesses, who prophesied the end of the world, or the advent of God, should drink milk
in bed, as Sir William ordered; Sir William with his thirty years' experience of these kinds of cases.
and his infallible instinct, this is madness, this sense; in fact his sense of proportion.
Dalloway: 1992, pp. 108-109.
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Lady Bradshaw has been broken by her husband's power, will and authority some fifteen
years ago: "It was nothing you could put your finger on; there had been no scene, no snap;
only the slow sinking, water-logged, of her will into his" (Dalloway: 1992, p.110). Their
guests can escape after dinner but his patients have no escape from his lust for domination
which has subdued his wife and spoils their social occasions. The goddess of proportion and
her sister, the goddess of conversion, ensure that his patients cannot argue with him (18).
Living or not living is not your own affair; you must think of your family, have courage, be
honourable and if that doesn't work:
he had to support him police and the good of society, which, he remarked very quietly, would take
care, down in Surrey, that these unsocial impulses, bred more than anything by the lack of good
blood, were held in control. And then stole out from her hiding-place and mounted her throne that
Goddess whose lust is to override opposition, to stamp indelibly in the sanctuaries of others the image
of herself. Naked, defenceless, the exhausted, the friendless received the impress of Sir William's will.
He swooped; he devoured. He shut people up. It was this combination of decision and humanity that
endeared Sir William so greatly to the relations of his victims.
Dalloway: 1992, pp.111-112.
The relationship between Septimus and his wife, however, is of central importance to
Woolf s representation of madness and its effects on loved ones. At first, Rezia is clearly
depicted as being embarrassed and ashamed of her husband's behaviour. It is she who seeks
help from the medical profession and tries initially to follow their advice. She is flattered by
Dr. Holmes and then considers Bradshaw a wise man. But, ultimately Rezia and Septimus
begin to communicate. Rezia refuses to be separated from him and clearly understands that his
suicide is not an act of cowardice. In the park scene Rezia's embarrassment is so acute that she
would rather Septimus were dead. He makes everything "terrible" and she seems to be bitter
that he will not kill himself She is convinced that he is not ill, Dr. Holmes had said so, so he
must be selfish. She is alone, he is mad, and although he threatened to throw himself under a
cart, he is still here talking to himself out loud in the park. Septimus' threat of suicide is treated
as a criminal act, Holmes and Bradshaw chastise him for frightening his wife in such a way.
At first Septimus seems to resist the call to death, when it seems that Rezia has deserted
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him and accepted an invitation from Holmes to visit him and his family for tea (a dubious
invitation which smacks of sexual avarice):
So he was deserted. The whole world was clamouring: Kill yourself kill yourself for our sakes.
But why should he kill himself for their sakes? Food was pleasant; the sun hot; and this killing
oneself, how does one set about it, with a table knife, uglily, with floods of blood, - by sucking a
gaspipe? He was too weak; he could scarcely raise his hand. Besides, now that he was quite alone,
condemned, deserted, as those who are about to die are alone, there was a luxury in it, an isolation full
of sublimity; a freedom which the attached can never know. Holmes had won of course; the brute with
the red nostrils had won. But even Holmes himself could not touch this last relic straying on the edge
of the world, this outcast, who gazed back at the inhabited regions, who lay, like a drowned sailor, on
the shore of the world.
It was at that moment (Rezia had gone shopping) that the great revelation took place. A voice
spoke from behind the screen. Evans was speaking. The dead were with him.
[...] Communication is health; communication is happiness. Communication, he muttered.
Dalloway: 1992, pp. 101-102.
After the couple's unsatisfactory visit with Bradshaw, the final scene, which culminates in
Septimus' leap to death, sees a development in the relationship between the couple which is
yet another reverberation of one of Woolf s central themes; the separateness and
connectedness which exists between human beings. At the beginning of this episode Rezia and
Septimus are still distant. She sits in the living room making a hat while Septimus watches the
light and shadow, the signals on the wallpaper. Again it is his hyper-sensitivity to nature which
separates him from his wife. He is passive, immobile, taking in all the sensual perceptions
around him, she is active and at work:
Outside the trees dragged their leaves like nets through the depths of the air, the sound of water was
in the room, and through the waves came the voices of birds singing. Every power poured its treasures
on his head, and his hand lay there on the back of the sofa, as he had seen his hand lie when he was
bathing, floating, on the top of the waves, while far away on the shore he heard dogs barking and
barking far away. Fear no more, says the heart in the body; fear no more.
He was not afraid. At every moment nature signified by some laughing hint like that gold spot
which went round the wall - there, there, there - her determination to show, brandishing her plumes,
shaking her tresses, flinging her mantle this way and that, beautifully, always beautifully, and
standing close up to breathe through her hollowed hands Shakespeare's words, her meaning.
Dalloway: 1992, p.153.
Rezia watches him while she works, angry to see him smiling: "It was not marriage; it was not
being one's husband to look strange like that, always to be starting, laughing, sitting hour after
hour silent, or clutching her and telling her to write" (Dalloway 1992, p.153). Gradually the
two come together when after watching Rezia sew Septimus asks who the hat is for.
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Cautiously and courageously Septimus re-enters the living room and opens his eyes to take in
the real objects around him, the gramophone, the sideboard. He knows that real things are too
exciting but he is determined that: "He would not go mad" (Dalloway: 1992, p.155). Unlike
the leaves they do not move. The conversation between the couple develops into shared
laughter. He takes an interest in her work, in other people, she enjoys his input and his
humour. He helps her design the hat and the couple are united for the first time in the novel:
It was wonderful. Never had he done anything which made him feel so proud. It was so real, it was
so substantial, Mrs. Peters' hat.
'Just look at it,' he said.
Yes, it would always make her happy to see that hat. He had become himself then, he had laughed
then. They had been alone together. Always she would like that hat.
Danoway: 1992, p.158.
When the peace is interrupted by a knock at the door, the first fear is that it is Bradshaw come
to take him to the asylum, but it is a neighbour and Rezia leaves him for a while. Left alone
Septimus is at once terrified at the thought of being alone with just the real objects around
him. He realises that Evans has left him. When Rezia returns she determines that they can be
happy together, that they can help each other, that they will not be separated. She begins to
pack so that they can go to Bradshaw's country house together. But Septimus knows they are
in Bradshaw's power, that he will separate them, that Rezia will have no power to prevent
their separation. However, when Rezia refuses to burn all his writings, and lovingly binds them
together like romantic letters with a ribbon, Septimus knows that through this act of love, she
has triumphed over Holmes and Bradshaw:
Shuffling the edges straight, she did up the papers, and tied the parcel almost without looking,
sitting close, sitting beside him, he thought, as if all her petals were about her. She was a flowering
tree; and through her branches looked out the face of a lawgiver, who had reached a sanctuary where
she feared no one; not Holmes; not Bradshaw, a miracle, a triumph, the last and greatest. Staggering
he saw her mount the staircase laden with Holmes and Bradshaw, men who never weighed less than
eleven stone six, who sent their wives to Court, men who made ten thousand a year and talked of
proportion; who differed in their verdicts (for Holmes said one thing, Bradshaw another), yet judges
they were; who mixed the vision and the sideboard; saw nothing clear, yet rules, yet inflicted. Over
them she triumphed.
Dalloway: 1992, p.162.
Despite her determination to keep Holmes away, Rezia is pushed aside. Despite Septimus'
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knowledge that his clarity, his ability to separate the vision and the sideboard, is more worthy,
he has no option but to escape the foolish doctors through suicide:
There remained only the window, the large Bloomsbury lodging-house window; the tiresome, the
troublesome, and rather melodramatic business of opening the window and throwing himself out. It
was their idea of tragedy, not his or Rezia's (for she was with him). Holmes and Bradshaw liked that
sort of thing. (He sat on the sill.) But he would wait till the very last moment. He did not want to die.
Life was good. The sun hot. Only human beings? Coming down the stairs an old man stopped and
stared at him. Holmes was at the door. 'I'll give it you!' he cried, and flung himself vigorously,
violently down on to Mrs. Filmer's area railings.
'The coward!' cried Dr. Holmes, bursting the door open. Rezia ran to the window, she saw; she
understood.
Dalloway: 1992, pp.163-164.
Although Rezia's and Septimus' togetherness in the final scene above is clear, it seems that
Woolf s theme of human connectedness and separation runs throughout the novel. In the same
area of London, during the same day, the main characters live their lives mostly independent of
one another. These lives only intersect at the party for which Clarissa is preparing and after
Septimus' death. Also, many cameo minor characters are introduced at certain moments of the
plot in order to give an added perspective. For example, we have several observations from
people who pass Rezia and Septimus, people who never appear again and whose only function
is perhaps to show how in one small area of London people live alongside one another with no
real awareness of one another's experiences. Of course Holmes and Bradshaw are untouched
by the war, as are many of London's ruling classes, and I would agree with Showalter that in
this sense Septimus becomes a "scapegoat, whose visionary emotional turbulence and lack of
psychic defences has to be seen in contrast to the fatuousness, insensitivity, impassivity, and
self-productive caution of the dominant codes. Septimus feels so much because others feel so
little" (Showalter in Dalloway: 1992, p.xliii).
Septimus' suicide, finally, is an active heroic act; he refuses to be the victim of London's
eminent medics; it is a courageous act of defiance. His question "Only human beings?" is
perhaps an echo reverberating from many of Woolfs texts, the question of the insignificance of
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individual existence in the face of nature. But it also highlights another important point, that
Rezia's and Septimus' day has been experienced in parallel, but in no way connected, to
Clarissa's preparations for a party. These two central characters exist in the same place and
. time but it is only Septimus' death which brings them together. Clarissa's attention is brought
to Septimus' death by overhearing Bradshaw saying that there should be some provision made
in a Bill with regard to "the deferred effects of shell shock" (Dalloway: 1992, p.201) He tells
Mr. Dalloway that a young man who had been in the army had killed himself that day.
The term 'shellshock' was used as a cover-all for a great increase in mental breakdown
among soldiers during and after World War One. As Elaine Showalter points out "shell shock"
somewhat inadequately stood for "various forms of male hysteria in which the terror, anguish,
and immobility of combat led to a variety of physical and emotional conversion symptoms:
limps, contractions, paralysis, stammering, loss of voice, sexual impotence, blindness,
deafness, heart palpitations, insomnia, nightmares, dizziness, or acute depression" (Showalter
in Dalloway: 1992, p.xxxvii). Soldiers who were considered to be shirking their duties, or
giving in to cowardice, were often severely punished; they faced court martial and electric
shock treatment. Following the war, London was overwhelmed by thousands of veterans
needing psychiatric care. Although Septimus shows many symptoms which would point
towards "deferred war neurosis," I would agree with Showalter that his acute disturbance,
hallucinations, delusions of grandeur and guilt are also suggestive of schizophrenia (Showalter
in Dalloway: 1992, p.x1).
Martin Stone's study of "Shellshock and Psychiatry" in The Anatomy of Madness:
Institutions and Society (Vol 2, pp.242-271) explains how the phenomenon of shellshock
changed the face of British psychiatry and had a transforming effect on treatment. It also
served to undermine Freud's theories regarding sexuality which had previously become very
popular. The asylums were full. Interestingly, Stone also notes that the initial standard
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treatment, the isolation, rest and milk cure, imported from America by Weir Mitchell, was
largely ineffective (Stone in Bynum, Porter et al: 1985, p.252). Stone points out that many of
the problems faced by the medical profession at the time were in fact related to the term
'shellshock' itself The term became an eclectic, diagnostic label which did not address the
actual mental symptoms suffered by its victims. This universal pathologising of what was in
fact a vast array of individual traumas is perhaps not dissimilar to those labels pinned onto
women in the late 1890s. The hysterical woman had suddenly been replaced by a hysterical
man and, I would suggest, that in order to preserve the masculine hierarchy and perhaps
rightly to protect those who had served in a terrible and horrific war for their country, some
new term must be found, however inadequate. Women are hysterical but men suffer from
'shellshock,' a term which is clearly linked to war, manliness, patriotism. Septimus had learnt
manliness, just as all Britain's soldiers learnt how to uphold masculine virtues. Our war
veterans were inadequately labelled and inadequately treated. War experiences had to be
repressed, veterans silenced and isolated, otherwise who would fight in the next war?
Perhaps it is of interest to note that Septimus' death itself has masculine connotations. He
leaps from the window and impales himself on the spikes of the railings, spikes remind us of
war and, of course, are phallic. Rhoda's suicide in The Waves, however, we assume to be a
watery end. Her act of suicide is a leap, for the final speaker (Bernard?) tells us that he/she
feels "the rush of the wind of her flight when she leapt" (Waves: 1977, p.228) But we assume
that this is a leap into water, given that so much of Rhoda's suicidal impulse is expressed
through images of the sea, or pools, or even a puddle:
'There is the puddle,' said Rhoda, 'and I cannot cross it. I hear the rush of the great grindstone
within an inch of my head. Its wind roars in my face. All palpable forms of life have failed me. Unless
I can stretch and touch something hard, I shall be blown down the eternal corridors for ever. What,
then, can I touch? What brick, what stone? and so draw myself across the enormous gulf into my body
safely? [...]
I am alone in a hostile world. The human face is hideous. This is to my liking. I want publicity and
violence and to be dashed like a stone on the rocks. I like factory chimneys and cranes and lorries. I
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like the passing of face and face and face, deformed, indifferent. I am sick of prettiness; I am sick of
privacy. I ride rough waters and shall sink with no one to save me.'
Waves: 1977, p.126.
Let us now return to the theme of death in relation to the central fictional protagonists Mrs
. Dalloway and Mrs Ramsay.
Mrs Dalloway and To The Lighthouse
Clarissa's recounting of her "transcendental theory" in Mrs Dalloway is prompted by the sound
of the ambulance which has been sent for Septimus (of whom she is still ignorant) and the
realisation that life and death exist together. Like Mansfield, Clarissa seems to want to believe
in some form of life after death, but rather than an entry into a world beyond, the emphasis in
Woolf s writing is on mergence or re-absorbtion into this material world. This theory has been
developed by Clarissa because of her dissatisfaction with relationships between people and her
realisation that no one can be fully known. Despite this, or because of this, inability to know or
be known she believes in a connection between people which suggests that no one is
independent from the whole of humanity. This feeling of connectedness is due to the
experience of feeling herself everywhere and part of everything:
... But she said, sitting on the bus going up Shaftsbury Avenue, she felt herself everywhere; not
'here, here, here'; and she tapped the back of the seat; but everywhere. She waved her hand, going up
Shaftesbury Avenue. She was all that. So that to know her, or any one, one must seek out the people
who completed them; even the places. Odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to,
some woman in the street, some man behind a counter - even tree, or barns. It ended in a
transcendental theory which, with her horror of death, allowed her to believe, or say that she believed
(for all her scepticism), that since our apparitions, the part of us which appears, are so momentary
compared with the other, the unseen part of us, which spreads wide, the unseen might survive, be
recovered somehow attached to this person or that, or even haunting certain places. after death.
Perhaps - perhaps.
Dalloway: 1992, p.167.
Again we can see a fictional outworking of the notion of "existent traces" in "A Sketch of the
Past." Clarissa seems to echo Woolf s desire to "tap" the pool of memory and past experience,
attach ourselves once more in order to re-live "from the start" (Moments: 1976, p.67).
The tension throughout Mrs Dalloway, as with so much of Woolf s fiction, is between the
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seen, performative, constructed and discrete self, and that which is dispersed, spreading,
uncontained and unseen. The distinction between the social and attached self and the self
which is alone and isolated, free-floating, is what we will find later within her depiction of Mrs
Ramsay in To the Lighthouse. Let us return to the mirror to see more clearly this distinction in
Woolf s description of Clarissa preparing herself for the party:
How many million times she had seen her face, and always with the same imperceptible
contraction! She pursed her lips when she looked in the glass. It was to give her face a point. That
was her self - pointed; dartlike; definite. That was herself when some effort some call on her to be her
self, drew the parts together, she alone knew how different, how incompatible and composed so for
the world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-room and made a
meeting-point, a radiancy in some dull lives, a refuge for the lonely to come to, perhaps; she had
helped young people, who were grateful to her; had tried to be the same always, never showing a sign
of all the other sides of her - faults, jealousies, vanities, suspicions, like this of Lady Bruton not asking
her to lunch; which, she thought (combing her hair finally), is utterly base! Now. where was her
dress?
Dalloway: 1992, p.40.
As the self is unified and assembled in a single diamond shape, the house is also prepared and
becomes a material, finite extension of the self, all in preparation for the party which will
become the stage upon which the self is to perform. But the question of reality always
remains. Here is Clarissa at the party:
And yet for her own part, it was too much of an effort. She was not enjoying it. It was too much
like being - just anybody, standing there; anybody could do it; yet this anybody she did a little admire,
couldn't help feeling that she had anyhow, made this happen, that it marked a stage, this post that she
felt herself to have become, for oddly enough she had quite forgotten what she looked like, but felt
herself a stake driven in at the top of the stairs. Every time she gave a party she had this feeling of
being something not herself, and that every one was unreal in one way; much more real in another. It
was, she thought, partly their clothes, partly being taken out of their ordinary ways, partly the
background; it was possible to say things you couldn't say anyhow else, things that needed an effort;
possible to go much deeper. But not for her; not yet anyhow.
Dalloway: 1992, p.187.
In To the Lighthouse, we have a recurrence of these themes through the characterisation of
Mrs Ramsay. She too is disappointed by the painful realisation of "the inadequacy of human
relationships" (Lighthouse: 1992, p.45) and is concerned with the distinction between the seen
and performative and that part of us which is not determined by contact with others. When the
dinner party is ended and the children have gone to bed Mrs Ramsay is relieved and luxuriates
in a self which is alone, unseen and free from any need to interact:
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For now she need not think about anybody. She could be herself, by herself. And that was what now
she often felt the need of - to think; well not even to think To be silent; to be alone. All the being and
the doing, expansive, glittering, vocal, evaporated; and one shrunk, with a sense of solemnity, to
being oneself, a wedge-shaped core of darkness, something invisible to others. Although she
continued to knit, and sat upright, it was thus that she felt herself, and this self having shed its
attachments was free for the strangest adventures. When life sank down for a moment, the range of
experience seemed limitless. And to everybody there was always this sense of unlimited resources, she
supposed; one after another, she, Lily, Augustus Carmichael, must feel, our apparitions, the things
you know us by, are simply childish. Beneath it is all dark, it is all spreading, it is unfathomly deep;
but now and again we rise to the surface and that is what you see us by. Her horizon seemed to her
limitless. [...] This core of darkness could go anywhere, for no one saw it. They could not stop it, she
thought exulting. There was freedom, there was peace, there was, most welcome of all, a summoning
together, a resting on a platform of stability. Not as oneself did one find rest ever, in her experience
(she accomplished here something dexterous with her needles), but as a wedge of darkness.
Lighthouse: 1992, pp. 69-70.
What I find interesting in this passage is the relationship between the colour, the darkness of
the core which is "all spreading" and "unfathotnly deep," and the shape of the core
("wedge-shaped"), which suggests a circumscribed self. In fact the public self shrinks, all
extraneous visible personality disappears and there is a very definite sense of unity and
wholeness in the privacy of isolation. However, this latter experience of being Mrs Ramsay
describes as being not oneself At the end of this extract of the passage her musings bring us
back to the question of which she should consider is the real self, the one that is alone, or the
one which is relational. If we continue reading this passage, we shall see that Mrs Ramsay's
sense of self is continually bombarded by external objects and internalised discourses.
Losing personality, one lost the fret, the hurry, the stir, and there rose to her lips always some
exclamation of triumph over life when things came together in this peace, this rest, this eternity; and
pausing there she looked out to meet the stroke of the Lighthouse, the long steady stroke, the last of
the three, which was her stroke, for watching them in this mood always at this hour one could not
help attaching oneself to one thing especially of the things one saw; and this thing, the long steady
stroke was her stroke. Often she found herself sitting and looking, sitting and looking, with her work
in her hands until she became the thing she looked at - that light for example. And it would lift up on
it some little phrase or other which had been lying in her mind like that - 'Children don't forget,
children don't forget' - which she would repeat and begin adding to it, It will end, It will end, she said.
It will come, it will come, when suddenly she added, We are in the hands of the Lord.
But instantly she was annoyed with herself for saying that. Who had said it? not she: she had been
trapped into saying something she did not mean. She looked up over her knitting and met the third
stroke and it seemed to her like her own eyes meeting her own eyes, searching as she alone could
search into her mind and her heart, purifying out of existence that lie, any lie.
Lighthouse: 1992, p.70.
So it is the Lighthouse, which has been seen already as a source of patriarchal discipline and
control, and language, specifically the language of the church, which interrupts and limits the
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self s freedom to travel in the imagination. As in Mrs Dalloway's transcendental theory it seems
that Mrs Ramsay also needs to believe in the possibility of mergence with external, non-human
objects:
It was odd_ she thought, how if one was alone, one leant to things, inanimate things; trees, streams,
flowers; felt they expressed one; felt they became one, in a sense were one; felt an irrational
tenderness thus (she looked at that long steady light) as for oneself. There rose, and she looked and
looked with her needles suspended, there curled up off the floor of the mind, rose from the lake of
one's being, a mist, a bride to meet her lover.
Lighthouse: 1992, pp. 70-71.
In this case it would seem that Mrs Ramsay's tendency towards transcendence, her belief in
some kind of perfect union, is a coping mechanism which momentarily allows her to forget her
disappointment in human relationships, to soften the "sternness" within her, to blur the "firm
composure" and to overcome the sense of her "remoteness" which comes from the realisation
that one cannot believe in a saving God:
How could any Lord have made this world? she asked. With her mind she had always seized the fact
that there is no reason, order, justice: but suffering, death, the poor. There was not treachery too base
for the world to commit; she knew that. No happiness lasted; she knew that.
Lighthouse: 1992, p.71.
We have already seen the dissolving of the interface between subject and object in Septimus
Smith's account of existential angst which comes from a first hand experience of the baseness
of human activity.
As Mrs Ramsay knits with "slightly pursed lips," the expression which "so stiffened and
composed the lines of her face," Mr Ramsay knows she is remote, aloof, outside of the reach
of his need to protect her and her sadness pains him. He cannot interrupt her or do anything to
help her (Lighthouse: 1992, pp.71-72). Also, Septimus notes when he watches Rezia "the
pursed lips that women have, the set, the melancholy expression, when sewing" (Dalloway:
1992, p.156). Following his observation of female work, contemplation and creativity Woolf
offers perhaps one of the most remarkable and harmonious scenes of married life because, to
Septimus, the expression is "perfectly natural," the scene is safe and offers him a way back into
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normal communication, mutual activity and understanding.
Lily's reflections in To the Lighthouse are also interesting when we consider the freedom of
the imagination and the relationship between women and art. Mrs Ramsay and Clarissa
Dalloway are domestic artists whose creativity is largely expressed through the provision
of food and ambience; we assume also that the final products of Mrs Ramsay's knitting, like
Rezia's hats, are mostly destined for someone other than herself. But Lily is more explicitly a
painter and her art seems to serve no such definite and useful purpose. She makes a decision
to free herself from the urge towards relationality. She will not be at the beck and call of a
husband and family; "gathering a desperate courage she would urge her own exemption from
the universal law; plead for it; she like to be alone; she liked to be herself; she was not made
for that;" (Lighthouse: 1992, p.56). For Lily, as for Rachel perhaps in A Voyage Out, marriage
is "degradation" and "dilution." (Lighthouse: 1992, p.111.)
Lily's struggle with her painting is also significant to us here because her problem is largely
to do with trying to represent a person (Mrs Ramsay) within a single frame. She, too, is
preoccupied with unity, the visual metaphors of colour and shape, and her problem is made
even more interesting when she tries to complete her representation of Mrs Ramsay after the
latter's death and some ten years later. Lily, then, is dependant upon her imaginative powers to
recall the image from her internalised memory rather than any representational skills which
would try to find a means of mirroring an external scene. This kind of mimetic art is
particularly difficult for Lily:
She could see it all so clearly, so commandingly, when she looked: it was when she took her brush in
her hand that the whole thing changed. It was in that moment's flight between the picture and her
canvas that the demons set on her who often brought her to the verge of tears and made this passage
from conception to work as dreadful as any down a dark passage for a child.
Lighthouse: 1992, p 23.
These demons not only echo her own feelings of inadequacy and lack of confidence, her sense
of duty towards her father, but also the words of those like Mr Tansley, who whispers in her
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ear " Women can't paint, women can't write..." (Lighthouse: 1992, p.54). It is this which
makes it impossible for her to translate what she sees onto canvas. When she returns to the
painting, in the final part of the novel, Lily is again assailed by these voices which question the
utilitarian value of art and the demons which disallow the worship of art and form:
Always (it was in her nature, or in her sex, she did not know which) before she exchanged the fluidity
of life for the concentration of painting she had a few moments of nakedness when she seemed like an
unborn soul, a soul reft of body, hesitating on some windy pinnacle and exposed without protection to
all the blasts of doubt. Why then did she do it? She looked at the canvas, lightly scored with running
lines. It would be hung in the servants' bedrooms. It would be rolled up and stuffed under a sofa. What
was the good of doing it then, and she heard some voice saying she couldn't paint, saying she couldn't
create, as if she were caught up in one of those habitual currents which after a certain time experience
forms in the mind, so that one repeats words without being aware any longer who originally spoke
them.
Lighthouse: 1992, p.173.
As with Mrs Ramsay an internalisation of patriarchal language puts a frame around her own
flights of fancy.
Language and feminism
Lily tries to discern the spirit within Mrs Ramsay which makes her different from everyone
else; "the essential thing" which makes her herself (Lighthouse: 1992, p.55). She is also
disappointed by the realisation that no matter how one admires and loves, no matter how
much one recognises that beneath the surface there are hidden "treasures" and truths
(Lighthouse: 1992, p.5'7), there cannot be complete knowledge, unity and mergence with
another person because, like ancient tombs, people are sealed (Lighthouse: 1992, pp. 57 &
58). Mrs Ramsay's shape, to Lily, is that of a dome, and, as Hermione Lee points out in the
introduction to this novel this shape; "which combines the solid and the ethereal," was central
to Woolf s conception of her plan for the shape of the novel (Lee in Lighthouse: 1992,
When Lily paints Mrs Ramsay and James sitting together on the step in front of the house, she
represents the union of mother and son by a single "triangular purple shape." Lily discusses
and defends her representation with Mr Bankes who raises the question of whether these
"objects of universal veneration" (Mother and child) ... might be reduced to a (purple) shadow
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without irreverence." But, despite Lily's pleasure in the intimacy of such a discussion, Bankes'
examination and his discourse is scientific ("The question being one of the relations of masses,
of light and shadows" p.59), and when Lily begins to consider this approach and how to
explain her own vision she is afraid that she may lose "the unity of the whole" (Lighthouse:
1992, p.60).
It is when Lily experiences a similar loss of personality to that of Mrs Ramsay's, when she
feels herself withdrawing from human community and merging with the whole, she is able to
take up her painting again:
With a curious physical sensation, as if she were urged forward and at the same time must hold
herself back, she made her first quick decisive stroke. The brush descended. It flickered brown over
the white canvas; it left a running mark. A second time she did it - a third time. And so pausing and
so flickering, she attained a dancing rhythmical movement, as if the pauses were one part of the
rhythm and the strokes another, and all were related; and so, lightly and swiftly pausing, striking, she
scored her canvas with brown running nervous lines which had no sooner settled there than they
enclosed (she felt it looming out at her) a space. Down in the hollow of one wave she saw the next
wave towering higher and higher above her. For what could be more formidable than that space? Here
she was again, she thought, stepping back to look at it, drawn out of gossip, out of living, out of
community with people into the presence of this formidable ancient enemy of hers - this other thing,
this truth, this reality, which suddenly laid hands on her, emerged stark at the back of appearances
and commanded her attention [...] It was an exacting form of intercourse anyhow. Other worshipful
objects were content with worship; men, women, God, all let one kneel prostrate; but this form, were
it only the shape of a white lamp-shade looming on a wicker table, roused one to perpetual combat,
challenged one to a fight in which one was bound to be worsted.
Lighthouse: 1992, pp 172-173.
Despite the echo of Mrs Ramsay's third stroke scene, this use of combative language, where
Lily feels she is called into an upstanding and active struggle rather than a passive and
prostrated transcendence, is interesting when we consider that it is Lily's feminist position
which must be worked out for the completion of her artistic project. There is, then, not only a
loss of personality, a kind of Keatsean "negative capability" required for creativity, but also a
need for attack, rather than merely a defence of her position as a female artist. The covering of
the white space, the empty canvas, is perhaps symbolic of a filling in of all the gaps, all the
absences, left by the refusal to allow women into the artistic sphere:
Can't paint, can't write, she murmured monotonously, anxiously considering what her plan of attack
might be. For the mass loomed before her; it protruded; she felt it pressing on her eyeballs. Then, as if
some juice necessary for the lubrication of her faculties were spontaneously squirted, she
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began precariously dipping among the blues and ambers, moving her brush hither and thither, but it
was now heavier and went slower, as if it had fallen in with some rhythm which was dictated to her
(she kept looking at the hedge, at the canvas) by what she saw, so that while her hand quivered with
life, this rhythm was strong enough to bear her along with it on its current. Certainly she was losing
consciousness of outer things. And as she lost consciousness of outer things, and her name and her
personality and her appearance, and whether Mr. Carmichael was there or not, her mind kept
throwing up from its depths, scenes, and names, and sayings, and memories and ideas, like a fountain
spurting over that glaring, hideously difficult white space, while she modelled it with greens and
blues.
Lighthouse: 1992, pp.173-174.
Although we do not lose the sense of fluidity, (Lily's rhythm is that of the waves, rather than
that of the light from the Lighthouse) which might remind us that this is a woman painting, the
language here is also suggestive of ejaculation, as if an androgynous, two-sexed process is
necessary. The rhythm is that of the sea, the material (the paint) is also fluid, the "semiotic" in
Kristevan terms, but the tool of expression is a brush (straight, solid, unified, phallic). It could
be argued then that by using both images in her expression of artistic practice Woolf is
dissolving, through Lily, the opposition between traditionally masculine and feminine symbols.
Mrs Ramsay's knitting is another example of this mixing of symbols, a "feminine" activity
which employs a "masculine" tool. (17)
As we have seen, Woolf persuades us in A Room of One's Own, that it is vital that we do
not think about our sex, that we do not dwell on inequalities and injustices, that a marriage
between the male and the female in the brain be consummated, if women are to become artists
at all (A Room: 1977, pp.94 & 99). Elaine Showalter (A Literature of Their Own) sees this
notion of androgyny as an aesthetic mythification, "a utopian projection of the ideal artist,"
which is "inhuman" and which "represents an escape from the confrontation with femaleness
or maleness" (Showalter: 1977, P. 289). However, Torii Moi gives us a positive reading of
Woolf s notion of androgyny in her introduction to Sexual/Textual Politics (1985) and takes
issue with Showalter's claim that this notion expressed in A Room of One's Own, was a "flight
away from a 'troubled feminism' (Moi: 1993, p.2). Moi explains that Showalter reads Woolf s
multiple personae and perspectives as a weakness, that the shifting of the narrative position
172
and the slippage of the "I" displays an impersonality which indicates a refusal to become
personally involved in feminism and feminist work. Woolf s refusal to use "realist fictional
forms" and her rejection of "a unified, integrated self-identity" is, to Showalter, a refusal to
- confront "female gender identity" (Moi: 1993, pp.6-7). But, as Moi points out, within French
feminisms (Irigaray, Cixous, Kristeva), and I would argue within Woolf s feminism, "this
integrated self is in fact a phallic self, constructed on the model of the self-contained, powerful
phallus. Gloriously autonomous, it banishes from itself all conflict, contradiction and
ambiguity" (Moi: 1993, p.8). Moi is concerned here to "rescue Virginia Woolf for feminist
politics":
Showalter wants the literary text to yield the reader a certain security, a firm perspective from which
to judge the world. Woolf, on the other hand, seems to practice what we might now call a
'deconstructive' form of writing, one which engages with and thereby exposes the duplicitous nature of
discourse. In her own textual practice, Woolf exposes the way in which language refuses to be pinned
down to an underlying essential meaning ... Through her conscious exploitation of the sportive.
sensual nature of language, Woolf rejects the metaphysical essentialism underlying patriarchal
ideology, which hails God, the Father or the phallus as its transcendental signified.
But Woolf does more than practice a non-essentialist form of writing. She also reveals a deeply
sceptical attitude to the male-humanist concept of an essential human identity.
Moi: 1993, p.9.
I would suggest that it is Woolf s refusal to practice essentialist forms of writing which reveals
her feminist stance, both in literary terms and in terms of her notions of selfhood.
Kristeva, Moi tells us, saw that the modernist writings wherein "the rhythms of the body
and the unconscious have managed to break through the strict rational defences of
conventional social meaning" were revolutionary. This revision of text through new modes of
linguistic and formal expression "testifies to the possibility of transforming the symbolic order
of orthodox society from the inside" (Moi: 1993, p11). Kristeva's feminist position, Moi
explains, was not Liberal wherein women demand "equal access to the symbolic order", nor
was it Radical, separatist wherein the symbolic order is rejected as male and femaleness, or
femininity is "extolled," Kristeva's position was to reject altogether "the dichotomy between
masculine and feminine as metaphysical" (Moi: 1993, p.12). However, Woolf s union of
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masculine and feminine impulses in the brain is described in A Room of One's Own through
sexual metaphors (A Room: 1977, p.99). This seems to incorporate the notion that "fusion," a
dissolving of boundaries, is necessary for the fertilisation of the mind and for creative activity
to take place (A Room: 1977, p.94).
The following passage will be of interest to us here when we consider Mrs Dalloway's and
Mrs Ramsay's desire for transcendence and mergence alongside that of Lily's. We must also
consider that Lily's impulse towards suicide, when the possibility of mergence with Mrs
Ramsay (the mother) is lost, is replaced by her eventual artistic practice and refusal to
annihilate the self
Kristeva also argues that many women will be able to let what she calls the 'spasmodic force' of the
unconscious disrupt their language because of their strong links with the pre-Oedipal mother-figure.
But if these unconscious pulsations were to take over the subject entirely, the subject would fall back
into pre-Oedipal or imaginary chaos and develop some form of mental illness. The subject whose
language lets such forces disrupt the social order, in other words, is also the subject who runs the
greater risk of lapsing into madness. Seen in this context, Woolf's own periodic attacks of mental
illness can be linked both to her textual strategies and to her feminism. For the symbolic order is a
patriarchal order, ruled by the Law of the Father, and any subject who tries to disrupt it, who lets
unconscious forces slip through the symbolic repression, puts her or himself in a position of' revolt
against this regime.
Moi: 1993, pp.11-12.
Mary Jacobus' reading of the text is concerned to go beyond Freudian concepts of pre-Oedipal
relationship between mother and daughter and incorporates a 1Cristevan reading of abjection
and signification which offers us some feminist insight into Lily's line in the painting. Lily has
moved beyond the desire for mergence and Jacobus' revision of Freud's concepts are
interesting in terms of "the relations between sexual difference, subjectivity, and writing" :
To the Lighthouse inscribes the movement of abjection without which there could be no subjectivity.
and no signification either. Differentiation begins here; within the representational scheme of the
novel, painting figuratively occupies the position of the sign-system - language - which the text
actually employs. If Lily's line at the end of the novel is the emblem of minimal but fixed difference
which secures her self-inscription, the price Lily pays for finishing her picture is the casting out of the
mother, the beloved Mrs Ramsay. Or Mrs Ramsay dies suddenly so that the 'third stroke' may be
appropriated not only for Lily's art, but for Woolf's writing. The pre-Oedipal configuration which
(re)produces the mother as the origin of all signification in Kristevan theory not only allows Woolf s
novel to be read - to be read - beyond Freudian theory, but suggests how a reading of Woolf might
revise and extend feminist thinking about the pre-Oedipal.
Jacobus in Bowlby: 1992, p. 118.
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It is well documented that Woolfs writing of this book was an exercise in the exorcism of
her own grief and a laying to rest of her dead parents in order to get on with her life as a
writer. (18) Perhaps the line in the centre of Lily's painting is representative of the impossibility
of framing in one shape a person who is called to assume different forms according to their
relationships, that despite the inadequacy of these relationships the self cannot sustain a single
shape and colour, for, even alone, it will attach itself quickly to the inanimate and define itself
by those external objects, mimic their shapes and colours, adopt their rhythms. The painting
cannot be a mirror in which the shape of Mrs Ramsay, or "her companion, a shadow" can be
reflected, or framed, even though Lily can see her clearly in her imagination and the sight has
the power to console her in her grief, the vision quickly vanishes (Lighthouse: 1992, p.197).
However, it is through her remembrances of Mrs Ramsay and contemplation of the loss
suffered by her death that Lily is brought back to the idea of relatedness: "It is the memory of
the everyday relationship which restores her and eases the pain of loss and not the sublime
transcendence and impersonality of symbolist form" (Waugh: 1989, p.100). For it was Mrs
Ramsay who seemed to offer some answer to the unanswerable question of the meaning of
life, who by bringing people together and celebrating the permanency of moments seemed to
inject shape, and stability into the chaos of existence (Lighthouse, pp.175-176). Lily realises
that her refusal to connect with and offer sympathy to others makes painting difficult, that
even "in the extreme obscurity of human relationships," even in silence and
non-communication, even though there is no knowledge of the other, there is intimacy and
rest. (Lighthouse: 1992, p.185 & 187). She begins to feel that if two together, for example
herself and Mr. Carmichael, were to act and speak then something might be achieved, answers
about life might come. Mr Carmichael and Lily have been thinking about the same thing,
even though they have not spoken of it; the arrival of Mr Ramsay and his children at the
Lighthouse. The effort Lily has invested in this is her gift of human sympathy, the acceptance
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of Mrs Ramsay's absence and the feeling of communion with the living is what finally allows
her to have her vision and complete her painting. The text ends with an echo of the realisation
of his arrival "It is finished'", and the painting is finished with a single stroke:
She looked at the steps; they were empty; she looked at her canvas; it was blurred. With a sudden
intensity, as if she saw it clear for a second, she drew a line there, in the centre. It was done; it w as
finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush in extreme fatigue, I have had my vision.
Lighthouse: 1992, p.225.
Nicole Ward Jouve notes that:
The inclusion of Lily the artist within the merciful and organic whole that radiates from Mrs Ramsay,
however intermittent and ephemeral her beams, enables Lily, in the end, also to have her 'vision'. To
trace the line that will harmonize the painting, focus it, straight as the tower of a lighthouse. Unless
the gesture, of course, also signifies her enduring separation from Mrs Ramsay, the womanhood that
can never be complete, splits the mother from the artist, inexorably. But then their short-lived
co-existence, the mothering of the one by the other, are also what the vision is made of.
(Jouve: 1991, p.197)
The line in the centre may break up the wholeness of mother and child but it seems now that
Lily's attempt to capture "the thing itself' (p.209) is less to do with a representation of Mrs
Ramsay, and more to do with Lily's acceptance of those survivors, and hence her reintegration
both as woman and artist into humanity. It is clear that Lily's completion is a positive step
away from "the waters of annihilation" wherein her grief leads her (Lighthouse: 1992, p. 196).
Returning to the transcendental experience in the 'third stroke' passage it is possible to see
Woolf s opposition of what appears to be "a wish for death" in Mrs Ramsay and Lily's
re-appropriation of life in her acceptance of the notion that "the full potential of human beings"
is "to be both separate and related" (Waugh: 1989, pp.106-107). Woolf s work, then, is of
great importance to feminists because "it articulates a critique of patriarchal institutions
through its exploration of the relatedness of subjects and objects" and because "she offers a
critique of the exclusive identification with relational modes of identity as they have functioned
within patriarchy" (Waugh: 1992, p.204.) The central focus of Mrs Dalloway is death,
violence, disorder: "Death was defiance. Death was an effort to communicate, people feeling
the impossibility to reach the centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew apart;
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rapture faded; one was alone. There was an embrace in death" (Dalloway:1992, p. 202).
According to Jouve Mrs Ramsay is "more powerful" than Mrs Dalloway because "her house
perpetuates life, allows an artist to come into her own. Mrs Ramsay's house is still chthonian"
(Jouve: 1991, p.198).
Woolf s communitarian values can be seen throughout her work; connection and alienation
in human relationships are in constant flux and the movement between the two is a recurring
theme which is often unresolved. However, I would argue that within To The Lighthouse
Woolf reaches some kind of resolution, not only in terms of female artistry, but also in terms
of the problem of relationality and human connectedness. Lily is intitially ashamed of her
inability to offer human sympathy to Mr Ramsay but, in praising his boots, she inadvertently
reaches across a masculine / feminine divide and arrives at a place of communion: "They had
reached, she felt, a sunny island where peace dwelt, sanity reigned and the sun for ever shone,
the blessed island of good boots" (Lighthouse: 1992, p.168). The humour here breaks up and
seems to undermine the serious and separate endeavours upon which both characters are
embarked. The arrival at the lighthouse and the finished painting are synchronous events which
can be interpreted as highly aestheticised symbols relating to differing sexual psychologies but
the non-aesthetic symbol of the boot is what ultimately brings Lily and Mr Ramsay together
(19). However banal boots may be, however absurd Mr Ramsay's opinions, these two
characters appear from different street corners and climb into the same taxi (A Room: 1977,
p.92). Perhaps Woolf s intention here is to recognise sexual difference, allow space for the
female artist to come into her own and offer another imperative; if women are to achieve
artistic and social, ordinary, everyday autonomy then part of our feminist rite of passage has
to be finding a way to connect.
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Notes
(1) "How Should One Read a Book?" (1925) in Collected Essays Vol. 2 (1966), ed. Leonard
Woolf London: Chatto and Windus.
(2) See the passage in question in Part One where Brontë bemoans the woman's role in
' Middle-class Victorian society. As we have seen, Woolf argues that the jarring effect of
Grace Poole's laugh which interrupts Jane's musings on the female condition is
unnecessary. A Room of One's Own (1929) Chapter 4.
(3) See also Jacob's Room (1922). Woolf explores the difference between men and women
and Jacob's recognition of this difference leads to the consequent difficulty he experiences
because he realises that he does not know how to talk to a woman (Jacob's Room: 1992,
pp. 60-61, 68-69).
(4) See Freud's essay "The Uncanny" (1919). Vol. 4 Collected Papers (1949). Trans. Joan
Riviêre. London: Hogarth Press Ltd.
(5) See Gilman's account of the effects of the rest cure in Part One.
(6) Some of these short stories were published posthumously in A Haunted House (1943).
(7)This account of the difficulties Woolf was experiencing whilst writing Night and Day
might explain Mansfield's later criticism of the book.
(8) See "write me your sane and sensible reflections on Vanity" (March 1931), Letters Vol. 4,
p.297. Also "arguments against suicide" (October 1930), Letters Vol. 4, p.242.
(9) See also Shoshana Felman's essay mentioned in Part One, "Women and Madness: the
critical phallacy" (1975). Diacritics, 5, pp.2-10 and in Belsey and Moore (1989).
(10)See Patricia Waugh Feminine Fictions (1989), p.99.
(11)See Freud "On Narcissism" (1914). Volume 14 Standard Edition.
(12)See Freud "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" (1915). Volume 14 Standard Edition.
(13)See later horse reference from A Voyage Out: 1992, p.196.
(14)For a comprehensive study of the relationship between Woolf and Mansfield, particularly
in terms of their writing practices, see Angela Smith's book Katherine Mansfield and
Virginia Woolf: A Public of Two (1999). Smith's theories centre around an exploration
of "liminality"; the shared psychological and literary thresholds which hold the work of
the two women together.
(15)See Collected Letters of Katherine Mansfield Vol. 3 To J.M. Murray "I am reviewing
Virginia to send tomorrow; its devilishly hard. Talk about intellectual snobbery - her book
reeks of it (but I cant say so)" (p.91). Also Murray and Mansfield decided that they would
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not include Woolf on their list of friends (p.90).
(16)Elaine Showalter claims that through her characterisation of Septimus, Woolf is able to
explore fanaticism "both in its mad form of hallucination and delusions of grandeur, and in
its socially approved manifestations as Proportion and Conversion" (Showalter in
Dalloway: 1992, p. xv). See also Woolf s indictment of Christianity in missionary form on
pages 109-110 where she employs violent imagery and berates Conversion's need for
sacrifice and submission; a surrender of the human will similar to that demanded by Sir
William.
(17) Su Reid explores Mrs Ransay's knitting as a "semiotic activity" in To the Lighthouse: An
Introduction to the Variety of Criticism (1991), p.89.
(18) See A Writer's Diary, 28 November, 1928: "I used to think of him and mother daily; but
writing the Lighthouse laid them in my mind (p.175). Also in "A Sketch of the Past"
Woolf explains that she was "obsessed" with "the presence" of her mother until her forties
when she wrote To the Lighthouse. The book, she explains, was written very quickly and
"when it was written, I ceased to be obsessed by my mother. I no longer hear her voice; I
do not see her" (Moments: 1976, pp. 80-81).
(19)See Patricia Waugh on Woolf s aesthetic practice in Practising Postmodernism Reading
Modernism (1992), pp. 107.
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Sylvia Plath: A Woman Telling Stories
It seems natural to follow Virginia Woolf with Sylvia Plath, for Plath too was concerned to
find a precise articulation of the immanent and transcendent self, the body, constructions of
femininity, the splitting of female consciousness, artistry and death. Also, within an
investigation of the narratives which have come out of, or run parallel to, autobiography, it
seems that the work of Sylvia Plath is another good starting point for a discussion about the
fictionalisation of life experience. Sylvia Plath's life, as well as her work, has come to be of
great significance and interest to critics, biographers and the ordinary reader. Although her
censorship has both frustrated and fascinated the public, Plath's mystification and
mythification is largely due to the fact that her private life has become, at least in part, public
property. Because her work is thought to be largely confessional and because she has been
written and rewritten so many times by others, Plath represents a consumable self, a
commodity, through the reproduction of her life stories and re-creations in the fictions or
"true" stories which are about her.
In The Haunting of Sylvia Plath (1991) Jacqueline Rose argues that, because Plath offers
multiple and different representations of herself, it is futile and unnecessary to try to create a
unified image of her as writer and woman. There is no one true voice, neither is there any
possibility of uncovering one true narrative version. We could argue, therefore, that Plath
herself, consciously or not, chose to defy any such totalisation:
As Plath writes herself across her journals, letters, novel, short stories and poetry. her different voices
enter into an only ever partial dialogue with each other which it is impossible to bring to a close. To
which of these voices are we going to assign an absolute authority - The voice of The Bell Jar, which
she publishes under a pseudonym; the voice of the Letters Home, in which she communicated another
but incompatible truth; the voice of the Journals which seems so cruelly at moments, to give to those
letters the lie ., the voice of her poems, which can be read as the upflight of a transcendent femininity
[...]? Above all these differences of writing and interpretation should act as a crucial caution against
one conception of censorship - the idea that behind it can be discovered the single. unadulterated
truth. Plath may be censored but, as we have seen, she also censors, transforms and endlessly rewrites
herself.
Rose: 1991, p 104.
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Once we immerse ourselves in the self-representation which appears in the multiple written
forms of the journals, letters, short stories, poems and the novel The Bell Jar (1963) the
question "Who was Plath?" soon becomes irrelevant, due to the very impossibility of finding a
satisfactory answer. This is a welcome move away from criticism which has brought Plath's
life into readings of her text, pathologizing both her style and form. Rose, instead, chooses to
accept the inconsistency of Plath whilst contesting that a particular postmodern feminist
reading of Plath's "disordered, fragmented, shifting subjectivity" which suggests a political
response to patriarchal notions of unity and linearity does not quite suit her work. Despite
the movement across boundaries ("psychic, political, cultural") Plath's precision means that
"the contours of the opposing elements never completely lose their shape" (Rose: 1991,p.10).
Rose offers an alternative way of reading Plath's texts, a mode of reading which allows us to
explore the surface, the body of work rather than dig around for buried truths about their
author:
Plath is neither one identity, nor multiple identities simply dispersing themselves. She writes at the
point of tension - pleasure/danger, your fault/my fault, high/low culture - without resolution or
dissipation of what produces the clash between the two.
Rose: 1991, p.10.
Other representations of Plath have not allowed us this freedom. In Ted Hughes' introduction
to Plath's Journals (1982) he insists that the real Plath is only to be found in her poetry, in the
"high art" of her writing, and in particular the poetry she wrote in the last months of her life,
now published in Ariel (1965):
Sylvia Plath was a person of many masks, both in her personal life and in her writings. Some were
camouflage cliché facades, defensive mechanisms, involuntary. And some were deliberate poses,
attempts to find the keys to one style or another. These were the faces of her lesser selves, her false or
provisional selves, the minor roles of her inner drama.
... her real self, being the real poet, would now speak for itself, and would throw off all those lesser
and artificial selves that had monopolized the words up to that point, it was as if a dumb person
suddenly spoke.
A real self, as we know, is a rare thing. The direct speech of a real self is rarer still. Where a real
self exists it reveals itself, as a rule, only in the quality of the person's presence, or in actions. Most of
us are never more than bundles of contradictory and complementary selves. Our real self. if our belief
that we have one is true, is usually dumb, shut away beneath the to-and-fro conflicting voices of the
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false and petty selves. As if dumbness were the universal characteristic of the real self. When a real
self finds language, and manages to speak, it is surely a da771ing event - as Ariel was.
Hughes in Journals: 1982, ppxiv - xv.
Because of the controversies surrounding Plath, expressed in the many readings of her
work and life, this has not been an easy subject to address and I found that objectivity in this
case was a strangely elusive stance whilst a wholly subjective approach seemed problematic
because any resulting empathy might colour my readings. I was at once reluctant to project
pathological readings onto the texts and simultaneously negotiating criticisms which seemed to
be frequently drawing me into an unsatisfactory vortex of anger and an urge to defend Plath. It
seems that only when one is able to surrender to the text does a more comfortable inroad
present itself, for within the text the person of Plath is no longer problematic. That journey is
an exploration of artistic practice and language.
I shall begin with my own difficulties and consequent approach. I first came to Plath as an
undergraduate in 1991 on a course entitled "Literature and Gender" wherein Ariel, Plath's final
collection of poetry, was a set text. We read this alongside Anne Stevenson's collection of
poems The Other House (1990), which was written at the same time as Stevenson was
researching and writing her biography of Plath, Bitter Fame (1989), and within which there is
a long poem "Letter to Sylvia Plath" written in 1988. In this poem the speaker seems to want
to clarify her position regarding Plath and her work echoing the poet's constant urge to "Catch
it! Catch it! Catch it! Catch it!" Stevenson offers many representations of the writer and her
life which seem to want to undermine the person and consequently colour readings of Plath's
texts. In Stevenson's work the biographical details of Plath's life as she perceives them
inextricably attach themselves to the body of her writing. The letter begins in the third stanza
of the poem:
Dear Sylvia, we must close our book_
Three springs you've perched like a black rook
between sweet weather and my mind.
At last I have to seem unkind
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and exorcise my awkward awe.
My shoulder doesn't like your claw.
Stevenson: 1990, p.18
The speaker then forgives and praises "the fiercest poet of our time" before going on to give
her interpretation of Plath's rise to fame which oddly juxtaposes an appropriation of some of
Plath's themes with a negative image of the writer as a woman who "bought with death a
mammoth name / to set in the cold museum of fame."
A dissolute nun, you had to serve
the demon muse who peeled your nerve
and fuelled your energy with hate.
Malevolent will-power made you great,
Sylvia, I see you in this view
of glassy absolutes where you,
a frantic Alice, trip on snares,
crumple and drown in your own tears.
Stevenson: 1990, p.19.
This "selfish and sad" Alice could not find "gratitude and love ... / in reputation's building
ground." The speaker continues this disengrandisation of Plath which seems to find its root in
some kind of ethical, overarching disdain regarding Plath's suicide. The tone is bitter both in
terms of the posthumous fame which has come out of what is portrayed as a cowardly act and
in terms of the burden of consciousness suffered by those still living:
The future is where the dead go
in rage, bewilderment and pain
to make and magnify their name.
Meanwhile, the continuous present casts
longer reflections on the past.
Nothing has changed much. Famine, war
fatten your spider as before.
Poor Sylvia, could you not have been
a little smaller than a queen -
a river, not a tidal wave
engulfing all you tried to save?
Rather than not be justified
you sickened in loneliness and died,
while we live on in messy lives,
rueful or tired or barely wise.
Stevenson: 1990, pp. 20-21.
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I met Anne Stevenson in the summer of 1992 at Lumb Bank, a writer's retreat which once
was the Hughes' family home, in Heptonstall, a small village in West Yorkshire in whose
graveyard Plath is buried. Stevenson had come to read from her latest poetry and I was
• interested to meet her and ask her about Plath. I had not yet read Bitter Fame. Stevenson told
me that she and Plath had been contemporaries with similar Anglo-American backgrounds and
education. The impression of Plath she communicated was that she was a brilliant, but vain
and silly girl. I was quite surprised to find that she had not in fact met Plath when I later read
the preface to Stevenson's controversial biography but found that the attitude and sentiment
expressed in that conversation was quite clearly here again in written form. New to feminism,
I was also interested to speak to a more experienced woman about her attitudes towards
gender and writing and thus embarrassed myself by asking, during a more formal question time
after Stevenson's reading, what she thought about her texts being taught and read on a course
such as "Literature and Gender." Stevenson was immediately championed by the two male
tutors who openly scoffed at my question saying that it was ridiculous and inappropriate; we
were supposed to be talking about writing processes, not politics. Stevenson did not comment.
Naturally, I do not wish to fall into the category of those women described in Stevenson's
preface to Bitter Fame whose responses and readings after Plath's death were due to "a
shocking revelation of extremist elements in their own psyches." Nor can I identify with those
"for whom the legacy of Sylvia Plath was no more than a simplified feminist ideology"
(Stevenson: 1989, p.304). As we know only too well this radical simplification led some of
these women to a seemingly relentless defamation of Hughes and the removal of his name
from Plath's gravestone. However, I cannot pretend that my consequent, reluctant and
mistrustful reading of Bitter Fame was not influenced by the encounter described above.
A more positive influence on my reading of Plath, has been Jacqueline Rose's book The
Haunting of Sylvia Plath. Although there is biographical detail within this volume, the
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emphasis is on a reading of Plath's text rather than a distasteful exhumation of her grave.
Stevenson presents a negative, "corrected" version of the woman who has supposedly been
wrongly mythologised and hence has achieved a posthumous "meteoric rise to fame"
(Stevenson: 1989, p. xi). Rose, on the other hand, is concerned to read not untruths and
contradictions, nor psychopathic influences, across the many forms and genres of Plath's
writings in an attempt to uncover some true version of the person, but to note and analyze the
differences within the language:
It is that provisional, precarious nature of self-representation which appears so strikingly from the
multiple forms in which Plath writes. What she presents us with, therefore is not only the difference
of writing from the person who produces it, but also the division internal to language, the difference
of writing from itself It is then all the more striking that so many critics have felt it incumbent upon
themselves to produce a unified version of Plath as writer and as woman, as if that particular form of
fragmentation or indirect representation were something which, through the completion of their own
analysis of her, they could somehow repair. Their frequent diagnoses of Plath seem to me to have as at
least one of their effects, if not purposes, that they have transposed into a fact of her individual
pathology the no less difficult problem of the contradictory, divided and incomplete nature of
representation itself
Rose, 1991, p. 5.
We have read too often the assumption that a sick logic informs Plath's writing (1) or
statements like Stevenson's in her analysis of the Ariel poems which suggest that all Plath had
to offer was an inroad into her own psyche:
Although she never quite abandoned her self-preoccupation, toward the end the "self', so prominent
as source of Sylvia's unique rage, all but disappears, as if, with the exorcisms of "Daddy" and "Lady
Lazarus," she was able to attain another plane in her mythology. [...]
With superb artistry these poems record a dangerously altered and alienated state of mind.
Stevenson: 1989, pp. 287-288.
Edward Butscher opens his critical biography Sylvia Plath: Method and Madness (1976) with
the following admission :
To write about an artist's life is to write about his or her art. That is the inescapable truth a critical
biographer must constantly confront if he hopes to make sense out of the mass of material, fact and
fiction, preserved in the artist's name. When the artist in question is primarily a poet, the relationship
between life and art, history and myth, becomes even more intense and less patient of disengagement.
When the poet is Sylvia Plath, a "confessional" poet who was consciously dedicated to fusing
biography with poetry to create an enduring legend, this relationship can no longer be either split
asunder or seriously challenged. And yet, the task remains to trace to their various sources the
complex system of roots that led, almost inexorably, to both the later poetry and the suicide of the poet
at the age of thirty.
Butscher: 1976, p.xi.
185
Once again we find that it is a fascination with the death of Plath which drives the readings of
her texts and a desire to uncover reasons for that death in fact cover and colour those readings
with an impulse to constantly pathologise her writing.
• It is almost impossible to separate Plath's voice, Plath's representations of a self; from those
who speak about her life or speak for her, about her work, in editorial comment. She is both
cultural icon and cultural commodity, but, above all, I would agree with Rose that "Plath is a
fantasy" (Rose: 1991, p.5). We can surely gain nothing by reducing her to this or that
personality and anyway this seems an impossible task if we believe the conflicting reports of
Plath's multiple selves from those who knew her in life. We would probably be better equipped
to concern ourselves with the literary legacy, the insights Plath can offer in terms of
representation within the labyrinthal body of her text. Dido Merwin contests that Plath lies in
her letters, suggesting that there should be no fiction therein. Hughes claimed that the
Journals and the final collection of poems are the only true representations of the real Plath.
But as we attempt to get close to this "reality," reading across her genre and form, listening to
all the voices, we realise more and more that we are still only gaining a glimpse, an elusive
shadow that rightly refuses to be brought into the spotlight. The body of text, like the physical
body of Plath, is still a surface expression, the masquerade of a life.
Rather than try to read a life into that text, or imagine a life on the other side of its
language, surely more can be gained if we allow ourselves to remain within the, perhaps more
legitimately accessible, linguistic production of Plath's prose and poetry. This is not easy, as
we are constantly pulled this way and that by those voices which insist on Plath's confessional
bent and point up some psychic or biographical reality behind the fantasy in Plath's writing.
Indeed, within the published journals we will see that Plath was often working on her style and
form in order to produce texts out of her own experience. There is ample evidence that she
used her life as source material but the concern is always to find a language which could offer
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an adequate or appropriate representation of that material. Rather than an exploration of the
conflicting reports of the person (including Plath's) in order to locate a version which most
suits our own subjective response to Plath, perhaps it is an investigation of the language, the
dialogues within and across these texts, with all their contradictions and fissures, that will offer
an understanding of Plath's importance as, above all, a woman telling stories.
The Art of Saying "I"
Reading Plath raises many interesting questions about writing the self in a period when critics
are trying to balance Barthes' notion of "The Death of the Author," which demands that we
allow the text to live independently, with research which is moving more and more towards a
celebration of women's autobiographical texts; here the finding of a voice, the recovery of
authorship for women, is a central concern. The boundaries between life and art have been
particularly blurred by critics, biographers and Plath herself. Linda Anderson points out in her
book Women and Autobiography in the 20th Century (1997) that: "Plath's life has provided
the most common or advertised route into her work." The Bell Jar supposedly offers "the
thinnest of fictional disguises," whilst The Journals are promoted because they unveil "Plath's
most intimate and private self' (Anderson: 1997, p.101). As Anna Tripp suggests in her essay,
"Saying 'I': Sylvia Plath as Tragic Author or Feminist Text" (1994), an author-centred reading
of Plath's poetry would place her historically as preceding second-wave feminism therefore
critics such as Anne Stevenson, author of Bitter Fame could argue that feminist readings are
inappropriate. I would agree with Tripp that a critique which is derived from the surface of the
text, rather than one which reaches through to a life, can offer us some useful insights into
Plath's projects (both poetry and prose works) which may not have been informed by sexual
politics but were often, I will argue, inspired by her rejection of ideologies surrounding
gender. (2)
187
In The Haunting of Sylvia Plath Rose also suggests another area of interest which I will
address in more depth later; that is Plath's hybridic nature in relation to cultural production
(Rose: 1991, p.167). Plath was concerned not only with the "high" art of poetry but also with
'works which would have a mass appeal, short stories for women's magazines. Plath's eclectic
interest in and production of "low" formulaic prose has earned her criticism from many
quarters. Lucas Myers explains in his appendix to Stevenson's Bitter Fame that during an early
meeting with Plath he could not disguise his disapproval of Plath's involvement with
magazines such as Mademoiselle and Seventeen. What is perhaps more interesting is his
description of Plath's non-reaction to this: "What surprised me most about Sylvia was that she
didn't seem to notice my disapproval. She chatted on, with energy" (Stevenson: 1989, p.313).
Plath's interest in popular fiction has also earned disapproval from her feminist supporters,
who view such publications as Plath was keen to appear in as degrading to women because
they promote and uphold idealised notions of feminine domesticity. Consequently, this area
of Plath's work has largely been ignored by feminist critics but I hope to show through detailed
analysis that it is perhaps within this writing that we can see most clearly Plath's rejection of
patriarchy's order for gender roles within marriage and, in particular, her rejection of culturally
produced models of femininity.
The centre of my interest lies within Plath's writing practices. I will re-iterate here, it is not
Plath's personal experience which I wish to analyse but the means by which she appropriates
language to express those experiences. Let us first focus particularly on the difference within
the language used to express the same, or similar events in her history. The following selected
excerpts illustrate this difference:
December 28, 1953:
So I hit upon what I figured would be the easy way out; I waited until my mother had gone to
town, my brother was at work, and my grandparents were out in the back yard. Then I broke the lock
of my mother's safe, took out the bottle of 50 sleeping pills, and descended to the dark sheltered ledge
in our basement, after having left a note to mother that I had gone on a long walk and would not be
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back for a day or so. I swallowed quantities and blissfully succumbed to the whirling blackness that I
honestly believed was eternal oblivion. My mother believed my note, sent out searching parties,
notified the police, and, finally, on the second day or so, began to give up hope when she found that
the pills were missing. In the meantime, I had stupidly taken too many pills, vomited them, and came
to consciousness in a dark hell, banging my head repeatedly on the ragged rocks of the cellar in futile
attempts to sit up and, instinctively, call for help.
Letters Home: 1976, p.131.
February 19, 1956:
A morbid fear: that protests too much. To the doctor. I am going to the psychiatrist this week, just
to meet him, to know he's there. And ironically, I feel I need him. I need a father. I need a mother. I
need some older, wiser being to cry to. I talk to God, but the sky is empty, and Orion walks by and
doesn't speak I feel like Lazarus: that story has such a fascination. Being dead, I rose up again, and
even resort to the mere sensation value of being suicidal, of getting so close, of coming out of the
grave with the scars and the marring mark on my cheek which (is it my imagination?) grows more
prominent: paling like a death-spot in the red, windblown skin, browning darkly in photographs,
against my grave winter-pallor. I identify too closely with my reading, my writing.
The Journals of Sylvia Plath: 2000, p.199.
It was completely dark.
I felt the darkness, but nothing else, and my head rose, feeling it, like the head of a worm.
Someone was moaning. Then a great, hard weight smashed against my cheek like a stone wall and the
moaning stopped.
The silence surged back, smoothing itself as black water smooths to its old surface calm after a
dropped stone.
A cool wind rushed by. I was being transported at enormous speed down a tunnel into the
earth. Then the wind stopped. There was a rumbling, as of many voices, protesting and disagreeing in
the distance. Then the voices stopped...
Then the chisel struck again, and the light leapt into my head, and through the thick, warm,
furry dark, a voice cried,
'Mother!'
The Bell Jar: 1966, pp. 180-181.
... The second time I meant
To last it out and not come back at all.
I rocked shut
As a seashell.
They had to call and call
And pick the worms off me like sticky pearls.
Dying
Is an art, like everything else.
I do it exceptionally well.
"Lady Lazarus," Ariel: 1968, p.17.
Here we have the dispassionate communication of her suicide attempt in letter form, the raw,
emotional outpourings and internal dialogue of the diary, the balanced formalisation of her
prose and the highly crafted drama of her poetry. Although the content of the story is
recognisable in each different form, the narrative voice undergoes a marked alteration to such
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an extent that the telling of the story, the manner in which it is told, is perhaps of more interest
than the events described.
However, a closer analysis of structure, diction and tone may also suggest that within these
*different genre-frameworks there is a re-apparition of a recognisable poetic voice. In my
readings this has become something of a magic thread uncovering the recurrence of a
dialectical exploration into the relationship between immanence and transcendence, a
realisation of the self as material body but also as a being who can transcend that reality and
explore the imagination through the production of fantasy. We have already seen this
preoccupation within Woolf s themes and writing practices.
A Kristevan reading of Plath's text is perhaps appropriate here; we can surmise that a return
to the body and the imagination is signalled in the above passages by a return to poetic
language, ICristeva's semiotic. Central to the first passage, for example, we have a marked
change in tone when the speaker employs alliteration and imagery to describe a regressive
return to mergence with the mother as well as the experience of unleashing the death-drive: "I
swallowed quantities and blissfully succumbed to the whirling blackness that I honestly
believed was eternal oblivion". The 's' and 'b' sounds are onomatopoeic and note the centrality
of the "whirling blackness" which describes the experience of both internal and external chaos
as boundaries dissolve due to the act of swallowing. The positioning suggests perhaps that this
theme is the very source and pivot of the prose paragraph. Note also that in the third passage
alliteration, imagery and the word "black" are used in a sentence which stands between the
"someone" and the "I" of the narrative: "The silence surged back, smoothing itself as black
water smooths its old surface calm after a dropped stone." The void and tension between the
silence and the voices, the darkness and the light, self and other, is only to be dissipated when
the re-birthing has been completed in a later mirrored, or symmetrical, sentence and this
re-entry is signalled by the isolated exclamation "Mother!" However, the sentence; "Then the
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chisel struck again, and the light leapt into my head, and through the thick, warm, furry dark, a
voice cried," is markedly different in tone, despite the similarities as regards its use of
alliteration, imagery and form, due to the use the recurring hard "c" sounds rather than the
softer "b" and "s" in the previous sentence. Rather than dissolution, here the sounds suggest a
kind of crystallisation of form. This is not a slipping into oblivion, a recourse to the imaginary,
but a jolting back to the symbolic and language.
As the speaker of "Lady Lazarus" asserts everything is art and so, perhaps from these
readings, we can deduce that the theatre of the self, is to be played out on the one hand within
language; note the suggestion of a deliberate dissolution, regression and a return to the dark
enclosure of the semiotic: "I rocked shut/ As a seashell", and on the other hand a finely crafted
and formalised language which demands active control. Even when we find a common theme
or a recognisable style, tone, voice, the discovery is accompanied by the realisation that all is
multiplicity, all defies the impulse to establish a unified definition or interpretation. "Lady
Lazarus" can give us ample material for a discussion about the fragmentation and artifice of
the subject. Here Plath incorporates both the confessions of autobiographical story, the
immanence of the flesh, the desire for deconstruction and annihilation, whilst writing the desire
for a transcendence of the self in order to re-construct a fictional, mythical, being: "Out of the
ash / I rise with my red hair / And I eat men like air." Elisabeth Bronfen suggests that in "Lady
Lazarus" Plath:
reverses common notions of life and death, suggesting that her three suicide attempts and her repeated
return from the realm of the dead should be seen as an expression of autonomous authorship. In that
she herself legislates the boundary between life and death, she comes into a power of her own. [...]
Only in relation to the doctor, who seeks to restitute her, does she take on the function of a reified
body, which serves not her own but someone else's act of creation: 'I am your opus, 11 am your
valuable.' Yet the power inherent in the art of dying encompasses self-revivication as well. Not the
doctor but rather she herself possesses the body in which she returns.
Bronfen: 1992, p.401.
There is, within the theme of Plath's texts, a constant questioning of subjectivity, autonomy
and authorship. How do we go about telling stories about ourselves? What happens to that
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self in the process and production of writing? We have seen already in the Journal entry
selected (February 19, 1956) Plath's complaint that she was identifying too closely with her
writing. Thus we are confronted with the question: do we write about ourselves or do we
become that self which we have written? According to her Journal entry of February 25, 1956,
Plath tried to justify her life and create order through writing:
The dialogue between my Writing and my Life is always in danger of becoming a slithering shifting
of responsibility, of evasive rationalising: in other words; I justified the mess I made of life by saying
I'd give it order, form, beauty, writing about it I justified my writing by saying it would be published,
give me life (and prestige to life).
Journals: 2000, pp. 208-209.
Plath finishes this entry with the expression of her desire "to build all solid." She, at least here,
seems to be consciously seeking some kind of unification and cohesion through her writing of
the self. But this desire is linked to form, style and publication, control in the symbolic and
acceptance/recognition in the public world. For Plath, the danger is a lack of solidity, and the
threat of the fluid nature, the "slithering shifting," is screened by her language as she moves the
weight of responsibility from life experience to written articulation where the burden of
consciousness is borne by the text.
Once a life experience has been told as a story, verbalised or written down, it is objectified
and as such the self can be partially unified through form. As Foucault points out in "What is
Enlightenment?" this concept of the self as an aesthetic artefact is hardly new and certainly not
limited to literary experience. Baudelaire's Nineteenth Century objectification of the self was
inextricably bound up with the notion of artistic invention rather than self-discovery.
Baudelaire's "dandy", Foucault explains, "makes of his body, his behavior, his feelings and
passions, his very existence, a work of art." The modern man "tries to invent himself'
(Foucault in Rabinow (ed): 1984, pp. 41-42). We are not, therefore, free to wander within,
and explore, a pre-existent but unknown self, however, we are encouraged to consider and
undertake the task of self-production. Reading Plath one has to address this consideration
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alongside the notion of an obvious dispersal of the self as it is represented by multiple generic
productions.
Also of interest to us is the presence of an alterego; another recurrent theme in Plath's
writing. This splitting of the self, the production of an other, is particularly interesting when
we consider notions of narcissism and schizophrenia and these areas are perhaps ripe for
exploration here in the following photograph and mirror passages:
January 10, 1953:
Look at that ugly dead mask here and do not forget it. It is a chalk mask with dead dry poison
behind it, like the death angel, it is what I was this fall, and what I never want to be again. The
pouting disconsolate mouth, the flat, bored, numb, expressionless eyes: symptoms of the foul decay
within.
Journals: 2000, P. 155.
The nurse sighed and opened the top bureau drawer. She took out a large mirror in a wooden
frame that matched the wood of the bureau and handed it to me.
At first I didn't see what the trouble was. It wasn't a mirror at all, but a picture.
You couldn't tell whether the person in the picture was a man or a woman, because their hair was
shaved off and sprouted in bristly chicken-feather tufts all over their head. One side of the person's
face was purple, and bulged out in a shapeless way, shading to green along the edges, and then to a
sallow yellow. The person's mouth was pale brown, with a rose-coloured sore at either corner.
The most startling thing about the face was its supernatural conglomeration of bright colours.
I smiled.
The mouth in the mirror cracked into a grin.
A minute after the crash another nurse ran in. She took one look at the broken mirror, and at me,
standing over the blind, white pieces, and hustled the young nurse out of the room.
The Bell Jar: 1966, pp.184-185.
This alienation from, distrust and hatred of the other, represented through the reflected or
photographic image, is re-iterated throughout Plath's writing. Despite the use of the
impersonal pronoun "it" in the first passage, the image is recognised as a representation of
Plath's inner self. In the passage taken from The Bell Jar, however, Esther's knowledge that
the image is of herself is not apparent. Even though the dropping of the mirror might indicate
the shock of recognition, it could also be read as a reaction to the encounter with the other
which she had perceived at first to be a static, not a moving, picture. In fact, Esther's rational
responses to the nurses shows a marked contrast to self-loathing which we read in the Journal
entry: "I listened with mild interest. Anyone could drop a mirror. I didn't see why they should
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get so stirred up" (Bell Jar 1966, p.185).
In Plath's poem "Mirror" (1961) it is the glass which is the speaker: "I am silver and exact.
I have no preconceptions. / Whatever I see I swallow immediately / Just as it is, urunisted by
love or dislike. / I am not cruel, only truthful -." Like the mirror in Woolf s short story "Lady
in the Looking Glass" it reflects the stillness of the objects opposite and waits, menacingly, for
the faces which will interfere with its meditation-like contemplation of the opposite wall. The
indifference expressed here in the opening lines is contrasted later in the poem by the reaction
of the woman who is reflected, now in a lake: "She rewards me with tears and an agitation of
hands. IT am important to her." This dispassionate "I" is assured of its power. The tone of
Plath's poem throughout suggests a divorcing of selves and their reflections because the
mirror, the keeper of reflected images, has a subjectivity of its own. (3)
We could read Plath's recourse to the semiotic as an attempt to articulate exclusion from
the symbolic through circumnavigation via the imaginary, as well as an attempt to address the
loss of boundaries, and consequent anguish, which follows the experience of herself as other.
It is noteworthy that in Plath's autobiographical piece "Ocean 1212-W" (1962) separation
from her mother and a sense of abandonment is juxtaposed with a sense of being separate from
the surroundings of which she had once felt part. At the beginning of the piece she recounts an
early memory of crawling into the sea and being rescued by her mother. Her earliest encounter
with the sea is at first related to primary mergence with the mother: "Breath, that is the first
thing. Something is breathing. My own breath? The breath of my mother? No, something else,
something larger, farther, more serious, more weary" (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.117). This
breath is different from the other sounds she remembers, no other sound can lull her back into
her earliest memories: "The motherly pulse of the sea made a mock of such counterfeits"
(Johnny Panic: 1979, p.117). The narration of her first entrance into the sea is a one of instant
attraction and dangerous, if fantastical, mergence:
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Like a deep woman, it hid a good deal; it had many faces, many delicate, terrible veils. It spoke of
miracles and distances; if it could court, it could also kill. When I was learning to creep, my mother
set me down on the beach to see what I thought of it. I crawled straight for the coming wave and was
just through the wall of green when she caught my heels.
I often wonder what would have happened ill had managed to pierce that looking-glass. Would
my infant gills have taken over, the salt in my blood? For a time I believed not in God nor Santa
Claus, but in mermaids. They seemed as logical and possible to me as the brittle twig of a seahorse in
the Zoo aquarium or the skates lugged up on the lines of cursing Sunday fisherman - skates the shape
of old pillowslips with the full, coy lips of women.
Johnny Panic and other prose writings: 1979, p.118.
Rather than self-annihilation, again we have the sense of transcendence, shape-shifting as well
as the imagery which links women with the sea and creatures from within the ocean.
When Plath learns that the reason for her mother's disappearance is the birth of her baby
brother, her relationship with the sea-scape changes: "As from a star I saw, coldly and soberly,
the separateness of everything. I felt the wall of my skin: I am I. That stone is a stone. My
beautiful fusion with the things of this world was over" (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.120). She now
considers herself a "reject" thrown out by the tide:
I picked up, frigidly, a stiff pink starfish. It lay at the heart of my palm, a joke dummy of my own
hand. Sometimes I nursed starfish alive in jam jars of seawater and watched them grow back lost
arms. On this day, this awful birthday of otherness, my rival, somebody else, I flung the starfish
against a stone. Let it perish. It had no wit.
Johnny Panic and other prose writings: 1979, pp.120-121.
This is a story about growing consciousness and realisation of her own otherness. She doesn't
breathe with the sea. She knows she has a separate identity because she knows that others
exist. As Rose points out in reference to this piece "there is no such thing as an ego on its
own, since the ego exists, comes into being, only as difference from itself' (Rose: 1991,
p.146).
"Poem for a Birthday" (1959)
Identity, the act of swallowing and an address to a mother are recurring themes in Plath's
"Poem for a Birthday". As Rose points out this has been read by some critics as a transitional
poem in terms of Plath's poetic development, whilst others have suggested that it relied too
heavily on Theodore Roethke (4). Kroll and Hughes describe the poem as a clear sign of
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"Plath's emergent mythology of self-transcendence" (Rose: 1991, p.41). Rose also notes
Hughes' judgement that the poem signals some sort of re-unification of the self "where the
self, shattered in 1952, suddenly finds itself whole" (Hughes in Rose: 1991, p. 41) (5). The
• poem appears in seven distinct parts and so immediately seems an expression of the
fragmented nature of identity. However, repetitions of the themes I have mentioned also form
some sense of coherence and unity, an impulse, perhaps a progression, towards wholeness. In
the penultimate line of the poem the self emerges mended, the task of reconstruction is
completed: "My mendings itch. There is nothing to do." The final line "I shall be as good as
new" suggests, however, a period of convalescence, there is nothing left to do but wait for the
wounds to heal, the scars will fade to give the illusion of newness. This is perhaps a
Frankensteinesque birth, a body which has been stitched together from all the disparate parts.
In the first section of the poem "Who", the "I" is reduced to a minimalistic orifice: "I am
all mouth." The convalescent body in the denouement juxtaposed with this disembodied "I" at
the beginning would indicate a sense of grotesque, if macabre, progression. We could also
read "I am all mouth" as a self-derogatory statement: all mouth, no action, I say I am but I am
not, I say I will do, but I do not, there is nothing behind my language and nothing will come
out of it. Later in this section the "I" is further disembodied: "Mother, you are the one mouth /
I would be tongue to. Mother of otherness / Eat me." The possible relocation of the tongue
suggests a lack of possession and detachment. The mouth can lose its tongue, the tongue can
inhabit another mouth, can mouth another's language. The imperative "Eat me" suggests a
desire for total effacement, disappearance, to be swallowed and kept hidden within another
orifice. With reference to Kristeva's Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1982) Bronfen
explains that this poem:
unfolds a fantasy of returning to the psychic condition that existed prior to having received a social
identity [...] situating this presymbolic psychic condition, in which the individual is not separated
from her immediate presence and reality, in a tomb-like site. [...] It is indeed through an apostrophe of
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the maternal body that this journey into the realm of unstructured, disseminated materiality can begin,
into a psychic site which Julia Kristeva has called the semiotic chora subtending all processes of
symbolization. Imagining herself not only shrunken in size but also inside another body - namely, as
the tongue in her mother's mouth - she invokes a reversal of birthgiving.
Bronfen: 1998, pp. 86-87.
In the second part of the poem "Dark House" the "I" is not sitting, not passive, but active:
"Chewing", "Oozing", "Whistling, wiggling", "Thinking". Movement is possible because the
"I" is eating: "These marrowy tunnels! / Moley-handed, I eat my way." By the third section the
"I" has begun to reject the mother: "A red tongue is among us. / Mother, keep out of my
barnyard, / I am becoming another." Now that "I" must swallow rather than be swallowed:
Feed me the berries of dark.
The lids won't shut. Time
Unwinds from the great umbilicus of the sun
Its endless glitter.
I must swallow it all.
Collected Poems: 1981, p. 133.
Swallowing time, eating the cord, eating berries that will bring sleep, perhaps bring us again to
Plath's attempted suicide and the notion of an annihilation of the self, but this section ends with
another command: "Tell me my name." This name is already known by someone, it must be
told and the desire for knowledge of the name indicates the desire for self-identification.
However, in section six, "Witch Burning," it is clear that the speaker has not managed to lay
claim to an embodied self. "I inhabit / The wax image of myself, a doll's body. / Sickness
begins here."
Towards the end of the poem we enter familiar territory as regards imagery. The setting of
the cellar where Plath first attempted suicide, the madhouse, allusions to electric shock
treatment, all these pull us into The Bell Jar, the journals, and the short story "Johnny Panic
and the Bible of Dreams." The voice in this section connects with the beginning of the poem
where the "I" was sitting small in a flowerpot, but the tone here is fearful:
III am a little one, I can do no harm.
If I don't move about, I'll knock nothing over. So I said,
Sitting under a potlid, tiny and inert as a rice grain.
They are turning the burners up, ring after ring.
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We are fa of starch, my small white fellows. We grow.
It hurts at first. The red tongues will teach the truth.
Collected Poems: 1981, p. 135.
The tone of the imperative "Mother of beetles, only unclench your hand" is also notably
- different. The pleading "only" indicates the voice of one subdued, one who promises to be
good: "Give me back my shape. I am ready to construe the days / I coupled with dust in the
shadow of a stone."
To be devoured was not good: "I entered / The stomach of indifference, the wordless
cupboard." Love and language are outside where "The food tubes embrace me" and "The
jewelmaster drives his chisel to pry/ Open one stone eye." Re-integration into the symbolic
world of language is not necessarily rebirth, but resurrection as we have seen in "Lady
Lazarus" : "This is the after-hell: I see the light." This is not the after-birth, the last three
words "good as new" indicate repair of something old, not emergence of something new-born.
Bronfen notes that many of Plath's poems "though tracing a psychic tourney into the absolute
negativity preceding and subtending language, focus on the process of re-emergence back into
daylight" (Bronfen: 1998, p.86).
It is clear from Plath's work that she is addressing the injustice of female confinement and I
would suggest that sometimes the poetic voice attempts to formulate a new language which
articulates a refusal of phallogocentric separation and a necessary return to the female body, to
the abandoned mother. However, there is also a sense of poetic urgency which moves away
from mergence, dissolution, silence and darkness. It is the very interplay between self and
other within Plath's writing which expresses the indeterminacy, lack of unity, unfixedness of
female experience within a patriarchal society that prioritises determinacy, unity and stability.
The fact that the "mendings itch" might suggest that, if the speaker does not wait for her
"fissures" to heal, she may come apart again. The wholeness at the end of the poem is
therefore fragile and dependent on passivity and obedience. One must not scratch at the joins.
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However, like the ending of "Lady Lazarus" we can also read a reclamation of power. The self
has been engulfed and resurrected, it has lost its shape and been reformed but the possibility of
re-dissolution is in the hands of the subject, rather than under the control of the doctors.
• The female human is not unified, she is multiple, she is both self and other, subject and
object, and therefore her 'narcissistic' and 'schizophrenic' experiences are intrinsic to her
eccentric existence rather than symptomatic of her abnormality. However, a total collapse into
the Kristeva's semiotic would lead to a total annihilation of the self, a recourse to the death
instinct, therefore measures must be taken to define the interface and set up a system so that
we can protect the ego's boundaries (6).
The Bell Jar (1963)
The threat of annihilation through mergence with all and disintegration of the unified self
causes Esther in Plath's novel to place herself within an imaginary glass bell jar. Hence she
creates a transparent but non-porous outer casing to hold herself in and to protect her from
outside interference. The effect of implementing this defence mechanism is not necessarily
pleasant, as Esther explains, she is left with no sense of feeling and "stewing in my own sour
air" (Bell Jar: 1966, p.196). However, the re-establishment of some kind of self-reflexive
awareness, as well as the sense of confinement, is evident in the prose: "I sank back in the
grey, plush seat and closed my eyes. The air of the bell jar wadded round me and I couldn't
stir" (Bell Jar: 1966, p.196-197). Thus this cocooning process is described as a safety measure
to guard against any further loss of personal unity. The necessity of the imaginary bell jar and
the ensuing numbness is interesting when we consider Irigaray's writing on female
schizophrenia.
In "Women's Exile" (1977) Luce Irigaray explains that women experience madness as
corporal pain and they do not have the means to articulate either the body or the splitting of
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the self However, Plath's bell jar metaphor can be read as an attempt to seize upon some form
of language which can describe, capture and elaborate through symbolic means the condition
against which Esther is rebelling (female confinement) and which is the intrinsic cause of her
illness. As Bronfen points out there is a reverberation between the heroine's fluid sense of
identity and a need to establish some kind of autonomy in the face of patriarchal law (7):
In Sylvia Plath's autobiographic portrait of her struggles as a young woman artist, the psychic impasse
of scepticism translates uncannily into the hysteric's concern with keeping the question of identity
undecided, oscillating between various self-fashionings, celebrating each, but as constructions. As
Jacques Lacan argues in his discussion of Freud's case study on Dora, the hysteric places herself in
relation to a figure of paternal authority, sustaining his desire even as she ceaselessly questions the
authority of his power. But the hysteric's position before this symbolic law is also contradictory, given
that, although she accepts that the question of her existence can be articulated only in relation to
symbolic interpellation, she, nevertheless, perpetually renegotiates her relation to the expectations she
is asked to fulfil.
Bronfen 1998: pp.53-54.
Bronfen's analysis in Over Her Dead Body (1992) is useful to us here, as she notes the
significance of death as performance both in terms of Esther's failed attempts to write, her
attempt to experience death and Plath's own relationship with narratology:
Plath resorts to a chiasmic structure. At first Esther uses her body as a medium, fantasising and then
realising death in lieu of the novel about Elaine she can't write. Yet The Bell Jar is implicitly the
novel that Sylvia Plath, disguised as Esther Greenwood, couldn't have her fictional self write until she
had experienced death. It is written out of death, in contradistinction to the external rendition of her
suicide attempt in the newspaper as well as to the fantasy spectators like Joan. In this novel she offers
a reading of her death-like self, not only by repeating the death and rebirth she designs for herself but
also by supplementing it with the double of the self-ironic commentator. Even as she tells the story of
how her body and her text turn death back into life, death remains potentially a revenant sublation.
Bronfen: 1992, pp.411-412.
It is well known that originally the novel was written under a pseudonym and Plath
undermined the book's importance telling her mother to forget it and to keep its existence a
secret: "Forget about the novel and tell no one of it. It's a pot-boiler and just practice"
(Letters: 1976, p.477). Plath's transition towards "low" art at this stage in her writing career, I
believe, is important from a feminist perspective. Critics such as Jacqueline Rose, Elisabeth
Bronfen and Linda Anderson have explored Plath's easy movement and the cultural
significance of Plath's interest in both the "high" art of her poetry and the "low" art of her
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prose writings. The fact that the manuscript for The Bell Jar was written on the other side of
the paper she was using for the Ariel poems is perhaps a clear indication of the symbiotic
relationship between these two forms (8).
• The importance of The Bell Jar is partly rooted in its clear political investigation and
commentary on the toxic effects of the American dream as regards the female role in society.
It is Esther's mother's desire that she study to be a secretary rather than waste her time on
travel, journalism or writing a novel. She should many, support her husband and have
children. It is this sentencing which drives Esther to madness and suicide. This is certainly
reflective of Plath's early concerns about her future writing career. In November 1952 Plath
seems delighted with the acceptance of her stories in women's magazines but she questions
how high she can set her goals and fears a descent into domestic obscurity. She wonders why
Woolf committed suicide and whether her writing was a "sublimation" of "deep, basic
desires":
The future? God - will it get worse & worse? Will I never travel, never integrate my life, never have
purpose, meaning? Never have time - long stretches, to investigate ideas, philosophy - to articulate the
vague seething desires in me? Will I be a secretary - a self-rationalizing, uninspired housewife,
secretly jealous of my husband's ability to grow intellectually & professionally while I am impeded -
will I submerge my embarrassing desires & aspirations, refuse to face myself, and go either mad or
become neurotic?
Journals: 2000, p.151.
She decides against seeking psychiatric help: "I will not let myself get sick, go mad, or retreat
like a child into blubbering on someone else's shoulder. Masks are the order of the day - and
the least I can do is cultivate the illusion that I am gay, serene, not hollow and afraid"
(Journals: 2000, p.151).
In a later Journal entry (February 1957) Plath articulates again her fear of being seduced
by domesticity and makes reference to lighter reading and in the same paragraph to Woolf
I was getting worries about becoming too happily stodgily practical instead of studying Locke, for
instance, or writing — I go make an apple pie, or study the Joy of Cooking, reading it like a novel.
Whoa, I said to myself. You will escape into domesticity & stifle yourself by falling headfirst into a
bowl of cookie batter. And just now I pick up the blessed diary of Virginia Woolf which I bought with
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a battery of her novels saturday with Ted. And she works off her depression over rejections from
Harper's (no less! - - - and I can hardly believe that the Big Ones get rejected tool) by cleaning out the
kitchen. And cooks haddock and sausage. I feel my life linked to her, somehow. I love her.
Journals: 2000, p.269.
Plath's continues her entry with references to her love of Mrs Dalloway and To the
Lighthouse. The fact that in these two novels Woolf presents two formidably successful
housewives and hostesses, in whose hands the art of cooking, or throwing a dinner party
becomes a kind of theatrical performance, does not seem to allay Plath's self-derision. She
continues to bemoan the fact that she is "apple-pie happy" and at the same time is feeling
"sick" because she has not been writing. She also claims that she was "reduplicating" Woolf s
suicide in her own "black summer of 1953" (Journals: 2000, p.269).
This duplicity which we see in Plath's attitude towards domesticity is characteristic of
Plath's duplicity in other areas. Plath's novel is at once a hilarious story about an ambitious girl
caught in the middle of the artificiality of the New York media circle and struggling to release
herself from suburban constricts of the American dream for happy family life, and a novel
about psychosis, death and rebirth. Bronfen takes issue with Hughes' criticism that the
structure of The Bell Jar does not work because it is an unbalanced tug-of-war between two
types of novel (9):
While 'the bewildering fact that each level speaks in the equally-real-or-symbolic terms of the other'
leads Hughes to judge the novel to be a raggedly imperfect art of a book, producing a paradox that
makes it truly tragic, I would counter that it is precisely this rhetoric of ambivalent contradiction, with
both the protective fiction and the traumatic message of psychic fragility simultaneously colouring
each other, which makes for Plath's successful deployment of a strategy of cultural performativity. Not
the tone of tragic violence or mythic pathos, as in the Ariel poems, impresses here, but rather the
brilliant eye for the absurd humour inherent to the constrictive scenario of romantic self-absorption
and the impasse of scepticism played through in her Journals of the same period.
Bronfen: 1998, p115.
I would agree with Bronfen that the relationship between psychic fragility and the culture of
fifties America is in fact the central theme of Plath's novel:
the disconcerting duplicity Plath performs in The Bell Jar aims at disclosing how the knowledge of
psychic alienation and death urge in fact functions as the shared secret upon which the smooth
artificiality, the cool glamour, and the apple-pie happy domesticity proclaimed by 1950s commercial
culture came to rest. Bronfen: 1998, p.115.
202
Let us consider the following passage from The Bell Jar where Esther performs a
sacrificial ritual, offering her clothing to the city of New York. This passage follows an
account of attempted rape from which Esther has only narrowly escaped.
At that vague hour between dark and dawn, the sunroof of the Amazon was deserted.
Quiet as a burglar in my cornflower-sprigged bathrobe, I crept to the edge of the parapet. The
parapet reached almost to my shoulders, so I dragged a folding chair from the stack against the wall,
opened it, and climbed on to the precarious seat.
A stiff breeze lifted the hair from my head. At my feet, the city doused its lights in sleep, its
buildings blackened, as if for a funeral.
It was my last night.
I grasped the bundle I carried and pulled at a pale tail. A strapless elasicizal slip which, in the
course of wear, had lost its elasticity, slumped into my hand. I waved it, like a flag of truce, once.
twice ... The breeze caught it, and I let go.
A white flake floated out into the night, and began its slow descent. I wondered on what street or
rooftop it would come to rest.
I tugged at the bundle again.
The wind made an effort, but failed, and a batlike shadow sank towards the roof garden of the
penthouse opposite.
Piece by piece, I fed my wardrobe to the night wind, and flutteringly, like a loved one's ashes, the
grey scraps were ferried off, to settle here, there, exactly where I would never know, in the dark heart
of New York
Bell Jar: 1966, pp.116-117.
The reader is clearly meant to assume that Esther intends to sacrifice herself following her
violent ordeal with Marco, her assailant. However, it is not herself that she intends to give up
but the symbols of femininity which have lead her into danger. The fact that she waves the
garments as if they were flags of truce suggests that Esther holds herself partly responsible, for
she has been in collusion with the expected trappings of womanhood. As we have seen with
Woolf, clothing and female confinement are inextricably linked. Casting off her wardrobe from
the roof of a New York tower block (a symbol of masculinity) is an indication of Esther's
refusal to be trapped any longer. The clothes float in the wind, evoking an ethereal image of
changing shapes; the phallic tower stands solid and firm, like "the dark heart" of the patriarchal
city itself. As we shall see in the next section Plath was concerned to undermine the cultural
ideologies of femininity whilst trying to establish herself within the very genre which seemed
to advocate an embrace of constructed womanhood.
Linda Anderson's comments about the relationship between representations of the self,
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genre and gender in Plath's work will serve to close our discussion here. Anderson discusses
Plath's awareness of the generic distinction between "the heroic and implicitly masculine
endeavour of high literary culture," which demands "economy of achievement and sacrifice,"
and the supposedly more leisurely, less serious, production of popular genres (Anderson:
1997, p.109). The problem for Plath is that if she writes about love and sex in the first person,
then she may find herself absorbed into the cultural dogma which insists that the popular genre
is "the feminised other of an imagined artistic autonomy." Anderson notes that several of
Plath's Journal entries agonise over the question of how she should indulge her desire, her
penchant for this form, without losing her own autonomy, and her realisation that
introspection cannot cure the "true confessional" if the quality of the work is bad (Anderson:
1997, p. 109).
Plath's attempt "to retain authority over the meaning of her text" (in order that her novel
might be afforded the tag of "high culture") by widening the gap between the "I" of the text
and Plath's own point of view was an attempt which was at first reluctant. Taking control
would be a passive response to the "established convention" which constrains female
subjectivity in cultural and ideological terms. Anderson suggests that Plath's highly crafted
framework within her novel The Bell Jar was a resistance to the threat to her originality, as if
'realism' might destroy that; what she wanted was to create "a space in which she could
explore definitions of the female subject both in, and we could add, as fiction" (Anderson:
1997, p.111). The creation of the third person female characters in her magazine stories,
which also contain autobiographical detail, and Plath's adherence to formulaic frameworks
more deliberately signals that Plath is crossing the cultural divide whilst attempting to retain
her autonomy. I would agree with Anderson that in her prose fiction Plath is opposing these
very ideologies of gender which are bound to those of genre. Anderson points us to de Mann's
theory of violence and autobiography; he suggests that by producing a representation of the
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self we risk "its obliteration by language." But Anderson insists, and I agree, that we take note
of sexual difference when we consider distinctions between autobiography and fiction:
gender adds another unsettling twist to the relationship between the fictive or the figurative and the
real, the violence written into the oppositions of discourses poses, at the most extreme, the
problematic relationship of the subject - any subject - to its culturally positioned object, to the female
or feminine body.
Anderson: 1997, p. 113.
As Anderson explains, Plath was aware that writing the self for women is an exercise in
objectification which uncovers that which is already fiction. Taking Esther's character as an
example Anderson shows how Plath incorporates this theme into her novel: "however hard she
may try to imagine otherwise, Esther repeatedly discovers that her gendered body is already
commodified, violently appropriated, beyond her control" (Anderson: 1997, p.121). Anderson
concludes with the assertion that what Plath could not be aware of was how far The Bell Jar
would predict "her own reification as cultural myth: the process by which her 'self,
appropriated as a commodity, would be used to sell her books" (Anderson: 1997, p.122).
I would suggest that Plath's experiments in popular culture cannot be de-politicised, that
Plath's cross-cultural writing is as interesting as those cross-generic forms we have already
explored and that, both in terms of fictions of the self and of gender, we have in Plath's shorter
fiction a valuable area to investigate.
Economics, femininity and popular culture.
Let us first consider the part that Hughes has played in the posthumous production of Plath as
myth and commodity. Following his estranged wife's death, Hughes undertook the role of
censor, as well as the critic who introduced Plath's work, offered forewords and editorial
comments. Although, as Rose comments, much has been written already on Plath's situation
within marriage and much anger has been expressed about the censorship following her death,
I feel it is necessary to recover at least some of this ground. In the introduction to the first
edition of a collection of prose writings by Plath, Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams
205
which Ted Hughes wrote in 1977, he tells the reader about Plath's ambitions for herself as a
writer as well as documenting the various purposes, pre-occupations and practices within the
different forms of her writing. As regards her prose writing, and in particular her short stories,
• Hughes reveals her need to be published and recognised as being supposedly linked to her
economic ambitions:
She declared her ambition about two things. The first was to become a proficient story writer, of the
high-power practical, popular American type, whose stories could appear in the big journals and earn
huge sums of cash and give her the feeling of being a professional with a real job in the real world.
[ ...] Her ambition to write stories was the most visible burden of her life. Successful story-writing,
for her, had all the advantages of a top job. She wanted the cash, and the freedom that can go with it.
She wanted the professional standing, as a big earner, as the master of a difficult trade, and as a
serious investigator into the real world. And finally, not least, she wanted a practical motive for
investigating the real world. The fear recurs constantly in her journals that these were all things not
naturally hers, they would have to be fought for, as if they belonged naturally only to her opposite. She
behaved as if she believed that. So her life became very early a struggle to apprentice herself to
writing conventional stories, and to hammer her talents into acceptable shape. 'For me', she wrote,
'poetry is an evasion from the real job of writing prose."
Hughes in Johnny Panic: 1977, p.12.
Plath wanted fame for herself as well as for her husband, but nowhere have I found in Plath's
writing a grasping after material wealth, or these "huge sums of cash" that Hughes refers to;
on the contrary the evidence seems to point away from this. In a journal entry written in
Boston in 1958 when Plath was undergoing therapy and re-evaluating her life past, present
and future we find the following musings which I feel for my purposes here is worth quoting in
some length:
Writing: My chain of fear logic goes like this: I want to write stories and poems and a novel and be
Ted's wife and a mother to our babies. I want Ted to write as he wants and live where he wants and be
my husband and be a father to our babies.
We can't now and maybe never will earn a living by our writing, which is the one profession we
want. What will we do for money without sacrificing our energy and time to it and hurting our work?
The worst:
What if our work isn't good enough? We get rejections. Isn't this the world's telling us we shouldn't
bother to be writers? How can we know if we work hard now and develop ourselves we will be more
than mediocre? Isn't this the world's revenge on us for sticking our neck out? We can never know
until we've worked, written. We have no guarantee we'll get a Writer's Degree. Weren't the mothers
and the business men right after all? Shouldn't we have avoided these disquieting questions and taken
steady jobs and secured a good future for the kiddies?
Not unless we want to be bitter all our lives. Not unless we want to feel wistfully: What a writer I
might have been, if only. If only I'd had the guts to try to work and shoulder all that trial and work
implied.
Writing is a religious act: it is an ordering, a reforming, a relearning and reloving of people and the
world as they are and as they might be. A shaping which does not pass away like a day of typing or a
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day of teaching. The writing lasts: it goes about on its own in the world. People read it: react to it as to
a person, a philosophy, a religion, a flower: they like it, or do not. It helps them, or it does not It feels
to intensify living: you give more, probe, ask, look, learn, and shape this: you get more: monsters,
answers, color and form, knowledge. You do it for itself at first. If it brings in money, how nice. You
do not do it first for money. Money isn't why you sit down at the typewriter. Not that you don't want it.
It is only too lovely when a profession pays for your bread and butter. With writing, it is maybe,
maybe-not. How to live with such insecurity? With what is worst, the occasional lack or loss of faith
in the writing itself? How to live with these things?
The worst thing, worse than all of them, would be to live with not writing. So how to live with the
lesser devils and keep them lesser?
Journals: 1982, pp. 270-271.
Plath wanted to be able to live from writing and frequently questioned whether other jobs
were obstructing her progress as an artist. Hence, in her pursuit of the aesthetic she sometimes
refused to consider taking jobs in order to dedicate more time to her writing, presumably
suffering then from worry about financial hardship and perhaps criticism from those who
would like to see the Hughes established in the material world of economics (some of the
"lesser devils"), for Ted too viewed any other job than writing as a "prison term" (Journals:
1982, p.281). Although her dream of a home was some large exclusive estate (which of course
would require wealth), the emphasis in the following journal entry (August 1958) seems to be
less on hard cash and more on the desire for privacy and "exile," the dream of an aestheticised
life-style, living close to the land:
I find myself horrified at voicing the American dream of a home and children - my visions of a home,
of course, being an artist's estate, in a perfect privacy of wilderness acres, on the coast of Maine.
Journals: 1982, p.253.
Both Dido Merwin and Lucas Myers criticised Plath's supposed materialism. Merwin goes
to some length to explain Plath's greed due to her refusal to furnish the Hughes' first flat from
junk shops, preferring instead to surround herself with items more aesthetically pleasing
(Stevenson: 1989, p.324-325). Myers writes: "I was afraid Sylvia would pull him into a
struggle for income, shoes, tableware, functioning appliances, perhaps into the American
English Literature Establishment, a shallow sea hostile to his happiness" (Stevenson: 1989,
p.315). The reference here suggests again Myers' insistence on literary hierarchies and his
suspicion of the "flashy American" (Stevenson: 1989, p.312).
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Plath often preferred to write prose and her desire to write stories for women's magazines
lasted throughout her career. Rose suggests that "Plath's yearning for prose is not only part of
a distinction between forms of culture (high art versus storytelling) but also belongs to her
' persistent sexualisation of aesthetic vision" (Rose: 1991, p.119). This is a form of fantasy and
language written specifically for women (Rose: 1991, p.120-121). Lynne Pearce raises an
important point in her book Feminism and the Politics of Reading (1997) in answer to the
question of the existence of "women's writing." Pearce defends the notion of its existence due
to her own experience of "readerly response" explaining that when she chose to re-position
herself as a reader she moved away from male-authored and found "joy and relief" in
female-authored texts. She further explains that when she found herself reading texts which
were specifically addressed to women this confirmed her notion that "texts do gender their
readers" and that "women's writing" is less defined as "writing by women, or about women,
but, more especially writing for them" (Pearce: 1997, p.4'7).
We can also see that Plath's ideas about masculine and feminine writing are not clear cut;
she often invokes masculine, as well as feminine impulses ( Rose: 1991, pp.120-121). If we
look into Plath's Journals we will find many more useful accounts of her relationship with
language and its relationship to gender, which would raise questions about Hughes' intimations
of material, rather than aesthetic, avarice. That Plath was concerned to forge a career out of
writing and was bitterly disappointed about her literary rejections is not in question. But what
about her motives? She wanted to be a great writer of original genius; "It is sad to be able only
to mouth other poets. I want someone to mouth me" (Journals: 1982, p.33), but she was
besailed by self-doubt and aware of the hindering effect of her pre-occupation with publication
as the juxtapositions here reveal: "I feel great works which may speak from me. Am I a
dreamer only? I feel beginning cadences and rhythms of speech to set world-fabrics in motion.
Let me keep my eye off publication and simply write stories that have to be written"
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(Journals: 1982, p194). She learnt a great deal about writing from Woolf and was aware of
Woolfs legacy: "Virginia Woolf helps. Her novels make mine possible" (Plath: 1982, p.168).
Whilst Plath believed that her voice was somewhat Woolfish, she seems to want to distance
- herself to some extent from any mimetic stylistic influence, note here the word "alas": "What is
my voice? Woolfish, alas, but tough" (Journals: 1982, p.186). Certainly we can trace
Woolfian influences in Plath's prose writings in terms of theme and there is clearly a shared
desire to find precise expression. In the diary entries we can see that Plath's exacting
self-discipline echoes Woolf s need for precision and accuracy.
Like Woolf, Plath also wanted to be able to "become the thing itself" and capture it
entirely; "Practice: Be a chair, a toothbrush, a jar of coffee from the inside out: know by
feeling in" (Journals: 1982, p.182). She wanted to be able to create and "reveal" (Journals:
1982, p.168) characters that would endure; "learn other lives and make them into print worlds
spinning like planets in the minds of other men" (Journals: 1982, p.182). Also, she admired
Ted who also taught her these things; "I must recall, recall, out of the stuff of life.... 'Get hold
of a thing and shove your head into it,' Ted says just now" (Journals: 1982, p.183).
Hughes tells us that Plath was also worried that her own experience would not give her
enough material for a great novel, nor even for a short story and hence her writing of prose
largely consisted of objective, lifeless cameos of the people she met or attempts to emulate the
style and content of those other writers she admired (Hughes in Journals: 1977, pp.11, 14).
But it was perhaps, more specifically, her experience as a female, and there is ample evidence
of her frequent ambivalent attitude towards that condition, which she feared would not offer
her the necessary freedom and access to become a professional writer of "high" art. In 1958
Plath notes the distinctive demands in terms of time and situation for the writing of poetry as
opposed to prose: "Somehow, to write poems, I need all my time forever ahead of me - no
meals to get, no books to prepare ... Prose sustains me. I can mess it, mush it, rewrite it, pick
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it up any time" (Journals: 1982, p.186). There is repeated evidence that Plath wanted
independence, both economic and emotional, and this fuelled her craving for a profession of
her own. In September 1951, pre-Hughes, she writes:
My greatest trouble, arising from my basic self-love, is jealousy. I am jealous of men - a dangerous
and subtle envy which can corrode, I imagine, any relationship. It is an envy born of the desire to be
active and doing, not passive and listening. I envy the man his physical freedom to lead a double life -
his career, and his sexual and family life. I can pretend to forget my envy; no matter, it is there,
insidious, malignant, latent. L..]
At any rate, I admit that I am not strong enough, or rich enough, or independent enough, to live up
to my ideal standards. You ask me, what are those ideal standards? Good for you. The only escape (do
I sound Freudian?) from the present setup as I see it is in the exercise of a phase of life inviolate and
separate from that of my future mate, and from all males with whom I might live. I am not only
jealous; I am vain and proud. I will not submit to having my life fingered by my husband, enclosed in
the larger circle of his activity, and nourished vicariously by tales of his actual exploits. I must have a
legitimate field of my own, apart from his, which he must respect."
Journals: 1982, p.35.
These sentiments were later to re-appear in Plath's novel The Bell Jar when Esther's mother
encourages her daughter to learn short-hand typing, rather than merely rely on her English
degree, so that she can be useful to some future husband:
Everybody would want her. She would be in demand among all the up-and-coming young men and
she would transcribe letter after thrilling letter.
The trouble was, I hated the idea of serving men in any way. I wanted to dictate my own thrilling
letters.
Bell Jar: 1966, p.79.
The last thing I wanted was infinite security and to be the place an arrow shoots off from. I wanted
change and excitement and to shoot off in all directions myself, like the coloured arrows from a
Fourth of July rocket.
Bell Jar: 1966, p.87.
Despite Plath's obvious love for Hughes, she became worried sometimes that married life
had dulled her ambitions and she was afraid that she had become too dependent on him.
Despite the fact that she had written what she describes as some of her best poetry at Smith
College in March 1958 (Journals: 1982, p.209), later that year in Boston, she was frequently
lamenting what she considered to be her "incompetence" as regards her prose writing and lack
of a plot for a novel. She tormented herself with reprimands regarding her creative
"paralysis," sometimes blaming their "sedentary" life-syle (Journals: 1982, p.253), sometimes
wondering if she was being affected by Ted's dominant personality:
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My danger, partly I think, is becoming too dependent on Ted. He is didactic, fanatic - [...] It is as if I
were sucked into a tempting but disastrous whirlpool. Between us there are no barriers - it is rather as
if neither of us - or especially myself - had any skin, or one skin between us and we kept bumping into
and abrading each other. I enjoy it when Ted is off for a bit. I can build up my own inner life, my own
thoughts, without his continuous 'What are you thinking/ What are you going to do now?' which
makes me recalcitrantly stop thinking and doing. We are amazingly compatible. But I must be myself
- make myself and not let myself be made by him. He gives orders - [...J.
Journals: 1982, p245.
It is interesting that in the introduction to the second edition of Johnny Panic (1979) Hughes
validates the publication of some of the stories only because of their relation to her life:
Sylvia Plath herself had certainly rejected several of the stories, so they are printed against her
better judgement. That must be taken into account. But in spite of the obvious weaknesses, they seem
interesting enough to keep, if only as notes towards her inner autobiography.
Hughes in Journals: 1979, p.12.
Plath's ambitions were not just those of an aspiring artist; after her marriage she was
concerned to cook and care for her husband and frequently writes about her domestic duties in
her journal. Mostly these notes are clearly written with affection and she was pleased to feel
missed and needed when, during a spell in hospital following a miscarriage and appendectomy,
Ted told her that he was struggling with the child-care and domestic chores which were
presumably his wife's main responsibility:
Ted is actually having a rougher time than I - poor love sounded quite squashed yesterday: 'How do
you do it all?... The pooker makes an astonishing amount of pots to wash.... She wets a lot' and 'I
seem to be eating mostly bread!' I felt needed and very happy and lucky.
Journals: 1982, p.338.
As we have seen, Plath's journal entries do show, however, some contradictions and
ambiguities in her attitude towards the domestic role she had undertaken. She mentions a
particular row between them which had resulted from an occasion where Ted had criticised
her in front of others for not sewing buttons on shirts or darning socks (Journals: 1982,
p.276). Plath was constantly looking forward to the idea of motherhood after her marriage
although she was frequently telling herself to get some writing done before she had children
and was concerned that the career of both motherhood and writing might be difficult. During a
period when she had stopped ovulating (June 1959) Plath is clearly afraid of the threat of an
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inability to be maternally creative which echoes those entries which express her paralysis and
barrenness in relation to her writing. As an antidote to this fear she seems to luxuriate in the
idea of a domestic idyll conjuring images of herself as an "Earth Mother":
I would bear children until my change of life it that were possible. I want a house full of our children,
little animals, flowers, vegetables, fruits. I want to be an Earth Mother in the deepest richest sense. I
have turned from being an intellectual, a career woman: all that is ash to me. And what do 1 meet in
myself? Ash. Ash and more ash.
L..] Suddenly the deep foundations of my being are gnawn. I have come, with great pain and effort, to
a point where my desires and emotions and thoughts center around what the normal woman's center
around, and what do I find? Barrenness.
Journals: 1982, p.310.
Fear of betrayal by the female body seems to be inextricably bound up with Plath's attitude
towards herself as a woman, in a feminine role, and herself as a writer as we can see from the
following extract written earlier in the year (January, 1959):
Don't wake up in the morning because I want to go back to the womb. From now on: see if this is
possible: set alarm for 7:30 and get up then, tired or not. Rip through breakfast and housecleaning
(bed and dishes, mopping or whatever) by 8:30. Ted got coffee and oatmeal today: he doesn't like to
do it, but does it. I am a fool to let him. Alarm-setting gets over the bother of waking at ragged hours
around nine.
Be writing before 9, that takes the curse off it. It is now almost II. I have washed two sweaters, the
bathroom floor, mopped, done a day's dishes, made the bed, folded the laundry and stared in horror at
my face: it is old before its time.
Nose podgy as a leaking sausage: big pores full of pus and dirt, red blotches, the peculiar brown
mole on my under-chin which I would like to have excised. Memory of that girl's face in the nal
school movie, with a little black beauty wart: this wart is malignant: she will be dead in a week. Hair
untrained, merely brown and childishly put up: don't know what else to do with it. No bone structure.
Body needs a wash, skin the worst: it is this climate: chapping cold, desiccating hot: I need to be tan,
all-over brown, and then my skin clears and I am all right. I need to have written a novel, a book of
poems, a Ladies' Home Journal or New Yorker story, and I will be poreless and radiant. My wart will
be nonmalignant.
Journals: 1982, p.286.
So Plath had found herself again caught within what she describes as a "vicious circle." She
had earlier been aware of the danger of such domestic isolation and the interiority of their
life-style, where she had no one to speak to but Ted, and when she did take a job it was partly
to seek out "fresh exterior experiences" so that she could write about someone other than
herself and move away from the experience of being "too ingrown" where she sits with her
"face to a wall, a mirror" (Journals: 1982, p. 260). The poems which she had earlier in the
year been pleased with were ones where she had been able to draw on her own "real
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experience of life" which she felt had been "shutup, untouchable, in a rococco crystal cage, not
to be touched" for the previous five years (Journals: 1982, p.209).
Hughes continues his introduction to the first edition of the prose collection Johnny Panic
with the observation that Plath's best work was produced when she allowed herself to be
subjective and use her own life as source, such as the writing of "Johnny Panic" where she
used her own experience alongside, and perhaps spurred on by, that of working in the mental
patients' department of Massachusetts General Hospital:
It was only when she gave up that effort to 'get outside' herself, and finally accepted the fact that her
painful subjectivity was her real theme, and that the plunge into herself was her only real direction,
and that poetic strategies were her only real means, that she suddenly found herself in full possession
of her genius - with all the special skills that had developed as if by biological necessity, to deal with
those unique inner conditions.
Nevertheless, her stories are much more interesting than she thought. They seem livelier now, in
some ways, than they did when she wrote them. And their vitality comes from the very thing she was
always striving to escape: the themes she found engaging enough to excite her concentration all turn
out to be episodes from her own life: they are all autobiography. They have the vitality of her personal
participation, her subjectivity. And all are circling the flames which the poetry, encouraged by 'Johnny
Panic' and The Bell Jar, eventually jumped into.
Hughes in Johnny Panic: 1977, pp.15-16.
"Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams" ends with a startling and vivid image of the shock
treatment Plath had earlier in her life received, an experience which later she was to re-work in
The Bell Jar. The tone throughout this short story is largely ironic and the voice is often racy
and humorous where she incorporates narratives of the inmates' experiences within the main
narrative which is a scathing attack on mental institutions and their practices. Where Plath tries
her hand at objectivity Hughes suggests that she crushes "the life out of the narrative" but
where she wants to "record" without thought of publication or of "artful shaping", as in the
private journal extracts he allows to appear in this collection, she produces her "most
effective" writing. But Plath was disgusted with what she considered to be the inability to "get
outside" herself in her stories. She criticises the artificiality of the pieces where she feels that
she has not been able to explore and develop "the deep emotional undercurrents" of her
characters and their relationships because she is constantly shutting out her own subjectivity:
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"As if little hygienic trap-doors shut out the seethe and deep-grounded swell of my experience.
Putting up pretty artificial statues" (Journals: 2000, pp.501-502).
In his foreword to Plath's Journals Hughes continues to emphasise that the failure of some
of her work was largely due to Plath's "ambition" regarding her pre-occupation with
publication in specific magazines and her consequent "efforts to produce what the market
seemed to require." He continues:
The impulse to apprentice herself to various masters and to adapt her writing potential to practical,
profitable use was almost an instinct with her. She went about it, as these journals show, with a
relentless passion, and yet with a fever of uncertainty and self doubt. This campaign of wilful ideals
produced everything in her work that seems artificial.
Hughes in Journals: 1982, p. xiii.
After moralising about artificiality Hughes writes of "alchemy," and suggests that the
"sympathetic reader" of the Journals will appreciate that the "apprenticeship writings" (the
stories) were "like impurities thrown off from the various stages of the inner transformation,
by-products of the internal work." We should read these "by-products" as "outermost" aspects
"of a drive that was moving all the time in quite a different direction" (Hughes in Journals:
1982, p.xiii). Hughes' point is important because of the implied insistence on high art. Rose
notes Hughes' moralistic "charge of falsity" and draws our attention to the fact that editorial
decisions regarding the value of Plath's work which is considered as part of a "low" culture is
evident here. Plath's "experiments with popular fictional forms" were censored from the earlier
journals whereas the editors allow the publication of the "tracts of stream-of-consciousness
writing after her breakdown (writing as high art, as the most intimate inner drama of herself)"
(Rose: 1991, p. 82).
The Wishing Box (1956)
Plath's short story "The Wishing Box" is a disturbing narrative about a newly married couple
whose dream-life becomes a source of conflict between them. This story not only reflects
aspects of Plath's life experience but also contains some interesting passages which relate
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directly to Hughes' autobiographical stories. The husband in "The Wishing Box" whose
dreams are vivid, superior and belong in the world of high culture, is oblivious to his wife's
jealousy and feelings of inadequacy but within the opening lines the conflict is indicated by the
bitter tone:
Agnes Higgins realized only too well the cause of her husband Harold's beatific, absent-minded
expression over his morning orange juice and scrambled eggs.
'Well,' Agnes sniffed, smearing beach-plum jelly on her toast with vindictive strokes of the butter
knife, 'what did you dream last night?'
Johnny Panic: 1979, p.48.
Harold's dreams not only belong in the world of classical music and literature but also become
"meticulous works of art" as he narrates them. His "astonishingly quick, colorful imagination"
is contrasted with that of Agnes whose images are formless and dark, "fragmentary scenes of
horror" which she cannot recall or narrate "for fear they reflected too unflatteringly upon her
own powers of imagination" (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.50). Only in her childhood were Agnes'
dreams vivid with color and symbolic images. Now she was "ousted" from "those benevolent
painted dream worlds." Harold's dream world, on the other hand, continues to be just as
symbolic as it has always been and the narrator gives two examples which are unmistakably
taken from Ted Hughes' dream-life experience:
Once, at a depressing and badly-aspected time of Harold's life before he met Agnes, Harold dreamed
that a red fox ran through his kitchen, grievously burnt, its fur charred black, bleeding from several
wounds. Later, Harold confided, at a more auspicious time shortly after his marriage to Agnes, the red
fox had appeared again, miraculously healed, with flourishing fur, to present Harold with a bottle of
permanent black Quink. Harold was particularly fond of his fox dreams; they recurred often. So,
notably, did his dream of the giant pike. 'There was this pond,' Harold informed Agnes one sultry
August morning, 'where my cousin Albert and / used to fish; it was chock full of pike. Well, last night
I was fishing there, and I caught the most enormous pike you could imagine - it must have been the
great-great-grandfather of all the rest; I pulled and pulled and pulled, and still he kept coming out of
that pond.'
Johnny Panic: 1979, pp.50-51.
The fox and pike are recognisable icons from Hughes' poetry and appear in his first
collection, Hawk in the Rain (1957). Recent media coverage of Hughes, following his death,
has shown Hughes himself narrating, almost exactly, the above dreams as being part of his
own mythology. In the BBC's Close Up on Ted Hughes (24.12.1998) the fox dream was
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presented as being a historical turning point in Hughes' education, the catalyst which urged
him to change his course at Cambridge from English Literature to Anthropology. Hughes tells
us his dream story; he was struggling late into the night to finish an essay, his last in this
subject, when finally he gave up trying "to push through the barriers" and went to bed:
I immediately dreamed that I was back at my table and, in my dream, as I sat at my table, over my
essay, the door opened and round the side of the door came the head of a fox - the height of a man.
And I watched him, he came down the stair and he was a man, a small man. So, he was just a fox, on
his hind legs, walking like a man. And, as he came across the room towards me, I saw that he was - it
was as if he had come out of a furnace - his whole body was one burn. He put out his hand and it was
a human hand but it was all burned, the hand was just as burned as the rest of his body, so it was all
blackened and cracked and bleeding. And he put his hand on the page and lifted it up and there was a
blood-print of his hand on the page. And as he put it down he said "You have to stop this , you're
destroying us."
Through this dream, then, Hughes received the revelation that the academic study of literature
was stifling his creativity and preventing his ability to write poetry. On the Close Up
programme John Carey explains that "the animal dynamism" which Hughes wanted in his
poetry was "not to do with the intellect" which is required for "the inspection, analysis and
study of English Literature." Anthropology, on the other hand, suited better Hughes' purposes:
"The study of ancient cultures and myth fuelled his interest and fed into his poetry."
Hughes' narration of his giant pike dream recently appeared in a previously unpublished
interview given to Thomas Pero of a US angling magazine and was published by The Weekend
Guardian (9.1.99) under the title "Poet, pike and a pitiful grouse." Here Hughes speaks about
his recurring dreams and his belief that pike "have a totally different mystique" so people
"become hooked on pike at some very deep level." Here is his story:
I began to dream regularly about pike and about one particular lake where I did most of my fishing.
Pike had become fixed at some very active, deep level in my imaginative life. This recurrent dream
was always an image of how I was feeling about life.
When I was feeling good, I'd have dreams full of giant pike that were perhaps also leopards ...
always in that particular lake. They'd become symbols of deep, vital life. That's how I see it. My
obsession with pike maybe was my obsession with those energies. It was a psychological thing. This
went on for years. A very bad time might produce a nightmare dream of the lake lined with concrete
and empty.
Rose suggests that the fox dream in "The Wishing Box" is a fantasy which refers to Plath's
216
desire to "repair" Hughes' past "destructiveness" towards "things and people' (evidence Rose
has gathered from unpublished letters to Plath's mother written at the beginning of the
relationship with Hughes, Rose: 1991: pp.124-125).
The only dream which Agnes recounts to her husband in "The Wishing Box" is a childhood
fantasy of Superman, a figure from popular culture. Harold is "visibly impressed" and realises,
for the first time, that he has never thought of "playing listener" or asking about his wife's
dreams because he has been so preoccupied with his own. The husband who has previously
looked "right through the very attractive and tangible form of his wife" (Johnny Panic: 1979,
p.43) at breakfast now looks "at her pretty, troubled countenance with new interest: Agnes
was, Harold paused to observe for perhaps the first time since their early married days, an
extraordinarily attractive sight across the breakfast table" (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.51). He asks
about her current dream-life and Agnes confesses, having rejected the idea of stealing ideas
from Freud, that she does not have dreams anymore.
The narrative continues with Harold's instruction to imagine a goblet which Agnes has to
describe to him. Her complaint that her images, conjured "with great effort," remain in the
"back" of her head is met with a response which further convinces Agnes that her imagination
is inferior: "I see my dreams on the front of my eyelids, like on a movie-screen. They just
come; I don't have anything to do with them' (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.52). Harold tells her to
continue practising just as he has taught her, but Agnes begins instead to read while Harold is
at work in order to fill her mind with images:
Seized by a kind of ravenous hysteria, she raced through novels, women's magazines, newspapers, and
even anecdotes in her Joy of Cooking; she read travel brochures, home appliance circulars, the Sears
Roebuck Catalogue, the instructions on soap-flake boxes, the blurbs on the back of record-jackets -
anything to keep from facing the gaping void in her own head of which Harold had made her so
painfully conscious. But as soon as she lifted her eyes from the printed matter at hand, it was as if a
protecting world had been extinguished.
Johnny Panic: 1979, p.53.
Hughes' introduction to the second edition of the Johnny Panic collection includes an
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interesting passage which relates to Plath's imagination and writing practices and which also
relates to the next part of this short story. Having referred to the "obvious weaknesses" of
some of the stories in this collection, he continues:
Some of them demonstrate, even more badly than the stronger stories, just how much the sheer
objective presence of things and happenings immobilized her fantasy and invention. The still-life
graphic artist in her was loyal to objects. Nothing refreshed her more than sitting for hours in front of
some pile of things laboriously delineating each one. But that was also a helplessness. The blunt fact
killed any power or inclination to rearrange it or see it differently. This limitation to actual
circumstances, which is the prison of so much of her prose, became part of the solidity and truth of
her later poems.
Hughes in Johnny Panic: 1979, p.12
Now let us regard the above statements in the light of the following passage from Plath in
"The Wishing Box" which would seem to corroborate in fictional form what Hughes claims
was Plath's experience:
The utterly self-sufficient, unchanging reality of the things surrounding her began to depress
Agnes. With a jealous awe, her frightened, almost paralysed stare took in the Oriental rug, the
Williamsburg-blue wallpaper, the gilded dragons on the Chinese upholstered sofa on which she was
sitting. She felt choked, smothered by these objects whose bulky pragmatic existence somehow
threatened the deepest, most secret roots of her own ephemeral being. Harold, she knew only too well,
would tolerate no such vainglorious nonsense from tables and chairs; if he didn't like the scene at
hand, if it bored him, he would change it to suit his fancy. If, Agnes mourned, in some sweet
hallucination an octopus came slithering towards her across the floor, paisley-patterned in purple and
orange, she would bless it. Anything to prove that her shaping imaginative powers were not
irretrievably lost; that her eye was not merely an open camera lens which recorded surrounding
phenomena and left it at that. 'A rose', she found herself repeating hollowly like a funeral dirge, 'is a
rose is a rose....'
Johnny Panic: 1979, p.53.
Reminiscent of Esther's experience in The Bell Jar Agnes soon finds that she cannot read.
The words on the page seem to fulfil her longing for hallucination but rather than "sweet",
here the image is nightmarish; "the letters separated, writhing like malevolent little black
snakes across the page in a kind of hissing, untranslatable jargon" (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.54).
Literature is swiftly replaced by movies, rather than images behind her eyelids this way she can
get "the fluid kaleidoscope of forms before her eyes" and this lulls "her into a rhythmic trance;
the voices, speaking some soothing, unintelligible code, exorcised the dead silence in her
head" (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.54).
The constant intake of television and sherry result in the ability to change her view of
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Harold at will. She enjoys the blurring images of his face when he returns from work with
"malicious satisfaction" (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.54). Although she argues that sherry relaxes
her, Agnes begins to suffer from insomnia. She lies awake next to her dreaming husband off
- on "some rare, wonderful adventure":
Finally, a bleak, clear awareness of what was happening broke upon her: the curtains of sleep, of
refreshing, forgetful darkness dividing each day from the day before it, and the day after it, were lifted
for Agnes eternally, irrevocably. She saw an intolerable prospect of wakeful, visionless days and
nights stretching unbroken ahead of her, her mind condemned to perfect vacancy, without a single
image of its own to ward off the assault of smug, autonomous tables and chairs. She might, Agnes
reflected sickly, live to be a hundred: the women in her family were all long lived.
Johnny Panic: 1979, pp.54-55.
Harold returns home after an illuminating bus ride to find that his wife has committed suicide,
having obtained some sleeping pills from the doctor, :
he found Agnes lying on the sofa in the living room, dressed in her favourite princess-style emerald
taffeta evening gown, pale and lovely as a brown lily, eyes shut, an empty pillbox and an overturned
water tumbler on the rug at her side. Her tranquil features were set in a slight, secret smile of triumph,
as if, in some far country unattainable to mortal men, she were, at last, waltzing with the dark,
red-caped prince of her early dreams.
Johnny Panic: 1979, p.55
Finally, isolation and domestic boredom have been superseded by an exotic, everlasting dream
of the superhero of her childhood dreams.
Rose suggests that "The Wishing Box" can be read "as an allegory for poetic rivalry
between Plath and Hughes" and that "sexual difference" is represented here, and in other
stories: "in terms of a struggle over different forms of imagination, a different register, for the
man and for the woman, in the world of signs" (Rose: 1991, p.179). Harold "who has the
prerogative of the imagination" is able to indulge his cultural, rather than sexual, wish
fulfilments by dreaming dreams which propel him "above his station" (Rose: 1991, p.180).
Only at the time of her death can Agnes achieve her fantasy and then she transforms herself
into "the heroine of a romantic film," becoming the embodiment of her own ideal (Rose: 1991,
pp.180-181). As Rose further explains, this story is ambiguous in its claims for or against
popular culture; either it kills or it saves Agnes, providing "the very means and forms of her
219
escape." Either it leads to "passivity and lethargy" (the trance) or it empowers Agnes so that
she can imagine transformations (Harold's face) and change things by her own will. Rose
continues: "it is the intoxicating power of vulgarity which breaks her out of the deadening,
' self-sufficient, unchanging reality of things" and, contrary to Hughes' suggestions in the
passage above, in Plath's fantasy it is not poetry which "releases the woman's imagination from
the killing objectivity of the world" but popular culture (Rose: 1991, pp.181-182). Rose also
suggests that the central theme within this short story is that "the man's unconscious can be
experienced as coercion by the woman" and that it is Harold's insistence that Agnes should
dream which leads to her suicide (Rose: 1991, p.153).
Elisabeth Bronfen describes this story as a direct "dismantling of the conventional gender
of creation" (Bronfen: 1998, p.103). Within the battle of dream narratives, Agnes is
marginalised: "an exile from a large part of her husband's psychic reality, Plath discloses a fatal
strategy of duplicity in her heroine's psychic reality" (Bronfen: 1998, p.103) (10).
Agnes initially adheres to her husband's rejection of her memories of childhood imagination
and tries to follow his instruction. Meeting with failure she then tries to fill the void with mass
culture: women's magazines and mind dulling women's day-time television. With her
new-found addiction to media and alcohol she can transform reality into fantasy. Her suicide is
triumphant because she has become the embodiment of the sign, she is living fiction,
performing her imagination rather than merely recounting her fantasies over the breakfast
table. I would agree with Bronfen that the final image of Agnes "as a dolled-up corpse" has a
significant implications in terms of the cultural performativity dictated by American society
(II).
Day of Success (1960)
Hughes introduces Plath's later story "Day of Success" which appears in Johnny Panic as "an
example of her efforts at pastiche." Although her stories "for the more sentimental English
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women's magazines" show "a slightly freer range of invention" he criticises the writing because
"one can feel the rigidity of the objective situation elbowing the life out of the narrative"
(Johnny Panic: 1979, p.12). In fact, despite some uncharacteristic clumsiness of style, we can
' read this story as a more serious attempt to follow the formulaic criteria which is demanded of
the short story suitable for publication in women's magazines, especially when we consider the
premise that heroines should overcome the difficulty which besets them. Drawing from my
own experience of writing for women's popular magazines it seems that the recipe consists of
four stages: conflict - which produces the impulse of the plot. The essence/source of conflict
exists outside the boundaries of the narrative and in the case of this story the threat is that a
newly successful husband will leave his homely wife, seduced by a more glamorous and
successful rival. The second ingredient, crisis, brings the conflict into the narrative and
stimulates change producing a causal link to the next stage; climax - the turning point. The
final element, resolution, is the narration of how the main protagonist deals with the conflict
situation and whatever changes have occurred within the plot.
At the opening of the story, Ellen, housewife and mother, is already showing signs of
insecurity. Her reaction to the ringing of the telephone in the first sentence causes her to
freeze, take stock of her perfect family life, and pray that nothing should shatter their domestic
bliss. We learn that her husband is expecting a call which could lead him to fame and fortune
and that one of her friends was abandoned when her own husband achieved success.
Insecurity, due to her feelings of being dowdy and her knowledge of her friend's misery, lead
Ellen to feelings of intense fear and jealousy. In the denouement it is clear that the success not
only refers to her husband's recognition as a writer but also Ellen's ability to rise above her
lack of self-esteem.
Following an unsettling journey through the glossy magazines at the doctor's surgery where
images of perfect women make Ellen feel even more inadequate, plus a visit from her formerly
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abandoned friend, Ellen dresses up for her husband's return from lunch with an attractive
female producer. She reprimands herself for not making such an effort everyday. However, by
the time he returns she has bathed and fed the baby, thus spoiling her clothes and the
expensive scent she has used extravagantly is over-masked by the smell of baby food. Jacob
has decided not to work with the archetypal homewrecker and has instead made plans to buy a
cottage in Cornwall thus fulfilling their shared dreams of domestic perfection in a romantic
idyll. The final line is a clear indication of Ellen's security as she tells her friend she does not
need an expensive city hair-cut: "Braids are back in style this season, love - the latest thing for
the country wife!" (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.198). Of course Ellen's self-esteem is restored
when she realises that she can trust her husband, therefore her happiness is dependent on his
love for her, rather than a surety in her own self-worth. This character is also not in
competition with her husband. She seems to have no desire to do anything except care for
him, their home and his child. She also supports his work by acting as his secretary. She
performs to perfection the cultural construction of the feminine homemaker and mate.
But do we like Ellen? Isn't her rebuff smug, an unfriendly rebuttal towards her helpful, if
misguided friend's suggestion that she indulge in feminine trickery? Is this happy ending
anything more than precarious? I would suggest that although the framework of the story
follows exactly the marketing demands for the women's magazine industry, Plath's subversion
is evident in the style and tone of this piece. I can only read the multiple clichés as signs that
Plath was deliberately distancing herself from both the character and the plot of this short
story. At first look, an avid reader of her work can do no other than cringe and pull away from
the narrative when we come across such sentences. A second reaction might be that Plath was
writing this story with her tongue in her cheek. Let's first consider the style and tone of the
opening paragraph:
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Ellen was on her way to the bedroom with an armload of freshly folded nappies when the phone rang,
splintering the stillness of the crisp autumn morning. For a moment she froze on the threshold, taking
in the peaceful scene as if she might never see it again - the delicate rose-patterned wallpaper, the
forest-green cord drapes she'd hemmed by hand while waiting for the baby to come, the old-fashioned
four-poster inherited from a loving but moneyless aunt, and, in the corner, the pale pink crib holding
sound asleep six-month old Jill, the centre of it all.
Johnny Panic: 1979, p.185.
Whose voice is this? The overloading of adjectives (nearly every object has a familiar,
therefore powerless descriptor) and the stereotypical "pale pink crib" make the reader recoil
immediately from the narrative voice which is painting such a cliched and unrealistic scene.
The only word in this passage doing any work at all is "splintering" and that is later undone by
the "crisp" which attaches itself unoriginally to "autumn morning." Ellen thinks in clichés "This
is it L.] The beginning of the end" and even the imagery is trite and vaguely comical: the
telephone is a "small, black instrument of doom" (Johnny Panic: 1979, p.185). Does Plath
mean to insult her imagined readers? I doubt it. I think what we have here is an example of
Plath's ability to express through the undercurrent of tone and style her own duplicitous and
uncomfortable relationship with the cultural ideal of a perfect wife and mother. She too
wanted to care for Hughes and support his work, she too wanted to raise their children in a
rural idyll. But she also wanted to be an accomplished writer. Perhaps the suggestion here is
that to sacrifice one's personal ambition wholly to the domestic leads to an intense dulling of
the brain. We can read this and Plath's other prose writings as a clear message to Ted and her
other readers that she considered the prescribed female domestic role could have a detrimental
effect on creativity.
Whilst Plath was playing with happy endings there is also the underlying knowledge that
"apple-pie happiness" may also be poisoned by hidden worms (Bronfen: 1998, p.124).
Complicity with cultural prescriptions of ideal femininity is an unsettling theme here and, as
Bronfen points out, something monstrous lurks beneath the surface of the text:
By emphasizing how inextricably linked her heroine's self-identity is with the products of
contemporary popular culture, to the extent that the disclosed toxic remains, supposedly excluded
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from any happy self-image, cannot in fact be distinguished from the cleaned artificial surface. Plath
offers us an utterly compelling representation of how, in the highly commercialized and media
infiltrated culture of the late twentieth century Western world, we are the signs we consume even
while we are consumed by them. Furthermore, in the light of the political unrest that has begun to
emerge as a fifty-years after effect, given that the opening of the archives pertaining to all the shared
secrets upon which post-Second World War prosperity was based means confronting the remains
preserved in our collective cultural crypt, Plath's insistence that clandestine traumatic knowledge not
only always haunts its host but will strike back and shatter protective fictions of infallibility with a
force equal to the effort put into repressing this truth suddenly seems uncannily pertinent. In
hindsight, the Ivy Smith girl who can do everything with a clean bright smile on her face is in fact a
horrific monster, because we cannot help but sense the forces of destruction lurking beneath the
duplicitous surface of utterly perfect artificiality.
Bronfen, 1998, pp.125-126.
I do not believe that the reader is invited to herald Ellen's self-satisfaction as anything other
than a smug self-delusion. In this denouement there is no sense of triumph, in fact, Ellen has
not escaped but merely allowed herself to be further duped by what appears on the surface to
be domestic bliss. There is no horizon beyond this. What lies beneath is the certainty that Ellen
will continue in her role as secretary, mother, housewife. There is nowhere the suggestion that
Ellen either desires or will encounter any possibility of intellectual development. There is no
sense of balancing options here, nor is there any sense of the duplicitous attitude we have
found in Plath's Journals. This heroine has succumbed blindly and willingly to the American
dream. She is "happily, stodgily practical" (Journals: 2000, p.269).
Whether or not we read these short stories as an articulation of the dilemmas Plath faced in
her own domestic situation, we cannot ignore the wider political implications of such work. I
believe that reading the biographical details of her own marriage into Plath's texts is less
important than a feminist reading of her prose. In the next section of this chapter I shall
investigate the relationship and dialogue between the poetry of Hughes and Plath, an area of
scholarship which has recently opened up largely due to the publication of Hughes' Birthday
Letters in 1998.
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Story""It's only a story / Your Story. My	 .
Ted Hughes' "Visit"
Much renewed interest in Plath has been sparked by the publication of Ted Hughes' Birthday
' Letters (1998) which was hailed in the media as a breaking of the poet laureate's thirty-five
year silence about his first marriage, kept since Plath's suicide in February 1963. This book has
marked something of a turning point in several respects, not least because it has created an
arena wherein Hughes has told, through poetry, his version of their love affair, marriage and
the after-effects of Plath's death. This rhetorical poetic correspondence to a late wife is also
addressed to a public audience. Private details of the couple's lives become commodities in the
literary market, hence Plath is, yet again sold and bought as a curiosity. The headlining of this
collection has been latterly accompanied by those which mourn the loss of its author who died
nine months after its publication in October 1998. When Hughes' death was announced on the
BBC's Six O'clock News the report was dominated by an outline of his marriage to Plath.
There were five photographs, two of Hughes' alone at the beginning and the end of the report,
and within this framework appeared one of Hughes and Plath (taken when they were married),
one of Plath with her babies (as we are told that he suffered much criticism because he left her)
and one of Plath alone (as we are told about her suicide). And so we are brought back to the
person and the life of Plath through media coverage of the recently published Birthday Letters
and the death of Hughes.
Also, the recent publication of Plath's Journals edited by Karen Kukil (2000) marked a
turning point as regards former censorship of Plath (12). This edition contains the complete
remaining Journals from the originals at Smith College, Massachussetts. Hughes authorised
the opening of previously sealed journals before his death and passed the copyright over to
their two children Frieda and Nicholas. Following Hughes' death, then, our access to "a
complete and historically accurate text" has finally been permitted (Kukil in Journals: 2000, p
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ix). This publication was also accompanied by media coverage which once again brought the
person of Plath into view. The Guardian printed a week's worth of extracts from the new
publication with commentary by Katherine Viner in March 2000. The first of these appeared in
The Weekend supplement with a front page photograph of Plath and the headline: "A Life
Reclaimed. Sylvia Plath: Her Journals revealed at last." Adverts for the text included the
captions: "Everyone knows how Sylvia Plath died. Now discover how she lived" and "Read
the thoughts of Sylvia Plath's harshest critic. Herself " In answer to her own headline question
"Who is Sylvia?" Viner outlines briefly the factual, biographical details of Plath's life, mentions
the poems, the novel, the letters, and her husband's poems but tells us that only the Journals
reveal Plath's "private thoughts and feelings." Viner claims that "the silent woman" (13) at last
speaks for herself (Viner: The Guardian, March 18, 2000). In The Daily Telegraph (April 1,
2000) Allison Pearson reviews The Journals, describing the unabridged text as "the longest
suicide note ever written." Whilst she notes that Plath's writing contains "a riveting social
document" of life for a young woman in Fifties America, she also asks whether Plath is a
"suitable figurehead "for "the sisterhood" given her "Mills and Boon" descriptions of her love
for Hughes and her "Bridget Jones" listings of how she should live in order "to win friends and
influence people" (see Journals, April 1st, 1956). In answer to her second question of whether
there is anything new to be learnt from The Journals, Pearson points out that "Plath
fundamentalists" may gain the pleasure of comparing dates with letters but quickly moves us
back to Hughes' Birthday Letters which she now reads differently because she hears the
echoes of Plath's Journals within them:
This time I could hear Sylvia's vocabulary - her precise words- gonging through his verse. He must
have taken those diary pages to heart - and to mind - in a way we can hardly begin to comprehend
Perhaps there are things buried in there which he unearthed from the missing journals: it is a literary
riddle he has taken to the grave.
Pearson, The Daily Telegraph, 1st April, 2000.
It is clear that the publication of Birthday Letters marked Hughes' intention of bringing
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Plath back into the public eye and differing reports as to the reason for this have been
prevalent both prior to and following his death. The Times seemed particularly keen to
promote this latest work and offered nearly a weeks' worth of extracts from the collection
• prior to its publication along with biographical details about Plath, Hughes and their
relationship. On the first day of this coverage, Saturday 17 January 1998, readers were invited
into this "private" world with sensationalist headings such as: "After years of abuse from
critics, Ted Hughes tells his own story of his marriage to Sylvia Plath;" "Poet Laureate breaks
decades of silence. Erica Wagner reports on a startling new book in which Hughes confronts
the pain of his past," "A thunderbolt from the blue: this book will live forever. Andrew
Motion on the Ted Hughes collection that few friends thought they would ever see;" and on
the front page, "Revealed: the most tragic literary love story of our time," (my emphasis). The
impact of this publication seems, in part, to hang on the very fact that it came so late, and after
such adamant refusal to indulge readers with peep-hole information which might have, in some
way, allayed judgement and suspicion regarding Hughes' part in Plath's demise. Tom Paulin is
reported to have said that Birthday Letters was "an eloquent answer to his critics: 'Hughes
admirers will feel that here is someone emerging from a tragic silence. It is definitive, and I
very much hope it will silence his detractors' (The Times, 19.1.98).
More recently, following the public announcement of Hughes' death (his illness was not
largely known), came the suggestion that this collection was, at least in part, a swan-song. In
the BBC's Close Up programme (24.12.98) the collection was described as a book which "the
world never expected to see" and which consequently "stunned the literary world." Tom
Paulin suggested in this programme that Hughes' was attempting to "put his house in order" (a
concept Paulin finds "scary"). He continued with the claim that Hughes' had "silenced his
critics" because finally he had told us: (in Paulin's words) "I've had this extraordinary
relationship ... I've been made to suffer by those whose business it wasn't." This suggests a
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need for public acceptance and justification. Seamus Heaney, in the same programme says that
he can only "guess" at why Hughes published Birthday Letters but is "sure" that it has
something to do with "impatience or rage." Heaney explains that formerly Hughes had "kept
• silent" (presumably resisting the above impulses) "because of a perception that if he entered
into giving his version of events it would only become another version, as if he had no
particular extra authority." Heaney seems to suggest that the solution to this lack of authority
was to present his version in poetic form; "the only way to enter into it decisively was to enter
poetically." The question which I found myself asking is what impact these poems of 'private'
angst, written over a period of thirty years, would have on readers of Plath and Hughes?
Heaney explains the overwhelming effect of the collection on him as a reader and the
"sense of clandestine access to this material." More recently, in a presentation speech for the
ITV's South Bank Show Awards (25.1.99), we find Heaney in the position of defending
Hughes, whose Birthday Letters had won the Literature Award, his readers and poetry. His
loyal accolade: this was a poet who in his lifetime had suffered "the death of privacy,"
Birthday Letters was Hughes' "counter offensive," its popularity has less to do with the
reader's desire for "sensational revelations" (or perhaps "clandestine access") and everything to
do with the "instinctive" recognition of "a need to be more serious," and non more deserving
than Hughes of "the high honours surrounding the word poet." When Frieda Hughes received
the 1998 Whitbread Book of the Year Award (26.1 99) she read from a letter which Hughes
had sent to a close friend shortly after the publication of Birthday Letters. These words, she
explained, could express better than anyone else could on his behalf his reasoning:
"I think these letters do release the story that everything I have written since the early 1960s has been
evading. It was in a kind of desperation that I finally did publish them. I had always thought them
unpublishably raw and unguarded, simply too vulnerable. But then I just could not endure being
blocked any longer. How strange that we have to make these public declarations of our secrets. But we
do. If only I had done the equivalent thirty years ago I might have had a more fruitful career, certainly
a freer psychological life. Even now I feel the sensation of inner liberation, a sudden huge possibility
of new inner experience. Quite strange."
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Also interesting is the fact that acclaim from critics seems to focus on the newness of
Hughes' poetic style in this collection. Before its general release critical response to Birthday
Letters was documented in The Times by Erica Wagner. Wagner herself had introduced the
* work, in her leading article, as narratives "almost conversational in tone" which revealed
Hughes "at his most accessible and heartfelt." Conversely, Andrew Motion notes the "more
symbolic and private" language of the final poems where "Hughes' need for self-protection"
becomes "intense" due to the difficulty of representing the time when Plath was writing Ariel
and "increasingly volatile":
In the short term. these final poems will probably be less admired than the rest of the book In the
fullness of time, they should be reckoned its finest achievement: poetry staggering under the weight of
its emotional load, but keeping its dignity and purpose.
The Times, 17.1.98.
Following the introduction of Hughes' work and the publication of three poems from the
collection on Saturday 17 January 1998, Elaine Showalter's reaction was reported on Monday
19, when the series was continued: "It's absolutely thrilling," she said. "I always thought I
probably would not live long enough to see what Ted Hughes had to say about Sylvia Plath.
The poems, just the ones that are printed, are really interesting because they are so different
from what he has done before. They are so loose." Professor James Fenton, Oxford, notes not
only the interest in content but also the striking "intensity with which he still comes to the
subject." Tom Paulin talks of "mystical humanism", "medieval quality" and the "great
authenticity" of the poems in The Times but on the BBC Close Up programme he praises the
epistolary novel form, Hughes' "writing to the moment" in "direct statements to Plath." He
talks of the "intimacy, spontaneity and casualness of the letter form" with its "honesty and
sincerity" and its "risk-taking vulnerability". Joyce Carol Oates seems to suggest that the
poetry in Birthday Letters was competent but not great. She notes that Hughes' mimicry of
Plath's work cannot be as original or sharp and that our eagerness for these later texts lies in
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our curiosity about the poets' lives: "It's a testament to the power of what we might call
contemporary biographical mania, that our interest in this capable, conventional poetry would
only be stirred by our collective prurient interest in the poets' mismanaged lives." (14)
'	 That Birthday Letters seems to have been written for the common reader is a point that
Germaine Greer seems to raise in the Close Up programme. Hughes offers a version which is
more accessible and therefore distinct from Plath's more "difficult" stories:
"After Birthday Letters he was a hero and he was a hero of a soap-opera and everybody felt that they
knew him and that they could understand that relationship because they had been given the
wherewithal and the assumption is that Sylvia didn't give you the wherewithal. Sylvia's utterances
were too difficult. Neither is true, the truth of relationships is beyond literature."
David Baddiel, one of the critics discussing the collection during the BBC's Whitbread Book
of the Year Award programme, suggested that its success as "a great work of art" was due to
its "cross generic" quality, the fact that it "challenges the form" of poetry because it is also
"part memoir, part biography, part narrative, part literary criticism." But Baddiel also
expressed his desire to put an end to what Francine Stock described as a "great late twentieth
century mystery": "When I read it I really wanted to read about Sylvia Plath and Ted Hughes
afterwards. I really wanted to know what the absolute cold factual stuff was that all this
impressionist thing was coming off from." Birthday Letters can certainly be read as a gift from
its author to his readers of clandestine knowledge but as Bronfen points out, nothing can be
resolved because Plath remains silent:
Each explanation is not only belated but also imperfect and partial. It can be no more and no less than
an addition - a refiguration, a commentary, an attempt at clarification, with the recognition of
interpretative fallibility inevitably inscribed. Even if these missives do not offer us the key to the one
locked chamber in the porous vault we have constructed around the life of Sylvia Plath, they do mark
a new beginning. They leave us alone with our demand and our expectation that Ted Hughes might
finally account for his part in their shared story. With these segments - written in anger and reproach,
offering us at times a sentimental transfiguration of the past, at times a rawly emotional rendition - he
offers his last word in the case; a version which is unrelentlessly concerned with his release from the
spell of death.
Bronfen: 1998, pp. 27-28
Fay Weldon, Baddiel's fellow critic in this programme, clearly wanted to distance herself from
this kind of voyeurism and noted that the personal and private revelations in Hughes'
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collection of letters, rather than causing a revisionist response among feminists, has further
stirred some of the anger. Weldon, to a certain degree, echoes my own response: "I resist this
exploration of the soul ... there is a sort of torment and torturedness that I don't want to know.
• It's his, not ours." In Close Up Blake Morrison expressed the sentiment that despite the range
of Hughes' knowledge it was a "great pity" that what people wanted to hear from him was this
kind of detail about his marriage.
I welcomed Hughes' collection because it seemed to open up a new area for investigation
which I hoped would be of benefit to Plath scholars. Erica Wagner, for example, has published
a new critical work Ariel's Gift: Ted Hughes, Sylvia Plath and the Story of Birthday Letters
(2000) which links the biographical details of the couple's lives to the imagery in their poetry.
I was also curious to discover Hughes' version and expression of certain events into which we
have already been given insight, through the largely posthumous publications of Plath's diary,
letters, autobiography, poetry and fiction. I wondered how, or if, this new voice would alter
our perceptions of Plath's originals: what could I learn from Hughes about Plath's texts and
writing practices? However, rather than compare and contrast biographical versions of the
details of their lives I was keen to discover whether it would be possible to read a kind of
dialogue across the texts of Plath and Hughes. I was interested to see the The Times'
presentation of this new work alongside the blatantly biased details from Plath's life. Would
this kind of negative slant on Plath also be found within the Hughes collection? What became
clear very early on was that alongside Hughes' reclamation of "a narrative about his life that
has been wrested from him" (Diane Middlebrook, The Times, 19.1.98), the media, perhaps
more so than Hughes, was trying "to regain control" in order to benefit its marketing
strategies.
Let me dip briefly into an analysis of this recent representation of Plath. On the front page
of The Times (17.1.98), beneath a recent photograph of Hughes, we have the caption.
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"Hughes: targeted by critics" and beneath a bleary photograph of Plath: "Plath: gassed herself
in 1963." We read about the "intense suspicion" and "hostility" directed towards Hughes
"bruised by abuse", who arguably was "the patient husband of an impossible wife," and note
these juxtaposing and questionable oppositions: "one English countryman, one exotic
foreigner; one complex European; one simple girl from Massachusetts" (my emphasis) (14).
In Wagner's front page report Hughes' "critical and commercial success" is further
juxtaposed with Plath's suicide whereafter she becomes "a frozen icon of betrayed
womanhood," and although Wagner writes here that "feminism and political correctness have
erected what Motion describes today as "a high wall' around Plath," she reports that Hughes
himself had told Stevenson "that he wished to surround himself, his late wife and his children
with 'a wall of astral fire' and preserve, in complete privacy, his own thoughts and feelings
about Sylvia Plath." The "simple girl" in this article (walled in, it seems, by all parties) is
described as a "remarkable artist," whose "vibrancy" was "arresting," and whose "own divided
voice, cheerful in the letters she wrote to her mother, so often despairing in her journal, has
made her an elusive spirit." The final words selected for the opening front page report are
those from the voice in Plath's "Lady Lazarus": "[R]eaders will be able for the first time to
confront Hughes's account of the contradictions that others have found in their lives and the
still-controversial death of the women who wrote: 'Dying is an art, like everything else. I do it
exceptionally well."
It seems that whilst Motion may be correct in his assertion that "[T]here's no sense of
score-setting or wrong-righting" in Hughes' publication of Birthday Letters, Wagner, like
Stevenson, is constantly at pains to do so with regard to the assumption that it was her
shocking suicide which opened the gates to fame. Germaine Greer suggests, in her
contribution to the Close Up programme, that Plath's suicide was an act which wreaked a
life-long assault on Hughes: "She got what she wanted - I mean her shadow lay across his
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life." Greer regrets her readiness to blame Hughes for Plath's death and explains that feminists,
having lost an icon, a "heroine", needed to find a culprit. For Greer, despite the evidence of
Plath's genius in the later works wherein "the terrible imagistic clarity grows and grows and
- grows," the effect of Plath's suicide has implications with regard to her reading of the text:
"you cannot deny the fact that you're in the presence of a major poet but a suicide note is not a
major work and that's what we got." I found this reading of Ariel and The Bell Jar by one of
our leading feminist theorists disturbing.
Craig Brown, one of the critics discussing Birthday Letters in the Whitbread Book Awards
not only notes Hughes' anger in this collection but also his insistence on animal muses and
Hughes' implied suggestion that it was poetry which pushed Plath towards her death, a reading
of Hughes' intentions in these texts which I would endorse: "Certainly he thinks that with
Sylvia Plath she was pushed by her muse into suicide, that if she hadn't written poems you get
the feeling she wouldn't have killed herself' (16). There is always a sense that Hughes seems to
present himself as a helpless bystander who is at first an impotent rival in the face of Plath's
dead father, and secondly an inadequate protector and an unwitting spectator in the face of
Plath's death-drive:
Birthday Letters asks, therefore, to be read not only as a commemoration of Sylvia Plath but perhaps
more crucially as the work of Ted Hughes's mourning. By transforming the contingency of death into
a coherent narrative about their passionate meeting, their tempestuous marriage, as well as his
inability to ease her obsession with her father and with writing until these two enmeshed death forces
ultimately came to consume her, he can finally set the furies that have haunted him since her demise
at rest. [...] The image of Sylvia Plath that emerges in these Birthday Letters is, then, of one who is
being eaten alive by the dangerous fiction she has created in relation to her mother and father, while
he is nothing but a protective shield between the woman he loves and the dead father to whom she is
so fatally drawn.
Bronfen: 1998, p.24.
Bronfen's analysis of Hughes' collection as an "apostrophe to the deceased" certainly echoes
my own response to Hughes' revisiting and retelling of Plath's poetic narratives:
Conceived as an apostrophe to the deceased, whom he evokes so that her presence might serve as a
source for his poetic inspiration, Birthday Letters is written in the second-person present. Hughes
speaks to Sylvia Plath as though she were still alive, as though they were looking back on their shared
past together. Manipulating the structure of direct address in a fictionalized way so as to allow for the
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impossible - the resurrection in fantasy of someone dead - he promises to give account of a
particularly painful and haunting chapter of his life. However, if in the course of this rhetorical
gesture, as Barbara Johnson notes, 'the absent, dead, or inanimate entity addressed is thereby made
present, animate, and anthropomorphic', one must not forget that apostrophe 'is a form of
ventriloquism through which the speaker throws voice, life, and human form into the addressee.
turning its silence into mute responsiveness.' (20) Indeed, the reanimation inherent in this rhetorical
mode allows Hughes to appropriate Plath's silence [...] so as to legitimize his version of their shared
life. It is as if, having her present again, he can use this digression from straight speech finally to tell
his version of what happened. In her function as muse - thus the strange logic of apostrophe - Sylvia
Plath calls forth vignettes from their daily life which allow him to give voice to his anguish and
sorrow over her death, but also his sense of having been betrayed, because he was struck by her violent
fury, and drawn with her into death's force field
Bronfen: 1998, pp. 23-24.
I would suggest that clues towards an alternative explanation for the breakdown of their
relationship could be drawn from the interview Poets in Partnership (BBC Radio 1961), an
extract of which is played for us earlier in the Close Up on Ted Hughes, before the move from
Primrose Hill. Whilst Hughes speaks about the couples' similarities, their shared "tempo" and
"rhythm," Plath tells quite a different story in answer to the interviewer's prompt:
INT - You wouldn't like to give the impression though that you spend the whole of your married life
thinking up poems and reading them to each other?
SP - Well, I think our married life is practically indistinguishable from all the people who live
around us. The only main difference is that Ted doesn't go out to work at nine, come home at five. He
retires about nine to his room and works but I certainly have a life just like all the other housewives
and mothers in our district - shopping, dishes, taking care of the baby and so forth. (Laugh) I think
very few people have an idea that I do anything at all except household chores and so on. (16)
Despite this questionable arrangement which must have frustrated and hindered Plath's
writing, she managed to bring out her first collection of poetry, The Colossus, in 1960 when
Hughes was publishing his second.
What I also find questionable and somewhat disappointing is that Greer defends Hughes
further, justifying his affair and flight of Plath and her babies, by seeming to level criticism at
Plath for her rejection of this "humdrum" existence:
"I think that she was probably crazy happy for some parts of that marriage but what she couldn't bear
was for it to become humdrum and ordinary. She had to be provoking intensities all the time and I
really think that Ted had to run for his life. He was in deep trouble there."
Now let's look at Wagner's selective and subjective introductions to Hughes' poems in The
Times' series of early publications alongside some readings of poems by Plath and Hughes
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which seem to create a kind of dialogue we have not met before. Beneath the title of the poem
"St Botolph's," in which Hughes narrates his first meeting and passionate embrace with Plath
in February 1956, is the emboldened and enlarged headline "Bite left tooth-marks on his
cheek." This event is of course notorious in terms of previous censorship for, as Rose points
out, the immediate forerunning and following passages to the narration of this event by Plath
in her diary (clearly a very drunken affair), which also indicates Hughes' violent passion, were
omitted from the Journals in 1982. They do, however, appear in Rose's book and here, in
part, in Wagner's introduction:
I was stamping and he was stamping on the floor, and then he kissed me bang smash on the mouth
[and ripped my hair band off, my lovely red hairband scarf  which has weathered sun and much love.
and whose like I shall never find again and my favorite earrings: hah, I shall keep, he barked.] And
when he kissed my neck, I bit him long and hard on the cheek and, when we came out of the room,
blood was running down his face. [His poem 'I did it, I.' Such violence, and I can see how women lie
down for artists. The one man in the room who was as big as his poems, huge, with hulk and dynamic
chunks of words: his poems are strong and blasting like a high wind in steel girders.] And I screamed
in myself, thinking: oh, to give myself crashing fighting to you.
(In parentheses Rose's completed version from Nancy Milford's original review before editing)
Rose: 1991, p. 121.
Wagner omits the area I have underlined and the whole of the passage following "blood was
running down his face." It seems that in promoting Hughes' work the emphasis in the media is
being directed towards the figure of Plath, both as an object of investigation and the
subject/content of the poetry. This might serve to steer us away from the author, who is also a
subject here. Hughes' poem "St Botolph's" ends with the following lines and if we look at the
pronouns in this section there are twice as many which refer to Hughes:
You meant to knock me out
With your vivacity. I remember
Little from the rest of that evening.
I slid away with my girl-friend. Nothing
Except her hissing rage in a doorway
And my stupefied interrogation
Of your blue headscarf from my pocket
And the swelling ring-moat of tooth-marks
That was to brand my face for the next month.
The me beneath it for good.
(my emphasis)
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In the Close Up programme, Greer lays some of the responsibility for Hughes' victimisation on
his foolhardy response to this first encounter:
"I think that Hughes went like a lamb to the slaughter, that when she bit him at that party - it was
such a stagey thing to do [shaking her head]- and that men with more common sense it wouldn't have
worked, they would have said 'Oh God, get this dame off me' but she assessed his response. He
couldn't get over it."
Although Wagner tells us that we learn from Plath's journal that "she was determined to
meet 'that big, dark, hunky boy" what precedes and follows this entry selectively quoted
seems to show some ambivalence, not reported here, in Plath's attitude to Hughes, who she
only knew at this time through reading his poetry:
Then the worst thing happened that big, dark, hunlcy boy, the only one there huge enough for me,
who had been hunching around over women, and whose name I had asked the minute I had come into
the room, but no one told me, came over and was looking hard in my eyes and it was Ted Hughes. [...]
And now I sit here, demure and tired in brown, slightly sick at heart. I shall go on. I shall write a
detailed description of shock treatment, tight, blasting short descriptions with not one smudge of coy
sentimentality [...]
I shall never see him again, and the thorny limitations of the day crowd in like the spikes on the
gates at Queens last night: I could never sleep with him anyway, with all his friends here and his close
relation to them, laughing, talking, I should be the world's whore, as well as Roget's strumpet. I shall
never see him, he will never look for me. He said my name, Sylvia, and banged a black grinning look
into my eyes, and I would like to try just this once, my force against his. But he will never come [...]
Journals: 1982, pp.112-113.
It is clear that Plath wishes not only to preserve her dignity and reputation but also that she is
determined to keep her creative writing in tact. Anne Stevenson's comment in Close Up that
Plath "was absolutely determined to be a writer and to find a mate" seems to corroborate
Plath's voice-over in the programme when she explains that she had read Ted's poetry, was
"very impressed and wanted to meet him." A reading of Hughes' poem "Trophies," however,
might also redress the balance in terms of the narration of seductive power. Here Hughes
"borrows" Plath's image of the panther which appears in her poem "Pursuit" and questions her
early attempt at attributing to him a mythical, anthropomorphical power with the opening
words "The panther?" Hughes answers with his own familiar theme of animal-spirit possession
thus undermining her insistent imagery which appears in both her poetry and journal as we
shall see. She is the one who is metamorphosised "So it sprang over you," and he is numbed
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by the "shock attack" into a "drunken euphoria". Yet despite this, the title of the poem and the
final lines of the last stanza throw some ambiguity over this shift of responsibility: "As it
carried me off I detached / The hairband carefully from between its teeth / And a ring from its
-ear, for my trophies" (Birthday Letters: 1998, pp. 18-19).
"Pursuit" was written after Plath's first encounter with Hughes. In her journal (27 February,
1956) Plath explains that the poem "Pursuit" is not only dedicated to Hughes but also that it is
"about the dark forces of lust" (Journals: 1982, p.116). Plath sent this poem to her mother
(March 9, 1956) asking her to read it aloud so that she could get the full effect of its hypnotic
quality and the "simple, seductive beauty of the words." Written after Blake, she explains what
she considers its power as a "metaphysical' poem: "It is, of course, a symbol of the terrible
beauty of death, and the paradox that the more intensely one lives, the more one burns and
consumes oneself; death, here, includes the concept of love, and is larger and richer than mere
love, which is a part of it." She writes that an alternative epigraph to that from Racine's
Phedre ("Dans le fond des forets votre image me suit") could have come from Yeats:
Whatever flames upon the night, Man's own resinous heart has fed.' The painter's brush
consumes his dreams and all that" (Letters: 1978, pp. 222-223).
This poem gives us an insight into the beginnings of what will be a significant thematic and
metaphorical exploration of her relationship in terms of animals and hunting imagery. The
opening lines herald a theme which Plath was to reiterate in her later poem "The Rabbit
Catcher"; the relationship between sex and death: "There is a panther stalks me down: / One
day I'll have my death of him." The speaker of the poem is at once prey "The hunt is on, and
sprung the trap" but also an equal "The black marauder, hauled by love / On fluent haunches,
keeps my speed", the implication here is that the hunter has to keep up. Whilst there is a sense
of flight "His ardor snares me, lights the trees, / And I run flaring in my skin" the over-riding
emotion seems to be excitement rather than fear. Whilst the panther "Compels a total
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sacrifice" the speaker's response indicates a willingness to succumb which is not expressed in
terms of passivity: "I hurl my heart to halt his pace, / To quench his thirst I squander blood."
The verb "hurl" is strong and active indicating that there is no loss of agency but a reciprocal
-response. The hunter must slow down to catch the heart. The last two lines suggest that the
prey is waiting in excited anticipation "The panther's tread is on the stairs, / Coming up and up
the stairs." Whilst the door has been bolted it is not to keep him out but to keep out "that dark
guilt" (Collected Poems: 1981, pp. 22-23). Desire and repulsion are juxtaposed throughout
this poem and this creates a tension where violence becomes intensely erotic.
"18 Rugby Street" which narrates the couple's first sexual encounter when Plath visited
Hughes in London also appeared in The Times. In her introduction to this poem, headlined
Scar from the past warned: stay clear, Wagner includes a line from an earlier entry in
Plath's Journal, March 10, 1956; "a huge joy galloped through me", as Plath's reaction to the
news that Hughes had returned to Cambridge. What Wagner omits is again of interest to Plath
scholars. Plath's desire for "my black marauder" or "the panther" (Journals: 1982, p.131) is
juxtaposed in the Journal entry with her "fear of being crushed in a huge dark machine"
(Journals: 1982, p.132). We can see that Hughes had already become part of her writing.
Plath uses metaphor and vivid imagery to describe her feelings and thoughts about him and his
effect upon her:
March 11. Sunday morning. Another day of hell. He is on the prowl, all the fiends are come to
torment me: and I alone am escaped to tell thee L.] they will not come. Not in the gray sober light of
morning. They will not come.
But last night they came, at two in the morning, Phillippa said. Throwing mud on her window,
saying my name, the two mixed: mud and my name; my name is mud. She came to look for me, but I
was sleeping. Dreaming of being home in Winthrop on a lovely new spring day, walking in pajamas
down the streets of melting tar to the sea, the salt freshness, and squatting in the sea in a tangle of
green weeds were clam-diggers with osier baskets, rising, one after the other, to look at me in my
pajamas, and I hid in spring shame in the trellised arbors of the Days' home.
[—I
And all this while, those boys in the dark were treating me like that whore, coming like the soldiers
to Blanche DuBois and rolling in the gardens, drunk, and mixing her name with mud. Two reports
today, to insert more needles in my skin. I must cram for my paper. Oh, god give me the guts to live
through this week Let me some day confront him, to make him human, and not that black panther
which struts on the forest fringes of hearsay. Such hell. They refuse to face me in the daylight. I am
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not worth that. I must be, when, if ever they come. They will not come. I don't want to eat, to go to tea
today. I want to rave out in the streets and confront that big panther, to make the daylight whittle him
to lifesize.
Journals: 1982, pp.133-134.
I was interested to read Hughes' poem "Visit," not because it gives us his version of the
event which "is only a story" but because it gives us an interesting insight into the privacy of
Plath's journal writing. Hughes again abdicates responsibility for this pursuit; he was drunk
when he threw mud at the window, he was somehow "being auditioned/ For the male lead in
your drama," manipulated "As if a puppet were being tried on its strings," he is being
experimented on like "dead frog's legs", jigging unwillingly "through those gestures". But
more significant than this listing of metaphorical excuses is Hughes' explanation of the
experience and effect of reading the account of P3ath's fee3ings len years after ber demh.
Clearly what she had expressed in her journal she had hidden from her husband and kept to
herself.
Hughes refers to a scar on Plath's cheek, a remnant to her suicide attempt at twenty,
fictionalised graphically in The Bell Jar, in two of the poems published in The Times, thus
justifying Wagner's headline. The first reference appears in the first poem published, "Fulbright
Scholars", where Hughes recalls looking at a photograph of the new intake from America, the
words "doubt", "maybe", "unlikely" seem to undermine his attraction and draw attention to the
more emphatic last sentence here:
No doubt I scanned particularly
The girls. Maybe I noticed you.
Maybe I weighed you up, feeling unlikely.
Noted your long hair, loose waves -
Your Veronica Lake bang. Not what it hid.
Birthday Letters: 1998, p.3.
Hughes' second reference to Plath's scar appears in "18 Rugby Street." Here Hughes'
attraction does not seem to be in question even if his common sense is. I quote from Birthday
Letters as Wagner's omissions make the warning "stay clear" the central focus.
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It was never a face in itself Never the same.
It was like the sea's face - a stage
For weathers and currents, the sun's play and the moon's.
Never a face until that final morning
When it became the face of a child - its scar
Like a Maker's flaw. But now you declaimed
A long poem about a black panther
- While I held you and kissed you and tried to keep you
From flying about the room. For all that,
You would not stay.
In the roar of soul your scar told me -
Like its secret name, or its password -
How you tried to kill yourself And I heard
Without ceasing for a moment to kiss you
As if a sober star had whispered it
Above the revolving, rumbling city: stay clear.
A poltroon of a star. I cannot remember
Howl smuggled myself, wrapped in you,
Into the hotel. There we were.
You were slim and lithe and smooth as a fish.
You were a new world. My new world.
So this is America, I marvelled.
Beautiful, beautiful, America!
Birthday Letters: 1998, pp.20-24.
The suggestion that Plath's lack of Englishness might be a problem to Hughes seems strange
here. Also strange is Myers' claim that "Ted was a little embarrassed by the flattering poems
she wrote about him" (Stevenson: 1989, p.314) when what we are perhaps hearing here is a
voice which is trying to convey the memory of a man "overwhelmed", "obsessed, stricken and
deeply loving" (Motion, Times 17.1.98). An extract from an interview with Plath in Close Up
explains that the relationship grew out of the fact that they were both spending time writing
together and both writing poems to one another.
The Close Up programme describes Plath's poet-apprenticeship to Hughes during their life
in the Primrose Hill area of London. The commentary also suggests that Hughes' tutelage
which put Sylvia in touch with her "poetic self' and "demons" was a dangerous and "high risk
enterprise." Alvarez explains: Ted "the dominant figure" gave Plath "the keys to the cellar
door and she went down there, and down she went. What was in the cellar turned out to be
nightmare." The programme suggests that Plath's former practice of dramatising her own life
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stories and "emotional trauma" in her writing now became a more intense project as she began
to find her poetic voice. By the time the couple move to Devon it is assumed that the reason
for the breakdown of their the relationship is directly related to Plath's writing practice: "the
psychic drama being played out in Sylvia's poetry was assuming a darker edge, engulfing her
husband and describing their marriage in the past tense." The reference given is taken from the
last stanza of Plath's "The Rabbit Catcher" (1962): "And we, too, had a relationship - / Tight
wires between us, / Pegs too deep to uproot, and a mind like a ring / Sliding shut on some
quick thing, / The constriction killing me also" (Collected Poems: 1981, p. 194).
Jacqueline Rose tells us that Plath's "Rabbit Catcher" is "the poem in which the weight of
biographical reference on poetic interpretation operates with the greatest force" (Rose: 1991
135) (18). This poem is omitted from the first publication of Ariel which seems to corroborate
critical readings which insist that the poem is a metaphor for the Plath / Hughes relationship.
The poem opens with a list of verbs which create an image of nature's hostility and violence
towards the speaker: "It was a place of force -- / The wind gagging my mouth with my own
blown hair, / Tearing off my voice, and the sea / Blinding me with its lights." Suffocation,
silencing and blinding would seem to indicate that the speaker is powerless, but in the second
stanza the speaker regains agency: "I tasted the malignity of the gorse, / Its black spikes, / The
extreme unction of its yellow candle-flowers." The spikes and the flowers are efficient,
beautiful and "extravagant like torture." The religious imagery here wrought from the word
"unction" (a ceremony where one is anointed with oil) is at once suggestive of death and also
brings in a soothing tone which is undone by the word "torture". The hollow where the snares
are laid is "Simmering, perfumed", and, as Rose suggests, this place seems to be a metaphor
for the female body (Rose: 1991, p.138-139). It is at once an attractive symbol of femininity,
but also a trap.
Similar to the excitement of waiting in "Pursuit" we have another image of the hunter and
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the orgasmic death of the prey in the penultimate stanza of "The Rabbit Catcher": "How they
awaited him, those little deaths! / They waited like sweethearts. They excited him." The sexual
connotations here are unavoidable when we read the last stanza which immediately moves to a
"relationship". The "Sliding", shutting and "constriction" also kills the speaker. We could read
the "also" as referring to the rabbits or the hunter (19).
The recurrence of hunting and snaring images in Plath's "Rabbit Catcher" offer us an inroad
which I believe is disturbingly relevant with regard to other recent media publications about
Plath's person which seem to inform readings of her work. Hughes' poem of the same title
seems to go some way towards digging up some ground we have already covered regarding
Plath's lack of Englishness and the couple's cultural and geographical differences. The
implication wrought from reading Hughes' poem is that he has read Plath's poem as an
expression of distaste for the figure who traps small animals and is "excited" by the "little
deaths." Perhaps the poem is a harsh criticism of Hughes, given his childhood pastime (which
is well documented in Close Up) and the speaker's direct address to this past relationship.
Hughes' almost direct reference to Plath's "blunt" fingers "Ringing the white china" suggests
that he wishes to release this figure from her scorn. The first part of Hughes' poem gives the
reader an introductory narrative to the event which perhaps inspired Plath's poem. Sylvia was
angry, he did not know what he had done wrong, she "hurled" the children into the car and he
jumped in because he suspected she would "do something crazy." They could not find a road
to the sea and she was further infuriated by "our English private greed/ Of fencing off all
coastal approaches." Then "despised England's grubby edges when you got there." He found a
snare and she "tore it up". Here, then, is his answer to her criticism and his justification of the
practice she so despised:
I was aghast. Faithful
To my country gods -1 saw
The sanctity of a trapline desecrated.
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You saw blunt fingers, blood in the cuticles,
Clamped around a blue mug. I saw
Country poverty raising a penny,
Filling a Sunday stewpot. You saw baby-eyed
Strangled innocents, I saw sacred
Ancient custom
Birthday Letters: 1998, p. 145.
The juxtaposition throughout this section of the poem of the "I saw" / "you saw" certainly
highlights the couples' differing perceptions but Hughes further explains that his lack of
understanding was related to the fact that his wife's rage was not an empathetic response to
the rabbits but indicative of something far more sinister: "You were weeping with a rage /
That cared nothing for rabbits. You were locked / Into some chamber gasping for oxygen /
Where I could not find you, or really hear you, / Let alone understand you." This gratuitous
reference to the gas chamber echoes the imagery of Plath's final poetry but also forms a
biographical link to her death. Not only does this seem an irrelevant and inadequate response
to Plath's "Rabbit Catcher", but also it endorses and substantiates that common impulse and
appropriation we have encountered in the media to offer misreadings of her work. Hughes'
final lines continue to borrow vocabulary and imagery from Plath's original but it is both
something in himself and Plath's poems which are snared: "In those snares / You'd caught
something. / Had you caught something in me, / Nocturnal and unknown to me? Or was it /
Your doomed self, Your tortured, crying, / Suffocating self? Whichever, / Those terrible,
hypersensitive / Fingers of your verse closed around it and / Felt it alive. The poems, like
smoking entrails, / Came soft into your hands." There is no doubt that Hughes perceives of
himself as a victim and that he expresses this through an appropriation of Plath's texts. (21)
Hughes' accusation that Plath's "rage" was divorced from her distaste of killing animals
seems to be a contradiction to his story in a recent article which appeared in the Guardian
Saturday Review (9.1.1999), a previously unpublished interview given to Thomas Pero for a
US angling magazine. The article appears on the front page of the Review section with the
243
title "Poet, pike and a pitiful grouse," a large colour photograph of Hughes holding a huge fish
and a sub-heading intended to hook any doubters "he talks about Sylvia Plath and his
obsessions with fishing and hunting". A secondary bait to this part of the article is provided by
the enlarged inset of part of a quotation from the interview: "The day before I got married the
first time, I hooked a pike in my dream.As it came up its girth filled the entire lake." No
analysis of the meaning of this dream is given, only an explanation that his obsessive dreams
about catching pike in a particular lake always reflected his current state of mind. The "pitiful
grouse" of the title, more significantly, refers to the central narrative of the report and an event
which involved Plath. On a visit to Wuthering Heights the couple came across an injured
grouse and Hughes killed it; "And she went berserk." Hughes further explains that Plath had
some mythical connection with that particular species and that the effect on him of her
reaction (expressed in somewhat exploitative language) was to change his hunting habits
forever (almost):
"So, I'd not only killed this helpless thing in front of her, I'd killed the legendary bird. As she went
berserk, I felt it go through me like an electric shock A total transference to me of her feeling.
I realized I didn't want to kill any bird or animal ever again."
Despite the narration of this relinquishment Hughes gives an elaborate defence of his reason
for hunting: "I always used to be aware of everything when I was shooting ... You were
intensely alert to the whole landscape and the life in the landscape. I'd glance out of the
window and I'd immediately see the ears of hares sticking out of the corn." Later in this
interview Hughes narrates a day when he succumbed and did go hunting, a day when he found
again a lost "paradise" of which he was now deprived, when he realised that only hunting gave
him a connection to "the whole".
Valentine Cunningham's article "For Better or Verse?", published in the Times Higher
Educational Supplement (27.11.1998), notes the couple's differences and their distinction as
poets. He admits that his claim for Hughes' poetic superiority might be due to his having
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thirty-five years more practice. There is no doubt that Plath's last work gives evidence of a
separation from Hughes' influence, a brilliance, distinction and genius which would have been
a contending voice in the bid for honours. However, Cunningham goes on to substantiate his
weighing of merit by claiming that Hughes' work will survive because he deals in myth and she
only in fantasy. She is only a "displaced American tourist in her bobby sox" with no real
experience of suffering, whereas Hughes' father really was a survivor of Gallipoli. Plath's
"mere fantasies" of Dachau are less worthy because they are reflections of "an epoch's
brutalisms" only perceived "through the windows of a tourist bus," whereas Hughes'
transcendent poetry "as old and 'as deep as England' offers "a kind of prophetic vision of an
ancient English selfhood." Unfortunately, Cunningham's final statement that "Plath will be
turned to more and more as a case, while Hughes will be read as a poet" seems already, in
some part, to be a truth but I would deny the claim that the reason for this is that Plath's
fantasy provokes to a lesser degree the imagination than Hughes' myth.
Cunningham's article does suggest that Hughes' publication of Birthday Letters is not only
read as a "striving to have the last word" but also as a volume whose poems are "enlivened"
by Plath's death in the face of his own. Whilst the book's success cannot be argued and tributes
and honours for the late poet laureate are not for me to question, I cannot help but question
the integrity of a text which takes for its subject Plath's life whilst constantly exploiting the
undercurrent of her death. Whilst David Baddiel sees this "infusion" of the "knowledge of her
death" throughout the poetry as a creation of "a new tense" and a "complex use of time," my
response is that this is a perpetuation and an exploitation of the myth which has grown around
Plath's life and work. I would argue that this is not a biography. I cannot engage in Hughes'
representation of his wife. As Blake Morrison tells us in Close Up Hughes "tells us about
himself' in this collection. Nor is this literary criticism; Hughes' readings of Plath's work are
pathological and infused with the need for public justification and exoneration; he has
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recognised himself in her stories and by saying "I" he seems to believe that he can change her
version by giving his own. I remain sceptical.
That Plath's texts are alive and open to multiple interpretation marks her genius as a writer.
Hughes' exorcism, his psychological liberation, may have been wrought through exercising the
art of saying "I" but my earlier hope of reading a dialogue across the poems of both Plath and
Hughes has, in part, been thwarted. Clearly there are interesting reverberations and echoes in
Hughes' collection which bring us back to Plath's texts, but the conversation is unavoidably
one way. In this sense Hughes' poems can only be read as rhetorical, since Plath could not
reciprocate. I believe that Plath remains an important writer for feminist scholars because, as
we have seen, her project was to find expression for the experience of living a woman's life.
She was able to voice female subjectivity both in terms of a transcendence of the feminine
body and in terms of a relational self which inhabits the material body in the real world.
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Notes
(1) See David Holbrook, Sylvia Plath: Poetry and Existence (1976). London: The Athlone
Press, p. 277.
(2) Tripp concludes:
One of the effects of a concentration on the surfaces of the text and the resistances found there is to
open up Plath's texts to the possibility of new feminist readings which treat the poems as challenging
the subject positions allotted to women by a patriarchal culture.
Women: a cultural review. Vol. 5 No. 3, O.U.P.:1994.
(3) Elizabeth Bronfen points out that: "Plath's adamant rejection of an exclusively
self-absorbed narcissism as the source of poetic expression highlights the importance she
placed on control in the process of converting experience into poetry" (Bronfen: 1998,
p.62). Her self-discipline, as far as poetic technique was concerned, was reflected by the
emphasis Plath put on the vocal quality of her work. She evoked a sense of her own
presence through saying them aloud, listening to her own voice and measuring the tone. In
an interview with Peter On (30th October, 1962) Plath explained the importance of this
voicing of her later poems: "I think that this in my own writing development is quite a
new thing with me, and whatever lucidity they may have comes from the fact that I say
them to myself, I say them aloud.' The Poet Speaks (1966), Orr. (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul) in Bronfen: 1998, p170.
(4) Bronfen notes that "Poem for a Birthday" was "initially conceived as a deliberate
Theodore Roethke pastiche," and that it "came to mark the significant turning point in the
development of Plath's poetic voice" (Bronfen: 1998, p.86).
(5) Rose's detailed analysis of "Poem for a Birthday" is very useful in terms of a Kristevan
reading and in relation to theme of madness ( Rose: 1991, pp. 40-63).
(6) See Patricia Waugh Practising Postmodernism Reading Modernism (1992), pp. 133-135.
(7) Bronfen refers here to Lacan's "Intervention on Transference" (1951) in Berheimer and
Kahane's In Dora's Case: Freud-Hysteria-Feminism (1985). Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, pp.92-104.
(8)Bronfen's comments on Plath's cultural performativity are helpful here:
Plath's move into popular fiction brings with it a shift in tone from the highly self-conscious prosody
of the early poems and the violence and rage of the Ariel poems, to a narrative voice marked by
self-irony, able to describe the pathos of cultural dislocation, the horror of self-consuming madness.
even while at the same time stepping away from this overflow of destructive feeling. By virtue of
humour Plath comes to perfect the cultural performativity she had experimented with in her earlier
prose writings, with parody emerging as the narrative strategy that allows her to dismantle the very
discursive formations whose regulative law she also finds herself unable to abandon fully, by
simultaneously celebrating the artificiality of fantasies of health and happiness and pointing to the
horror beneath the perfect surface.
Bronfen: 1998, p.113.
(9)Bronfen quotes from Winter Pollen: Occasional Prose (1994). William Scammell (ed)
247
New York: Picador, p.480.
(10) For an intelligent, extended analysis see Bronfen: 1998, p.104.
(11) See Bronfen: 1998, pp.105-106.
(.12) My own reaction to The Journals (2000) has surprised me, much of my research on Plath
for this thesis was undertaken before its publication and, whilst the text has become a
treasure on the bookcase, I have not feverishly sought out those missing extracts now
available. Perhaps this is because Plath has never been a silent woman for me; her voice
has been clearly heard in my reading of her texts for the past decade. I have been
interested to see an attempt in the media to convince us that we can uncover the true self
of Plath through her so-called private jottings but her multiple self-representations in this
collection are no more or less interesting that those selves which make their appearance in
her poems and fiction.
(13) A reference to Janet Malcolm's biography The Silent Woman (1994) which explores and
analyses the "Plath / Hughes' industry."
(14) Sarah Lyall 'A Divided Response of Hughes' Poems', New York Times, Arts Page, 17
January 1998, p7.
(15) This echoes the criticism found in Bitter Fame, in an Appendix offered by Lucas Myers, a
friend of Hughes from Cambridge, who argues that his forebodings about the marriage lay
within his perception that Plath was too different from her husband. He had expected that
he would marry someone "highly intelligent but close to nature, a daughter of the English
countryside" (Myers in Stevenson: 1989, p. 314-315).
(16) See also Lucas Myers, Appendix 1 in Stevenson's Bitter Fame: "Sylvia ... had acquired
the technical mastery to write lasting poems, but the fuel at her disposal to propel poems
into being was the same substance that provoked her suicide. At cost to herself and her
survivors, she doubtlessly attained what she wanted most from life, a permanent place in
the history of twentieth-century poetry in English" (Myers in Stevenson: 1989, p321).
(17) For a fictionalisation of Plath's existence at this time as new mother and "model
secretary" see Ellen in "The Day of Success," Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams
London: Faber & Faber, 1979, pp 185 - 198.
(18) For an intelligent feminist reading of "The Rabbit Catcher" see Rose's analysis in The
Haunting of Sylvia Plath (1991), pp. 135 - 143.
(19) Perloff reads this poem alongside Lawrence's "Love on the Farm" (1908) in Linda
Wagner's Critical Essays on Sylvia Plath but argues that there is no indication of sexual
arousal in Plath's poem (pp. 109-123). Like Rose, I do not agree with this reading. Plath's
"I felt hands", "ringing", and "little deaths" is reminiscent of the ending Lawrence's
poem: "With his hand he turns my face to him / And caresses me with his fingers that still
smell grim / Of the rabbit's fur! God, I am caught in a snare! /1 know not what fine wire is
round my throat; / I only know I let him finger there / My pulse of life, and let him nose
like a stoat / Who sniffs with joy before he drinks the blood. [...] and a flood / Of sweet
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fire sweeps across me, so I drown / Against him, die, and find death good."
D.H. Lawrence, The Complete Poems Vol.1 (1964). London: Heinemann.
(20)Bronfen's comments here about the effects of borrowing from Plath are particularly
salient:
if apostrophe allows the poet to ventriloquize the absent addressee, his own poetic voice seems to be
infected by the exchange as well. While the dead beloved, functioning as muse for the poetic
utterances of a mourning love is a literary topos well known to us [...] the unusual turn Ted Hughes
gives this poetic convention is that he explicitly refers to the texts written by the dead woman. He
casts himself as one who has been both consumed by her death and the furies that have haunted him
since, and also infected by her texts. [...] Indeed, in the course of his poetic narrative he articulates
how her reformulation of shared experiences in her journal entries or poems not only diverged from
his perception at the time but in hindsight also allowed him to recognize what at the time he had
missed or misunderstood, notably her psychic anguish, torture and the inherited traumatic knowledge
that cryptonymically came to haunt her. While he openly admits that he came to see the world anew
through her eyes, he also insists that - in part owing to their cultural difference, in part owing to her
parental debt - he often could not share her fated vision of place and events. Yet part of his
appropriation of the deceased not only involves commenting on her journal entries but also imitating
her poetic voice. In doing so, he does not only undo temporality, speaking as she did in the past.
Rather, he uses ventriloquism to offer his version of poems, such as Daddy', 'Ariel', or the 'Rabbit
Catcher', the bone of so much critical attention. One could surmise that, much as he sought to control
the Plath Estate, and with it the memory and reputation of his dead wife, with these poetic
refigurations of scenes from the poems and journals he also seeks to control the correct interpretation
of her texts. But - and herein lies the paradox of the elegiac apostrophic mode - the voice of the
survivor is never more than a supplement. Even if it seeks to supersede the deceased, it feeds off its
host, and lives only in relation to the texts that have gone before it.
Bronfen: 1998, pp.26-27.
(21) Bronfen refers to Barbara Johnson, 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion', in Johnson,
A World of Difference (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987), p.185
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Postmodern Bodies
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Subjectivity, Feminism and Postmodern Theory
The questions of materiality and relationality remain central to my exploration of the female
body, women and madness. At this point I would like to investigate the chasm which has
opened up between postmodern and feminist theory as it relates closely to our discussions of
representations of the body and subjectivity in women's literature. Postmodernism's
repudiation of the Enlightenment projects of developing science, universal morality and law,
and a belief in the autonomy of art, are now seemingly unrealisable partly because there is no
longer any discretion in these areas. The boundaries between art and science are increasingly
diffuse (1). Feminist sceptics would question the political consequences of such abandonment
whilst embracing the notion that "universal" truths and objectivity are obsolete. After all, the
universal rational subject is still male and all knowledge is wrought from interested parties.
Patricia Waugh's essay "Postmodernism and Feminism" (1998) raises the question as to
whether postmodern theory is emancipatory and draws attention to the uneasy relationship
between postmodernism and feminism. Waugh invites us to consider more critically recent
feminist theory which embraces a kind of postmodern "sublime" wherein the "otherness" of
female space (which exists outside of rationality), portrayed through images of fluidity,
hybridity and the cyborg, is seen as desirable. Recognising the positive shift of such thought
which has released the bounds between gender and anatomy, Waugh also signals a crisis in
terms of knowledge and identity which has implications for women. Women need to develop a
"new ethics" in response to postmodern technological changes and the shilling relationship
between knowledge and power (Waugh in Jackson and Jones: 1998, pp. 178-180). We may
have much to lose in terms of political agency and we must protect and preserve the newly
emerged female subject by means of a modification, rather than abandonment, of
Enlightenment notions of reason, justice, autonomy and human progress. Like Bordo, Waugh
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rejects the nihilistic and disembodied "view from everywhere" (Bordo: 1993, P. 133).
Throughout this thesis I have been concerned to consider women who are situated in a
particular place in terms of their domestic and artistic lives in order to uncover their feminist
responses to the female condition. In this sense, although we have explored notions of
transcendence, the embodied self viewed from a specific 'somewhere' has been perhaps more
pertinent to my own feminist project.
Waugh makes a distinction between what she terms "strong" and "weak" postmodern
theory, these distinctions relate to postmodernism as a critique of knowledge as formulated by
Enlightenment theory, and postmodernism as aesthetic practice. She also sees within these two
distinctions a further generic difference between "deconstructive" postmodernism, a
critique and abandonment of Enlightenment thinking, and "reconstructive" postmodernism
which imagines alternative futures, transformations or breaks with modernity. Waugh's terms
and theory can offer a useful insight into the relationship between feminism and
postmodernism and an exploration of such a breakdown, she suggests, may lead to a
discovery:
that a particular form of the postmodern which has been productive for feminism in the aesthetic
sphere may be problematic for feminist critiques of knowledge and for feminist politics. This suggests,
contrary to globalising accounts of the postmodern condition, that feminism is free to take a strategic
stance on postmodernism, selecting those aspects which might be useful to a particular goal at a
particular time.
Waugh in Jackson and Jones: 1998, p. 182.
Certainly my own readings of literary texts which have aestheticised the female condition have
been largely informed by feminist polemical writing which has taken a more realist approach,
for example the work of Simone de Beauvoir and Germaine Greer.
Waugh explains that "strong deconstructive postmodernism" can be traced back to
Nietzsche's declaration in Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals (1872) that all
knowledge is perspectival. There is no metanarrative or universal truth on which we can
ground knowledge or ethics because human perspectives are endlessly different. This kind of
252
postmodernism tends to emphasise the importance of performance and rhetoric and makes
room for "little narratives" which can reflect the desires of different, particular and marginal
groups. Although grand narratives are exposed and rejected there is a resultant problem in that
- the feminist project is also seen as yet another little story. "Strong reconstructive
postmodernism" differs from the above only in that it envisages or "produces a number of
'aestheticised' and sometimes utopian accounts of knowledge and culture" (Waugh in Jackson
and Jones: 1998, p.183). Waugh refers here to Richard Rorty's theory of textualisation and
consensus; his vision of solidarity where little pieces are brought together as opposed to the
formulation of one grand theory. We can see this utopian vision within the fictional work of
many postmodern women writers, for example Doris Lessing's denouement of Memoirs of a
Survivor (1974). In this novel the female protagonist watches many different itinerant tribes as
they pass by her house but the final image is of many people working on a single tapestry. We
can also see the patchwork effect in postmodern historiographic metafictions such as Margaret
Atwood's Alias Grace (1996) where competing narratives from history are wrought together
in a highly complex pattern alongside fictional accounts from differing narrative perspectives
and genres. In terms of aesthetics, this patterning serves to create a whole out of disparate
'stories' whilst emphasising the fragmented nature of truth; all accounts, whether they be from
history or fiction, are still stories.
Another aestheticised version of strong reconstructive postmodernism, also problematic in
terms of emancipatory politics, is that of the rhetoric of the 'sublime' wherein a utopian space
is envisaged outside of rationality, or beyond language. Otherness or difference can be seen to
exist beyond the law. As we have seen, madness, hysteria, or a return to the body within
women's texts can be read as a romanticised occupation of this sublime space. Waugh sees this
critique of reason, prevalent in the nineteen-eighties, as "a dangerous tendency" because,
rather than persevering with a project which would politically transform physical space,
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imaginary spaces become politicised. Indeed, French feminists such as Irigaray and Cixous
were criticised for their mystification of the 'other' and their work was appropriated, especially
by male theorists, for this kind of postmodern reading. The sublime space became fetninised
- and these imaginary language games, rather than challenging stereo-typical notions of
femininity, in fact furthered the identification of real women with "a mysterious, irrational and
unrepresentable 'otherness' (Waugh in Jackson and Jones: 1998, p.184).
The perfecting of the female body through technology, as well as advances in reproductive
science, leads to a future vision of women not as real but as robots. Naomi Wolf tells us that:
"The spectre of the future is not that women will be slaves, but that we will be robots" (Wolf:
1991, p.267). Through genetic engineering women will be bred for passivity and beauty, thus
technology will perpetuate the destabilintion of the female body:
Whatever the future threatens, we can be fairly sure of this: Women in our "raw" or "natural" state
will continue to be shifted from category "woman" to category "ugly," and shamed into an
assembly-line physical identity. As each woman responds to the pressure, it will grow so intense that
it will become obligatory, until no self-respecting woman will venture outdoors with a surgically
unaltered face. The free market will compete to cut up women's bodies more cheaply, if more sloppily,
with no-frills surgery in bargain basement clinics. In that atmosphere, it is a matter of time before
they reposition the clitoris, sew up the vagina for a snugger fit, loosen the throat muscles, and sever
the gag reflex. [...]
The machine is at the door. Is she the future?
Wolf: 1991, p.269.
Writers such as Wolf and Greer have much to say as regards the damaging effects of plastic
surgery on women in our times. Greer tells us that "the man-made woman is well on her way
to ousting the born woman" (Greer: The Observer Review, 19th October 1997). The female
breast, with its artificial implants, is becoming ever-more preferable to a breast which can feed
an infant. Is this freedom for women? Clearly women have the right to choose not to treat
their bodies as merely instruments for nurture but, to what extent are women still pandering to
male ideals of femininity when they choose to undergo the knife?
Donna Haraway's essay "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist
Feminism in the 1980s" (1985) is a deliberate attempt to blur the "natural" order wherein men
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take a dominant position in the sciences and women are closer to the natural and emotional
world. She celebrates female intervention in technology, offering a different stance to that of
the eco-feminist who would see science and technology as largely masculine/masculinist areas
which have been responsible for female oppression and the destruction of nature in the name
of technological progress. Haraway's cyborg transgresses the boundaries between
machine/organism, fact/fiction, imagination/socio-material reality, it is a hybridic
mythical/historical/scientific transformation which belongs to a "world without gender"
(Haraway in Kemp and Squires: 1997, p. 475). Haraway would argue that the cyborg is a new
form of political identity which transcends all boundaries and categories:
This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and
materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as reverent worship and
identification. Blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seriously. ... Blasphemy
protects one from the Moral Majority within, while still insisting on the need for community.
Blasphemy is not apostasy. Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even
dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together because both or all are
necessary and true. Irony is about humour and serious play. It is also a rhetorical strategy and a
political method, one I would like to see more honored within socialist feminism. At the center of my
ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg.
Haraway in Kemp and Squires: 1997, p. 474.
This voice seems to echo Foucaultian notions of boundlessness regarding identity whilst the
tone, despite the feminist content, is particularly reminiscent of Nietzsche's rhetorical and
ironic articulation of autonomous self-construction.
Whilst Haraway's cyberfeminism might be repudiating any claims that woman's identity is
more closely linked to nature and man's to culture, her deliberate irony and aestheticism can be
read as an obscure game rather than a serious engagement in politics. It seems that the more
complex and flexible the theory the more diffuse its polemical purpose. But Haraway
anticipates this criticism of non-relation to social, lived realities and sees her writing as an
attempt at epistemology and politics. Hoping to locate an area of unity, perhaps a politics of
recognition and acceptance, she sets up two corresponding lists showing the transition from
the "old hierarchical domination" such as the "Public/private", "Nature/culture" oppositions to
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"the scary new networks [she has] called the informatics of domination," specifically "Cyborg
citizenship" and "Fields of Difference" as replacements for the above. This is a common
movement, and one which we cannot reverse, but the cyborg is not passively constructed
within these new systems:
The cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self. This
is the self feminists must code.
Communications technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting our bodies.
These tools embody and enforce new social relations for women worldwide. Technologies and
scientific discourses can be partially understood as formalizations, that is, as frozen moments, of the
fluid social interactions constituting them, but they should also be viewed as instruments for enforcing
meanings.
Haraway in Kemp and Squires: 1997, p. 480.
It is clear that Haraway wants to move beyond notions of universality and essentialism, the
anti-science movement and out of what she considers to be the restrictive dualism of earlier
feminist thinking but this "go-with-the -flow" intellectualism is still, I would propose, a
difficult area, especially when we consider the recent public outrage in the late nineties
regarding Genetically Modified food products. Enough private voices have been raised
refusing this technology in our homes, fridges and bodies, and large public, corporate bodies,
such as Sainsbury's supermarkets, have reassured their customers that all GM foods have been
withdrawn from their shelves. The emergence of shelves and fridges devoted to organically
grown foods in large supermarket chains also suggests a reluctance on the part of many
consumers to allow the blurring of scientific and natural boundaries. Whilst Haraway
"would rather be a cyborg than a goddess", referring to the spiritualization of Eco-feminism in
the early to mid-eighties, it is clear that we are witnessing the emergence of an "eco-warrior"
who is demanding material/political results perhaps similar to that anti-technological
movement signalled by Marcuse amongst others in the mid-sixties (2).
The reality of the cyborg cannot be denied given the more positive technological advances
within medical practices. Haraway notes the blurring of the animal/human distinction pointing
to the hypothetical, as yet, vision of transplanting baboon hearts within human bodies. We
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have witnessed recently the real incorporation of mechanical hearts within the human body as
an interim measure to prolong life thus crossing the boundary between machine/human. A
mechanical heart can function, for a short time, bridging the gap between an individual's heart
failure and the transplant of another functioning human heart into that individual's body.
However hopeful these advances may be, I would argue that Haraway's intellectual, elitist
pluralism is not a political, materialist vision because its premise is not one which reshapes
reality, rather it is one which points towards utopia. A utopian vision may be ardent but by
definition it is a view of nowhere (Gk ou not & topos place). The existence of fluid sexualities,
and the notion that "gender is a continuum" is not in question but the insistence of recognition
from every perspective unsettles movements which have claimed some kind of marginal
discretion and this has problematic implications relating to political activism (3). Unlike Wolf
and Greer, Haraway is not about to point the way forward as regards challenging 'the beauty
myth' or how women should react positively to the ageing process (see Greer The Change:
Women, Ageing and the Menopause (1991). Nor would I offer her theories as a means to
counteract the anxieties suffered by young girls in the twenty-first century who are
concerned to avoid, at all costs, the negative exposure which was focused on Jade in this
Summer's 'Big Brother' programme (Channel Four, 2002). We cannot afford to ignore the
damaging effects of such media coverage if we are to provide safe passage for our society's
daughters.
Haraway, then, offers a critique of the metanarratives of science and politics; her position
constitutes a repudiation of the notion that the grand theories of science, nature and
philosophy reflect external truths. Rationalism is not grounded nor is it unitary, rather it is
fragmented and exists only across multiple language games which carry within them
their own internal rules. In terms of feminism, gender "can no longer be regarded as an
essential or even a stable category, nor can it be used to explain the practices of human
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societies as a whole. It is no longer legitimate to appeal to the category 'women' to ground a
metanarrative of political practice - even in the name of emancipation" (Waugh in Jackson and
Jones: 1998, p.185). This premise signals a move away from essentialism and theories of
difference, but it is problematic because it would follow that there are no truths relating to
female experience which can be used to explain oppression.
Lyotard utilises the same examples for de-legitimising classical scientific method in The
Postmodern Condition (1985); according to him the new sciences should replace those
discredited epistemologies and Cartesian Doubt should be replaced by Uncertainty. In the
postmodern age rational critique should be subjugated and the verification of hypotheses
through observable external phenomena is understood to be constantly undermined by the
notion of fictionality. The Uncertainty Principle of quantum physics, for example, blurs the
boundaries between aesthetic and scientific knowledge. A postmodern world is an
aestheticised world and science plays a direct part in this with its more recent emphasis on the
unseen. All this "impinges on" strong postmodern feminism, the problem being that if we
believe that all is fiction, if all is uncertain and immaterial, then we could be compromising the
project of liberation for actual material women who live in an actual material world (4).
In Jeanette Winterson's novel Gut Symmetries (1997) the central male character, Jove,
works on Grand Unified Theories: "that sought to unite the strong, weak, and electromagnetic
quanta in a sympathetic symmetry that would include gravity and overturn the
bolt-it-together-somehow methods of The Standard Model" (Winterson: 1998, p.9'7). Jove
criticises The Standard Model because he connects the theories of physics to human
relationships:
The attraction of the Model is that it recognises the symmetries of the three fimdamental forces, weak
force, strong force, electromagnetic force. Difficulties begin when these three separate forces are
arbitrarily welded together.
His wife, his mistress, met.
Winterson: 1998, p.97.
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This novel seems to be looking for answers to reality through the Greeks, Christianity,
Newton, Einstein, Darwin and the modern scientific theory of quantum physics. These theories
are threaded together with fantasy and narratives of beginnings, family and origin. The
dominant narrator is Alice, a scientist, and secondly Stella, a poet. When they meet they fall in
love. Alice's sense of self is clearly fragmented and unstable:
My self-esteem is a jigsaw I cannot complete. I get one part of the picture and the rest lies in pieces. I
suspect that there is no picture, only fragments. Other people seem to glue it together somehow and
not to worry that they have been using pieces from several different boxes. So what is the answer? Is
identity a deceit, a make-shift, and should we hurry to make any pattern we can? Or is there a
coherence, perhaps a beauty, if it were possible to find it? I would like to convince myself about
myself but I cannot. The best there is are days when the jigsaw assumes its own meaning and I no
longer care what picture is emerging. By that I mean I am unfrightened by the unexpected.
Winterson: 1998, p. 113.
The notion of the Superstring Theory which is repeated throughout calls into question all
stability and parallel universes are offered as possible alternatives in which to exist. An
understanding of quantum physics and wave functions also offers an alternative to the notion
that death is final (Winterson: 1998, pp. 160 & 161).
There is only one section where Jove is allowed a narrative voice and this is where he
justifies his cannibalistic consumption of Stella's body. Like Rochester's complaining voice in
Jean Rhys' Wide Sargasso Sea (1968), Jove explains his perception of his wife's madness: "I
was attracted to her energy without realising that it was a kind of craziness" (Winterson: 1998,
p.190). To Jove there is nothing mystical in life, only that which has not yet been explained.
He distances himself from the irrational in Stella which can imagine beyond the material:
My wife believed that she had a kind of interior universe as valid and as necessary as her day-to-day
existence in reality. This failure to make a hierarchy, this failure to recognise the primacy of fact,
justified her increasingly subjective responses. She refused to make a clear distinction between inner
and outer. She had no sure grasp either of herself or of herself in relation to the object. At first I
mistook this pathology as the ordinary feminine.
Winterson: 1998, p.191.
But Jove loses control, he fears the dissolution of subject and object in the imaginary. His need
to retain sanity results in him cutting himself because corporeal pain equals existence. The
material and the metaphysical, the rational and the irrational are constantly at play throughout
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this novel.
Helena Grice and Tim Woods argue that Winterson has appropriated postmodern debates
about the dissolution between science and art in order to express her own sense of postmodern
subjectivity:
Winterson has cannily latched on to the recent debates within theoretical physics as a means of
providing her with a central metaphor to describe her postmodern sense of the instability and
perpetual flux of the universe. In addition to Superstrings, Winterson has also appropriated the
terminology of Quantum Physics, the indeterminacy principle and the General Theory of Relativity, as
discourses allied to the postmodern discourse on epistemological insecurity and ontological instability.
Grice and Woods: 1998, p.118.
Materiality and rational thought, fragmentation and mergence, magic, religion, poetry, all are
brought together in a complex pattern in Winterson's novel. It is perhaps interesting that the
male scientist, Jove, is not a rigorous thinker; he is neurotic. Jove's weakness is seen through
his need to consume and possess and this would seem to undermine his scientific
methodology. It is the romance between Stella and Alice which is central. Winterson's familiar
themes of the love triangle and unstable sexual identities reflect postmodern uncertainty as
regards gender but whilst she appropriates the language of science, often as a metaphor for
love, Winterson's engagement with the new sciences is schematic and largely unresolved (5).
Whilst the female poet and the female scientist unite, there is still no room for a male scientific
rationale.
Haraway's cyborg offers a solution to the void created when feminists exile themselves
from the masculine dream of wholeness in Enlightenment theories. A hybrid creature, both
machine and organism, both real and fantastic, the cyborg would undermine the founding myth
of the Enlightenment that in the absence of a transcendent deity the dualisms of the mind/body,
consciousness/cosmos, art/science, custom/reason could be reconciled. Haraway will not allow
the differentiation between art and science, human and machine and yet "the cyborg promises
ultimate reconciliation in a postmodernist and posthumanist world" (Waugh in Jackson and
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Jones: 1998, p.187). Haraway reiterates Lyotard's renunciation of any possibility of
wholeness. In terms of feminist politics, she claims an emancipatory potential in the movement
from organicism to industrialisation, namely that the vast increase of information in our
postmodern age serves to explode the concepts of subjectivity and truth which have formerly
oppressed women. But we must question the efficacy of this notion in terms of ethics and
agency.
The cyborg is another example of the postmodern sublime. This otherness is problematic
for feminist politics because it romanticises the unrepresentable. The emphasis on a marginal
position only repeats patriarchal control although it is supposedly disguised as a liberationary
discourse. Haraway's and Lyotard's perspectival constructivism is posited as a more ethical
position that of the grand narrative, or totalising lcnowledges, but the view from
everywhere results in an ignorance or neglect of the constraints placed on our "actual being in
the world":
Moreover, without the capacity to stand back, to believe in the view from nowhere as a kind of
regulative principle underpinning our attempts to know and judge, we would be unable to
discriminate amongst different points of view. Postmodern hybridity, nomadism, fragmentation and
endless fictionality may seem to offer an escape route from biological, social and cosmic determinism.
However, if they preclude the possibility of discrimination between, and negotiation across, multiple
positions and discourses, then it is difficult to see how such a radical or strong postmodernism could
form the basis for any kind of politics, ethics or epistemology which assumes the necessity for the
personal and collective agency and responsibility.
Waugh in Jackson and Jones: 1998, p.188.
Waugh suggests that there might be a need to invest in grand narratives whilst being aware
that all knowledges are embedded in local and particular cultural traditions. Within the
particularity and situatedness of weak postmodernism we might be able to reach "a shared
structure of values, a sense of personal significance, and the possibility of belief in historical
progress through collective engagements which do not require foundations of truth or value"
(Waugh in Jackson and Jones: 1998, p.188). Objectivity (the view from nowhere) is thus
grounded "and combined with the perspective of the culturally situated and embodied subject."
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Within weak postmodernism the "fluid, disembodied and centreless subject" is no longer
regarded as a utopia (Waugh in Jackson and Jones: 1998, p.188). Waugh regards some
reconstructive postmodernism which emerges from hermeneutic critique as 'weak' because it
does not deny the possibility of agency or "the need to experience the self as a coherent and
consistent, if revisable entity". Also, some theories within this mode recognise "that ethics
requires a subject" (Waugh in Jackson and Jones: 1998, p.189) (6). However, other examples,
such as communitarian postmodern theory, seem 'strong.' Whilst the centreless cyborgian
theory still carries with it an insistence that truth and value are internal to the condition of a
particular community or framework, I would argue that relationality is not central to
Haraway's theory. A communitarian project would surely take account of the truth and value
of women's relationships within society as well as their positioning as regards socio-historical
and scientific narratives.
Seyla Benhabib's work on the relationship between feminist theory and politics and its
relation to postmodern aesthetics seems to offer a third position which can perhaps stabilise or
at least calm the rocking of the boat. In her introduction to Situating the Self: Gender,
Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (1992) Benhabib argues for what she
terms a "post-Enlightenment project of interactive universalism" (Benhabib: 1992, p.3). This
universalism would repudiate metaphysical Enlightenment claims of a "disembedded and
disembodied Subject" (Benhabib: 1992, p. 4) and incorporate in its place "an embodied and
embedded human self whose identity is constituted narratively" (Benhabib: 1992, p.6).
Benhabib argues for an interaction, rather than legislation, which would take account of
gender difference and contextual situatedness (Benhabib: 1992, p.3). She is interested to
justify "those contingent processes of socialization through which an infant becomes a person,
acquires language and reason, develops a sense of justice and autonomy, becomes capable of
projecting a narrative into the world of which she is not only the author but the actor as well"
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and to establish "a discursive, communicative concept of rationality" (Benhabib: 1992, p.5).
This discursive, communicative self, therefore, moves beyond a Foucaultian position because
she is not only able to reflect on but also to challenge her situatedness (Benhabib: 1992, p.8).
. Benhabib's theories include a moral and ethical code which enlarge upon the
Niezschean/Foucauldian premise of the individual because it dmts to take account of "the
standpoint of others" (Benhabib:1992, p.9). Within a communitarian perspective Benhabib
offers a critique of the notion of an "unencumbered self' (Benhabib: 1987, pp.10-13) and
makes a distinction between what she terms "the Generalized and the Concrete Other" (7).
Central to much feminist theory is the notion that women have been formerly enclosed within
the private and marginalised from the public spheres of experience. In the postmodern world,
however, women have found themselves crossing the borders between these two modes of
existence. In the latter part of the Twentieth Century women have begun to move daily
between different groups and communities in the world beyond home. Nevertheless, the
experience of the private and domestic sphere is bound to influence our behaviour in the public
domain (8).
Benhabib points out that "universal" theories of the moral self not only privatize and thus
exclude women's experience, they also view the moral self as "a disembedded and
disembodied being" who is concerned only with the standpoint of a "generalized other," who
is also disembedded and disembodied. These moral theories Benhabib terms "substitutionalist"
because, whilst they claim to be universal they come out of a specific group of subjects:
invariably white, male adults who are propertied or at least "professional" (Benhabib:1987,
p.81). She is concerned to articulate an "anticipatory-utopian critique" of the social
organization which comes out of this limited perspective and suggests an alternative mode
from a feminist perspective, to replace "substitutionalist" theory with "interactive"
universalism which takes account of multiple perspectives (Benhabib: 1987, p.81). Whilst the
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"generalized other" should not be discounted; "the recognition of the dignity and worthiness of
the generalized other is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition to define the moral
standpoint in modern societies, we must also include the standpoint of the "concrete other"
which is not disembedded but situated and "defines our relationships as private,
noninstitutional ones, concerned with love, care, friendship and intimacy" (Benhabib: 1987,
p.92).
Benhabib's utopian goal of interactive universalism is inclusive. This ethical theory is based
on the necessity that concrete subjects communicate with concrete others and enter into
dialogue with other situated selves in order to interpret and reflect upon needs and transform
cultural organizations which silence, or discount those needs. This is particularly important for
women because the privatization of female experience has silenced any attempt to give voice
to those needs and discounted any discussion which may have come out of reflection.
Consequently, the vision of autonomy and human identity cannot be fully integrated until we
have reached a fully integrated communicative concept of rationality which takes account of
the generalized and the concrete other. Benhabib recognises concerns about utopian thinking
which may result in either instrumentalism or else apathy as regards critique of the present
condition but these concerns should not lead to a rejection of the hope of achieving utopia. As
we have seen, weak postmodernism in its communitarian form is more attractive to feminists
such as Benhabib who would resist 'Uncertainty' because it threatens emancipatory ideals and
political action. Feminism in this form would contextualise theories of knowledge, embrace
Enlightenment principles of rationality and hold onto utopian notions of progress. This
feminist/rationalist stance necessitates a perspective from where we are and an image of that
world from the outside with ourselves in it. By contrast a strong deconstructive
postmodernism retreats from such utopian visions due to the deep sense of disillusionment
regarding a perfect society.
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Waugh makes the distinction between the "aesthetic fictions" where "there is no
responsibility for accurate depiction of historical reality" and the nowhere of objective
knowledge which should aim "to describe material realities" (Jackson and Jones: 1998, p.191).
Waugh suggests that feminists should be wary of strong postmodernism which denies this
distinction. Waugh refers to the fiction of Angela Carter and Jeanette Winterson where
"history may be deconstructed as an endless regress of mirrors or reinvented in fantastic
form":
The Nowhere of the aesthetic, however, may provide imaginary visions, but only the Nowhere at the
end of and guiding rational thought, can attempt to determine the historical consequences of their
actual realisation. For a feminist politics committed to the futures of actual women in the world, the
rather more earth bound and situated reason of weak postmodernism may complement the stronger
postmodernist impulses at work in experimental art and literature.
Jackson and Jones, 1998:191-192
Whilst Haraway would celebrate women's involvement in technology and Wolf would express
her anxiety because women are becoming less and less human, I would agree that the
aesthetics of Angela Carter, and to a lesser degree Jeanette Winterson, do complement a
postmodern feminist vision. Reading Carter and Winterson entails an encounter with fiction
which represents a non-rationalist space of the sublime; certainly, the material realities of
female experience are not the obvious focus of these texts which abound with grotesque
representations of the body. However, in terms of politics, my reading of these texts
(particularly Carter's) does not exclude the possibility of an appropriation for a feminist project
which would expose constructions of femininity, uncover the result of oppression and
encourage the need to rebel. Carter and Winterson seem concerned to kill off the 'Angel in the
House' and move towards an embrace of the monstrous in female form. Although I do not
have space to consider in depth the body of Carter's and Winterson's work, I feel that a brief
investigation of their fantastic, postmodern bodies is perhaps a positive place to end.
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Fantastic Bodies
My title "Fantastic Bodies" refers back to our discussion regarding cybernetics (the human /
machine) but will include here an investigation of a more organic hybrid (human / animal) as
explored particularly through the character of Fevvers in Carter's Nights at the Circus (1984).
I have become interested in the thematic connection between the fabulous characters created
by Carter and Winterson and how these can be appropriated within feminist readings. The
excessive, part-human creatures such as Mother, the many breasted scientist / goddess in
Carter's The Passion of New Eve (1977) and Fevvers, the giant aerialiste whose huge wings
are both a source of beauty and fascination, in Carter's later novel, I believe, give us a clear
insight into Carter's philosophy as related to the female body. Characters in Winterson's fiction
such as the web-footed protagonist Villanelle in The Passion (1987) and the giantess
Dog-Woman in Sexing the Cherry (1989) are also of interest to feminist readers especially
if we have been disappointed by the diseased body of Louise, the love-object in
Winterson's later novel Written on the Body (1996) (9). Theories regarding the function of
fantasy writing alongside those which comment on the role of folklore and the carnivalesque in
women's fiction might be particularly helpful to read alongside Wolfs more realist The Beauty
Myth (1991). I will also consider why it is that fictional characters such as Fevvers should be
so attractive and appealing to us. Why do these fantastic bodies invite such an affectionate
response despite their obvious lack of verisimilitude? How is it that the exaggerations of
fantasy writing can be disruptive?
Much critical reading of Carter and Winterson makes reference to the Russian philosopher
Mikhail Bakhtin whose writing on carnival, the grotesque body and dialogic theory will be of
use to us here. Lucie Armitt explains in Theorising the Fantastic (1996) that "Bakhtin's work
on carnival and the grotesque has been central to our understanding of the literature of the
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body as a political aesthetic" (Armitt: 1996, p.67). As feminist readers concerned with the
body there is much to be gained from a Bakhtinian reading of Carter and Winterson as Armitt
explains:
One particular strand of the dark side of the carnivalesque has recently flourished under the scrutiny
of feminist theory. Intrinsically concerned with the centrality of the body to subjectivity, sexuality and
the politics of power, feminist literary critics have frequently argued a case for the woman's existence
as monster under patriarchal law. Woman may be the body in society, but she is excluded or
marginalized by the body of society, even as she employs such carnivalesque processes for her own
revolutionary ends.
Armitt: 1996, p.70.
Mary Russo's writing on the female grotesque begins from an autobiographical perspective
explaining that a part of her upbringing was the teaching that "making a spectacle out of
oneself seemed a specifically feminine danger", the danger being that of exposure a "loss of
boundaries" (Russo in de Laurentis: 1988, p.213). She considers feminine masquerade in terms
of cultural politics and explains that the carnivalesque: "has translocated the issues of bodily
exposure and containment, disguise and gender masquerade, abjection, marginality, parody
and excess, to the field of the social constituted as a symbolic system" (Russo in de Laurentis:
1988, p.214). Thus the normal taboos surrounding the female body could be dissolved.
However, as Russo explains, early carnival both reinforced and undermined these taboos.
Women both disputed their place and invited contempt which served to further establish the
boundaries outside of carnival. Whereas Balchtin sees the unconstrained laughter and speech
associated with carnival as wholly positive, Russo points out that women risked becoming
further estranged from the centre of their communities; they became not only dangerous but
were also in danger. Bakhtin fails to recognise, for example, the fear and loathing stimulated
by the figure of the pregnant hag (10).
In Bakhtin "the individual body in excess" is used to explore "social, collective
significance" and to interrogate 'serious' mainstream political agendas" (Balchtin: 1984, p. 67).
Carnival is still commonly seen as "holiday excess" which flouts the limits and prohibitions of
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everyday existence and the restrictions imposed on populace by authoritarian bodies. Thus the
body and the pleasures of the flesh, dance, eroticism, music, and feasting, are brought back to
the centre. Laws, which normally keep the body under control are transgressed; the damned
challenge authority and the dominant, hegemonic social order with their profanity and
vulgarity (Bald-Ain: 1984, pp. 67-68). Bakhtin's writing on the material body within the
heritage of folk humour is excessive, exaggerated, fleshy. This is related, I believe, to the
characters of Carter's later novels.
The material bodily principle in grotesque realism is offered in its all-popular festive and utopian
aspect. The cosmic, social, and bodily elements are given here as an indivisible whole. And this whole
is gay and gracious.
In grotesque realism, therefore, the bodily element is deeply positive. It is presented not in a
private, egotistic form, severed from the other spheres of life, but as something universal, representing
all people. As such it is opposed to severance from the material and bodily roots of the world; it makes
no pretence to renunciation of the earthy, or independence of the earth and the body. We repeat: the
body and bodily life have here a cosmic and at the same time an all-people's character; this is not the
body and its physiology in the modern sense of these words, because it is not individualized. The
material body principle is contained not in the biological individual, not in the bourgeois ego, but in
the people, a people who are continually growing and renewed. This is why all that is bodily becomes
grandiose, exaggerated, immeasurable.
Bakhtin: 1984, p. 19.
The emphasis on fertility, abundance, the positive aspects of a collective, festive body, rather
than an isolated, individualised body can clearly be read in the extended, rather than nuclear,
family plots of Nights at the Circus (1984) and Wise Children (1991). Like Plath, Carter was
interested to embrace low culture and we can see clearly another connection here with
Balthin's theory:
The essential principle of grotesque realism is degradation, that is, the lowering of all that is high,
spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, the sphere of earth and body in their
indissoluble unity.
Balchtin: 1984, pp. 19-20.
In Bakhtin's essay "From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse" he claims that "there is no
unitary language or style in the novel" (Bakhtin in Lodge: 1988, p.131). The two myths that
are undermined by the historical evolution of novelistic discourse are that there is only one
language and that language is unified. At the end of this essay which traces the development
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from the classical period in Rome and Greece to Western literary consciousness in the Middle
Ages and the Renaissance, he suggests that the task which remains is to consider the impact of
speech genres in folk language on the formulation of the novel. I would argue that Carter has
been instrumental in continuing this project with her revision of the fairy-tale and her parody
of carnivalesque structures.
Nights at the Circus (1984)
The swan motif which appears at the climax of The Magic Toyshop (1967) is one which is
more centrally continued in Nights at the Circus. Fevvers the "Cockney Venus" is the voice
who opens this later novel. Carter describes this character as "Mae West with wings" (Carter
in Haffenden: 1985, p. 88) Like Helen of Troy, Fevvers explains that she was hatched "out of
a bloody great egg." She is an antipathy to Melanie with her bawdy language and hedonistic
life-style. The humour throughout this novel is a marked contrast to the menace and pathos in
The Magic Toyshop. We often find this bottle blonde gorging herself on food and drink and, at
six foot two and fourteen stone, she makes a contrasting figure to that thin, fragile, adolescent,
snow-white body in The Magic Toyshop: "The blond guffawed uproariously, slapped the
marbly thigh on which her wrap fell open and flashed a pair of vast, blue, indecorous eyes at
the young reporter." Inherited from her "putative father" she has wings which are most of the
time hidden under her clothing "where they made an uncomfortable looking pair of bulges,
shuddering the surface of the taut fabric from time to time as if desirous of breaking loose.
(Carter: 1994, pp. 7 & 8). (11)
Fevvers is interviewed by Walser at the tail end of the nineteenth century, a timid
young journalist whose mission it is to find out if she is "fact or fiction." She is a marvellous
spectacle, a survivor not a victim, and the message is always that one can look but not touch.
Walser is struck by her "physical ungainliness" and considers her "a lump" (pp. 16 & 17). He
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wonders why has she arms and wings and why has she a belly button if she was indeed
hatched. She narrates her scrapes and escapes from those who would exploit her or wish to
keep her prisoner. Left in a basket, adopted, protected and brought up in a whorehouse by
- Lizzie and Ma Nelson, her surrogate mothers, she learnt to fly. Later she tries to support her
family by earning her keep as a curiosity in Madame Schreck's "museum of woman monsters"
as "the only fully feathered intacta in the entire history of the world." (pp. 55 & 71) Even
when sold to Mr Rosencreutz for "the promise of hard cash" she escapes intact because she
will be no man's May sacrifice (p.83). Hence to the Circus where she performs as aerialiste, a
fabulous bird in a gilded cage (p.14 & 107).
When the circus rope is tampered with, Waltser witnesses the use of Fevvers' wings to
right her balance but also watches her come conventionally to earth down the ladder. This
event makes him realise that she is both marvellous creature and woman:
he was enchanted by the paradox: if she were indeed a lusus naturae, a prodigy, then - she was no
longer a wonder.
She would no longer be an extraordinary woman, no more the Greatest Aerialiste in the world but
- a freak. Marvellous indeed, but a marvellous monster, an exemplary being denied the human
privilege of flesh and blood, always the object of the observer, never the subject of sympathy, an alien
creature forever estranged.
She owes it to herself to remain a woman, he thought. It is her human duty. As a symbolic woman,
she has a meaning, as an anomaly, none.
As an anomaly, she would become again, as she once had been, an exhibit in a museum of
curiosities. But what would she become, if she continued to be a woman?
Then he saw she was pale under her rouge, as if recovering from real fear, and bundling herself in
her feathery cape as if it would warm her. She gave him a thin smile.
(p. 161)
The character of Walser, the journalist, is important because for a large part of the narrative
we see Fevvers only through his eyes. Only in the final stages of the novel, when the couple
are separated, does Fevvers begin to narrate her own story. In order to follow Fevvers'
company Walser has had to join the circus as a clown and becomes an apprentice of the
Colonel who promises a journey across Siberia. Walser becomes part of the "Dance of
disintegration; and of regression; celebration of the primal slime" (p.125). Kristeva's definition
of carnivalesque structure is interesting here when we consider Walser, not only as a clown,
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but also as the would-be author of Fevver's story:
A carnival participant is both actor and spectator; he loses his sense of individuality, passes through a
zero point of carnivalesque activity and splits into a subject of the spectacle and an object of the game.
Within the carnival, the subject is reduced to nothingness, while the structure of the author emerges
as anonymity that creates and sees itself created as self and other, as man and mask.
Kristeva: 1980, p. 78.
Walser himself becomes a hybrid of fact and fiction when he joins the circus:
When Walser first put on his make-up, he looked in the mirror and did not recognise himself. As he
contemplated the stranger peering interrogatively back at him out of the glass, he felt the beginnings
of a vertiginous sense of freedom that, during all the time he spent with the Colonel, never quite
evaporated; until that last moment when they parted company and Walser's very self, as he had known
it, departed from him, he experienced the freedom that lies behind the mask, within dissimulation, the
freedom to juggle with being, and, indeed, with the language which is vital to our being, that lies at
the heart of burlesque.
(p. 103)
The forward pointing reference to Walser's loss of self and madness is the result of the
Trans-Siberian Train crashing in the vast deserted snow-scape in which Fevvers' right wing is
broken and Walser is knocked unconscious, then buried alive. The circus survivors are
kidnapped by outlaws and Walser is left behind. He is later dug out by an escaped murderess
but abandoned because he has clearly lost his memory and his mind, his only words being
"Cock-a-doodle-do!" Covered in feathers and half-naked, he is "a sentient being, still, but not
a rational one; indeed he is all sensibility, without a grain of sense, and sense impressions alone
have the power to shock and ravish him" (p. 236). Walser is apprenticed by a shaman and
Carter explains that this part of the novel brings up questions of what is real and what not. Her
purpose is to deromanticize primitive tribal law, and to present shamanism as just another
epistemology: "every social system tends to denaturize people, it's one of the things about
living in groups; since you can't live on your own and retain your social identity, it's just one
more bit of the difficulty of being!" (Carter in Haffenden: 1985, pp. 88-89) Carter defends her
portrayal of Walser, he is not an object or a victim, rather she explains that she intended to
present him as being unable to maintain "the illusion of his own scepticism" :
his rather two-dimensional idea of himself- as the foreign correspondent, the person in control, the
permanent bystander, with the privileged marginality of the journalist - has to be broken down before
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he can become ... not a fit mate for Fevvers at all, but a serious person [...] he does become an object
[...] But nobody forces Jack Walser to behave as a human chicken. It is a systematic humiliation, but
it's not Fevvers who does it to him - it's life.
(pp. 89-90)
After the train crash, Lizzie and Fevvers leave the circus crew and set off alone, Fewers
determined to find her lost young American. To Lizzie's dismay Fewers decides she has fallen
in love and wants to marry and mate. She argues her case, despite Lizzie's warning that Walser
may not want to acquiesce:
Let him hand himself over into my safekeeping, and I will transform him. You said yourself he was
unhatched, Lizzie; very well - I'll sit on him, I'll hatch him out, I'll make a new man of him. I'll make
him into the New Man, in fact, fitting mate for the New Woman, and onward we'll march hand in
hand into the New Century -,
Lizzie detected a note of rising hysteria in the girl's voice.
(p.281)
Lizzie is concerned that she will give herself away, perhaps echoing our concerns for Melanie
at the end of The Magic Toyshop: "I raised you up to fly to the heavens, not to brood over a
clutch of eggs'" (p.282). But this denouement begins to offer a more positive vision of male /
female relationships; one in which the woman is not trapped. Fewers tries to convince Lizzie
that Walser's role as secretary, recording women's stories, can bring humanity into a new
mode as regards relationships between the sexes:
'The doll's house doors will open, the brothels will spill forth their prisoners, the cages, gilded or
otherwise, all over the world, in every land, will let forth their inmates singing together the dawn
chorus of the new, the transformed -'
(p.285)
Lizzie, the old witch with more foresight, is not convinced by Fewer's rapturous and utopian
hopes for the New Woman and indeed when the couple first reunite there are disturbing
reverberations of Melanie's coupling. Although Fewers has wrestled him to the ground, it is
he who has power over her. Under his gaze Fewers feels that she is being seen as "natural, but
abominable" (p.289) He sings "Only a bird in a gilded cage" to her in a voice which is "like
the very essence of madness" and she is afraid of losing herself: "She felt herself turning,
willy-nilly, from a woman into an idea" (p.289) (12). Fewers struggles for subjectivity,
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knowledge and mastery of her self:
In Walser's eyes, she saw herself at last, swimming into definition, like the image on photographic
paper; but, instead of Fevvers, she saw two perfect miniatures of a dream.
She felt her outlines waver; she felt herself trapped forever in the reflection in Walser's eyes. For
one moment, just one moment, Fevvers suffered the worst crisis of her life: 'Am I fact? Or am I
fiction? Am I what I know I am? Or am I what he thinks I am?
(p. 290)
Her only means of escape is to show her feathers but she knows with one broken wing and her
faded plumage that she is no splendid goddess However, when she is seen by Walser's
companions she knows that she has inspired them and this refreshes her spirits. She performs
and thus becomes herself, winning the heart of the reconstructed Walser.
Finally, we have reached a much more positive denouement regarding love and family. This
text ends with Fevver's contagious laughter when Walser asks why she wanted to convince
him that she was the "only fully-feathered intacta in the history of the world"?
She began to laugh.
'I fooled you, then!' she said. 'Gawd, I fooled you!'
She laughed so much the bed shook.
'You mustn't believe what you write in the papers!' she assured him, stuttering and hiccuping with
mirth. 'To think I fooled you!'
[...] Fevvers' laughter seeped through the gaps in the window-frames of all the houses in the village;
the villagers stirred in their beds, chuckling at the enormous joke that invaded their dreams, of which
they would remember nothing in the morning except the mirth it caused. She laughed, she laughed,
she laughed.
[...] The spiralling tornado of Fevvers' laughter began to twist and shudder across the entire globe, as
if a spontaneous response to the giant comedy that endlessly unfolded beneath it, until everything that
lived and breathed, everywhere, was laughing. Or so it seemed to the deceived husband, who found
himself laughing too, even if he was not quite sure whether or not he might be the butt of the joke.
Fevvers, sputtering to a stop at last, crouched above him, covering his face with kisses. Oh, how
pleased with him she was!
'To think I really fooled you!' she marvelled. 'It just goes to show there's nothing like confidence.'
(pp. 294-295)
The final word "confidence" marks a movement towards autonomy which "surmise" did not
suggest in The Toyshop.
In response to the laughing denouement of Nights at the Circus Marina Warner refers to
Bakhtin's account of "the survival of the risus pascalis, 'Easter laughter', medieval laughter,
blasphemous but permitted" (Warner in Sage: 1994, p.253). According to Balchtin, folk
humour belonged to the people, people were embraced and carried away by laughter; laughter
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became irresistible. Warner sees Carter's appropriation of carnival laughter as a political
response:
The irony is that Angela Carter clowned more and more over the length of her prolific career because
she saw, with her sharp-eyed mordancy, that in her struggle for change she was losing ground - that
through Thatcher's eighties and in the world they were creating, all too many were able to resist - by
turning a deaf ear to 'the truth of laughter' and much besides. She knew that humour was a last-ditch
stratagem, even an admission of defeat: this is the nub of the irony.
Warner in Sage: 1994, pp. 253-254
It is Carter's contagious, infectious humour and her refusal to ignore the problematic effect of
Thatcherite individualism which makes Carter's aesthetic feminist project important to the
modern reader. Carter's lowbrow, Rabelaisian, carnivalesque themes can be seen throughout
her work, from The Bloody Chamber (1979) to Wise Children (1991). In these texts women
are not afraid of their bodies and not afraid of their sexuality. She presents positive images of
ageing women who are not wringing their hands in despair like the woman in Plath's poem
"The Mirror" (1961). Like the fabulous phoenix in "Lady Lazarus" (1962), Fevvers rises from
the ashes of the burnt out toyshop, but not in order "to eat men like air."
I believe that there is still much ground to cover here. Carter must be read as a leading
feminist postmodern writer because in her later exploration of the postmodern sublime she
continues to explode patriarchal notions of femininity and embrace communitarian values
which would complement those more realist and equally important texts from de Beauvoir,
Greer and Wolf. The movement towards autonomy which can be traced through her fantastic
heroines marks a positive movement within her writing about females and their bodies.
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Conclusion
Perhaps, in this third wave of feminism, we can avoid further madnesses by re-addressing the
necessity for a shared vision. In my readings of fictional and non-fictional, fantastic and realist
texts, I feel I have uncovered a magic thread which might lead us safely out of the forest; a
common voice reminding us that we are not alone, that we have a responsibility towards one
another, and that, whilst we can imagine ourselves anyway we please, 'real women' exist in a
real world. In order to avoid being passively constructed as 'man-made' women, in order to
avoid being driven mad by that fabrication, we need to work out, individually and together,
who we are. It is my hope that our bodies can be both fantastic and real, that we can transcend
fictional patriarchal constructs whilst situating ourselves positively, in fiction and in society, as
women. Greer asked "What will you do?" at the end of The Female Eunuch (1969) and, in
relation to women's perception of themselves, Wolf asked "What will we see?" at the end of
The Beauty Myth (1991) because how we see ourselves will determine how we inhabit our
bodies and our world (Wolf: 1991, p.291). This is no less true in 2003. The problem of female
subjectivity is not resolved, but we must not give up the resolve to see together, to tell one
another that we are all beautiful, and to listen to one another's stories.
I believe that our aesthetic explorations of women's literature can offer us a wealth of
knowledge which gives us a much needed access into female consciousness. I began by
exposing notions of female 'madness' as a means of transcending those patriarchal concepts
which seek to harness women's relationship with their bodies, language and fantasy. I feel we
have ended on an equally political note in our attempts to address the postmodern sublime as it
relates to female subjectivity. Writing and reading about the body continues to be an important
aesthetic and polemical practice; we continue to politicise our imaginary and our real spaces as
we seek to reconcile the relationship between the body and the mind. Our imagined futures
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cannot realistically be aligned with the grotesque or cybernetic bodies we have latterly
encountered and yet these utopian visions have their place within postmodern, feminist politics
and literature.
- Carter embraced the notion of the female subject as both author and actor whilst
acknowledging the difficulty of that practice. At the end of her short story "The Flesh and the
Mirror" (1974) she asks: "[T]he most difficult performance in the world is acting naturally,
isn't it? Everything else is artful." (Carter: 1988, p.70) As long as we insist upon an autonmous
self-construction and become the authors and the actors in our real and imagined worlds then
surely we can embrace a fantastic, transcendent and an embodied, immanent notion of female
subjectivity. As we have seen in Mrs Dalloway and To the Lighthouse, Woolf was able to hold
in balance within the same texts her insistance on the need for everyday, communicative
relationships and the withdrawal of a transcendent, reflective self. Both are necessary. Also,
whilst critics may argue that Plath's transcendence in her final poems was both indicative of
her suicidal impulses and of her revelation as a true artist, we have seen Plath's importance as a
writer of shorter popular fiction which takes for its focus the lives of women in domestic
circumstances; clearly for Plath female subjectivity in its situated and embodied state was a
subject worth addressing in her work. It is also worth noting that her first drafts of the Ariel
poems were written on the back of the same paper she had used for her original manuscript of
The Bell Jar. This palimpsestic writing is, I believe, indicative of Plath's inclusion of the
transcendent and immanent themes which exist across the body of her work, if not in the same
published volumes.
It seems that we are constantly brought back to a celebration of the multiplicity of female
experience. The tendencies begun within my aesthetic readings of the work of our two main
writers here, Woolf and Plath, remain as central concerns within the postmodern sublime.
Transcendence may lead to freedom, to "madness", to death, even to suicide and, clearly, we
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cannot exist exist within a utopian and transcendent sublime. Therefore, as situated, emdodied
selves, what can we achieve by imagining ourselves beyond the material? Our postmodern
uncertainty is certainly related to our ontological insecurity and whilst materiality and
-relationality are part of our daily existence, the fantastic sexualisation of aesthetic vision can
also play its part in our feminist projects. Carter's playful celebration of the flesh, exaggerated
in the grotesque and sublime Fevvers is surely less nihilistic in its rebellion against
constructions of femininity than Gilman's narration of a heroine who has transcended the flesh
via a seeming descent into madness. If thinking beyond the real can lead to infectious laughter,
this seems a far more positive place to finish than a vision of infected minds. The aesthetic
practice of writing and reading about women's lives, however fantastic, must continue because
it continues to offer a means of healing or at least managing the crisis of female subjectivity.
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Notes
(1) See The Arts and Sciences of Criticism (1999), edited by David Fuller and Patricia Waugh.
This collection of essays considers from varying perspectives the debate between scientific and
aesthetic models of knowledge. Of particular interest is the borrowing of discourses practised
by critics and philosophers from these differing and yet increasingly related ways of knowing.
(2) See Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva's "ecofeminism" in Kemp and Squires: 1997, pp.
500-501.
(3) Waugh: 1992, pp.130-135.
(4) Waugh in Jackson and Jones: 1998, p.185.
(5) For other love triangle narratives in Winterson's work see The Passion (1987) and Written
on the Body (1992).
(6) Butler insists on a subject too. In relation to how she views Haraway's philosophical
ambition to transform notions of nature and things, her development of radical accounts of
ecology and technology and the premise that agency is not only human, Meijer and Prins
ask: "does your concept of 'abject' bodies leave room to include the possibility for
nonhuman bodies to come to 'matter'? Or does it remain restricted to the realm of what is
'liveable' as fully human?" Butler responds by saying that whilst she recognises the
importance of Haraway and has no problem with the notion of the "actor", she still wants
to work with the "subject" (Signs Vol. 23: 1998, pp. 285-286).
(7) This is fully developed in Feminism as Critique (1987) where Benhabib gives an account
of the controversy generated by Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice: Psychological
Theory and Women's Development (1982) written in response to Lawrence Kohlberg's
theories on moral development. Whilst Kohlberg's scoring system in relation to "the ethics
ofjustice and rights" indicated that women were under-developed compared to their male
counterparts he was not taking into account the difference of social situatedness, his focus
was on the public rather than the private domain.
(8) As we have seen elsewhere in this thesis, Patricia Waugh is also concerned to include an
alternative feminist model of identity relating to aesthetics, psychoanalysis and autonomy
theory in her work on postmodernism. Whilst not wishing to establish a theory of identity
which is "exclusive to women," she would partly endorse the notion that the female
experience is often a relational one and that should not be over looked. Waugh calls for a
recognition that all human beings are both connected and separate, that an insistence on
"separateness, impersonality, containment and pure reason" would only produce "divided
and deformed human beings":
The exclusion of gender from postmodern discussions has left its theorists largely blind to the
possibilities of challenging autonomy through a relational concept of identity. If women's identity has
tended, broadly and allowing for differences across this, to be experienced in terms which do not
necessarily see separation gained only at the expense of connection, one would expect some sense of
this to be expressed in discourses other than the theoretical and psychoanalytic. Women's sense of
identity is more likely, for psychological and cultural reasons, to consist of a more diffuse sense of the
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boundaries of self and their notion of identity understood in relational and intersubjective terms."
Waugh: 1993, p. 203.
(9) Through an employment of the framework of romance narrative based on a reading of
Barthes in Feminism and the Politics of Reading (1997) Lynne Pearce gives a reading of
Winterson which traces an initial falling in love or "ravissement" with the Winterson oeuvre
to a sense of loss, disappointment, grief, a falling out of love, which she experienced when
she came to read Written on the Body [See Roland Barthes - A Lover's Discourse:
Fragments (1978). Trans Richard Howard. Harmondsworth: Penguin]. Pearce's later essay
"The Emotional Politics of Reading Winterson" (in thice & Woods: 1998) is a revisiting of
that reading. This gradual disenchantment with Winterson's work as described by Pearce is
particularly relevant to my reading of the two authors as regards representations of the
female body. Whereas Carter moves towards a celebratory female subject, Winterson
moves away from the fantastic bodies of Villanelle in The Passion and Dog-Woman in
Sexing the Cherr-y towards the diseased and dying body of Louise in Written on the Body.
Certainly when I came to read this text I felt that I was reading an author to whom it was
becoming more difficult to relate. I felt alienated from Winterson and at the end of this
text; abandoned, cheated, confused. I was interested to find a similar response from Pearce.
(10) Russo refers to Natalie Davis article "Women on Top" (in Society and Culture in Early
Modern France (1965), Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 124-152). Russo also
relates the theory of the grotesque to French feminist semiotic theory whereby the female
body and the maternal body are celebrated as excessively desirable. See Kristeva's account
of the grotesque as parody in The Powers of Horror (1982) and Irigaray's parody and
mimetics in The Sex Which Is Not One (1985).
(11) All further references are taken from this edition.
(12) There are echoes here with Desiderio's description of "the miraculous Albertina"; the
central love-object in The Infernal Desire of Dr Hoffman (1972). In his introduction to
this 'autobiographical' narrative, which culminates with his murder of "the inexpressible
woman", Desiderio tells us "if Albertina has become for me, now, such a woman as only
memory and imagination could devise, well, such is always at least partially the case with
the beloved" (Carter: 1982, p13). The notion that the perfect woman is a fabrication born
out of male fantasy is also a theme which is explored by Carter in The Passion of New
Eve (1977). Tristessa, the Hollywood movie icon who has been the object of the
transsexual Eve/lyn's desire is ultimately revealed to be male at the climax of the novel.
Even at the sight of his hitherto hidden penis, Eve/lyn cannot see his fantasy as male:
I could not think of him as a man; my confusion was perfect - as perfect as the exemplary confusion of
the proud, solitary heroine who now underwent the unimaginable ordeal of a confrontation with the
essential aspect of its being it had so grandly abandoned, the implicit maleness it had never been able
to assimilate into itself.
That was why he had been the perfect man's woman! He had made himself the shrine of his own
desires, had made of himself the only woman he could have loved! If a woman is indeed beautiful
only in so far as she incarnates most completely the secret aspirations of man, no wonder Tristessa
had been able to becomes the most beautiful woman in the world, an unbegotten woman who made no
concessions to humanity.
Tristessa, the sensuous fabrication of the mythology of the flea-pits. How could a real woman ever
have been so much a woman as you? Carter: 1982, pp. 128-129.
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